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P R E F A C E

Volume 11 contains works written by V. I. Lenin in the period from June 1906 to January 1907. The majority of them are devoted to questions connected with the activities of the Social-Democratic Group in the First State Duma, the dissolution of the Duma and the beginning of the election campaign for the Second Duma.

The articles "Lessons of the Moscow Uprising", "Hands Off!" and "Guerrilla Warfare" are devoted to problems of the organisation and tactics of an armed uprising.

In the articles "The Declaration of Our Group in the Duma", "Who Is for Alliances with the Cadets?", "Yes-Men of the Cadets", "The Political Crisis and the Bankruptcy of Opportunist Tactics", "The Dissolution of the Duma and the Tasks of the Proletariat", Lenin exposes the Menshevik tactics of support for a Cadet Duma and of the slogan of a Duma Cabinet composed of Cadets, gives a political appraisal of the dissolution of the First Duma and formulates the tasks of the Party in this period.

The writings "The Social-Democrats and Electoral Agreements", "A Dissenting Opinion", recorded at the November All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., "Draft Election Address", "Blocs with the Cadets", "The Social-Democrats and the Duma Elections", "When You Hear the Judgement of a Fool"... (From Notes of a Social-Democratic Publicist)", are devoted to questions concerning the election campaign for the Second Duma.

The articles "An Attempt at a Classification of the Political Parties of Russia", "Socialist-Revolutionary Mensheviks" and "Philistinism in Revolutionary Circles" are devoted to a class analysis of the Russian political parties.

This edition of Lenin's *Collected Works* includes for the first time the leaflet "Whom to Elect to the State Duma", the note on the "Union of the Bund with the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party" and the article "The Working-Class Party's Tasks and the Peasantry", which expounds the Bolsheviks' main slogan in the election campaign, for complete independence of the class policy of the proletariat and the impermissibility of blocs with the Cadets.

ON THE EVE¹

The political situation is becoming clear with amazing speed.

Some months ago it was impossible to say with any certainty whether the State Duma would meet or what it would be like. A few weeks ago it was still unclear, to the broad mass of the people at least, in what field and in what form the next stage of the struggle for freedom would develop. The simple-minded peasants believed in the Duma; they could not admit of the idea that the eloquent requests and statements of all the representatives of the people would have no result. The bourgeois liberals, who were trying to induce the government to make concessions out of "*good will*", believed in the Duma. It would be no exaggeration to say that in a few days their faith was shattered before our eyes, the faith of the mass of the people, all of whose interests nurtured and strengthened this belief. They believed because they wanted to believe, they believed because the immediate political future was still dark, they believed because the political twilight left room for every kind of ambiguity, wavering and depression.

Now everything has again become clear. The foresight of people who were thought to be eccentric pessimists in the period of the elections to the Duma and during the first days of the Duma has been vindicated. The Duma has been sitting only five or six weeks and already people who have been whole-heartedly endeavouring to devise and develop activities in the Duma and around the Duma are frankly and honestly admitting the great fact: "How tired the people are of waiting."

For decades they did not become tired of waiting, but now they have become tired after a few weeks; they were not tired of waiting while they were asleep or vegetating, while the external circumstances of their lives contained nothing directly changing their existence beyond recognition, their mood, their consciousness, their will. They have become tired of waiting after a few weeks, now that the thirst for action has awakened in them with incredible rapidity, and the most eloquent and sympathetic words, even from such a lofty platform as the Duma, have begun to seem dreary, boring and uninteresting. The workers have become tired of waiting—the wave of strikes has begun to mount higher and higher. The peasants have become tired of waiting; no persecutions and tortures, exceeding the horrors of the medieval Inquisition, can stop their struggle for the land, for freedom. The sailors in Kronstadt and Sevastopol have become tired of waiting, as well as the infantrymen in Kursk, Poltava, Tula and Moscow, the guardsmen in Krasnoye Selo, and even the Cossacks. All now see where and how a new great struggle is flaring up, all realise its inevitability, all sense the absolute need for the actions of the proletariat and peasantry to be staunch, steadfast and well-prepared, and that these actions should be simultaneous and co-ordinated. They feel that it is necessary to wait for this.... We are on the eve of great historical events, we are on the eve of the second great stage of the Russian revolution. The Social-Democrats, who consciously express the class struggle of the proletariat, will stand at their posts to a man, and will perform their duty to the end.

Rabotnik, No. 1,
June 8 1906
Signed: N. Lenin

Published according to
the *Rabotnik* text

WAVERING ABOVE, DETERMINATION BELOW

It is quite evident that we are now passing through one of the most important periods of the revolution. Signs of a revival of the broad, mass movement against the old order have been visible for a long time. Now this revival is reaching its climax. The Duma elections and the first week of the sessions and activities of the opposition Duma acted as a "farthing dip" which ignited the conflagration throughout the country. The quantity of inflammatory material was still so vast, and the atmosphere was still so "heated", that no precautionary measures could be of any avail.

And now it is becoming absolutely obvious to everyone that the conflagration has really spread throughout the country. The rising has spread to quite new strata, both of the proletariat—including even those who only six months ago provided recruits for the Black Hundreds—and, particularly, of the peasantry. The army, which is connected with the most backward sections of the peasantry, and whose ranks are carefully combed so as to get rid of, destroy and suppress all that is fresh and virile—even the army has proved to be almost entirely engulfed in the flames. News of "revolts" and outbreaks among the armed forces is flying in from all sides, like sparks from a great fire.

Newspaper reporters who have some connection with the bureaucracy report that the Minister of War has uttered a warning against dissolving the Duma, for in that case he could not rely upon the army.

Under these circumstances, it is no wonder the government is wavering. It is true nevertheless that, although wavering, the government is preparing very definitely to

crush the revolution by bloodshed. Provocation is increasing. A war to the death has been declared on the free press. The Left newspapers "are being confiscated in defiance of all laws". Kronstadt is inundated with special troops. The pogrom in Belostok marked the opening of counter-revolutionary operations, and armed operations at that. The government is wavering; warning voices are heard from its ranks, voices recommending a deal with the Cadets. But this wavering, this "pause for reflection", is not causing the government for a moment to forget the old, customary, and well-tried policy of naked violence.

Lassalle said that reactionaries are business-like people. Our reactionaries are proving that this is true. They are reflecting, weighing things up, wavering, in doubt as to whether to start a general offensive on the new line (i.e., by dissolving the Duma) at once, or not. But they are *preparing* for an offensive, and are not pausing in this "business" for a single moment. From the point of view of robbers around whose necks the noose is being drawn ever tighter, they are reasoning correctly. Shall we yield to the Cadets, who promise a "strong government", or take reprisals by fire and sword? Their decision today is: we need be in no hurry to adopt the first alternative, *that* can be done at any time in the future; but in any case we must prepare to adopt the second alternative. No doubt many of them also reason in the following way: let us first try the second alternative and choose the most opportune moment for it. We can yield to the Cadets at the last moment, when we are absolutely convinced that it is impossible to restore *everything* by wholesale bloodshed!

As robbers, they are reasoning quite correctly. Obviously, they will not surrender without a desperate and ruthless fight. Meanwhile, of course, they are preparing a line of retreat—in case things turn out badly—in the shape of a deal with the Cadets, an alliance with them on the platform of the "strong government" about which Mr. Struve so opportunely reminds them. The reactionaries are preparing for a stern and decisive battle, and they regard a deal with the Cadets as a minor result of an unsuccessful battle.

The proletariat must weigh up the tasks of the revolution soberly and squarely. As regards handling big problems, it

is no less "business-like" than the reactionaries. It must concentrate all its attention, all its cares and all its efforts on the decisive battle inevitable tomorrow or the day after—and regard a deal between the government and the Cadets as a by-product of one of the possible stages of the revolution. The proletariat has nothing to fear from such a deal; both the Trepovs and the moderate liberals will come to grief over it. But the proletariat must not under any circumstances, directly or indirectly, support such a deal, support the demand for a responsible Cabinet representing the majority in the Duma. We need not now *prevent* this deal; but we shall not support it. We shall pursue *our own* road. We shall continue to be the party of the advanced class, which will *not* issue to the masses a *single* ambiguous slogan, which will not, directly or indirectly, have any truck whatever with any of the sordid dealings of the bourgeoisie, and which will be able to protect the interests of the revolution under all circumstances, whatever the outcome of the struggle.

A compromise between the government and the Duma is by no means impossible as one of the *specific* episodes of the revolution. The Social-Democrats must neither advocate, support nor "shatter" such a compromise at the present time. They must concentrate all their attention, and the attention of the masses, on the main and essential thing and not on secondary and side issues. They will take the utmost advantage of every compromise between the bourgeoisie and the old regime, of all the wavering above. But they will consistently warn the working class and the peasantry against the "friendship" of the Cadets. To the wavering above they must oppose invincible determination below and, not yielding to provocation, must firmly and persistently gather their forces for the decisive moment.

UNITY!

The Social-Democratic Group in the State Duma is on the eve of taking action. Undoubtedly, this Group can now render the cause of the working-class movement and of the revolution a great service by its bold and consistent utterance, by proclaiming with unmistakable clarity the demands and slogans of *consistent* democracy and of the *proletarian* class struggle for socialism. Now that the question of Social-Democratic action in the Duma has been decided by the Unity Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, there can be no two opinions among Social-Democrats about this. And we think that our Caucasian comrades were quite right to sign the notorious "solemn pledge" of the members of the State Duma² and to state in the press in this connection that "we are signing this in order to be able to fulfil the mission with which the people have entrusted us, and we emphasise that the only political obligations we recognise are obligations to the people".

The more important the actions of our representatives in the State Duma become for the Party, the more carefully must we weigh the principles of Social-Democratic tactics at the present time. It must be admitted that the course of political events, which has become exceptionally rapid in the past few weeks, throws considerable light on questions which only yesterday were still unclear; it helps us clearly and precisely to define our position, and removes many of the disagreements between the Right and Left wings of our Party.

In this connection we are particularly pleased to emphasise the arguments of former Menshevik comrades in today's issue of *Kuryer*.³ True, the leading article, "Duma

'Laws"', starts with a somewhat ambiguous protest against describing the drafting of laws for the Duma as useless chatter; but it turns out that the comrades had good reason for putting the word "laws" in inverted commas. They support—and they are a thousand times right in doing so—the drafting of laws that will not be laws in the ordinary sense, but "declarations" that "proclaim the right of the people to freedom", "proclaim the abolition of the old barriers".

Perhaps it would be more correct to call such "laws", not laws, but appeals to the people. But it would be unreasonable to stress disagreements on terminology when agreement prevails on the main issue. And on this, agreement is actually complete. "It is absolutely absurd and *harmful*," writes *Kuryer*, "to submit to the Duma Bills carefully drawn up in minutest detail, with scores and hundreds of paragraphs, remarks and so forth" (all italics ours). Quite so. Such activities, customarily called "constructive" are certainly *harmful*. They are harmful "because instead of presenting striking contrasts that everyone can see, such Bills *hopelessly confuse* the mind of the public with a welter of clauses and paragraphs".

This is quite true. The mind of the public is indeed *hopelessly confused* with the welter of "constructive" legislative project-mongering. This project-mongering obscures, blunts and corrupts the mind of the public, for "in any case, these laws will never be put into operation. Before that can be done, *power must be wrested* from the hands of those who now hold it. And this power can be wrested from those hands *only* by a popular movement that will put in the place of the Duma itself a *far more powerful and democratic institution*, which will not be obliged to reckon with the 'laws' drawn up by the Duma." This statement shifting public attention to the absolute necessity of wresting power and of establishing a "far more powerful" institution that will not reckon with the laws drawn up by the Cadet Duma, very correctly appraises the fundamental tasks of the revolutionary proletariat and the requirements of the present situation.

In this same article, the comrades of *Kuryer* brilliantly trounce the Cadets for failing to understand these tasks. The Cadets draft their Bills "like real legislators, forgetting

that *they have not even a farthing's worth* of real legislative power". "They draft their 'Bills' as if the courts tomorrow will have to try citizens according to the new Cadet laws."

Kuryer tells the Cadets that their position is disgraceful. There is only one conclusion to be drawn from this thrice correct admonition, and that conclusion suggests itself. Revolutionary Social-Democrats cannot and must not support the demand for the appointment of a responsible Cabinet representing the majority in the Duma! For such a Cabinet will be a Cadet Cabinet, and on *the very morrow* of its appointment it will have to draw up penalties for abuses of freedom. At the present time, when the Star Chamber⁴ is still the power in the land, such a Cabinet can only serve as a liberal screen for the old regime. At the present time, such a Cabinet would only serve as a new cloak to conceal these same pogrom-mongers for a time! We should, of course, very soon expose this disguise. We shall take the utmost advantage of the new situation when it arises, when not only the old regime, but the Cadets, too, are entangled in this new cloak and are overwhelmed by the tide. But we, the party of the proletariat, must not, directly or indirectly, avowedly or tacitly, assume the slightest responsibility for this attempt to disguise the old regime. We must not issue to the masses the slogan of supporting the demand for the formation of a responsible Cabinet representing the majority in the Duma. Whatever our intentions, owing to the objective conditions of the present political situation such a slogan will inevitably mean that the party of the proletariat will have to bear part of the responsibility for this disguise, for this deal between the bourgeoisie and the old regime. Such a slogan will indirectly imply approval of the Cadet "Bills" that are so excellently criticised in *Kuryer*; for indeed it cannot be denied that there is a connection between the Cadets' plan to punish abuses of freedom and their plan to obtain, in the shape of a Cabinet, a modicum of power for applying these penalties; to obtain a modicum of power *from* the old regime, *for* the strengthening of the old regime, *by means of a deal* with the old regime, in the shape of a screen shielding it from the onslaught of the people *against* it.

The workers' party needs no such slogan. It will be able to carry on all its propaganda and agitation activities among the masses and build up wide organisations far better, far more integrally, systematically and boldly without such a slogan, by countering the effrontery of the pogrom-mongers and the "Bills" of the Cadets by means of our Social-Democratic "decrees", "proclamations" and appeals to the people through the medium of the Social-Democratic Group in the Duma (and, under certain conditions, of the Trudoviks acting in conjunction with it), and lastly, by issuing those "calls to the people to form a popular militia, which alone will be capable of protecting their lives and honour"—the calls that we recommended in *Vperyod*,⁵ No. 9,* which are recommended by *Volkszeitung*,⁶ the organ of the Bund, and of which *Kuryer* quite rightly approves.

Let us have unity, comrades! The unity of the political actions of the proletariat is growing with irresistible force, under the pressure of the whole revolutionary atmosphere. Let us not hinder this unity by introducing unnecessary and controversial slogans into our tactics. Let us take advantage of the present opportunity to secure complete agreement among all Social-Democrats at this moment, which will perhaps prove to be a supreme moment in the great Russian revolution!

Vperyod, No. 14,
June 10, 1906

Published according to
the *Vperyod* text

* See present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 510-11.—*Ed.*

THE DUMA AND THE PEOPLE

The speech delivered by Comrade Ramishvili, the Social-Democratic Deputy in the State Duma, contains some very true observations that correctly define Social-Democratic tactics. The speaker not only denounced the government of pogrom-mongers with the vigour of a genuine representative of the proletariat, he not only branded the representatives of the government as "enemies of the people"—and the new attempt of the Cadet Chairman of the Duma to restrict freedom of speech evoked the legitimate protest of the extreme Left—but in addition, in concluding his speech, he raised the general question of the relation between the Duma and the people.

This is what the Social-Democratic Deputy said on this question:

"I conclude by stating that we are backed by the people. Outside something is going on that is entirely different from what we are doing here in this Chamber. The atmosphere outside is entirely different. Here it is much milder; here a more *peaceful* mood prevails. In a month from now, perhaps, *we ourselves will be deciding our affairs....* The facts of life speak *much more loudly* about what is going on around us than we do here. I say that we are standing between the government and the people. The Duma is a *dangerous spot*. To go to the Left or to the Right means *conciliation with someone*, or a rupture with someone.... You must not forget that the *people themselves will obtain* what the Duma cannot obtain owing to its *wavering and lack of determination*. I say that the people are in a different mood from that which prevails here...."

We have italicised the particularly important passages in this speech. The speaker quite rightly said that the facts of life speak *much more loudly* than the Duma does; that the atmosphere outside is not as "*peaceful*", and that "*the*

people are in a different mood". That is undoubtedly true. And the deduction that follows from this truth is that those who say that the people must support the Duma are wrong. The people are already ahead of the Duma, are speaking louder, are less peacefully inclined, *are fighting more vigorously*. Hence, the only correct definition of the task of the Social-Democrats is: to explain to the widest possible mass of the people that the Duma only *timidly and inadequately* expresses the demands of the people. *Only* such a formulation of Social-Democratic tactics relieves the party of the proletariat of responsibility for the instability of the Cadets. Only such a formulation, which fully allows for the degree of development of the political consciousness, determination and preparedness of the peasant masses, adequately conforms to the great tasks of the present moment, a moment concerning which the elected representatives of the Social-Democratic proletariat bluntly say: "In a month from now, perhaps, we ourselves will be deciding our affairs." To be able to *decide* them, however, we must at once completely dissociate ourselves from all either dishonest or unwise attempts to seek a "peaceful" solution.

Comrade Ramishvili was quite right when he declared from the rostrum of the Duma: "The Duma is a dangerous spot." Why? Because it displays "wavering and lack of determination". And at a time when, in a month from now, perhaps, the people themselves will have to decide their affairs, wavering and lack of determination is positively criminal. Whoever displays these qualities *at such a time will inevitably* find himself in an extremely false position, no matter how sincere his intentions may have been. It does not depend on our will that at such a moment all the economic and political conditions surrounding us inevitably give rise to a decisive struggle between the people and the old regime. Whoever wavers in face of this impending struggle will, indeed, have to choose between the alternative of "*conciliation with someone or a rupture with someone*". This is exactly the position that the Cadets are in. The liberal bourgeoisie is reaping what it has been sowing for years by its double-faced and vacillating policy, and by its desertions from revolution to counter-revolution. Conciliation with the old regime means a rupture with the fighting people.

A rupture with the old regime is what would be essential for conciliation with the fighting people.

The majority in the Duma has been doing everything to make its position clear in this inexorable choice. Every step this Cadet, and sometimes even worse than Cadet, majority takes in its policy is in preparation for a rupture with the fighting people, preparation for conciliation with the old regime. These steps are small ones, we shall be told. But they are real steps in real politics, we shall reply. These steps conform to all the fundamental class interests of the liberal bourgeoisie. And the *Cadets'* demand for a Duma Cabinet appointed by the old regime bears precisely this "peaceful" character.

We shall never tire of repeating that it would be stupid and harmful for the workers' party to support this demand. Stupid, because the only thing that is really weakening the old regime is the struggle of the people, who are going further than the timid Duma. Harmful, because it will sow deception and confusion in the minds of the people. Yesterday we pointed out that the comrades of *Kuryer* were right in stating that the Bills drafted by the Cadets were stupid and harmful.* Today it is to be regretted that these same comrades are advocating support for a Duma Cabinet, that is to say, a Cabinet that will carry through these stupid and harmful Bills!

Perhaps we shall examine these vacillations of *Kuryer* in greater detail another time. For the time being, it will be sufficient to point to them; the very fact that there is wavering at an important moment like the present shows that the position of the waverers is extremely precarious.

* See pp. 20-23 of this volume.—Ed.

THE FIGHT FOR POWER AND THE "FIGHT" FOR SOPS

It is common knowledge that already in its programme the Social-Democratic Party expressed the unshakable conviction that really to satisfy the urgent needs of the mass of the people *all power must be in the hands of the people*. If the mass of the people do not have the *entire* state power in their hands, if any organ of power not elected by the people, not liable to dismissal, and not entirely dependent on the people, is allowed to remain, it will be *impossible* really to satisfy the urgent and universally admitted needs of the people.

The Social-Democratic Party has always exerted every effort to spread this indisputable truth among the proletariat and among the whole people. The real, that is, the mass struggle for freedom has always passed, and always will pass, through the most varied and often unexpected stages. It cannot be otherwise owing to the enormous difficulties of the struggle, the complexity of its tasks and the changes taking place in the ranks of the fighters. In guiding the proletarian struggle at every stage in its development and under all circumstances, the Social-Democratic Party, as the conscious champion of the aspirations of the working class, must constantly bear in mind the general and fundamental interests of this struggle as a whole. Social-Democracy teaches us not to forget the general interests of the working class for the sake of particular interests; not to allow the specific features of the individual stages of the struggle to cause us to forget the fundamental aims of the struggle as a whole.

This is how the revolutionary Social-Democrats have always conceived their tasks in the present Russian revolution; and this conception alone is in accordance with the position and tasks of the proletariat as the advanced class. On the other hand, in conformity with the specific class interests of the bourgeoisie, the liberal bourgeoisie has always formulated its tasks in the struggle for political freedom quite differently. The bourgeoisie needs political freedom, but it is afraid to allow the people to have full power, because the proletariat, developed and united in the course of the struggle, would use this power of the people against the bourgeoisie. Hence, while striving for political freedom, the bourgeoisie nevertheless wants to retain a number of survivals from the old regime (the standing army, a non-elected bureaucracy, and so forth).

The proletariat's struggle for political freedom is *revolutionary*, because its object is to secure complete democracy. The bourgeoisie's struggle for freedom is *opportunist*, because its object is to obtain sops, to divide power between the autocracy and the propertied classes.

This fundamental difference between the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and the opportunist struggle of the bourgeoisie can be traced through the whole history of our revolution. The proletariat is fighting, the bourgeoisie is stealing its way into power. The proletariat is shattering the autocracy by its struggle; the bourgeoisie clutches at the sops thrown to it by the enfeebled autocracy. Before the whole people the proletariat holds on high the standard of struggle; the bourgeoisie raises the flag of minor concessions, deals and haggling.

The proletariat takes advantage of every breach, every weakening of the regime, every concession and sop in order to wage a more extensive, more determined, more intense and more mass struggle; the bourgeoisie uses them to cause the struggle gradually to calm down, weaken and die out, to curtail its aims and moderate its forms.

Let us review some of the stages of our struggle for freedom. The bourgeoisie "fights" to compel the government to show confidence in the Zemstvo⁷ ("Rights and an Authoritative Zemstvo") and in the people (at the beginning of the present decade). The proletariat unfurls the banner of

the struggle to overthrow the autocracy. The government proclaims an era of "confidence"⁸ (Svyatopolk-Mirsky). The bourgeoisie pours out a flood of speeches at banquets; the proletariat forces new breaches in the citadel of tyranny, dying in the streets on the 9th of January,⁹ and starting a huge strike movement.

The summer of 1905. The bourgeoisie sends a deputation to plead for liberties. In the autumn the Bulygin Duma¹⁰ is granted. The bourgeoisie is moved to tears of gratitude. A general cry goes up: to the Duma! The opportunist Social-Democrats waver. The proletariat continues to fight. A strike wave such as the world has never seen before spreads over the whole country and sweeps away the Duma. The proletariat seizes freedom and defends it with its blood against the encroachments of the autocracy.

In the first battle the proletariat is defeated. The bourgeoisie spurns the vanquished and slavishly clutches at the Duma. The proletariat gathers its forces for a fresh onslaught. It continues proudly to hold on high the banner of the struggle for complete democracy. But the onslaught could not be accomplished before the convocation of the Duma. The bourgeoisie once again grovels, throws overboard the slogan of a constituent assembly, froths at the mouth against "actions" and advocates conciliation, coming to terms, and the appointment by the supreme authority of a Cadet Cabinet.

The proletariat takes advantage of the new situation just as it did of the period of "confidence" in 1904, and of October 17, 1905.¹¹ It performs its revolutionary duty and does all in its power to sweep away the Witte Duma¹² as it swept away the Bulygin Duma. But it is unsuccessful, owing to the treachery of the bourgeoisie, and the inadequate organisation and mobilisation of the working class and peasantry. The proletariat continues the fight, *utilising* all the "Duma" conflicts and the conflicts around the Duma as points of departure for a wider and more determined mass movement.

A new struggle is developing. No one denies this. The proletarians, the peasants, the urban poor, the soldiers, etc., are rising in much greater masses than before. No one denies that this will be a struggle outside the Duma. Owing to the objective conditions of the present situation, it will

be a struggle directly aimed at the destruction of the old regime. To what extent it will be destroyed, no one can foretell. But the proletariat, as the advanced class, is striving with greater determination than ever for complete victory in this struggle, for the complete abolition of the old regime.

And the proletariat remains consistent, rejecting the opportunist slogans of the bourgeoisie which have misled a certain section of the Social-Democrats. It is not true to say that the appointment of a Cadet Cabinet means "wresting power" from the hands of the camarilla. That is a bourgeois lie. As a matter of fact the appointment of such a Cabinet at the present time will be a new liberal screen for the camarilla. It is not true to say that the appointment of a Cadet Cabinet will transform the fictitious constitution into a real one. That is a bourgeois lie. As a matter of fact such a Cabinet will merely enable the autocracy to cover itself with a new cloak of pseudo-constitutionalism. It is not true to say that the demand for a Cadet Cabinet is being taken up by the whole people. That is a bourgeois lie. As a matter of fact it is only being demanded by the Cadet Duma. The fact that non-Cadets are echoing it is due only to a misunderstanding, for they think it means much more than it actually does. The demands of the *whole people* are in fact much more drastic than the demands of the Cadet Duma. Lastly, it is also not true to say that "supporting" the demand for a Cadet Cabinet (or, what amounts to the same thing, supporting a Cadet Cabinet) with the aid of resolutions, instructions to deputies, and so forth, means actually fighting the old regime. That is a bourgeois lie. For the proletariat, such "support" would simply mean abandoning the struggle, handing over the cause of freedom to the wavering liberals.

The proletariat is fighting, and will continue to fight, to destroy the old regime. Towards this end it will direct all its propaganda and agitation, and all its efforts to organise and mobilise the masses. If it fails to destroy the old regime completely, it will take advantage even of its partial destruction. But it will never advocate partial destruction, depict this in rosy colours, or call upon the people to support it. Real support in a genuine struggle is given to those

who strive for the maximum (achieving something less in the event of failure) and not to those who opportunistically curtail the aims of the struggle *before the fight*.

Those who are not dazzled by flashy phrases will easily see that the people will *actually* fight, not for a Cadet Cabinet, but to abolish the old regime. It is in the interests of the bureaucracy to *diminish* the real scope of this struggle. It is in the interests of the proletariat to *expand* and intensify it.

Vperyod, No. 17,
June 14, 1906

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THE DECLARATION OF OUR GROUP IN THE DUMA¹

No Social-Democrat can have any doubt now that in the present situation the pronouncements of our Party members in the Duma could be of great value to the cause of the proletariat and of the whole people.

We welcomed the election victories of our Caucasian comrades.* We regard it as our duty to note their successes in the Duma and to criticise—in a business-like way—their mistakes.

As one of their successes we consider Comrade Ramishvili's speech on the "danger" and "peacefulness" of the Duma. Another success was his resolution on the Belostok pogrom¹⁴; yet another his excellent criticism of the Cadets' Public Meetings Bill and the correct formulation of the question of Cadet project-mongering in general. We hope to discuss these successes with our readers in greater detail another time.

As one of the mistakes we consider the silence of our Social-Democrats in the Duma when Aladyin "swallowed" Nabokov's mutilation of the resolution on the food question.¹⁵ The Social-Democrats ought to have protested and moved their own resolution. Another mistake was Comrade Gomarteli's speech in reply to the hypocrite Fedorovsky in which he, a Social-Democrat, admitted that it was undesirable for the army to be involved in politics. This is a big mistake, but it can still be remedied. Lastly, we also consider as a mistake the declaration recently adopted by the Group in the Duma. This cannot be remedied. We must now

* See present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 423-25.—*Ed.*

examine this mistake, not in a carping spirit—our comrades' task in the Duma is a difficult one, and mistakes are inevitable at first—but in the interests of the political education of the whole Party and of the whole proletariat.

The members of our Social-Democratic Group in the Duma had received another draft declaration from the camp of the former Bolsheviks. The following is this draft, slightly... abbreviated (in our country, newspapers do not enjoy the same freedom of speech as deputies in the Duma):

"Through the medium of our Group, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, the party of the class-conscious proletariat of all the nations inhabiting our state, addresses the whole people from the platform of the State Duma.

"Our Party is one of the contingents of the international army of the Social-Democratic proletariat. All over the world, the organised proletariat that is conscious of its class interests has risen for the struggle. It is fighting to throw off the yoke of capital. It is striving to secure the complete emancipation of all toilers from the yoke of tyranny, poverty, oppression and unemployment. Its object is to attain the socialist system of society, which will abolish all division of the people into exploiters and exploited. The Social-Democrats call upon all the toilers and the exploited to join their ranks, not only the wage-workers, but also small proprietors, if they are conscious of their common interests with the proletariat, if they are seeking salvation, not by consolidating individual small production, but by fighting jointly with the working class for the complete overthrow of bourgeois rule. And by its united and steadfast struggle the international socialist proletariat will achieve its goal.

"In Russia, however, the struggle now going on is not for socialism, but for political freedom. The great Russian revolution is in full swing. The yoke of autocracy is preventing the development of the country. The tyranny of irresponsible officials and the barbarous exploitation of the mass of the peasantry by the landlords has roused the anger of the whole people. The proletariat has been in the vanguard of the people's fight. By its heroic strike in October it compelled the enemy to recognise freedom. By its heroic insurrection in December it prevented all further procrastination in convening

the assembly of the representatives of the people. In spite of the autocracy's gerrymandering electoral law, its massacre, torture and imprisonment of the finest fighters for freedom, the State Duma, after all, turned out to be hostile to the autocracy.

"The people are now on the eve of another great struggle. The autocracy jeers at the assembly of the people's representatives and scoffs at its demands. The anger of the workers, peasants and soldiers is steadily rising. The outcome of the great Russian revolution will be determined by the conduct of the various classes in society.

"In the democratic revolution that Russia is now passing through, the liberal bourgeoisie, represented in the State Duma by the very influential Constitutional-Democratic Party, is inevitably endeavouring to restrict as far as possible the rights of the propertyless classes, and of the proletariat in particular, in order to hinder them in their struggle for complete, and not only political, emancipation. This aim of the liberal bourgeoisie, just as inevitably, results in its inconsistency and irresoluteness in the struggle for freedom, its wavering between the desire to lean on the people and its fear of the people's revolutionary initiative. In the interests of freedom, and of socialism, we shall most relentlessly combat these waverings. We shall most strongly resist every attempt, no matter by whom, to obscure the irreconcilable antagonism between the interests of the people and the old order, and between the interests of the proletariat and those of the bourgeoisie. And we shall exert all our efforts to combat attempts to retard the popular movement by means of fraudulent paper concessions and the lie of conciliation between the reactionary robbers and the revolutionary, i. e., the only true and consistent, democrats. In particular, the touchstone of this consistency for us will be the desire and readiness to organise a free, really popular, mass movement, unhindered by police barriers, for an extensive struggle outside the Duma to effect political and economic emancipation.

"We regard the peasantry as the chief of the potential allies of the proletariat in the work of consummating the struggle for freedom. We whole-heartedly support to the very end the peasants' struggle against semi-feudal landlord-

ism and against the Asiatic political system in Russia. While rejecting the utopian idea that equal land tenure is possible under capitalism, and not permitting any attempt to obscure the difference in the interests of the proletarians and small proprietors, we shall advocate the confiscation of all crown, church, monastery and *all landed estates*. We shall strenuously oppose the *redemption payments*—the noose that the liberal bourgeoisie wants to put round the necks of the poor peasants. We shall warn the peasants against surrendering the land to the police-bourgeois authorities, local or central, until the victory of the revolution is achieved, and until a really democratic state has been fully attained. When a democratic state has been fully established, we shall advocate the transfer of all the land to the local self-governing bodies. We shall very strongly warn the peasants against allowing the land question to be settled by undemocratic local committees, such as the bureaucratic and landlord committees proposed by the Constitutional-Democratic Party.

“Throughout the course of the revolution we shall steadfastly support the struggle of the workers for an eight-hour day, higher wages, abolition of fines, in short, for all the demands of our Party’s minimum programme. We regard the alliance between the proletariat and the broad masses of the urban and rural poor as a guarantee of the further victory of the revolution. The State Duma is useless for achieving and consolidating this victory. Only a national constituent assembly—convened by revolutionary means and elected by a universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot of all citizens, irrespective of sex, creed or nationality, and endowed with complete state power—only such an assembly can bring about complete freedom. It alone can establish in Russia ... substitute the armed nation for the standing army, abolish the bureaucracy that is neither elected by or responsible to the people, and introduce complete and unrestricted political freedom.

“That is the aim that we shall steadily pursue in the present revolution. That is the aim that the State Duma too must serve. It must help the people to organise and fully and thoroughly to understand the necessity for overthrowing the ... regime. It must explain to the people how

powerless is the present 'assembly of the people's representatives' and what a miserable role it is playing as a new screen for the old autocracy. The Duma must not engage in political project-mongering, or in drafting stillborn 'Bills', but must appeal to the people, ruthlessly tell it the whole truth, ruthlessly expose before it all the crimes that are committed by the gang ... government of Russia, and call upon it to wage a consistent, steadfast, persistent and co-ordinated struggle. And if the State Duma as a whole is unable or hesitates to undertake this duty, we will perform it in alliance with the genuinely revolutionary groups or individual members of the Duma.

"The victory of the people is not far distant. The cause of freedom is in reliable hands. The proletariat is at its post, mustering its forces, proudly spurning the efforts of wretched provocateurs to provoke it to fight single-handed, and uniting and rallying around itself the millions and tens of millions of the oppressed and exploited *living in eternal toil and eternal poverty*.

"And however weak and small our Group in the State Duma may be, we know that behind it and with it are fighting millions of proletarians, the vanguard of all the toiling and exploited masses. In this fight the proletariat will be victorious. It will raze to the ground the monstrous edifice built by the autocracy that is torturing Russia."

Were our comrades in the Duma right in rejecting this draft?

From the formal point of view, they were. According to the Rules, they must be guided by the Central Committee, not by "outsiders".

They were also right from the factional point of view, for this draft emanated from the "other" camp (if we reckon according to the former factions).

But what about the Party point of view? Were they right in rejecting the suggestion that it was desirable to formulate more clearly the socialist aims and the international character of the Party; that it was desirable to point to the movement outside the Duma; that it was necessary to make clear to the people the differences between the parties in the Duma; that it was necessary to draw a sharp distinction between proletarian and petty-bourgeois doctrines; that it

was important for the workers' party to protect the peasants *from* the Cadets; and that our immediate demands should be more clearly and fully formulated?

Were our comrades, or our Central Committee, right in saying in their declaration: "make the Duma an organ of the popular movement" instead of using the formula endorsed by the Congress: make the Duma an *instrument of the revolution*?

Were they right in taking on all the points enumerated above an obvious *step to the Right* of the resolutions and decisions of the Unity Congress of our Party?

Let all the organisations, and all the members, of our Party carefully consider these questions.

Ekho, No. 1,
June 22, 1906

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the *Ekho* text

"WHAT THOU DOEST, DO QUICKLY"

Today, two newspapers that do not belong to the sensational boulevard press, namely, *Nasha Zhizn* and *Mysl*,¹⁶ publish the important news that the Goremykin Cabinet has at last decided to resign. The new Cabinet is expected to be made up as follows: Yermolov—Prime Minister; Urusov—Minister of the Interior; Herzenstein—Finance; Timiryazev—Commerce; Stakhovich—Agriculture; Kuzmin-Karavayev—Justice; Nabokov—Foreign Affairs. It is believed that Heyden will "take" Education and that the Ministry of Railways will be taken by the present Minister, or by Shukhtan, the Chief of the Nikolayevskaya Railway.

Thus, we have the old bureaucrats in alliance with the Octobrists and Right Cadets, mainly ex-officials, that is to say, former bureaucrats (Urusov was formerly Deputy Minister of the Interior, Kuzmin-Karavayev a general, and Nabokov a gentleman-in-waiting).

Both the above-mentioned newspapers also report that lively negotiations have been taking place recently between the "Centre Party" in the Council of State¹⁷ (i.e., the gang of bureaucrats who are a cross between the Black Hundreds and the "law and order" people¹⁸) and the Cadets.

Let us assume that all this is true. We *must* assume that it is true until the opposite is proved; for the source of information is fairly reliable, and the fact follows logically from all preceding events.

Well, whose views are proved to be right by this Cabinet, or these negotiations between the Cadets and the pogrom-mongers? Our readers will recall that at the meeting in the Panina 'Palace on May 9,¹⁹ the Social-Narodnik, Mr. Myakotin, answering a Social-Democrat, protested that it was not fair to accuse the Cadets of desiring to *make a deal* with the pogrom-mongers. They will also recall that our

Right-wing Social-Democrats, headed by Plekhanov, loudly declared that all talk about treachery and making deals was groundless and premature.

Negotiations mark the beginning of a deal, said the Social-Democrat in reply to Mr. Myakotin. A deal marks the completion of negotiations.* Well, the fact that negotiations have been going on is now confirmed. The deal is well on the way.

But what has become of the promised complete amnesty, guarantee of liberties, and the abolition of the Council of State? Were *these questions* discussed during the negotiations between the Cadets and the pogrom-mongers? The newspapers are silent on this point. And we all know that the knights of “people’s freedom” have *never categorically stipulated* that these measures should be guaranteed *before* a Cadet Cabinet is formed. It is the minor things, which are done behind the backs of the people, which provide portfolios and soft jobs, that have been put in the forefront. What is vital for the people has been shifted into the background. The Cadets will “fight” for an amnesty and for freedom when they are in the Cabinet—this is the answer that will be used to silence the simpletons who have been spreading among the people the slogan of supporting a “responsible” Cabinet. But this Cabinet will be responsible as before to the laws, which remain the old, pogrom laws, and also to the Star Chamber, or camarilla, that appointed it. And by a “fight” for an amnesty and for freedom, the Cadets have meant in the past, and will continue to mean: negotiations between the Rodichevs and Nabokovs, the Nabokovs and Uru-sovs, the Urusovs and Goremykins and the Goremykins and Trepovs.

But it’s an ill-wind that blows nobody any good. The Cabinet of pogrom-mongers, Octobrists and Cadets will soon make things move; that is to say, it will drive the Cadets towards political bankruptcy, it will help the people to cast off one more harmful illusion, and accelerate the progress of political events towards a revolutionary denouement.

* See present edition, Vol. 10, p. 408. — *Ed.*

USEFUL POLEMICS

More than half of the Goremykin government's long communication on "measures for improving the conditions of life of the peasantry" is devoted to polemics against the views of the peasants and the talk ("rumours", as the Goremykins contemptuously call it) that is going on among the people. These polemics are extremely useful. The Goremykin government is debating with the "Russian peasantry". It declares that the views the peasants hold are "mistaken", and tries to prove to them that their demands and plans are "primarily opposed to the interests of the peasants themselves".

Now it is exceedingly praiseworthy, gentlemen of the Goremykin government, that you should try the art of gentle persuasion! You should have tried this long ago. It really would have been far better had you dealt with the peasants by argument rather than by means of the birch, the knout, bullets and rifle butts. Almost all newspapers would publish a government communication. The village priests, the Zemstvo officials, the rural district elders and the police officials would read it to the peasants. The peasants would ponder over it. They would be taught sense by the government, how to understand their real interests. And after thinking it over, and having been taught something by the government, they would decide by a majority vote who was right. How nice it would be if this were so! But how atrocious it is when, with one hand, the Goremykins and their myrmidons flog, torture and murder the peasants, and with the other, they run down their throats "communications" to teach them to understand their own interests! Peasant newspapers are being suppressed; peasant delegates and members of the Peasant Union " are languishing in jail, or in

Siberia; the villages are inundated with troops, as if they were enemy territory—and the Goremykin government hands the flogged and tortured peasants a communication to the effect that they are being flogged and tortured for their own good!

This is a useful communication! It will have a splendid effect on the peasants. The government has undertaken a little of the work of the Trudovik, or Peasant, Group in the Duma. This Group ought to appeal to the people, to tell them about the demands the peasant deputies in the Duma are making for land for the peasants, and what the government says in answer to these demands. The Trudovik Group has not yet done this. The government has come to its aid. Our government is so clever! It has itself published a communication to the whole people and has told them what the peasants demand.

Even in the most out-of-the-way villages, even in villages where they have never heard about the Peasant Union and about the peasant deputies in the Duma (if there are such villages—probably there are; ours is such a wild country), even there, the local priest, or village elder, will read the government's communication. The peasants will gather round, listen quietly, and then disperse. And afterwards they will gather again, with no officials present, and begin to talk. They will discuss the government's assurance that it and the bureaucrats are not protecting the interests of the landlords. They will chuckle and say: "Oh no, they wouldn't dream of such a thing!" They will discuss the statement that voluntary sale of the land by the landlords, particularly if it is done through the medium of the government officials, will be far more advantageous to the peasants than compulsory alienation (perhaps even without redemption payment). They will chuckle and say: "What fools we have been not to have realised up to now that it is far better for us to obey the landlords and the bureaucrats than to decide all matters for ourselves."

But perhaps the peasants will not only chuckle? Perhaps they will reflect over something else, and not only with laughter, but with rage? Perhaps they will decide for themselves not only where truth lies, but how to attain it?...

Our government is so clever!

Incidentally, Mr. Muromtsev, the Cadet Chairman of the State Duma, tells us not to use the word: government. It is wrong, if you please. The Duma, too, is part of the government. We must say: the Cabinet. Then we shall conclude just like "gentlemen" do: the Duma is the legislature, and the Cabinet the executive; the Duma is part of the government.

Kind Mr. Muromtsev! Kind Cadets! They have so painstakingly studied the German books on state law that they know them by heart. They know the business better than Goremykin, who in his communication *does not say a word about the Duma*, but refers all the time to the *government*. Who is right, Goremykin or Muromtsev? What should we say: Cabinet or Government?

Goremykin is right. His refinement ... humph! humph! ... his subtle mind ... caused him inadvertently to speak the truth. The Muromtsevs, being professors and pundits, utter conventional lies.

The peasants will learn something from Goremykin, not from Muromtsev. They will want to settle accounts with the government, not with the Cabinet. And they will be right.

FAMINE RELIEF AND THE TACTICS OF THE DUMA

Today's newspapers report that a joint meeting of the Budget and Food committees of the State Duma was held on Wednesday, June 21. The meeting discussed the proposal of the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Finance to appropriate 50 million rubles for famine relief. "The Committee resolved to recommend that the State Duma assign 15 million rubles for immediate needs, the sum to be taken from current expenditure, and to request the Cabinet to submit its views on the question of reducing the estimated current expenditure by that amount. The Cabinet's proposal that an internal loan of 50 million rubles be issued was rejected" (*Rech.*,²¹ June 22).

The question of appropriating funds for famine relief is an extremely important one. Every intelligent citizen should watch the progress of this question through all its stages with unremitting attention.

First of all we will remind the reader that the question that originally arose in the State Duma was the following: Would it be right to grant money to the government of pogrom-mongers, or should the Duma itself take the whole business of famine relief into its own hands? At first, Deputy Aladyin spoke in favour of the correct, i.e., the latter, solution. He proposed that committees of the Duma be elected, that members of the Duma be sent to the affected areas, that recourse should be made to "free institutions", and the money and the whole business of famine relief concentrated in their hands. Not a kopek for the Gurkos and Durnovos!—said Aladyin, amidst applause from the Left benches of the

Duma and cries of: Hear, hear! As we know, Aladyin did not keep to this correct position. He soared very high, but eventually settled on the perch in the Cadet hencoop. The Social-Democratic deputies made a mistake in not expressing their views by strong speeches on this question. The Duma adopted the Cadet formula of a motion to proceed to the next business.

Thus, the fundamental question of principle was settled on Cadet, landlord, liberal lines. The Duma refused to become the instrument of the revolution in this matter. The Duma feared the people, dreaded an appeal to the people. In principle, the Duma agreed to leave the business of famine relief in the hands of the Gurkos and the pogrom-mongering Ministers. Thus, the Cadet Duma has shown that it only wants to exercise pressure on the pogrom-mongers with the help of the people, and not to fight on the side of the people against the pogrom-mongers; that it only wants to curb the pogrom-mongers a little, but not to remove them altogether.

The question has entered a second stage. How will the Cadets exercise pressure on the pogrom-mongers now? Hagglng has begun between the Committee of the Duma and the Ministers. At the meeting of the Committee on June 21 the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Finance were present. The Duma that would have no dealings with the people and with "free institutions", that refused to negotiate with the latter, began to negotiate with these Ministers. "Not a kopek for the Right Honourable Ministers"—that was merely a rhetorical flourish. Negotiations with the Right Honourable Ministers have become a fact. The Ministers asked for permission to float a loan. The Committee of the Duma refused. They demanded that the money be taken from this year's Budget, i. e., that certain *harmful* expenditure be reduced so as to provide the necessary sum for famine relief. By this tactical device, this flanking movement, the Duma is seizing a particle of right to control the State Budget. The Budget was adopted without the consent of the representatives of the people; but now a revision of the Budget with a view to reducing harmful expenditure and obtaining funds for useful expenditure is being secured in a roundabout way.

Such is the second stage of the question. The Cadets, that is, the party of the liberal landlords and the liberal bourgeoisie, want to control the organs of the old regime; they want to influence them, to clean them and paint them up; to substitute the Nabokovs for the Stolypins. But they don't want to replace *all* these organs and institutions of the old, police, feudal regime by *free institutions* of the people, by officials freely elected by the whole people. How is the money for famine relief to be obtained? Who is to be entrusted with the expenditure of these millions? Three main answers to these questions are offered by the three main political forces of the present period. The government of police pogrom-mongers answers: Obtain the money by floating a new loan, so as not to encroach on our police-pogrom Budget. We, the police and pogrom-mongers, will spend the money. The working class, and all the politically conscious peasants, answer: Let the people themselves collect the money and spend it themselves through the medium of "free institutions" really elected by the whole people and really without any connection with the dirty police. These free institutions must be used for developing a broad mass movement to transfer all power in the state, and the whole "Treasury", to the people. The liberal landlords and the liberal bourgeoisie ("Cadets") answer: We don't want any "free institutions", we are afraid of them. The people would go "too far". Much better to remain with the old pogrom-mongers, and just clean and scrub them a bit. Take the money from their Budget by cutting down harmful expenditure. Entrust the expenditure of the money to this government of pogrom-mongers, but try to bring them under our, that is, the liberal landlords' control.

The answers are clear. So are the positions of the government, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The only question is, whom will the peasants follow?

The liberal bourgeoisie, the Cadets, are wavering between the government and the people. The position of the waverers is ambiguous. It is easy to say: Take the money from the current Budget by cutting down harmful expenditure! But the money is needed at once, and this operation requires the *consent* of the Council of State and the head of the state. Hence, the Cadets must be counting on obtaining

the voluntary consent of the higher officials and the camarilla. What are the Cadets' calculations based on? *On the possibility of a deal over the composition of the next Cabinet.*

We must look reality straight in the face. It is useless playing the hypocrite. It is useless playing hide-and-seek. The necessity of assigning money for famine relief is being used as a counter in the haggling that is going between the Cadets and the pogrom-mongers' government, between the Cadets and the camarilla. The Cadets, in effect, say to the pogrom-mongers: If you gentlemen give way to us and appoint Muromtsev as Prime Minister instead of Yermolov, we will give way to you and grant you 15 and perhaps all 50 millions for famine relief, without any "dangerous" (for you pogrom-mongers as well as us landlords) recourse to "free institutions" of the people.

That is the true significance of the present events in the Duma. That is the true significance of Mr. Yeshchin's article in today's issue of the Cadet newspaper *Rech*, which the leading article in that paper commends, with slight reservations, and in which the author argues that the Duma should grant the pogrom-mongers' government money, but "fence this grant round with all the conditions that the Duma can reasonably demand".

The political situation is clear. Our Social-Democratic deputies in the Duma are now faced with a very serious task. Firstly, they must launch a major attack against the Cadets when the Budget and Food Committee's report comes up for discussion. They must demand recourse to "free institutions" of the people. They must open the eyes of the peasants to the reason why the Cadets, among whom there are so many landlords, are afraid of the people who need *all* the land—without *any* redemption payment—and complete freedom. They must insist on a vote being taken on their resolution on this question, so that the party of the proletariat may be ensured of the sympathy of all the toiling masses, and so that the wavering and cowardice of the liberal landlords may be clearly and publicly exposed.

Secondly, when the Cadets defeat the proposal to have recourse to free institutions, the Social-Democrats must launch a second attack from our next fortified line. They **must** demand an explanation why the Committee (the joint

Budget and Food Committee) has not published *all* the details of their negotiations with the Right Honourable gentlemen, the Ministers of the Interior and of Finance. They must be well prepared for a far more thorough and resolute criticism of the whole Budget than that made by the Cadets in the Committee. Voices will then be heard from the rostrum of the Duma relentlessly exposing the double game the Cadets are playing, exposing all the "secrets" of the Russian Budget of the police pogrom-mongers—a Budget which squanders tens and hundreds of millions on assistance for landlords and capitalists, on military adventures, on "relief" for spies and gendarmes, on rewarding all the high-placed heroes of the Manchurian tragedy,²² and on maintaining a horde of thieving officials who tyrannise over the people. Voices will be heard from the rostrum of the Duma proving that *harmful* expenditure amounts to much more than 15 or 50 millions.

The Cadets only want to exercise a little pressure on the government. The pogrom-mongers will be the first to be called to account by the Social-Democrats; but the Cadets, too, will have to answer for their attempt to gloss over the profound antagonism between the camarilla and the people.

NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT THE CABINET

Yesterday we published newspaper reports about the contemplated formation of a Cabinet consisting of Yermolov, Urusov, Nabokov, Heyden and others.* Commenting on this list today, *Rech* says: "Evidently, the compilers of this list included members of the Constitutional-Democratic Party only tentatively; actually, the Constitutional-Democratic Party will take no part in a Cabinet of this character."

That is all very well, gentlemen of the Cadet Party! But how does *Rech* know that the Constitutional-Democratic Party will take no part in such a Cabinet?

The reader will ask: What do you mean by "how does *Rech* know"? Is not *Rech* the chief organ of the Cadets? Quite right. But in putting that question we wanted to suggest that it is *unbecoming*, in the highest degree unbecoming, for a party like the Constitutional-Democratic Party, which has held congresses legally, predominates in the State Duma, and is a wealthy, "enlightened" and liberal-minded party, to play hide-and-seek. Is it not high time it was said that *Rech* is the official and chief organ of that party? Is it not high time that the resolutions of the Central Committee of the Cadet Party were published? One of two things, gentlemen: *Either* your party has not officially discussed the question of the kind of Cabinet it will "take part in". In that case you should say so plainly. In that case, *Rech* should speak on its own behalf, and not on behalf of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, that is: "*We are sure that the Constitutional-Democratic Party will not take part*", etc.

* See pp. 38-39 of this volume.—Ed.

Or your party has officially discussed this question. In that case you should publish the minutes of that discussion, otherwise your silence proves that you are conducting secret negotiations behind the backs of the people.

"Today a more homogeneous list is being discussed," says *Rech* further, quoting only the names of Yermolov, Timiryazev, Heyden and Stakhovich, that is to say, bureaucrats and Octobrists, but no Cadets. Thus, *negotiations have taken place*. The Cadets were asked—perhaps through the medium of the "Centre Party" in the Council of State—will you take part in such a Cabinet? The Cadets answered: No, we will not.

Is that what happened, gentlemen? Have there been negotiations, or not? Did you state *your* terms, or not? Did your terms refer exclusively to the appointment of definite persons to the Cabinet, or did they also stipulate a complete amnesty, guaranteed liberties, abolition of the Council of State, and universal suffrage?

Until the Constitutional-Democratic Party officially gives full and absolutely precise answers to these questions we shall not tire of repeating to the people: Citizens, beware! Members of the party of "people's freedom" are conducting "unofficial" negotiations behind the backs of the people with a view to selling the people's freedom at a bargain price.

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AMONG NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS

In *Golos Truda*,²³ Comrade N. Rakhmetov discusses "the political tasks of Russian Social-Democrats". Four columns of this article are taken up by arguments to prove that

"it is not to the advantage of the proletariat, as one of the classes that are active in Russia today, to leave the Duma to its own resources. That would mean that the proletariat would strike itself off from the list of vital political forces, and the only result would be that the proletariat would fail to utilise the Russian bourgeois revolution to the extent it could do."

"It is enough to formulate the question in this way," says N. Rakhmetov, "to see that there can only be one answer to it." Quite true, Comrade Rakhmetov. The unfortunate thing, however, is that this is not a "formulation of the question", but a threadbare platitude.

The "question" has never been formulated *in this way*. It is quite evident, however, that Comrade Rakhmetov knows *how* it has been—and is now—formulated, for from the above quoted tirade he very surprisingly draws the following conclusion:

"It is the proletariat's duty—to itself as well as to the whole country—not only to refrain from being passively neutral in the struggle between the Duma and the autocracy, but boldly and resolutely to *take the side of the Duma against the government in this struggle.*"

Now this is where the "question" does arise. And Comrade Rakhmetov realises it, for he foresees that

"the newspaper *Svetoch* * will probably be very sceptical about such tactics. That newspaper writes: 'The only flaw in this flawless dialectical plan of a "revolution through the Duma" is that it leaves out of account the mundane, prosaic fact that the present Duma consists, in the main, of bourgeois elements who dread revolution and, consequently, are hostile to it.' Arguments like these may serve as a splendid illustration of how a Social-Democrat should never argue under any circumstances. A Social-Democrat ought to know that the political tactics of the proletariat are not dictated by the *moods* of other social groups, but by the objective historical process that *compels* these groups to *act* in a certain way. A Social-Democrat ought to know and take into account what the classes with which he has to deal are *compelled* to do. If he formulates the question in this way he will be convinced of the following: by expressing readiness to render the Duma revolutionary support against tsarism, the proletariat will *thereby* compel the Duma to become more revolutionary in its actions. Politically, one must be very immature indeed not to understand this simple 'truth'."

What a queer argument! According to Comrade Rakhmetov, even though our bourgeoisie is counter-revolutionary, it can be compelled to become revolutionary.

For this purpose, it appears, "the Duma must be surrounded with a flaming circle of revolutionary pressure". The Duma will then be confronted with the "question": "either be consumed in the flames or merge with them"; "the question of life or death".

We are very much afraid that Comrade Rakhmetov will get a severe gruel from Comrade Plekhanov for his metaphysical "formulation of the question", for his inability to formulate a most important political question dialectically. How often the former Mensheviks, and Comrade Plekhanov, have protested against this "either—or" method of formulating political questions! Why necessarily "either be consumed in the flames or merge with them"? Does Comrade Rakhmetov really think that the Herzenstein and Nabokov faction has no other alternative? Why, for example, should they not, in alliance with the more "decent" bureaucrats, attempt to break through this "flaming circle of revolutionary pressure"?

We, for example, think that if the victoriously rising tide of revolution compels the leading elements of the Cadet

* The organ of the Moscow Social-Democrats, recently suppressed by the government.²⁴

Party to do anything at all, it will be to try this third way out, i.e., simply to make a deal with the bureaucrats.

It is quite probable that the "party of people's freedom" in its present shape may be "consumed" in this attempt; but when will comrades like Rakhmetov understand, at last, that all the noise and fuss the Cadets have been making about people's freedom has been simply a stepping stone to ministerial portfolios and not to the "struggle against tsarism", which comrades like Rakhmetov are so unsuccessfully trying to foist upon them. And speaking generally, the masters of the Duma—for the time being—are the Cadet Centre; and you want to surround *this* Duma "with a flaming circle of revolutionary pressure". That is all very well; it is certainly important and necessary. But should not all those who are "pressing" constantly be warned that they will inevitably ... press the present masters of the Duma into the arms of the bureaucrats? Shouldn't they, Comrade Rakhmetov?

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WHO IS FOR ALLIANCES WITH THE CADETS?

It sometimes happens that experienced and cautious statesmen, who appreciate their responsibility for every important political step they take, send out in advance young and somewhat incautious tyros to reconnoitre, as it were. "No use to waste a clever lad,"²⁵ they say to themselves, anticipating that the young men will blurt out some minor secret or other, which will serve as a feeler.

Comrade N. Rakhmetov, writing in *Golos Truda*, gives one the impression of just such a tyro fulfilling this intended mission. But that is exactly why, from a certain angle, Comrade Rakhmetov's very trivial article—we poked fun at it yesterday*—undoubtedly acquires political importance. If an influential organ of our Right-wing Social-Democrats like *Golos Truda* publishes, without a single editorial comment, an article calling upon the Social-Democrats to ally themselves with the Cadets it shows that our Party is suffering from some serious malady. No matter how much cautious, experienced and shrewd men may try to conceal its symptoms, the malady shows itself in spite of them. To keep silent about it would be a great crime.

The fundamental mistake of the opportunist Social-Democrats lies in their failure to understand what the decisive victory of the bourgeois revolution means. Our Russian opportunists who, like all opportunists, belittle the theory of revolutionary Marxism and the role of the proletariat as the vanguard, constantly labour under the illusion that the liberal bourgeoisie must inevitably be the "boss" in the bourgeois revolution. They totally fail to understand the

* See pp. 50-52 of this volume.—Ed.

historical role of, say, the Convention in the great French Revolution as the dictatorship of the lower strata of society, those of the proletariat and the petty-bourgeoisie. They totally fail to understand the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry as the only possible social bulwark of a fully victorious Russian bourgeois revolution.

In essence, opportunism means sacrificing the long-term and permanent interests of the proletariat for flashy and temporary interests. In the period of the bourgeois revolution, the opportunist Social-Democrat forgets the importance of the revolutionary wing of the bourgeois democrats and pays slavish homage to the successes of the non-revolutionary wing of these bourgeois democrats. He loses sight of the essential difference between the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie (Constitutional-Democratic Party, Party of Democratic Reforms,²⁶ etc.) and the revolutionary, particularly, the peasant, bourgeois democrats. We have drawn the attention of our Right-wing comrades to this difference hundreds if not thousands of times. The Bolshevik draft resolution for the Congress* very clearly stated that the liberal bourgeoisie is trying to make a deal with the old regime, is wavering between revolution and reaction, is afraid of the people, and afraid of the free and all-sided development of their activities; and that all this is not due to chance, but to its fundamental interests. We said that we must utilise the democratic phrases uttered by this bourgeoisie, and utilise the timid steps it takes; but we must not for a moment forget its "compromising" and treacherous strivings. The peasant democrats, on the other hand, owing to the objective conditions in which the mass of the peasants find themselves, are compelled to act in a revolutionary manner, in spite of the fact that they are not fully politically conscious. The fundamental interests of *these* bourgeois democrats are not at present impelling them to seek a deal, but are compelling them to fight determinedly against the old regime. To avoid sacrificing the fundamental interests of the proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic revolution, a sharp distinction must be drawn between the liberal, or

* See present edition, Vol. 10, p. 158.—*Ed.*

ЭХО

Редакція и Главная контора. Покровский №. А. 7, 7, 6.

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"Cadet", bourgeois democrats, and the peasant, or revolutionary, bourgeois democrats.

It is this that the opportunist Social-Democrats do not wish to understand, although events have brilliantly confirmed the correctness of this distinction and continue to do so. In the Duma, too, the peasant democrats become a distinct group by being compelled to draw closer to the revolution, and to strive to free themselves from the yoke of the Cadets. The Cadets and Octobrists versus the Trudoviks and Social-Democrats—such is the alignment that has *already taken place* both on the question of instituting elected local land committees, and on the question of the Cadets' attempt to "curb" freedom of assembly.

The comrades of the Right wing of Social-Democracy are blind to these facts. Dazzled by the immediate situation, they are inclined to identify the party that at present predominates in the Duma, i.e., the Constitutional-Democratic Party, with the bourgeois democrats in general. N. Rakhmetov is particularly naïve in repeating this old mistake of the Mensheviks. While the "old hands" artfully get round the unpleasant deductions that must be drawn from wrong premises, the tyros chatter and blurt out the truth. If the Constitutional-Democrats represent the genuine bourgeois democrats in general (and not merely the worst strata of the bourgeoisie, and small upper strata at that) then, naturally, the necessary fighting alliance between the proletariat and the bourgeois democrats must be an alliance with the Cadets. The proletariat can, and must, be in the forefront of the fight for the victory of the bourgeois revolution, while strictly preserving its class independence. But *without* the bourgeois democrats it cannot carry through this revolution to the end. With whom, then, should it "march separately, but strike together"? With the liberal democrats, or with the peasant democrats?

With the liberals, with the Cadets, twitters Rakhmetov. Why hesitate? The Cadets are on top; they are more conspicuous; they are flashy and glib! With the Cadets, of course, with the Cadets! "It is much easier for the Cadets to twist and turn," says Rakhmetov, "when they are surrounded by a solid wall of hostility than it would be if they were approached with an offer of a *political coalition*."

... Much more can be achieved by the pressure of public opinion on the Cadets (by sending to the Duma resolutions, instructions, petitions and demands, organising protest meetings, *negotiations between the Workers' Group and the Cadets*) than by senseless, and therefore useless, rowdiness, to put it strongly" (our italics).

Here then is a completely formulated deduction, for which Rakhmetov fully deserves a testimonial bearing the inscription: "From the grateful Bolsheviks". Political alliances with the Cadets, negotiations between Social-Democrats and Cadets—what a clear and precise slogan! All we have to do now is to spread this Menshevik slogan as widely as possible throughout the workers' party and put to the workers the question: *Who is for alliances with the Cadets?* Whoever knows anything of the proletariat will have no doubt about what the answer will be.

The same issue of *Golos Truda* contains what is substantially a correct warning by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. against Social-Democrats merging with the Trudoviks. But *Golos Truda* has rendered the Central Committee of our Party a disservice by converting this warning into a cloak for advocacy of an alliance between the Social-Democrats and the Cadets! Nothing could be more calculated to discredit the Social-Democrats than this action of combining a—substantially correct, we repeat—warning *against* Social-Democrats *merging* with the revolutionary bourgeoisie, with the advocacy of an *alliance* between the Social-Democrats and the opportunist bourgeoisie!

And what moment have our Mensheviks chosen to advocate such an alliance? The moment when the alliance between the revolutionary and opportunist bourgeoisie, between the Trudoviks and the Cadets, is *breaking down*. A very appropriate moment, indeed, for our good Rakhmetov to choose for launching his crusade! The very moment that the Trudoviks—with the help of the Social-Democrats be it said—are beginning to break away from the Cadets, to throw off their yoke, to vote against them and to rally against the "alliance" between the Cadets and the Octobrists. And people like Rakhmetov have the presumption to talk pompously about revolutionising the Duma, when, as a matter of fact, they are helping the Cadets to degrade the Duma.

Remember this, gentlemen: alliances and negotiations with the Cadets are the worst way of exercising pressure on them. In practice, it will mean blunting the independent struggle of the Social-Democrats, and not Social-Democratic pressure on the Cadets. It is those who relentlessly expose every false step of the Cadets that are helping to revolutionise the Duma and are "exercising pressure" on the Cadets. Refusal to support these false steps exerts far more pressure on the Cadet Duma than any negotiations with the Cadets with a view to supporting them. The Workers' Group refused to vote for the reply to the address from the throne: the Cadets had emasculated it. The Workers' Group has refused to support the Cadets; thereby it has discredited them in the eyes of the people and has shifted morally the focus of public attention from the Cadets to the "Left" core of the Duma. By ruthlessly denouncing the half-heartedness of the *Cadet* Duma we are revolutionising the Duma and—what is more important—the people who believe in the Duma. We thereby, in effect, issue a call to throw off the Cadet yoke, to act more boldly, determinedly and consistently. We thereby also cause a cleavage among the Cadets and make their ranks waver under the joint assault of the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks.

We are carrying out the policy of the proletariat as the vanguard fighter in the revolution and not as an appendage of the most timid and pitiful upper ranks of the liberal bourgeoisie.

THE CADET DUMA GRANTS MONEY TO THE POGROM - MONGERS' GOVERNMENT

The inevitable has happened. From now on, the Budget of the autocratic government of pogrom-mongers will contain a small item that has been *approved* by the "people's"—if you please—representatives. It's the first step that's difficult, as the French say; or as we say in Russia: the first glass must be forced down, the second trickles down, and all the others glide down in a merry stream. The Cadets have swallowed the first glass in company with the henchmen of the autocracy.

Let us carefully trace the course of this historical event. The Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Finance asked the Duma to grant 50 million rubles for famine relief. "*Legally*", the Ministers could not obtain this money, could not take control of the relief campaign, without the consent of the Duma. The Ministers did not ask the Duma who is to be in charge of this campaign: "*Legally*", it must in any case be in the hands of the pogrom-mongers' government. Nor did the Ministers indicate in their proposal how the money is to be obtained. They merely said: "To allow the Minister of Finance to procure." It was only in the Committee that the Ministers proposed that a loan be floated to provide the money. Yesterday, however, the Minister of Finance bluntly stated in the Duma: "It is within the competence of the State Duma to authorise procurements, but the manner of procurement [we are quoting from *Rech* and take no responsibility for the style]* is determined by the supreme

* Interpolations in square brackets (within passages quoted by Lenin) have been introduced by Lenin, unless otherwise indicated.—Ed.

power." Thus, all that the Ministers had to obtain from the Duma was an assignment in general, but they were less concerned about the sources.

Two main solutions of the problem, which we indicated the other day,* were at once put forward in the Duma. The Cadets proposed that a sum of 15 million rubles be assigned with the proviso that an account of its expenditure be submitted to the Duma, and that the amount be taken out of the "anticipated savings" in the 1906 Budget. That, and nothing more. But the Minister of Finance very coolly said in reply to the Cadets: "If the State Duma decides to grant 15 million rubles, the Ministry of Finance will release that sum ... but will release it *not from anticipated savings* but from other secured items of expenditure." After making the expenditure, the Minister "will come to the State Duma and say: You compelled us to make an expenditure for which we found no surpluses."

Thus, the matter is as clear as daylight. The Minister simply spat in the face of the Cadet Duma: We shall use your permission to take 15 million rubles, he said in effect, but as for your decision about "savings", it is just empty words. The Minister did not hesitate to say that there would be no savings. He did not hesitate to say that he was quite willing to obtain money by assignment of the Duma, but he snapped his fingers at its advice about "savings".

What role did the Cadet Duma *actually* play in this business? The role of a *witness* called by the police to approve its expenditure of money filched from the people. "Legally", the signature of witnesses is required for the appropriation of money. The police demanded the signature. The Cadet Duma gave it. That is all the police wanted. The fact that the witnesses kicked a bit, did not worry them in the least.

But it was the *Cadet* Duma that played the part of police witnesses. The Social-Democratic deputies took up an entirely different and correct position. They spoke on the lines that we suggested the other day. "I declare, gentlemen," said Comrade Ramishvili in his excellent speech, "that if we grant the government a farthing, even that farthing will never reach the people." In their resolution, which we pub-

* See pp. 43-47 of this volume.—*Ed.*

lished yesterday, the Social-Democrats quite rightly said that no money should be given to the autocratic government, that the State Duma ought to set up *its own* relief committee, send its members to the affected areas and invite the co-operation of "free public organisations". The Social-Democrats turned their resolution into a revolutionary appeal to the people which branded the government as "the real culprit responsible for the famine", squandering the people's money on waging war against the people. The Social-Democrats demanded the *cessation* of expenditure on the gendarmerie, the political police, the rural mounted police, and so forth; they demanded a *reduction* in the salaries and pensions of high-placed drones and an *audit* of the cash balance and accounts of the Treasury. They also quite rightly demanded that the revenues from crown, church and monastery lands be used for famine relief. The Social-Democrats openly indicted the old regime as a whole, and all its organs, and also criticised the whole Budget.

How did the Duma vote? The Cadets won, of course. According to the unanimous statements of a number of newspapers, the Trudoviks voted with the Social-Democrats (*unfortunately*, a roll-call vote was not taken). The political alignment is becoming more and more distinct. The Octobrists and Cadets are in favour of coming to terms with the old regime. The Social-Democrats and Trudoviks are strongly opposed to this. The vigorous and united action of the Social-Democrats not only won over the peasants, but even caused a slight split among the Cadets. Not only the Left Galetsky, but even the Right Kuzmin-Karavayev was ashamed of playing the role of police witness. It was the Cadets, and the Cadets alone, who put the shameful signature of the "people's representatives" to the assignment of money to the pogrom-mongers.

This signature of the Cadet Duma is of enormous importance in principle. Naïve people and short-sighted politicians often say: The accusation that the Cadets are traitors and want to make a deal with the bureaucrats is groundless and premature. But this assignment of money to the pogrom-mongers' government is just such a deal—and strictly speaking, not the first. Look at the miserable shifts the Cadets resort to in their attempts to justify themselves.

This is a compromise, yells *Nasha Zhizn*, but it is justified by the temporary circumstances. Of course, gentlemen, all compromises between the bourgeoisie and the police autocracy have always been attributed to temporary circumstances.

But the peasants need immediate relief! Have not the peasant deputies betrayed the peasants? What do you think, gentlemen of the Cadet Party? The peasant deputies voted against the grant because they know better than you do where the money would go after passing through police hands. Why could not the State Duma take this matter in its own hands?

That is utopian, impracticable; we must reckon with the available organisation until it is changed by law—is the unanimous cry of the Heydens, Kokovtsovs, Milyukovs, and even the Bernsteinians of *Nasha Zhizn*. Yes, gentlemen, the bourgeoisie always regards the abolition of all the organs of the old regime as utopian because it wants to use these organs against the proletariat and against the revolutionary peasantry. In a police-ridden class state there will always be an endless amount of “urgent” expenditure. Once they have been engaged officials must be maintained; contracts that have been concluded must be paid for, and so on and so forth. There will always be an “available organisation” (namely, the police-bureaucratic organisation) which it is “impossible” to change at one stroke, without the consent of the Council of State, *and so on and so forth*.

Such excuses will always be found. These are the excuses that the liberal bourgeoisie hands out to credulous people in every country. These excuses are the natural screen with which the bourgeoisie tries to cover up its betrayal of the cause of the people's freedom.

The proletariat will always fight this hypocritical game. It will call upon the people to fight against all the organs and institutions of the old regime; to fight through the medium of the free organisations of the working class and the revolutionary peasantry.

YES-MEN OF THE CADETS

Yesterday we published the main resolutions adopted by the Fifth Congress of the Polish Social-Democratic Party.²⁷ The Polish comrades—25,000-30,000 strong, now affiliated to our Party—expressed their emphatic opposition to the Central Committee's tactics in relation to the State Duma. Condemning these tactics as a whole, they did not deem it necessary to dwell on the individual mistakes that inevitably follow from these wrong tactics, such as the notorious support for a Cadet Cabinet. But it goes without saying—and those who were present at the Polish Congress know this perfectly well—that the Polish Social-Democrats are absolutely opposed to this "support". The Conference representing all the St. Petersburg Social-Democrats also emphatically rejected support for a Cadet Cabinet²⁸; and the Regional Conference representing the Social-Democrats of the Central Moscow District, too, pronounced against it.²⁹

The St. Petersburg Conference represented about 4,000 Party members, and the Moscow Regional Conference about 14,000. Thus, about 20,000 members of the Party, that is, the major half of the membership (at the last congress 31,000-33,000 members were represented) *have condemned the Central Committee's tactics on the question of supporting a Duma Cabinet*. The majority of the Party membership is opposed to this policy. Our Party Cabinet, that is to say, the Central Committee of our Party, no longer expresses the Party's opinion. Its elementary political duty now is to expedite the convening of an immediate extraordinary congress. If it fails to do that it will become a clique, clinging to power in the Party on pretexts for delay and excuses of a *formal* nature, in spite of the expressed opinion of the Party

on the *substance* of the issue. At all events, the Party will now be able to secure the convocation of a congress.

The Mensheviks continue to advocate the tactics of supporting a Duma, *i.e.*, a *Cadet*, Cabinet, tactics that have been condemned by the majority of the Party membership (although, as the discussion in St. Petersburg has shown, a number of Mensheviks have now taken up an independent position and have turned away from opportunism). Let us, once again, examine the current arguments of the Right-wing Social-Democrats.

We are told that to secure the appointment of a Duma Cabinet means "wresting power from the hands of the *camarilla*", means "making the executive power responsible to the representative assembly of the people"; that it is "the transition from a pseudo-constitutional system to a real constitution" (*Golos Truda*, No. 5).

That is a *downright lie*. The Duma, *i.e.*, *Cadet*, Cabinet will be appointed (if the Cadets' demand is conceded) *by the camarilla*. But can the appointment of liberal Cabinet Ministers by the *camarilla* be called "wresting power". Appointing Ministers at its own discretion, the *camarilla* can dismiss them at any time. The *camarilla* does not surrender power, but *pretends to share power*; the *camarilla tests* the liberal flunkies to see whether they suit it or not. The shrewd members of the *camarilla*, like Pobedonostsev and Trepov, for example (judging by certain newspaper reports), frankly argue in this way: the best thing for us would be to appoint liberal Ministers. By so doing we should not only pacify the Cadets (*i.e.*, the majority in the Duma) but also the pro-Cadet Social-Democrats. And it is much easier to get rid of undesirable Ministers than to get rid of the Duma, let us say. We shall gain time, shuffle the cards, create utter chaos, mutual distrust and bickering over ministerial portfolios in the Right wing, *i.e.*, the major half, of the Duma, stir up trouble, and lead the Cadets by the nose as we did on the question of famine relief. On that question we compelled them "voluntarily" to play the role of police witnesses. Similarly, in their ministerial office we shall compel them to play the role of police flunkies.

Whoever is at all familiar with the history of the Russian Cadets, and of the "Cadets" in other countries, knows that

the camarilla has always succeeded in leading the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie by the nose. The only way to prevent this is to develop the *independent* political consciousness of the proletarians and revolutionary peasants. And it is just the Right Social-Democrats who are now obscuring and muddling this consciousness. To keep the political consciousness of the revolutionary classes absolutely clear, and to preserve their complete fighting independence, we Social-Democrats must leave it entirely to the Cadets to grovel at the feet of the camarilla for the sake of ministerial jobs. To involve the proletariat in this business would be to betray the interests of the proletariat and the interests of the revolution.

If the camarilla were to appoint Cadets as Ministers it would make "the executive power responsible to the representative assembly of the people" (*Golos Truda*).

That is a downright lie. When Cadet professors say it—well, God will forgive them. But it is unpardonable for a Social-Democrat to repeat it. The executive power, most worthy yes-men, is not responsible to "the representative assembly of the people", but to the *legislative power*. Please remember this. Now let us explain the matter further. In whose hands is the legislative power in Russia today? 1) The supreme authority; 2) the Council of State; 3) the State Duma.

Do you understand your mistake now? The Cadet Ministers will be responsible to the Duma, to the Council of State and to the camarilla. To try to make out that they will be responsible only to the Duma means *lying* to the people.

To proceed. What will be the position of Ministers who are responsible to the most diverse institutions? A false one. The Ministers will be obliged to *observe and uphold* all the existing laws until they are repealed by all the three legislative bodies enumerated above. It is not surprising, therefore, that eloquent Cadets like Rodichev, are gesticulating in the Duma and declaiming that they are—the shield of the dynasty. The Cadets know what's what. The Right Social-Democrats, however, try to sing in harmony with them, but they don't understand what they are doing.

Why has the Cabinet become the focal point of the Cadets' campaign? Why are they not shouting equally zealously, frequently and loudly: Down with the Council of State!

Down with *the laws* that are preventing the representative assembly of the people from becoming the legislative power! Why are they conducting *a thousand times smaller campaign* for a general amnesty, for complete freedom and for universal suffrage than they are conducting for ministerial jobs? Have you thought about this? No, you have not. The Cadets are knocking at the back door in the first place because they *don't want* complete freedom (recall their Public Meetings Bill); they *don't want* the complete abolition of the Council of State (remember the Upper Chamber in *their* programme), to which they will *also* be responsible, and *to the same extent* as to the Duma, and so forth. The Cadets do not want to demand that the government should *first* grant a general amnesty, *first* abolish the Council of State, *first* introduce complete freedom, *first* grant universal, etc. suffrage, and only *then* appoint them as Cabinet Ministers. Why don't the Cadets want to do this? Because they know what's what; but the yes-men of the Cadets do not.

The Cadets say: When we become Ministers then *we* will *fight* for all these liberties! It can't be done at once, you know. And their yes-men believe them, and do their best

The Cadets know that the Cabinet Minister will be responsible to the old, police, Russian laws; responsible to the Duma, to the camarilla and to the Council of State. And so the Minister will say in the suavest tones: I would only be too glad; I am with you heart and soul; but, you see, "the others" don't agree; and the Council of State is still a bit stubborn, you know. Have patience, gentlemen. I am a Cadet, and nobody can touch the conscience of the camarilla, or of the Council of State, better than the Cadets, I assure you.

Remember this, my dear yes-men; to combat the treacherous tactics of the Cadets what is required is not to echo the Cadets, but to preserve complete independence, that is to say, to *warn* the proletariat and the peasants not to trust the Cadets, not to repeat the Cadet slogans. Your tactics are *hindering* the independent struggle of the working class and revolutionary peasantry. You are selling our revolutionary birthright for a mess of Cadet reformist pottage.

There is no need for us to explain in such detail the *third lie*, viz., that the appointment of Cadet Ministers by the

camarilla marks a "decisive change", the transition to a "real constitution". Our readers themselves will understand that the fact that Trepov appoints Rodichev as a Cabinet Minister does not even change the *written* constitution. To speak of a change of the *real* constitution as the result of such an appointment is to allow your tongue to run away with you.

In our next issue we shall examine another current argument, namely: "After all, a Cadet Cabinet will be better. We have nothing else to choose from. We must support what is better." We shall see whether this is a sound, Social-Democratic argument.

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ONCE AGAIN ABOUT THE DUMA CABINET

"We must choose"—this is the argument the opportunists have always used to justify themselves, and they are using it now. Big things cannot be achieved at one stroke. We must fight for small but achievable things. How do we know whether they are achievable? They are achievable if the majority of the political parties, or of the most "influential" politicians, agree with them. The larger the number of politicians who agree with some tiny improvement, the easier it is to achieve it. We must not be utopians and strive after big things. We must be practical politicians; we must join in the demand for small things, and these small things *will facilitate the fight* for the big ones. We regard the small things as the *surest stage* in the struggle for big things.

That is how all the opportunists, all the reformists, argue; unlike the revolutionaries. That is how the Right-wing Social-Democrats argue about a Duma Cabinet. The demand for a constituent assembly is a big demand. It cannot be achieved immediately. By no means everyone is consciously in favour of this demand.* But the *whole* State Duma, that is to say, the vast majority of politicians—that is to say "the whole people"—is in favour of a Duma Cabinet. *We must choose*—between the existing evil and a *very small* rectification of it, because the largest number of those who are in general dissatisfied with the existing evil are in favour of this "very small" rectification. And by achieving the small thing, we shall facilitate our struggle for the big one.

We repeat: this is the fundamental, the typical argument of all opportunists all over the world. To what con-

Only the minority in the Duma supports this demand.

clusion does this argument inevitably lead? To the conclusion that we need no revolutionary programme, no revolutionary party, and no revolutionary tactics. What we need are *reforms*, nothing more. We do not need a revolutionary Social-Democratic Party. What we need is a party of democratic and socialist reforms. Indeed, is it not clear that there will *always* be people who admit that the existing state of affairs is unsatisfactory? Of course, always. Is it not also clear that the *largest* number of discontented people will *always* be in favour of the *smallest* rectification of this unsatisfactory situation? Of course, always. Consequently, it is our duty, the duty of advanced and "class-conscious" people, *always* to support the *smallest* demands for the rectification of an evil. This is the surest and most practical policy to pursue; and all talk about "fundamental" demands, and so forth, is merely the talk of "utopians", merely "revolutionary phrase-mongering". *We must choose*—and we must always choose between the existing evil and the most moderate of the schemes in vogue for its rectification.

That is exactly how the German opportunist Social-Democrats argued. They said, in effect: There is a social-liberal trend which demands the repeal of the anti-socialist laws, a reduction of the working day, insurance against illness, and so on. A fairly large section of the bourgeoisie supports these demands. Do not repel it by tactless conduct, offer it a friendly hand, support it, and then you will be practical politicians, you will achieve small, but real benefits for the working class, and the only thing that will suffer from your tactics will be the empty words about "revolution". You cannot make a revolution now, in any case. *One must choose* between reaction and reform, between the Bismarck policy and the "social empire" policy.

The French ministerial socialists argued exactly like the Bernsteinians.¹⁰ They said in effect: *We must choose* between reaction and the bourgeois radicals, who promise a number of practical reforms. We must support these radicals, support their Cabinets; phrases about social revolution are merely the chatter of "Blanquists", "anarchists", "utopians", and so forth.

What is the main flaw in all these opportunist arguments? It is that *in fact* they substitute the bourgeois theory

of "united", "social" progress for the socialist theory of the class struggle as the only *real* driving force of history. According to the theory of socialism, i.e., of Marxism (non-Marxist socialism is not worth serious discussion nowadays), the real driving force of history is the revolutionary class struggle; reforms are a subsidiary product of this struggle, subsidiary because they express unsuccessful attempts to weaken, to blunt this struggle, etc. According to the theory of bourgeois philosophers, the driving force of progress is the unity of all elements in society who realise the "imperfections" of certain of its institutions. The first theory is materialist; the second is idealist. The first is revolutionary; the second is reformist. The first serves as the basis for the tactics of the proletariat in modern capitalist countries. The second serves as the basis of the tactics of the bourgeoisie.

A logical deduction from the second theory is the tactics of ordinary bourgeois progressives: always and everywhere support "what is better"; choose between reaction and the extreme Right of the forces that are opposed to reaction. A logical deduction from the first theory is that the advanced class must pursue independent revolutionary tactics. We shall never reduce our tasks to that of supporting the slogans of the reformist bourgeoisie that are most in vogue. We pursue an independent policy and put forward *only* such reforms as are *undoubtedly* favourable to the interests of the revolutionary struggle, that *undoubtedly* enhance the independence, class-consciousness and fighting efficiency of the proletariat. Only by such tactics can reforms from above, which are always half-hearted, always hypocritical, and always conceal some bourgeois or police snare, be made *innocuous*.

More than that. Only by such tactics can real progress be achieved in the matter of important reforms. This may sound paradoxical, but its truth is confirmed by the whole history of the international Social-Democratic movement. Reformist tactics are the *least* likely to secure real reforms. The most effective way to secure real reforms is to pursue the tactics of the revolutionary class struggle. *Actually*, reforms are won as a result of the revolutionary class struggle, as a result of its independence, mass force and steadfast-

ness. Reforms are *always* false, ambiguous and permeated with the spirit of Zubatovism³¹; they are real only in proportion to the intensity of the class struggle. By merging our slogans with those of the reformist bourgeoisie we *weaken* the cause of revolution *and, consequently, the cause of reform as well*, because we thereby diminish the independence, fortitude and strength of the revolutionary classes.

Some readers may ask: Why repeat these elementary principles of international revolutionary Social-Democracy? Our answer is: Because *Golos Truda* and many Menshevik comrades tend to forget them.

A Duma, or Cadet, Cabinet is just such a false, ambiguous and Zubatov reform. To forget the real significance of such a reform, as an attempt on the part of the Cadets to strike a bargain with the autocracy, means substituting the liberal-bourgeois philosophy of progress for Marxism. By supporting *such* a reform, by including it among *our* slogans, we *dim* the revolutionary consciousness of the proletariat and *weaken* its independence and fighting capacity. By upholding our old revolutionary slogans *in their entirety*, we *strengthen* the actual struggle, and thereby increase the probability of reforms and the *possibility of turning them* to the advantage of the revolution, and not of reaction. All that is false and hypocritical in these reforms we leave to the Cadets; all that is of positive value in them we *utilise* ourselves. Only by such tactics shall we be able to take advantage of the attempts of the Trepovs and Nabokovs to trip each other up so as to throw both these worthy acrobats into the pit. Only if we pursue such tactics will history say about us what Bismarck said about the German Social-Democrats: "If there were no Social-Democrats there would have been no social reform." Had there not been a *revolutionary* proletariat there would have been no October 17. Had there been no December,³² attempts to prevent the convocation of the Duma would not have been defeated. We shall have another December, which will determine the future progress of the revolution....

Postscript. This article had already been written when we read the leading article in *Golos Truda*, No. 6. Our comrades are mending their ways. They now propose that *before* accepting their portfolios, the Duma Cabinet should

demand and secure the abolition of martial law in all parts of the country, the abolition of secret police, a general amnesty, and the restoration of all liberties. Very good, comrades. Ask the Central Committee to insert these terms in its resolution on the Duma Cabinet. In fact, do it yourselves, and then it will read: *before* supporting a Duma, or Cadet, Cabinet, we must demand and secure that the Duma, or Cadets, take the path of revolution. *Before* supporting the Cadets we must demand and secure that the Cadets cease to be Cadets.

Ekho, No. 6,
June 28, 1906

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AMONG NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS

Yesterday we showed that Trepov had no reason to fall out with the Cadets solely because he is on principle opposed to compulsory alienation of land for the benefit of the peasants, once the Cadets agree to the peasants being made to pay a round sum for the alienated land "at a fair valuation". Today, *Slovo*³³ says:

"Agrarian reform is the corner-stone of all the rumours about the formation of a new Cabinet representing the Duma majority. According to the rumours that have reached us from other sources, *the basis on which an agreement may be reached on the question of forming a Duma Cabinet is—the floating of a new loan.*

"The purpose of the loan is primarily to solve the urgent land question. It has been estimated that to solve this problem without having to resort to the undesirable principle of compulsory alienation, two thousand million rubles will be needed. The other half of the loan is to be placed at the absolute disposal of the Ministry of War and the Ministry of the Navy for the purpose of increasing the fighting efficiency of the Army and Navy."

Thus, everything is going smoothly: for two thousand million to compensate the expropriated landlords and others plus two thousand million to be placed at the absolute disposal of the Ministry of War and the Ministry of the Navy, Trepov is willing to put the Cadets in power, and let his principles go hang. It is not a high price he asks, is it, gentlemen of the Cadet Party?

* * *

Nasha Zhizn is very much disturbed at the idea of a new congress of our Party. It is trying to make out that this new congress will be some sort of disaster, a symptom of

some incurable sickness of the Party. "What, another congress!"—it cries in horror. Yes, another congress—as the inevitable way out of the situation in the Party, when the Central Committee and its directives are out of harmony with the opinion of the whole Party. The Party has now been reorganised on democratic lines, and we would ask the democrats of *Nasha Zhizn* how the organised opinion of a democratic party can be expressed if not through a congress. In their newspaper these gentlemen quote the figures published in *Ekho*³⁴ showing the number of organisations and Party members that have expressed opposition to the Central Committee's policy; and yet they are horror-struck at the idea of a congress.

No, the idea of a new congress is not disastrous; it is a symptom of the Party's vitality, a symptom of the strength of public opinion in the Party. It is a sign that the Party is finding a simple and easy way out of the situation that circumstances have created. And we are sure that nobody in the Party, least of all our responsible Cabinet—the Central Committee—will regard a congress as a disaster. For the Party, the convocation of a congress is now a necessity; for the Central Committee it is an obligation; for the Cadets and their yes-men, perhaps, it may be unpleasant. But what can one do! We know that whichever side is victorious at the congress, the congress will be very unpleasant for the bourgeoisie.

* * *

The following is printed in *Golos Truda* (No. 7):

"*Editorial note.* We have received a letter from Comrade K. P—v³⁵ concerning the article by Comrade N. Rakhmetov. We deem it necessary to state that we do not fully share some of Rakhmetov's views, and in particular, we totally disagree with his opinion about 'a political coalition' with the Cadets.

"We allowed Comrade Rakhmetov the right freely to express his views. We ourselves stand by the Amsterdam Resolution,³⁶ and we have made this sufficiently clear and definite in leading articles on the most diverse topics of current politics from the very first day the Constitutional-Democratic Party appeared in the political arena."

We do not know what Comrade K. P—v actually wrote to the editors of *Golos Truda*; but the perplexing thought that

involuntarily rises in one's mind is: Did the editors need this letter to enable them to "understand" N. Rakhmetov's article? If they did understand it without Comrade K. P—v's assistance and did not agree with N. Rakhmetov, how is it that they publish leading articles on matters of principle without indicating that they disagree with them? Moreover, the length of the article—interesting indeed only because of its slashing style and its "extreme" deductions and slogans—must have misled a fairly large number of readers who concluded that the author was in close touch with leading circles in the Party. Nevertheless, our feeling of perplexity is to some extent mingled with a feeling of satisfaction. True, it has taken *Golos Truda* a week to dissociate itself from N. Rakhmetov; but better late than never.

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THE UNSOUND ARGUMENTS OF THE "NON-PARTY" BOYCOTTERS

In a leading article the other day *Mysl* argued that the Trudovik Group in the State Duma must not be "split" by the formation of party groups. The boycott of the Duma, it says, made it a foregone conclusion that the extreme parties would not have their groups in the Duma. The Trudovik Group will be far more useful as a non-party organisation working in conjunction with its local, non-party "supporting groups".

This argument is utterly false. Non-party revolutionism is a necessary and an inevitable phenomenon in the period of a bourgeois-democratic revolution. The Bolshevik Social-Democrats have repeatedly emphasised this. Parties are the result and the political expression of highly developed class antagonisms. The characteristic feature of a bourgeois revolution is that these antagonisms are undeveloped. The growth and expansion of the non-party revolutionary-democratic element is therefore inevitable in such a revolution.

The Social-Democrats, as the representatives of the class-conscious proletariat, cannot pledge themselves not to participate in the activities of the various non-party revolutionary associations. Such for example, were the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, the Peasant Union, and to some extent the Teachers' Union, Railwaymen's Union, etc. We must regard participation in the activities of such associations as a temporary fighting alliance between the Social-Democrats and the revolutionary bourgeois democrats. Only if we look at it in this light can we avoid injury to the vital and fundamental interests of the proletariat, vindicate the absolutely independent socialist point of view of the Marxists, and form

independent Social-Democratic Party organisations wherever there is the slightest opportunity for doing so.

To regard the formation of such independent Social-Democratic organisations as "splitting" the non-party revolutionary organisations is to display, firstly, a purely bourgeois outlook, and secondly, insincerity or shallow thinking in one's claim to be non-party. Only bourgeois ideologists can regard the organisation of socialists in a separate party as a "split". Only those who are insincere, i.e., those who have inward qualms about their own *concealed* bias for a party, or those who have not given sufficient thought to the question, can regard the formation of *party* organisations as the "splitting" of the non-party organisations. It is illogical, gentlemen. To be *non-party* means being neutral towards the different parties (within the limits of the general aims of revolutionary democracy). The condemnation of adherence to a party that is expressed in the word "split", is a departure from neutrality and from being non-party and shows obvious bias for a party. You are either hypocrites, or you cannot think logically, gentlemen. In point of fact your outcry against splits and in favour of non-party organisation is intended to cover up your qualms about *your own* bias for a party. A genuinely non-party advocate of, let us say, a constituent assembly would not regard it as a split if some of those who held the same view formed an independent party, while continuing fully to subscribe to this demand.

Thus, let non-party revolutionaries develop non-party revolutionary organisations. Good luck to them! But let them stop shouting so much about the party revolutionaries who, they allege, are "splitting" the non-party revolutionaries.

Now about the boycott. We are convinced that the boycott was not a blunder. In the concrete historical situation that prevailed at the beginning of 1906 it was necessary and correct. After sweeping away the Bulygin Duma, and after December, it was the duty of the Social-Democrats to continue with equal vigour to hold aloft the banner of struggle for a constituent assembly and to exert *all* efforts to sweep away the Witte Duma too. We performed our revolutionary duty. And despite all calumnies and the belated repentance

of some people, the boycott did a great deal to sustain the revolutionary spirit and Social-Democratic consciousness of the workers. The best criteria of this are: 1) the fact that the rank-and-file workers supported it; 2) the brilliant way in which it was carried out in the particularly oppressed border regions; 3) the fact that the government issued a special law against the boycott.³⁷

The opinion that the boycott was mistaken and useless is wrong and short-sighted. It was useful not only from the moral and political, but also from the immediate and practical point of view. It diverted all the attention and efforts of the government to the struggle against the boycotters. It put the government in a ludicrous and idiotic position that was much to our advantage. The government was compelled to fight *for* the convocation of the Duma and as a consequence, it could pay very little attention to the composition of the Duma. The boycott was, to use a military term, a frontal attack, or a feint frontal attack, without which it would have been *impossible* to outflank the enemy. This is exactly what happened. We revolutionaries made a feint frontal attack, of which the government was mortally afraid, so much so that it passed an incredibly idiotic law. Meanwhile, the liberal bourgeoisie and the non-party revolutionaries took advantage of this frontal attack, which drew the main forces of the enemy to the centre, to start a flanking movement. They got into the enemy's rear and stealthily made their way into the Duma, penetrating the enemy camp in disguise.

Everybody behaves after his own kind. The proletariat fights; the bourgeoisie uses stealth.

Now, too, we put the political responsibility for the Duma that was convened by the camarilla, that is subordinated to the camarilla, and is haggling with the camarilla, *entirely* upon the Cadets. It was our bounden duty to do this because of the dual nature of the composition and activities of the Duma; it has something that we must support, and something that we must strenuously combat! Only bourgeois politicians can forget, or refuse to see, this duality. Only bourgeois politicians can stubbornly ignore the role of the Duma as the instrument of a counter-revolutionary deal between the autocracy and the liberal-monarchist bourgeois-

sie against the proletariat and peasantry. Whether this deal will succeed even temporarily, and what its consequences may be, no one can tell at present. In the last analysis, this will depend on the strength, organisation and political consciousness of the popular movement outside the Duma. That the representatives of the class that is *capable* of making such a deal predominate in the Duma, that negotiations for it are now in progress, and that the first, tentative steps towards it are being taken, are *facts*. No "denials" by the Cadets, nor the silence of the Mensheviks can conceal them.

If that is so—and it certainly is—then it is clear that the interests of the proletarian class struggle imperatively demanded that the proletariat should maintain complete political independence. It had to act differently from the liberal bourgeoisie, which is ready to snatch eagerly at any sop that is thrown to it. It had to warn the people with all the energy at its command against the trap that was being contrived by the camarilla. It had to do all in its power to prevent the convocation of a sham, Cadet, "representative assembly of the people". All this it tried to achieve by means of the boycott.

That is why the arguments of those Right-wing Social-Democrats who, to the amusement of the bourgeoisie, are now repudiating the boycott and denouncing their *own* conduct in the recent past are extremely trivial and amazingly unhistorical. For after all the Mensheviks, too, *were boycotters*; only they wanted to boycott the Duma at a different stage. It is enough to recall *two* historical facts, to forget which would be unpardonable for a Social-Democrat who attaches any value to his past. The *first* fact: the leaflet of the Joint Central Committee of our Party, which consisted of an equal number of Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, plainly stated that both sides agreed with the idea of a boycott and disagreed only about the stage at which it should be carried out. The *second* fact: not a single Menshevik in any Menshevik publication advocated going into the Duma; and even Comrade Plekhanov, who is so "resolute", did not dare to do so. For a Social-Democrat to repudiate the boycott is tantamount to distorting the recent history of the Party.

But does the fact that we boycotted the Duma *necessarily* mean that we must not form our Party Group in the Duma?

Not at all. The boycotters who, like *Mysl*, think so, are mistaken. We were obliged to do—and did—everything in our power to prevent the convocation of a sham representative body. That is so. But since it has been convened in spite of all our efforts, we cannot shirk the task of utilising it. Only bourgeois politicians who care nothing for the revolutionary struggle, and for the struggle for the complete success of the revolution, can see anything illogical in this. Let us recall the example of Liebknecht, who denounced, flayed and spurned the German Reichstag in 1869, but went into the Reichstag after 1870. Liebknecht fully appreciated the importance of the revolutionary struggle for a revolutionary and not a treacherously bourgeois representative assembly of the people. He did not cravenly repudiate his past actions. He quite rightly said: I did all I could to fight against such a Reichstag, to fight for the best possible result. The result turned out to be the worst. I shall be able to make use even of this worst result without betraying my revolutionary traditions.

Thus, the boycott cannot be used to deduce that we must refrain from utilising the Duma, or from forming our Party Group in it. The issue is an entirely different one, namely, that we must exercise the greatest caution (and *this* is the issue that the Bolsheviks raised at the Unity Congress, as anyone can see by reading their draft resolution*). We must consider whether we can utilise the Duma *now* by working inside it; whether we have Social-Democrats who are suitable for this work, and whether the external conditions are favourable for it.

We think that the answer to these questions is in the affirmative. We have had occasion to point out minor mistakes our Duma deputies have made, but on the whole they have adopted a correct position. An alignment *has arisen* in the Duma actually *corresponding* to the revolutionary situation; the Octobrists and the Cadets on the right, the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks (or more correctly, the best of the Trudoviks), on the left. We can and must utilise this alignment to warn the people against the dangerous side of the Cadet Duma, so as to develop a revolutionary

* See present edition, Vol. 10, pp 292-93.—*Ed.*

movement not restricted to the Duma, to Duma tactics, to Duma aims, etc. In view of this alignment we shall—if we manage things properly—also utilise the non-party revolutionary democrats, and at the same time come forward definitely and determinedly as a Social-Democratic, proletarian party.

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THE BOURGEOISIE'S CENSURES AND THE PROLETARIAT'S CALL FOR ACTION

The debate in the State Duma on the reports of the Belostok pogrom is drawing to a close. The government's crimes have been disclosed with the fullest and in some cases, one might say, with pedantic accuracy. The unanimity of the State Duma in condemning the vile conduct of the local *and central* authorities seemed to have been complete. People who are capable of saying that the Duma "combines the struggle of classes into one struggle" might have exulted over such unanimity.

But as soon as matters reached the stage of *practical* conclusions in regard to the measures necessary to *combat* the vile crimes of the gang of pogrom-mongers, this sham and superficial unanimity was at once scattered like dust. It at once became apparent that however much the "struggle of classes is combined into one struggle" the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are pursuing *essentially* different aims in their struggle for emancipation. The bourgeoisie wants to "censure" the government so as to be able to set to work itself to *subdue* the revolution. The proletariat wants to *call* upon the people to wage a revolutionary struggle.

This difference was clearly revealed in the two resolutions that were proposed in connection with the Belostok pogrom. The formula of the bourgeoisie (the Constitutional-Democratic Party): 1) trounces the government; 2) demands the resignation of the Cabinet; and 3) emphasises that "the government is conscious of its *powerlessness* to combat the revolution". The bourgeoisie wants a *strong* government to *combat the revolution*.

The formula of the proletariat (the Social-Democratic Party) is different. It: 1) trounces the government—it is to this “unanimity” of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie that simpletons in politics usually confine their attention; 2) declares that “the *only* way to protect the lives and property of citizens *is by arming the people itself*”; 3) “calls upon the *people* to take the protection of their lives and property *into their own hands*”, and to “*resist* national persecution”.

These two different formulas clearly reveal the difference in the *interests* of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The bourgeoisie wants to extinguish the revolution. The proletariat wants to arm the revolution. The bourgeoisie is long-ing to impeach the bureaucrats. The proletariat is appealing to the justice of the people (“these criminals and *their protectors* will not elude the justice of the people”—as is stated in the motion of our Social-Democratic Group in the Duma). The bourgeoisie is appealing only to *the Ministers*, appealing to them to *yield*. The proletariat is appealing to *the people*, calling them to arm and *resist*.

Our comrades in the Duma have struck the right note on this question. We hope that they will continue to counter-
pose the declarations of the revolutionary proletariat to the
phrase-mongering of the opportunist bourgeoisie as clearly,
distinctly and relentlessly as they have done on this occasion.

THE ARMY AND THE PEOPLE

All the newspapers continue to teem with reports about the movement among the armed forces. It is difficult to calculate now in how many regiments, or military units, there have been unrest and revolts during the two months of the Duma's "work". In regard to military affairs, too, the notorious peaceful parliamentary activity which naïve, not always naïve, by the way, bourgeois politicians have invented, has resulted in methods of struggle and forms of the movement that are by no means peaceful, and by no means parliamentary.

In publishing facts and reports about the movement among the armed forces, our liberal-bourgeois press usually uses this material only for the purpose of intimidating the government. The Cadet newspapers usually argue as follows: the conflagration is spreading. Look out, beware, gentlemen, members of the Cabinet. Yield to us before it is too late. And the Cabinet Ministers retaliate (through the medium of *Novoye Vremya* and other servile newspapers) by trying to intimidate the Cadets. They say: Look, gentlemen, the conflagration is spreading. Come to an understanding with us before it is too late. Both the Cadets and the government regard the movement among the armed forces as proof of the necessity of taking immediate measures to extinguish the revolution. Their short-sighted outlook, which is largely prompted by their selfish interests, prevents them from seeing that this movement is a most important index of the *real* character of our revolution, of its *real* aims. Both the Cadets and the government are each pursuing their own selfish interests in the question of the army. The pogrom-mongers need the army as an instrument for pogroms. The liberal

bourgeoisie needs it to protect the bourgeois monarchy from the "excessive" encroachments and demands of the peasants, and particularly of the workers. The vulgar, hypocritical and false doctrine that "the army must be kept out of politics" is particularly convenient for concealing the true designs of the bourgeoisie in this field.

But look at the character of the unrest in the armed forces, at the demands the soldiers are making. Try to regard the soldiers who risk being shot for "insubordination" as human beings who have their own, independent interests, as part of the people, as men who are expressing the urgent needs of certain classes in our society. You will see that these soldiers—who stand closest to the politically least developed peasantry, who are drilled, downtrodden and browbeaten by the officers—that these "dumb brutes" *are going immeasurably further* in their demands than the Cadet programmes!

The Cadets, and the Cadet Duma, like to claim that they are voicing the demands of the people. Many simpletons believe this. But look at the facts. Look at the demands the broad masses of the people are actually making, at the struggle they are actually waging, and you will see that the Cadets and the Cadet Duma are *curtailing* and distorting the demands of the people.

Look at the facts. The men of the Preobrazhensky Regiment put forward the demand: support the Trudovik Group in the struggle for land and freedom. Please note: not support the Duma, but support the Trudovik Group; the Group which the Cadets accused of "grossly insulting" the State Duma by introducing the Land Bill of the 33 deputies, which proposed to abolish the private ownership of land!³⁸ Obviously, the soldiers are going much further than the Cadets. These "dumb brutes" want *more* than the enlightened bourgeoisie....

An infantry regiment in St. Petersburg demanded the following: "... we soldiers must be allowed to elect our deputies to the State Duma to voice our soldiers' needs." The soldiers do not want to keep out of politics. The soldiers do not agree with the Cadets. The soldiers are advancing a demand that obviously amounts to the abolition of the caste army, of the army that is isolated from the people, and its replacement by an army of free and equal citizens. Now

this is exactly the same thing as the abolition of the standing army and the arming of the people.'

The soldiers in the Warsaw Area are demanding a constituent assembly. They are demanding freedom of assembly and of association *for soldiers* "without the consent or presence of officers". They are demanding that "military service be performed in the soldiers' native districts", the right to wear civilian dress when off duty, and the right to *elect soldiers' representatives* to supervise the soldiers' mess and to act as judges to try offences committed by soldiers.

Does this in any way resemble the Cadets' conception of army reform? Or does it come very close to the institution of a national and fully democratic militia?

The soldiers are voicing the real demands of the people, demands that are common to the overwhelming majority of the people, far better than those gentlemen, the enlightened bourgeoisie. The character and the main features of the movement among the armed forces express far more accurately the essence of the main and fundamental forms of the struggle for emancipation under present conditions than the tactics of the Cadets. The movement of the workers and peasants confirms this even more strongly. Our duty is not to attempt to squeeze this movement into the narrow limits of paltry Cadet politics, not to degrade it by adapting it to fit paltry Cadet slogans, but to support, expand and develop it in the spirit of genuine, consistent, determined and militant democracy.

AMONG NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS

Those gentlemen, the Cadets, continue innocently to "fail to understand". And perhaps the one who most stubbornly of all persists in "failing to understand" is Mr. Izgoyev. In a tone of injured innocence he expresses his indignation at "Messrs. the Bolsheviki" on account of their attacks against the Cadets.

"The party of 'people's freedom' will never deceive anybody. Nobody has a right to demand of it more than is indicated in the programme and tactics that have been approved by party congresses. The programme and tactics contain no mention of an armed uprising or the overthrow of the monarchy. The Bolsheviki must reckon with the party that actually exists; and it is somewhat strange that they should be angry with people who tell them the truth, and who refuse to act as they dictate."

But, Mr. Izgoyev, we *are* "reckoning with the party that actually exists". Do you continue to "fail to understand"? But the matter is so simple: for a bourgeois party, the *programme* of the "party of people's freedom" is not at all bad. Please note that we are saying this quite seriously.

There (*in the programme*, Mr. Izgoyev!) one finds, for example, the demand for free speech, freedom of assembly, and quite a number of good things. But this has not prevented the Cadets from drafting repressive Bills *against* free speech, *against* freedom of assembly, and against the other good things.

Well, now about tactics....

True, party congresses have approved of the tactics of "with a shield, or on a shield"; "death with glory, or death with shame". But outside of congresses, in actual politics, the Cadets' tactics smack of something entirely different.

You are opposed to an armed uprising? You have a perfect right to be, gentlemen. But you claim that you are in favour of *inflexible, relentless opposition*; you claim that you want power to be transferred to the people under a monarch who will reign, but not govern. Why then are you *haggling* for ministerial portfolios? So you see, Mr. Izgoyev; we *are* "reckoning with the party that actually exists", and not with one that merely exists on paper. If you were *really* fighting on the lines laid down by your programme and tactics, which have been "approved by party congresses", we would talk to you in entirely different terms.

Mr. Izgoyev's article contains many other curiosities. But speaking generally, it is the literary property of Comrade A. L.—y³⁹ and we do not intend to encroach upon it.

Ekho, No. 10,
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ORGANISATION OF THE MASSES AND CHOICE OF THE MOMENT FOR STRUGGLE ⁴⁰

In this issue we publish an article by Comrade Khrustalev on the question of whether it is now opportune to form Soviets of Workers' Deputies. Needless to say, the author's name is a guarantee of his intimate knowledge of the subject. All St. Petersburg workers are aware of this. They are also aware that at this particular moment the proletariat in the capital is very keenly interested in the question whether a Soviet of Workers' Deputies should be formed.

Under these circumstances, Comrade Khrustalev's polemic against the decision of the St. Petersburg Committee of our Party assumes immense importance.

We cannot agree with Comrade Khrustalev. He is quite wrong in defending the idea of Soviets of Workers' Deputies in general, and their historical role at the end of 1905, against the St. Petersburg Committee, as it were. He is wrong in refusing to place December to the Soviet's account. We would do so without hesitation; but we, of course, would place it on the "asset" and not on the "liability" side. In our opinion, the greatest merit of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, and the one that is still far from being fully appreciated, is the militant role they played.

But the Soviet of Workers' Deputies was a *special type* of fighting organisation; and platitudes about the utility of organisation will not help in the least to throw light on the question of the utility of forming this *special type* of organisation at the *present* moment. "The Soviet was the revolutionary parliament of the revolutionary proletariat," writes Comrade Khrustalev. Quite right. It is this role, which is by no means confined to the technique of fighting,

that is characteristic of the Soviet. Its functions, as the organiser of trade unions, as the initiator of inquiries, as a Conciliation Board, and so forth, were quite subsidiary and secondary. One can easily conceive of these functions being fulfilled without a Soviet. But one can hardly conceive of a general strike without a mass, non-party, strike committee. The Soviet was called into being by the requirements of the *direct* mass struggle, and as an organ of that struggle. That is a fact. It is this fact alone that explains the *special type* of role and the actual significance of the Soviet. And it is to this fact that the word "militant" in the resolution of the St. Petersburg Committee refers.

No one would dream of setting up a Soviet of Workers' Deputies to institute inquiries, to form trade unions, and so forth. *Forming Soviets means forming organs of the direct mass struggle of the proletariat.* These cannot be formed at any time; whereas trade unions and political parties are *always and absolutely* necessary. They can and should be formed under all circumstances. It is a profound mistake, therefore, to answer the St. Petersburg Committee by referring to the importance of organisation in general. For the same reason it is also a mistake to refer to the fact that all Social-Democrats support the idea of forming peasant land committees. These committees are being proposed *in connection* with the country-wide discussion of the agrarian reform, *in connection* with the agrarian movement that is already growing.

But these committees also may lead to "premature" action!—says Comrade Khrustalev ironically. The whole point, however, is that at the present time there is an important difference between peasant actions and workers' actions. A broad peasant action *cannot* be "premature" at the present time; but a broad workers' action may be very much so. The reason for this is clear. In political development the working class is *ahead of* the peasantry; and the peasantry has *not yet caught up with* the working class in preparedness for nation-wide revolutionary action. It has been catching up with the working class since December, and to a large extent as a result of December (no matter what timid pedants may say who are prone to underestimate the importance of December, or even to repudiate December).

It will catch up with the working class *still faster* with the aid of local land committees. It is certainly useful to urge on the rearguard that did not succeed in coming to the assistance of the vanguard in the previous battle; and there is nothing risky in that. But it is very risky to urge on the vanguard which did not get the assistance of the rearguard in the previous battle; and we must think very carefully before doing so.

Now it is this peculiar political situation that, in our opinion, Comrade Khrustalev has not taken into account. He is a thousand times right in his appraisal of the merits and importance of Soviets in general. But he is wrong in his estimate of the present situation and of the relation between peasant actions and workers' actions. He has apparently forgotten another proposal made by the St. Petersburg Committee in another resolution, viz., to support the idea of forming an Executive Committee representing the Left groups in the Duma for the purpose of co-ordinating the activities of the free organisations of the people.* Such a committee could determine more accurately the degree of readiness and determination of the peasantry as a whole, and consequently put the question of forming Soviets of Workers' Deputies on a practical basis. In other words: the St. Petersburg Committee is now aiming at something more: not only to form militant organisations of the proletariat, but also to *co-ordinate* them with the militant organisations of the peasantry, etc. The St. Petersburg Committee is *postponing* the formation of Soviets of Workers' Deputies at the present time, not because it fails to appreciate their enormous importance, but because it is making allowance for another, new *condition for success* that is now coming very much to the fore, namely, joint action of the revolutionary peasants and workers. Thus, the St. Petersburg Committee is not committing itself, and is not determining the tactics of the future beforehand. The St. Petersburg Committee is at *this moment* advising the vanguard: Do not go into battle, but first of all send a delegation to the rearguard; tomorrow the rearguard will have drawn up closer, and the as-

* See present edition, Vol. 10, p. 515.—Ed.

sault on the enemy will be more vigorous; tomorrow we shall be in a position to issue a more timely slogan for action.

To conclude. Speaking generally, Comrade Khrustalev has advanced very convincing arguments in favour of forming Soviets. He has appraised their general importance excellently. His main purpose was to combat those who belittle the role of the Soviets, and the importance of revolutionary actions in general. In this Comrade Khrustalev was quite right. There are not a few "belittlers" of this sort, and they are not only to be found among the Cadets. But Comrade Khrustalev, lacking permanent and close contacts with the proletariat—owing to the efforts of the hangmen and pogrom-mongers—has not fully appreciated the *present situation* and the *present* "disposition" of the revolutionary forces. *Today*, the vanguard must concentrate attention not on immediate action, but on consolidating and extending the closest contacts with the rearguard and with all the other units.

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AMONG NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS

Our observations in *Ekho*, No. 9, on the historical role of the boycott and on the significance of non-party revolutionary organisations* have evoked characteristic replies from the extreme Right and the extreme Left wing of the bourgeois democrats.

As was to be expected, *Mysl* was offended by our use of the term "bourgeois democrats" and angrily evades the main issue. It writes:

"*Ekho* even finds 'bourgeois democrats' in the 'Soviets of Workers' Deputies', which are purely proletarian class organisations.... One can hardly go further than that."

You radical gentlemen must remember that most of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies did not remain "purely proletarian". They very often accepted delegates from soldiers, sailors, office employees and peasants. Would it not be better to tell us *candidly* why you don't like the term "bourgeois democrats" instead of avoiding disagreements by quibbling?

Rech is quite beside itself with rage. In their opening remarks against us the Cadets handle us with kid gloves, as it were, "not desiring to say anything offensive". What perfect gentlemen! But towards the end these Cadets swear like ... like troopers. Our appraisal of the boycott is dubbed "clownish, or impenetrable stupidity". Oh, what gentlemen these Cadets are!

Rech writes:

* See pp. 77-82 of this volume.—Ed.

"At all events, let us place on record that *the object* of the Bolshevik tactics was to fight for the convocation of the Duma. And the *object* of all this beating the breast and shouting about the necessity of a boycott was to mislead the government."

Stop joking, gentlemen! You know perfectly well that our idea was quite different. The object of the boycott was to sweep away the Witte Duma, just as the Bulygin Duma was swept away. Although it failed to achieve *its own*, i. e., its direct and immediate object, the boycott nevertheless was *indirectly* of advantage in that, among other things, it distracted the attention of the government. In this case, too, as always, revolutionary tactics were the best means of developing the class-consciousness and fighting efficiency of the proletariat, and of indirectly ensuring the achievement of half-hearted reforms in the event of failure to achieve complete victory.

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A BOLD ASSAULT AND A TIMID DEFENCE

It has long been known that the reactionaries are bold and that the liberals are cowards.

New confirmation of this ancient truth is provided by the Cadets' draft of the State Duma's appeal to the people on the question of the land. Unfortunately, the Trudoviks' draft is no better than that of the Cadets. This time the Trudoviks are quite helplessly trailing behind the liberal bourgeoisie. But there are the Social-Democrats in the Duma; will they not come to the rescue?

Recall how this question of the State Duma appealing to the people arose. In its reply to the address from the throne the State Duma expressed itself in favour of the compulsory alienation of the private estates for the benefit of the peasantry. The Goremykin Cabinet concisely, clearly and with magnificent firmness and determination answered: "*Impermissible.*"

But the Cabinet did not confine itself to this gruff, police-official refusal. No, the Cabinet Ministers have learned something from the revolution. The Cabinet Ministers do not intend to confine their duties to making formal replies to formal questions of the Duma. The reactionaries are not formalists, they are practical men. They know that the real power is not the Duma, but the people. They want to carry their propaganda *to the people*. Without wasting precious time, they forthwith drew up an *appeal to the people*. It was this government communication (of June 20) that suggested the idea of the Duma appealing to the people. The government showed the way, the Duma trailed behind the government, as it was incapable of being the first to take a course worthy of a genuine representative assembly of the people.

How was the government's communication framed? Like a real fighting manifesto of the reactionary monarchist party. Oh, the reactionaries are not bashful in the least! They know how to write in militant terms. In their "communication" they plainly speak in the name of the *government*. Indeed, why should they stand on ceremony? The liberal professors claim that we are living under a constitutional system and that the Duma is also a part of the government. Let the professors chatter! Let them amuse the people with their constitutional antics! We reactionaries are practical men. We know that, *in fact*, we are the government. We say so plainly. As for the quibbles and formalism of these liberal pedants, we don't care a fig for them. We say plainly and openly: peasants, you don't know what is good for you. Compulsory alienation is no good to you; and we, the government, *will not allow* it. All the peasant talk about the land is lies and deception. It is the government that takes most care of the peasants. Even now it is ready to offer them sops. But the peasants have got to understand that they cannot expect improvements to come from "sedition and violence"; they can be obtained only by "peaceful labour" (they should have added: for the landlords) and as a result of the constant care our autocratic government takes of the peasants.

Such was the gist of the government's communication. It is an actual declaration of war on the revolution. It is an actual manifesto of the reactionary autocracy saying to the people: We shall tolerate no nonsense! We shall crush you!

And now the Cadets, and the Trudoviks who this time are in complete captivity to them, have set about answering the government's challenge. The draft replies of the Cadets and the Trudoviks have been published today. What a miserable, truly pitiful impression these two drafts create!

The reactionary camarilla does not hesitate to break the law and to declare that what is formally only a *small part* of the government is the real and *entire* government. The Cadets and Trudoviks like Shchedrin's sapient gudgeons,⁴¹ take shelter in the reeds of the law. They are hitting us with lawlessness, say these snivelling "people's", if you please, representatives, but we are defending ourselves with the law! The Duma, acting in accordance with the law,

expresses itself in favour of compulsory alienation. According to the law "no proposal of the government can come into force" without the consent of the Duma. We, in accordance with the law, have appointed a committee, a big one, of 99 members⁴².... This committee is drafting "a carefully considered and properly framed law".... Let the people "peacefully and quietly await the conclusion of the work of promulgating this law" (the Trudoviks deleted this utterly, indecently abject concluding sentence! Their consciences pricked them. But they inserted instead a statement about organising "local land institutions", *treacherously remaining silent* about the fact that the Duma, in other words, its Cadet majority, avowedly wants these institutions to be *landlord and bureaucratic* organisations).

For shame, gentlemen, representatives of the people! It is disgraceful for you to pretend that you do not understand what every Russian muzhik even in the remotest village now understands, namely, that in Russia today there is a wide gulf between laws on paper and the facts of life; that it is *impossible* for the transfer of all the land to the peasants and complete freedom for all the people to be achieved by the peaceful means of allegedly-constitutional and strictly legal efforts. If you lack the courage to write as firmly as the camarilla, and to utter your revolutionary truth as candidly, in answer to its reactionary *truth*, you should not have undertaken to reply to the Cabinet. The laws governing the Duma do not provide for an appeal to the people. That being so, oh wise men of the law, keep to your "interpellations" and do not meddle in a field where you have neither the courage, nor the straightforwardness, nor the ability to compete with the reactionaries, who are practical men and know how to fight!

And if you do draw up an appeal to the people you must write the truth, the whole truth, the bitter and unvarnished truth. You must say to the people:

Peasants! The Cabinet has issued its appeal to you. The Cabinet Ministers do not want to give you either land or freedom. The Cabinet Ministers brazenly speak in the name of the whole government; they speak against the Duma, although on paper the Duma is supposed to be part of the government.

Peasants! The Cabinet Ministers are in actual fact the autocratic government of Russia. They don't care a fig for your people's representatives in the Duma; they jeer at them and delay everything by their police-lawyer quibbling. They mock at the demands of the people and, as if nothing had happened, continue their policy of murder, violence, plunder and pogroms.

Peasants! You must know that the Duma is powerless to give you land and freedom. The Duma is tied hand and foot by the laws of the police government. You must secure that the representatives of the people have full power, all the power of the state, in their hands. Do you want land and freedom? If you do, then secure the convocation of a national constituent assembly, secure the complete abolition of the old regime all over the country, secure complete freedom of elections!

Peasants! Know that you will never be free unless you free yourselves. The workers understood this, and by their struggles compelled the government to yield the concessions of October 17. And you, too, must understand it. Only when you do so will you be a revolutionary people, that is, a people that knows what it must fight for, a people that knows how to fight, a people that knows how to vanquish its oppressors. Utilise your deputies in the Duma, those who represent you in the Duma; unite more closely and solidly all over Russia and prepare for a great struggle. Without a fight you will get neither land nor freedom. Without a fight you will have ruinous redemption payments forcibly foisted upon you; you will have foisted upon you land committees consisting of landlords and bureaucrats who will deceive and rob you as they did in 1861.⁴³

Peasants! We are doing all we can for you in the Duma. But you must complete the job yourselves if you really want conditions in Russia to be different from what they are now, even though there is a Duma.

* * *

But it would be ridiculous to propose such an appeal in the Duma.

But would it? Is it not more ridiculous to write "appeals to the people" in the stilted language of the hidebound Rus-

sian lawyers that the Cadets and (to their shame be it said) the Trudoviks use? Do the people exist for the Duma, or does the Duma exist for the people? Is freedom to exist for the Duma, or is the Duma to serve the cause of freedom?

* * *

Let the Cadets' appeal, the Trudoviks' appeal and our appeal be read at any peasant meeting! We will hear what the peasants say in answer to the question: Who is right?

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THE PARTIES IN THE DUMA AND THE PEOPLE

Yesterday's debate in the Duma on the appeal to the people provides extremely valuable material for the political education of the broad masses.

The question of appealing to the people proved to be such a vital one that the intrinsic nature of the different political parties was revealed with a clarity that left nothing to be desired. On this question the Duma found itself as if in a vice between the reactionary autocracy ("the government's communication") and the revolutionary people, whose struggle outside the Duma forced itself, one might say, through every chink and crevice of the Taurida Palace.^{*} From the moment it opened, the debate irresistibly swung over from formalities and details to the very core of the question.

Why appeal to the people? This is the question that eminently confronted the Duma. It coloured the whole debate. It raised the whole debate to the plane on which we formulated the question in yesterday's leading article,^{*} i.e., the issue became: To reply to the fighting statement of the Cabinet with a fighting statement of the Duma? To make no reply at all? Or to try to smooth out differences and soften the acuteness of the issue, an acuteness created by life itself.

The battle was opened by the Right wing in the Duma. The Right-wing Cadet Petrazhitsky, tried to secure the adjournment of the debate. Naturally the Octobrists supported this Right-wing Cadet. It became obvious that the counter-revolution was afraid of the Duma appealing to the people.

^{*} See pp. 96-100 of this volume.—*Ed.*

By its definite stand the reaction helped to rally the whole Left wing of the Duma. The proposal to adjourn the debate was defeated. The debate itself very distinctly revealed the three main trends in the Duma. The "Rights" (the Octobrists and a section of the Cadets) were in favour of "pacifying" the peasant movement and therefore *opposed* to any appeal. The "Centre" (the Cadets and probably the majority of the non-party deputies) were in favour of "pacifying" the peasant movement and were therefore *in favour* of issuing a *pacifying* appeal. The "Left" trend (the Trudoviks, evidently only a section of them, and the Social-Democrats) were in favour of explaining to the people that they *cannot* "wait peacefully and passively", and were therefore in favour of a *revolutionary* and not a "pacifying" appeal.

The views of this last trend were most vividly expressed by the Trudovik Zhilkin, the Polish deputy Lednitsky and the Social-Democrat Ramishvili. "The people are clinging to their last, almost childish, hopes," said Zhilkin. "I am not speaking about peace, order and tranquillity; I am speaking about the organised struggle against the old regime.... Did the State Duma come into being as the result of peace and tranquillity?" And, recalling the October struggle, the speaker, amidst the applause of the Left, exclaimed: "It is due to these 'disorders' that we are here today." "In this general sense," rightly said the speaker, "the committee's draft of the appeal to the people is very unsatisfactory" (but he should have added: the Trudoviks' draft is also unsatisfactory for it does not contain the ideas and theses that Zhilkin outlined in his speech). "We must emphasise and at the end express the idea that not peace and tranquillity, but unrest in the good and grand sense of the term can organise the masses...."

Lednitsky even employed one of the sharpest expressions that we employed yesterday, and said that the proposed appeal was "*pitiiful*". And Ramishvili, protesting "against calling upon the people to wait peacefully and quietly for a solution of the problem", declared: "*The revolutionary path is the only true path*" (we are quoting from the report in *Nasha Zhizn*). He also urged that the Duma should say that the land must be transferred *without redemption payments*.

Most of the Cadet and "non-party" speakers were in favour of a "pacifying" appeal; they condemned the taking of revolutionary steps (Kotlyarevsky answering Lednitsky) and argued that an appeal was useful "from the point of view of the landowners" (the Cadet Yakushkin).

The Black Hundred Volkonsky, backed by Skirmunt and the Right Cadet Petrazhitzky, argued that the appeal was "dangerous" and likely to ignite the flames of revolution; and he referred to the *law* in accordance with which the Land Bill had to be passed by the Duma, then sent to the Council of State, etc., etc., etc.

The trends were excellently delineated. Once again it was revealed that the Cadets are vacillating between reaction and revolution; between the old regime and the people. Once again events have proved how short-sighted and stupid are the tactics of "supporting the Cadets", tactics which can only weaken the revolutionary position of the Social-Democrats and the revolutionary democrats in the Duma. Once again events have proved that by acting independently the Social-Democrats can win over to their side a section of the Trudoviks and to some extent even split the Cadets.

The political situation itself is irresistibly determining the tactics of the Social-Democratic Party. In spite of the efforts of the Right-wing Social-Democrats, up to now there has *not resulted* any support of the Cadets, but what has resulted, fortunately, is an independent policy of the proletariat backed by a section of the peasant deputies. The outcome has not been the artificial division, invented by the opportunists: the Rights versus the combined Cadets, Trudoviks and Social-Democrats. The outcome has been a *revolutionary* division: the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks against the Rights, with the Cadets swaying like reeds.

Unfortunately, our Social-Democratic deputies did not take full advantage of the extremely favourable situation. During the general debate they should certainly have introduced *their own* Social-Democratic draft of an appeal to the people. Only in that case would their policy have been definitively and completely the *independent* policy of the representatives of the *class* party of the proletariat, as the *vanguard* of the revolution. Only in that case would the correct ideas expressed by Ramishvili, Zhilkin and Lednitsky not

have been submerged in the debate, but would have been combined, fixed and formulated in a clear and resolute platform of revolutionary Social-Democracy.

We can only express the wish that our Social-Democratic Group in the Duma will learn the lessons of the groupings that are more and more often occurring in the Duma, and more resolutely pursue an absolutely independent proletarian policy; that when the draft appeal is discussed paragraph by paragraph they will at least to some extent rectify matters by proposing their own independent amendments couched in consistently revolutionary terms.

A Social-Democratic draft of an appeal to the people, even if it remains only a draft read in the Duma, will have an extremely valuable effect in uniting and developing the revolutionary struggle, and will win over to the side of Social-Democracy the finest elements of the revolutionary peasantry.

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CONSPIRACIES OF REACTION AND THREATS OF THE POGROM-MONGERS

The newspaper *Rossiya*⁴⁵ is subsidised by the pogrom-mongers' government as a vehicle for the views of this government.

In connection with the Duma's draft appeal to the people this government newspaper is adopting a very threatening tone. It wants to intimidate the Duma by showing that the proposed course of action is illegal as well as "irrational", "revolutionary", etc. Today the Cadet *Rech* has completely changed front and is pronouncing against the appeal, obviously frightened by the threats emanating from the press that cringes before the government.

And there are threats in abundance. *Rossiya* today writes as follows on the subject of a Cadet Cabinet: "If it had been suggested to Vladimir Krasnoye Solnyshko that the administration of Rus should be entrusted to Solovei the Robber as a way of ensuring order, he would probably have proposed a simpler way—by putting an end to Solovei the Robber with the help of Ilya Muromets."⁴⁶ *That, as is well known, proved effective."*

This Ilya Muromets who is preparing to "put an end" to the revolution in Russia turns out to be no other than the *international army of counter-revolution*. In an article "The Foreign Powers and the Situation in Russia" (*Rossiya*, No. 170) the government newspaper, not from naivety but with the same aim of intimidation, *expounds* the problem of active intervention by foreign powers in Russian internal affairs.

This exposition of the government sheet is highly instructive and useful. The international counter-revolution is

paying close attention to Russia, is rallying and preparing forces against her "in case of need". "The imperial German Government," writes *Rossiia*, "is fully aware of this situation [viz., that "the present state of affairs in Russia is primarily the result of the influence of revolutionary elements abroad"] and, consequently, it has taken a number of appropriate measures which will not fail to have the desired results."

These measures consist in preparing the armed forces of Germany, together with Austria, for an invasion of Russia if the cause of freedom triumphs or is about to triumph. The Berlin Government has already communicated with the Austrian Government on this matter. Both of them have recognised that "under certain conditions active intervention in the internal affairs of Russia with the aim of suppressing or limiting this [i. e., the revolutionary] movement might be desirable and useful". At the same time it was established that intervention required a direct and clearly expressed wish on the part of the Russian Government.

Three army corps have been concentrated in Austria, in Galicia, and on the Russian frontier, where it is feared that there is a possibility also of the spread of an agrarian movement of the Russian type. On June 26, the Governor of Galicia, who is also a Russian landlord, even issued a proclamation warning the population that all disturbances would be suppressed with the utmost severity.

Hence there can be no doubt about the conspiracy of the international counter-revolution. The Russian Government is calling on the aid of foreign troops against the Russian people. Negotiations about this have been conducted and will be conducted, and they have already led to a quite definite agreement.

Let the workers and peasants know then that the government is betraying the country in order to ensure the rule of the gang of pogrom-mongers. So it was and so it always will be. History teaches us that the ruling classes have always been ready to sacrifice everything, absolutely everything: religion, liberty and homeland, if it was a question of crushing a revolutionary movement of the oppressed classes.

There is not the slightest doubt that the Russian pogrom-mongering rulers too will act in the same way and that they are already preparing to do so.

But the workers and peasants should not be afraid of such action. The Russian Government has its international reserve: the reactionary governments of Germany, Austria and other countries. But we too have our powerful international reserve: the socialist proletariat of Europe, organised in the three million-strong party in Germany, in the powerful parties of all the European countries. We welcome the appeal of our government to the international reserve of reaction: such an appeal will, in the first place, open the eyes of the most ignorant people in Russia and do us a valuable service by destroying faith in the monarchy, and, in the second place, such an appeal will better than anything else extend the basis and field of action of the Russian revolution by converting it into a world revolution.

All right, Mr. Trepov & Co.! Open fire! Call on your Austrian and German regiments against the Russian peasants and workers! We are for an extension of the struggle, we are for an international revolution!

* * *

But in appraising the *general* significance of the international conspiracy the petty, *partial* aims of the Russian pogrom-mongers should not be overlooked. We have already pointed out that the articles in *Rossiia* were not due to naivety. *Mysl* is mistaken in thinking so. It is not "naivety", not "cynicism", and not "garrulity". It is a calculated *threat to the Cadets*. The pogrom-mongers' government is afraid of a Duma manifesto to the people and *threatens the Cadets*: "Don't dare to do it! If you do, I shall dissolve the Duma and call on the Austrian and German regiments! I have already made preparations."

The Cadet simpletons have already shown the white feather and basely turned back, as today's *Rech* has shown. It suffices to threaten the Cadets—and the Cadets are ready to retreat....

The proletariat is not frightened by the wretched threats of the pogrom-mongers' government. The proletariat maintains its *independent* fighting position and does not allow itself to be scared by the bogey of a frightened Cadet.

Once more: Open fire, Mr. Trepov! Extend the revolutionary field of battle! The international proletariat will not be found wanting!

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**THE DISSOLUTION OF THE DUMA
AND THE
TASKS OF THE PROLETARIAT "**

Written in July 1906

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the pamphlet text**

The dissolution of the Duma confronts the workers' party with a number of questions of very great importance. Let us note the foremost of these: (1) the general estimate of this political event in the course of our revolution; (2) the definition of the content of the further struggle and of the slogans under which it must be carried on; (3) the definition of the form of this future struggle; (4) the choice of the moment for the struggle, or, more correctly, an appraisal of the conditions that could help in the correct choice of the moment.

We shall deal briefly with these questions.

I

The dissolution of the Duma has most strikingly and clearly confirmed the views of those who warned against being obsessed with the external "constitutional" aspect of the Duma and, if one may so express it, with the constitutional surface of Russian politics during the second quarter of 1906. Experience has now exposed the hollowness of the "mighty words" so volubly uttered by our Cadets (and Cadetophiles) before the Duma, about the Duma and in connection with the Duma.

Note this interesting fact: the Duma has been dissolved *on strictly constitutional grounds*. It has not been "dispersed". There has been no infringement of the law. On the contrary, it has been done strictly in accordance with the law, as under any "constitutional monarchy". The supreme power has dissolved the Chamber on the basis of the "constitution". On the basis of such-and-such an article, the present "Chamber" has been dissolved, *and by the same ukase* (rejoice,

you legalists!) new elections, or the date of convening a new Duma, have been authorised.

But this is the very thing that has at once exposed the illusory character of the Russian constitution, the fictitious nature of our native parliamentarism, which the Left-wing Social-Democrats so persistently pointed out throughout the first half of 1906. And now this special character of the Russian constitution has been admitted, not by "narrow-minded and fanatical" "Bolsheviks", but by the most peaceful liberal legalists, and they have admitted it *by their conduct*. The Cadets have admitted it by replying to the dissolution of the Duma by a mass "flight abroad", to Vyborg, and by a manifesto which violates the law⁴⁸; they have admitted it by replying through articles in the very moderate *Rech*, which is forced to admit that *in fact* it is a matter of the restoration of the autocracy, and that Suvorin inadvertently blurted out the truth when he wrote that it was hardly likely he would live to see another Duma.⁴⁹ All the hopes of the Cadets have suddenly switched from "constitution" to revolution, and all this happened as the result of a single, strictly constitutional act of the supreme power. And only yesterday the Cadets boasted in the Duma that they were the "shield of the dynasty" and supporters of strict constitutionalism.

The logic of life is stronger than the logic of textbooks on constitutional law. Revolution teaches.

Everything the "Bolshevik" Social-Democrats have written about the Cadet victories has been brilliantly confirmed. (Cf. the pamphlet, *The Victory of the Cadets and the Tasks of the Workers' Party*, by N. Lenin.*) All the bias and shortsightedness of the Cadets have become obvious. Constitutional illusions—that "bogey" the raising of which was the mark of the die-hard Bolsheviks—are now seen by all to be nothing but illusions, a phantom, a mirage.

"There is no Duma!" *Moskovskije Vedomosti*⁵⁰ and *Grazhdanin*⁵¹ cry out in a wild frenzy of delight. "There is no constitution!" sadly repeat the Cadets, those subtle connoisseurs of our constitution, who used to quote it so cleverly,

* See present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 199-276.—Ed.

to gloat so much over its clauses. The Social-Democrats will neither exult (we made some use even of the Duma) nor lose heart. The people has gained—they will say—by losing one of its illusions.

Yes, in the person of the Cadet Party, the whole of the Russian people is being taught a lesson, learning it not from books, but from its own revolution, one which it itself is making. We said on one occasion that in the person of the Cadets the people is ridding itself of its first illusions of bourgeois emancipation, and that in the person of the Trudoviks it is freeing itself of its last illusions of bourgeois emancipation.* The Cadets dreamed of emancipation from serfdom, tyranny, arrogance, Asiatic despotism, autocracy, *without* the overthrow of the old regime. The limited aspirations of the Cadets have already suffered bankruptcy. The Trudoviks dream of freeing the masses from poverty, from the exploitation of man by man, *without* destroying the commodity economy; they will yet suffer bankruptcy, and in the very near future too, if our revolution leads to the complete victory of our revolutionary peasants.

The rapid rise of the Cadet Party, their intoxicating victories at the elections, their triumph in the Cadet Duma, their sudden collapse from a single stroke of the pen of the "beloved monarch" (who, one might say, spat in Rodichev's face while the latter was assuring him of his love)—all these are events of serious political significance; they all mark stages in the revolutionary development of the *people*. In 1906, the people, i.e., the broad mass of the population, had not yet, as a mass, grown up so far as to be consciously revolutionary. The consciousness that the autocracy was intolerable had become general, and so too had the consciousness of the worthlessness of the government of bureaucrats and of the need for a representative assembly of the people. But the people could not yet realise and appreciate that a representative assembly of the people *with power* was incompatible with the continued existence of the old regime. For this, it turned out, a special

* See present edition, Vol. 10, p. 459.—*Ed.*

experience was still needed, the experience of the Cadet Duma.

During its short span of life, the Cadet Duma *vividly* demonstrated to the people the difference between a representative assembly of the people *without power* and one *with power*. Our slogan, a constituent assembly (i.e., a representative assembly of the people *with full power*), has been proved to be a thousand times right, but life, i.e., the revolution, has brought us towards it by a longer and more complex road than we were able to foresee.

Cast a general glance at the main stages of the great Russian revolution and you will see how, *through experience*, the people, step by step, approached the slogan of a constituent assembly. First we have the period of "confidence" at the end of 1904. The liberals are in raptures. They occupy the entire foreground. Some not very steadfast Social-Democrats even speak of the *two* main forces of the moment: the liberals and the government. But the *people* become imbued with the idea of "confidence". On January 9 the people "confidently" go to the Winter Palace. The period of "confidence" brings to the front a *third* force, the proletariat, and lays the basis for the people's utter *lack of confidence* in the autocratic government. The period of "confidence" ends by the people refusing to believe the government's *talk* about "confidence".

The next stage. The Bulygin Duma is promised. Confidence is confirmed by action. Representatives of the people are being convened. The liberals are in raptures and call for participation in the elections. The liberal professors, as befits these "ideological" lackeys of the bourgeoisie, call upon the students to go on with their studies and not to meddle with revolution. Some not very steadfast Social-Democrats succumb to the arguments of the liberals. The people appear on the scene. By the October strike the proletariat sweeps away the Bulygin Duma and seizes liberty, gaining the Manifesto, which is quite constitutional in form and content. The people learn by experience that it is not enough to obtain a promise of liberty, one must also *have the strength to seize* liberty.

Next. In December the government annuls the liberties. The proletariat rises. The first uprising is defeated. But the

stubborn and desperate armed fighting in the streets of Moscow makes the summoning of the Duma unavoidable. The boycott organised by the proletariat fails. The proletariat proves to be too weak to overthrow the Witte Duma. The Cadets fill its benches. The representative assembly of the people is an accomplished fact. The Cadets are in raptures. There is no limit to their cries of delight. The proletariat waits sceptically.

The Duma begins its work. The people make ten times more use of the slight extension of liberties than the Cadets. In spirit and determination the Cadet Duma is at once found to be *lagging behind* the people. The period of the Cadet Duma (May and June 1906) proves to be a period of the greatest successes for the parties to the *Left* of the Cadets: the Trudoviks outstrip the Cadets in the Duma; at public meetings the Cadets are censured for their timidity; the Social-Democratic and Socialist-Revolutionary press gains ground; the revolutionary peasant movement grows stronger; there is unrest in the army; the proletariat, which had been exhausted by the December events, recovers. The period of Cadet constitutionalism proves to be the period, not of a Cadet and not of a constitutional movement, but of a revolutionary movement.

This movement *compels* the government to dissolve the Duma. Experience proves that the Cadets are merely "froth". Their strength is derived from the strength of the revolution. And to the revolution the government retaliates by the essentially revolutionary (though in form constitutional) act of dissolving the Duma.

The people are becoming convinced *by experience* that a representative assembly of the people is *naught* if it does not have full power, if it is convened by the old regime, if the old regime remains intact side by side with it. The objective course of events is now bringing to the fore, not the question of how laws, or the constitution, are to be worded, but the question of *power*, of real power. All laws and all deputies are *naught* if they possess no power. That is what the Cadet Duma *has taught* the people. Let us then sing praises to the eternal memory of the deceased, and take full advantage of the lesson it has taught.

II

We are thus brought face to face with the second question, viz., the objective, historically dictated content of the impending struggle, and the slogans which we must provide for it.

Here, too, the not very steadfast Social-Democrats, the Mensheviks, have vacillated. Their first slogan was: *fight for the resumption of the Duma sessions* for the purpose of convening a constituent assembly. The St. Petersburg Committee protested against this. The absurdity of this slogan is too obvious. It is not even opportunism, it is sheer nonsense. The Central Committee made a step forward with the slogan: *fight against the government in defence of the Duma for the purpose of convening a constituent assembly*. This, of course, is better. It is not far removed from the slogan: *fight for the overthrow of the autocratic government* in order to convene a constituent assembly in a revolutionary way. The dissolution of the Duma undoubtedly provides the grounds for a nation-wide struggle for a representative assembly of the people *with power*; in this sense the slogan "in defence of the Duma" is not entirely unacceptable. But the whole point is that *in this sense* this slogan is already implied by our acceptance of the dissolution of the Duma as the *grounds* for a struggle. Without the special interpretation of it in *this* sense (i. e., in the sense just mentioned) the formula "in defence of the Duma" remains obscure and is liable to create misunderstanding and to bring us back to the somewhat obsolete past, to the *Cadet* Duma. In short, this formula gives rise to a number of incorrect and harmful "retrograde" ideas. What is correct in it is wholly and entirely embodied in the *reasons* for our decision to fight, in the *explanation* of why the dissolution of the Duma is considered a sufficiently important ground for fighting.

Under no circumstances should a Marxist forget that the slogan of the *immediately* impending struggle cannot be deduced simply and directly from the *general* slogan of a certain programme. It is not sufficient to refer to our programme (see last part: *The Overthrow of the Autocracy and the Constituent Assembly, etc.*) in order to determine the

slogan of the struggle that is immediately impending *now*, in the summer or autumn of 1906. For this we must take into account the *concrete* historical situation, we must trace the whole development and the whole consecutive progress of the revolution; our tasks must be deduced not only from the principles of the programme, but also from the *preceding* steps and stages of the movement. Only such an analysis will be a truly historical analysis, obligatory for a dialectical materialist.

And precisely such an analysis shows us that the objective political situation has now *brought to the fore* the question, not whether a representative assembly of the people *exists*, but whether this representative assembly *has power*.

The objective cause of the downfall of the Cadet Duma was not that it was unable to express the needs of the people, but that it was unable to cope with the *revolutionary* task of the struggle for *power*. The Cadet Duma imagined that it was a constitutional organ, but it *was* in fact a revolutionary organ (the Cadets abused us for regarding the Duma as a stage or an instrument of the revolution, but experience has fully confirmed *our view*). The Cadet Duma imagined that it was an organ of struggle against the *Cabinet*, but it was in fact an organ of struggle for the *overthrow* of the entire old regime. That is what happened in fact, because that is what the actual economic situation demanded. And for *this* struggle an organ like the Cadet Duma *proved* "useless".

The thought that is now being hammered into the head of even the most ignorant muzhik is: the Duma is of no use; no Duma is of any use *if the people do not have power*. But how to get power? By *overthrowing* the old regime and establishing a new one, popular, free and elected. *Either* overthrow the old regime, *or* admit that the aims of the revolution in the scope set by the peasantry and the proletariat cannot be realised.

That is how *life itself* has put the question. That is how 1906 has put it. And that is how it has been put by the dissolution of the Cadet Duma.

We cannot, of course, guarantee that the revolution will solve this problem at one stroke, that the struggle will be

an easy and simple one, that victory is completely and absolutely assured. No one can ever give any such guarantees on the eve of the struggle. A slogan is not a guarantee of simple and easy victory. A slogan is an indication of the *aim* that must be achieved in order to fulfil *certain* tasks. In the past, such an immediate task was the creation (or convocation) in general of a representative assembly of the people. Now the task is to secure *power* for such a representative assembly. This means removing, destroying, *overthrowing* the old regime, overthrowing the autocratic government.

Unless this task is *fully* carried out, the popular representative assembly *cannot* have full power; hence, too, there cannot be adequate guarantees that the new popular representative assembly will not share the fate of the Cadet Duma.

The objective state of affairs at the present time is bringing to the fore a fight, not for a popular representative assembly, but for the creation of conditions under which it will be impossible to disperse or dissolve it, impossible to reduce it to a farce, as Trepov & Co. did the Cadet Duma.

III

The form which the coming struggle will probably take is determined partly by its content and partly by the preceding forms of the revolutionary struggle of the people and of the counter-revolutionary struggle of the autocracy.

As regards the content of the struggle, we have already shown that after two years of revolution it now centres on the overthrow of the old regime. The complete achievement of this aim is possible only by means of an armed uprising of the whole people.

As regards the preceding forms of the struggle, the "last word" of the mass popular movement in Russia is a general strike and an uprising. The last quarter of 1905 could not but leave ineradicable traces in the mind and mood of the proletariat, the peasantry, the politically-conscious sections of the army, and the democratic sections of the various professional associations of intellectuals. It is quite

natural, therefore, that after the dissolution of the Duma, the first thought to enter the minds of the broad mass of those capable of fighting was: the general strike. No one seemed to entertain any doubt that the reply to the dissolution of the Duma *must* inevitably be an all-Russian strike..

The universal acceptance of this opinion was of definite value. Nearly everywhere the revolutionary organisations deliberately and systematically *restrained* the workers from spontaneous and limited outbreaks. Reports to this effect are coming in from all parts of Russia. The experience of October-December has undoubtedly helped to concentrate everyone's attention to a much greater degree than before on *general and simultaneous* action. Furthermore, another very characteristic fact must be noted: judging from the reports from some of the big centres of the working-class movement, e. g., St. Petersburg, the workers have not only quickly and easily appreciated the need for general and simultaneous action, but have firmly insisted on *militant* and determined action. The ill-advised idea of a *demonstration* (one-day or three-day) strike against the dissolution of the Duma suggested by several St. Petersburg Mensheviks met with the most determined opposition of the workers. The true class instinct and experience of those who had more than once waged a serious struggle at once suggested to them that the issue now required far more than a demonstration. We shall not demonstrate, said the workers. We shall start a desperate, determined fight when the moment for general action arrives. Judging from the available information, this was the general opinion of the St. Petersburg workers. They understood that partial actions, and demonstrations in particular, would be ridiculous after all that Russia has gone through since 1901 (the year in which the widespread demonstration movement began); that the intensification of the political crisis makes it impossible to "start from the beginning" again; that organising peaceful demonstrations would merely play into the hands of the government, which had "tasted blood" with great satisfaction in December. Peaceful demonstrations would exhaust the proletariat to no purpose and would merely provide exercise for the police and soldiers in seizing and shooting unarmed people. They would

merely somewhat confirm Stolypin's boast that he had achieved victory over the revolution, for he had dissolved the Duma without thereby intensifying the anti-government movement. Now everyone regards this as an empty boast, for everyone knows and feels that the fight is still ahead. At that time a "demonstration" would have been construed as a struggle, it would have been converted into a (hopeless) struggle, and the cessation of the demonstration would have been proclaimed throughout the world as another defeat.

The idea of a demonstration strike was only worthy of our Ledru-Rollins⁶² of the Cadet Party, who overrated parliamentarism as short-sightedly as Ledru-Rollin did in 1849. The proletariat rejected this idea at once, and it did well to reject it. The workers, who have always stood face to face with the revolutionary struggle, appreciated more correctly than certain intellectuals both the enemy's readiness to fight and the need for resolute militant action.

Unfortunately, in our Party, owing to the predominance of the Right wing among Russian Social-Democrats at the present time, the question of militant action has been neglected. The Unity Congress of the Russian Social-Democrats was carried away by the Cadet victories; it was unable to appreciate the revolutionary significance of the present situation and shirked the task of drawing all the conclusions from the experience of October-December. But the necessity of using this experience confronted the Party much sooner and much more sharply than many devotees of parliamentarism had expected. The confusion displayed by the central institutions of our Party at the critical moment was the inevitable outcome of this state of affairs.

The combination of a mass political strike with an armed uprising is again dictated by the whole situation. At the same time, the weak aspects of a strike as an independent means of struggle stand out in bold relief. Everyone is convinced that an extremely important condition for the success of a political strike is suddenness, the possibility of catching the government unawares. This is now impossible. The government learned in December how to combat strikes, and at the present moment it is very well prepared

for such a fight. Everyone points out the extreme importance of the railways during a general strike. If the railways stop running—the strike has every chance of becoming general. If the railways are not brought to a complete standstill—the strike will almost certainly not be general. But it is particularly difficult for the railwaymen to strike: punitive trains stand in full readiness and armed troop detachments are scattered all along the line, at the stations, sometimes even in the trains. A strike under such conditions may mean—in the majority of cases it must mean—a direct and immediate collision with the armed forces. The engine-driver, the telegraphist, the switchman, will instantly be faced with the dilemma: either to be shot on the spot (Golutvino, Lubertsy and other stations on the Russian railway system have not won revolutionary fame all over Russia for nothing) or to remain at work and break the strike.

Of course, we have a right to expect great heroism from very many railway workers and employees, who have proved their devotion to the cause of liberty by *deeds*. Of course, we are far from denying the possibility of a railway strike and its chances of success. But we have no right to hide from ourselves the *real* difficulties of the task; to remain silent about such difficulties would be the very worst policy. If we face realities, if we do not bury our heads in the sand, it will be clear that a strike must *inevitably* and immediately develop into an armed uprising. A railway strike *is* an uprising; this cannot be disputed after what happened in December. And without a railway strike, the railway telegraph will not stop working, the conveyance of letters by rail will not be interrupted, and, consequently, a post and telegraph strike of serious dimensions will also be impossible.

Thus, the inexorable logic of the situation that has developed since December 1905 proves the subordinate significance of a strike in relation to an uprising. Whether we like it or not, and in spite of all “directives”, the acute revolutionary situation is bound to convert a demonstration into a strike, a protest into a fight, a strike into an uprising. Of course, an uprising, an armed mass struggle, can flare up only if it is actively supported by one or another section of the army. Therefore, a strike of the troops, their refusal

to shoot at the people, can undoubtedly, in certain cases, lead to the victory of a merely peaceful strike. But it is scarcely necessary to prove that such cases would be but single episodes in an exceptionally successful uprising, and that there is only one way of making such episodes more frequent and likely: successful preparation for an uprising, energy and strength in the first insurgent actions, demoralisation of the troops by extremely daring attacks or by the desertion of a large section of the army, etc.

In short, in the situation now created by the dissolution of the Duma, there can be no doubt that an active fight must lead directly and immediately to an uprising. Perhaps the situation will change; in that case this conclusion will have to be revised; but for the time being it is absolutely indisputable. Therefore, to call for an all-Russian strike without calling for an uprising, without explaining its inseparable connection with an uprising, would be folly bordering on crime. Therefore, in our work of agitation, all efforts must be concentrated on explaining the connection between the two forms of the struggle, on preparing the condition that will enable three streams of the struggle—a workers' outbreak, a peasant uprising and an army "revolt"—to merge into a single torrent. These *three forms* of a really popular, i.e., *mass*, active movement, infinitely remote from a mere conspiracy, of an *uprising*, overthrowing the autocracy, were quite definitely seen long ago, last summer at the time of the famous mutiny of the *Potemkin*.⁵³ The success of an all-Russian uprising probably depends most of all on the fusion of these three streams. No doubt such grounds for a struggle as the dissolution of the Duma will greatly assist this fusion, because the most backward section of the peasants (and, consequently, of our army, which mainly consists of peasants) had set great hopes on the Duma.

Hence the conclusion: to take the greatest possible advantage of the dissolution of the Duma as the grounds for concentrated agitation and for a call for a national uprising; to explain the connection between a political strike and an uprising; to direct all efforts towards achieving unity and joint action on the part of the workers, peasants, soldiers and sailors in an active, armed struggle.

Finally, when speaking of the form of the movement, special mention must be made of the peasant struggle. Here the connection between a strike and an uprising is particularly clear. It is also clear that here the purpose of an uprising must be, not only the complete destruction, or removal, of all local authorities and their replacement by new authorities elected by the people (the common aim of every uprising, whether in the towns, in the countryside, in the army, etc.), but also the *expulsion of the landlords and the seizure* of their lands. The peasants must undoubtedly aim at the *actual* abolition of landlordism even before the question is decided by a national constituent assembly. There is no need to say much about this, because no one, probably, could imagine a peasant uprising without the peasants settling accounts with the landlords and seizing their lands. Obviously, the more conscious and organised such an uprising is, the fewer will be the instances of destruction of buildings, property, livestock, etc. From a military point of view, for the achievement of certain military aims, destruction—e. g., the burning of buildings and sometimes of property—is quite legitimate and essential in certain cases. Only pedants (or traitors to the people) can bewail the fact that the peasants always resort to such methods. Nevertheless, we need not conceal from ourselves that the destruction of property is sometimes only the result of lack of organisation, of inability to *take* and retain the property of the enemy instead of destroying it—or the result of *weakness*, when one of the belligerent sides *wreaks vengeance* on the enemy because it is not strong enough to *destroy* or crush him. Of course, in our work of agitation we must, on the one hand, do all we can to explain to the peasants that it is absolutely legitimate and necessary to wage a *pitiless* struggle against the enemy, even to the extent of destroying his property; on the other hand, we must show that on the degree of organisation depends the possibility of a much more rational and advantageous outcome of the struggle: destroying the enemy (the landlords and bureaucrats, especially the police) and transferring all property to the people, or to the peasants, intact (or with the least possible damage).

IV

The question of the form of the struggle is closely bound up with the question of *organisation* for the struggle.

In this respect, too, the great historical experience of October-December 1905 has left indelible traces on the revolutionary movement of today. The Soviets of Workers' Deputies and similar bodies (Peasants' Committees, Railwaymen's Committees, Soviets of Soldiers' Deputies, etc.) enjoy tremendous and fully deserved prestige. It would not be easy at present to find a Social-Democrat, or a revolutionary belonging to some other party or trend, who would not be in favour of such organisations in general, or who would not recommend their formation at the present moment in particular.

It seems to me there is no difference of opinion, or at least no serious difference of opinion, on this point. Hence there is no need to dwell on this particular question.

But there is one aspect to which we must devote particular attention, because it is most often ignored. I refer to the fact that the role played by the Soviets of Workers' Deputies (for the sake of brevity we shall speak of them as the *type* of all organisations of this kind) in the great October and December days surrounded them with something like a halo, so that sometimes they are treated almost as a fetish. People imagine that those organs are "necessary and sufficient" for a mass revolutionary movement at all times and in all circumstances. Hence the uncritical attitude towards the choice of the moment for the creation of such bodies, towards the question of what the real conditions are for the success of their activities.

The experience of October-December has provided very instructive guidance on this point. Soviets of Workers' Deputies are *organs of direct mass struggle*. They originated as organs of the *strike* struggle. By force of circumstances they very quickly became the organs of the *general revolutionary* struggle against the government. The course of events and the transition from a strike to an uprising *irresistibly* transformed them *into organs of an uprising*. That

this was precisely the role that quite a number of "soviets" and "committees" played in December, is an absolutely indisputable fact. Events have proved in the most striking and convincing manner that the strength and importance of such organs in time of militant action depend *entirely* upon the strength and success of the uprising.

It was not some theory, not appeals on the part of someone, or tactics invented by someone, not party doctrine, but the force of circumstances that led these non-party mass organs to realise the need for an uprising and transformed them into organs of an uprising.

At the present time, too, to establish such organs means creating organs of an uprising; to call for their establishment means calling for an uprising. To forget this, or to veil it from the eyes of the broad mass of the people, would be the most unpardonable short-sightedness and the worst of policies.

If that is so—and undoubtedly it is—the conclusion to be drawn is also clear: "soviets" and similar mass institutions are in themselves *insufficient* for organising an uprising. They are necessary for welding the masses together, for creating unity in the struggle, for handing on the party slogans (or slogans advanced by agreement between parties) of political leadership, for awakening the interest of the masses, for rousing and attracting them. But they are not sufficient for organising the *immediate fighting forces*, for *organising an uprising* in the narrowest sense of the word.

A slight illustration. The Soviets of Workers' Deputies have often been called parliaments of the working class. But no worker would agree to *his* parliament being convened only for it to be handed over to the police. All workers would admit the need immediately to *organise forces*, to set up a *military* organisation composed of detachments of armed workers to protect their "parliament".

Now that the government has thoroughly learned by experience what "soviets" lead to and what sort of institutions they are, now that it has armed itself from head to foot and is waiting for such institutions to be formed so as to attack the enemy before he has time to reflect and develop his

activities, it is especially necessary for us to explain in our work of agitation the need for a sober view of things, the need for a *military organisation* alongside the organisation of soviets, for defending the latter, for carrying out an uprising, without which the soviets or any elected representatives of the masses will remain powerless.

These "military organisations", if one may call them so, must strive to rally the masses not through the medium of elected persons, but directly by rallying the masses that are immediately taking part in street fighting and civil war. The nuclei of such organisations should be very small, voluntary units of ten, five, perhaps even three persons. We must with the utmost vigour make it known that a battle is approaching in which it will be the duty of *every* honest citizen to be ready to sacrifice himself and fight against the oppressors of the people. Less formality, less red tape, more simplicity in organisation, which must be as mobile and as flexible as possible. All those who wish to take the side of liberty must at once unite by forming fighting groups of five—voluntary units of persons working in the same trade or the same factory, or of people connected by ties of comradeship, or by Party ties, or, finally, simply by residence (those living in the same village, or in the same house or flat in a town). There must be both party and non-party units of this kind, bound together by the single, immediate revolutionary task: an uprising against the government. Such units must be formed without fail on the widest possible scale even before arms are obtained, *irrespective* of whether arms can be obtained or not.

No Party organisation will "arm" the masses. On the contrary, the organisation of the masses into light, mobile, small fighting units will, when things begin to move, render a very great service in regard to procuring arms.

Volunteer fighting units, composed of "*druzhinniki*", if we adopt the name made so honourable by the great December days in Moscow, will be of tremendous value at the moment of the outbreak. A "*druzhina*", or volunteer squad, that can shoot will be able to disarm a policeman, or suddenly attack a patrol and thus procure arms. A volunteer squad

which cannot shoot, or which has not procured arms, will assist in building barricades, reconnoitring, organising liaisons, setting ambushes for the enemy, setting fire to houses occupied by the enemy, occupying rooms to serve as bases for the insurgents—in short, thousands of the most diverse functions, can be performed by voluntary units of persons who are determined to fight to the last gasp, who know the locality well, who are most closely connected with the population.

Let an appeal be made at every factory, in every trade union and in every village for the formation of such volunteer fighting squads. People who are well known to each other will form them in advance. People who do not know each other will form squads of five and ten on the day of the fight, or on the eve of the fight, on the spot where fighting takes place, if the idea of forming such units is spread widely among the masses and actually adopted by them.

At the present time, when the dissolution of the Duma has stirred up many new sections of the population, one frequently hears the most revolutionary responses and declarations from ordinary representatives of the least organised sections of the common people in the towns, even of those who on the surface appear to be most "Black-Hundred" in character. Let us then make sure that they are all informed of the decision of the vanguard of the workers and peasants to begin the fight for land and liberty in the very near future, that they are all made aware of the necessity of forming volunteer fighting squads, that they are all convinced of the inevitability of an uprising and of its popular character. If we achieve this—and it is not at all utopian—we shall have in every large town, not hundreds of *druzhinniki*, as in Moscow in December, but thousands upon thousands of them. And then *no machine-guns will be able to stand up to us*, as people used to say in Moscow when arguing that the fighting squads there were not sufficiently of a mass character and were not sufficiently close to the people in type and composition.

Thus: organisation of Soviets of Workers' Deputies, of Peasants' Committees and of similar bodies everywhere, together with the most widespread propaganda and agita-

tion for the necessity of a simultaneous uprising, for the immediate preparation of forces for this, and for organising volunteer squads of "*druzhinniki*" on a mass scale.

* * *

P. S. This chapter was already written when we learned of a new "turn" in the slogans of our Central Committee: for the Duma as an *organ for convening* the constituent assembly.

The question of organisation, therefore, includes the additional question of organising a provisional revolutionary government, for that in point of fact is what a body really capable of convening a constituent assembly would be. But we must not forget, as our Cadetophiles are fond of doing, that a provisional government is primarily the *organ of an uprising*. Does the late Duma wish to become the organ of an uprising? Do the Cadets wish to be the organ of an uprising? By all means, gentlemen! In the *struggle* we welcome all allies among the bourgeois democrats. Even if your alliance—excuse me for saying so—were the same thing for us as the alliance with France is for Russia (i.e., a source of funds), even then we should be very pleased; we are practical politicians, gentlemen. But if your Cadet participation in an uprising is merely an empty dream of the Mensheviks, we shall merely say: How petty and trifling your dreams are, Menshevik comrades! But take care you do not die of "unrequited love" for the Cadets, who will be unable to return your passion....

The theoretical aspect of the question of a provisional government has been discussed more than once. The possibility of Social-Democrats taking part in a provisional government has been proved. Of greater interest now, however, is the *practical* aspect *provided* by the events of October-December. The Soviets of Workers' Deputies, etc., were *in fact* the embryos of a provisional government; power would *inevitably* have passed to them had the uprising been victorious. The centre of attention must now be shifted to studying these embryonic organs of a new government that history has brought into being, to studying the conditions for their

work and *their success*. This is of more vital importance and more interesting at the present time than speculation "in general" about a provisional revolutionary government.

V

It remains for us to consider the question of the moment to be chosen for an uprising. The tender affection of the Right-wing Social-Democrats for the Cadet Duma caused them to demand immediate action. This idea ended in a complete fiasco. The attitude adopted by the mass of the working class and of the urban population in general has shown that the gravity of the situation is appreciated or apprehended. A real fight is expected, not for the Duma, of course, but for the *overthrow* of the old regime. The delay is due to the general mood prevailing, to the desire to prepare for a really decisive and desperate struggle, the desire to achieve co-ordinated action.

It is possible, and perhaps most probable, that the new struggle will break out just as spontaneously and unexpectedly as the previous ones did, as a result of a rise in temper and of one of the inevitable explosions. If things take that turn, if such a course of development proves inevitable, we shall not have to decide the question of the time for action; our task then will consist in greatly intensifying our work of agitation and organisation on the lines already indicated.

It is possible, however, that events may require that we, the leaders, appoint the time for action. In that case, we should advise that an all-Russian action, strike and uprising, be timed for the end of summer or the beginning of autumn, towards the middle or end of August. The important thing would be to take advantage of the building season in the towns and the end of summer work in the fields. If we could secure agreement among *all* the influential revolutionary organisations and unions as to the time for action, there would be a real possibility of carrying it out at the time fixed. The simultaneous beginning of the struggle over the whole of Russia would be a great advantage. Even if the government got wind of the time fixed for the strike,

that would in all probability not be fatal; a strike is not a plot, or a military attack that depends upon surprise. The troops all over Russia would probably be most of all demoralised if they were kept week after week with the thought of the inevitable outbreak of the struggle preying on their minds, if they were kept under arms, and if agitation were carried on with increasing vigour by all organisations side by side with the mass of "non-party" revolutionaries. Influential members of the Duma among the Social-Democrats and Trudoviks could also help to make simultaneous action successful.

Isolated and absolutely useless outbreaks, like "revolts" of soldiers and hopeless peasant risings could, perhaps, be restrained if the whole of revolutionary Russia were convinced that this great universal fight is inevitable.

We repeat, however, that this is possible only if complete agreement is reached among *all* the influential organisations. Otherwise, only the old way of the spontaneous rise of temper will be left open.

VI

To sum up briefly.

The dissolution of the Duma marks a complete turn towards autocracy. The possibility of simultaneous action all over Russia is increasing. The probability of all partial uprisings merging into one is increasing. The inevitability of a political strike and of an uprising as a fight for power is felt as never before by large sections of the population.

What we have to do is to develop the widest possible agitation in favour of an all-Russian uprising, to explain its political and organisational tasks, to exert every effort to make everyone realise that it is inevitable, to make all the people see the possibility of a general onslaught so that they undertake not a "riot" or a "demonstration", not mere strikes and wrecking of property, but a fight for power, a fight with the aim of overthrowing the government.

The whole situation favours the fulfilment of this task. The proletariat is preparing to put itself at the head of the

struggle. A responsible and difficult, but a great and thankful task confronts the revolutionary Social-Democrats: to assist the working class as the advanced detachment of an all-Russian uprising.

This uprising will overthrow the autocracy and will create a representative assembly of the people with real power, i. e., a constituent assembly.

P.S. This article was written *before* the Sveaborg mutiny⁵⁴ began.

DISPATCH OF A DELEGATION TO SVEABORG

RESOLUTION OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMISSION
OF THE ST. PETERSBURG COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

In view of the special reports received from Sveaborg⁵⁵ concerning the extremely acute situation in this town and the possibility of an immediate outbreak, the Executive Commission of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. resolves:

1) to send immediately to Sveaborg a delegation consisting of comrades NNNN;

2) to instruct this delegation to take all measures required for a thorough examination of the situation on the spot;

3) to instruct it to influence local members of the Party, revolutionaries and the population so as to secure a postponement of action, provided this is possible without excessive sacrifice on the part of the population through arrests by the government of persons already marked out for that purpose;

4) to instruct the delegation, in case it is quite impossible to stop an outbreak, to take the most active part in leading the movement, i.e., to help the masses who have joined the struggle to organise independently, to disarm and wipe out the reaction, to undertake decisive offensive action after suitable preparation, and to come forward with correct and really revolutionary slogans, capable of rallying the whole people.

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BEFORE THE STORM

A month has passed since the State Duma was dissolved. The first wave of armed uprisings and of strikes in an attempt to support the insurgents, has passed. In some places the zeal of the authorities, who have been employing "emergency" and "special emergency" measures for the defence of the government against the people, is beginning to subside. The significance of the past stage of the revolution is becoming more and more apparent. A new wave is drawing nearer and nearer.

The Russian revolution is proceeding along a hard and difficult road. Every upsurge, every partial success is followed by defeat, bloodshed and outrage committed by the autocracy against the champions of freedom. But after every "defeat" the movement spreads, the struggle becomes more intense, ever larger masses of people are drawn into the fight, more classes and groups of people participate in it. Every onslaught of the revolution, every step forward in organising the militant democrats is followed by a positively frantic attack by the reaction, by another step taken in organising the Black-Hundred elements of the people, and by the increased arrogance of the counter-revolution, desperately fighting for its very existence. But in spite of all these efforts, the forces of reaction are steadily declining. More and more workers, peasants and soldiers, who only yesterday were indifferent, or even sided with the Black Hundreds, are now passing over to the side of the revolution. One by one, the illusions and prejudices which made the Russian people confiding, patient, simple-minded, obedient, all-enduring and all-forgiving, are being destroyed.

Many wounds have been inflicted on the autocracy, but it has yet not been killed. The autocracy is swathed in bandages, but it is still holding out, it is still creaking along, and is even becoming more ferocious as its life-blood oozes away. The revolutionary classes of the people, headed by the proletariat, take advantage of every lull to gather new forces, to strike fresh blows at the enemy, so as to root out at last the accursed canker of Asiatic tyranny and serfdom which is poisoning Russia.

There is no surer means of overcoming faint-heartedness and of refuting all narrow, one-sided, petty and cowardly views on the future of our revolution than by casting a general glance at its past. The history of the Russian revolution is still a short one, but it has sufficiently demonstrated and proved to us that the strength of the revolutionary classes and the wealth of their historical, creative power are far greater than they seem to be in times of calm. Every rising wave of the revolution has revealed an unobtrusive and relatively silent accumulation of forces for the fulfilment of the new and loftier task, and every time the short-sighted and timid appraisals of political slogans have been refuted by an outburst of these accumulated forces.

Three main stages of our revolution have become clearly discernible. The first stage was the period of "confidence", the period of mass pleadings, petitions and declarations about the need for a constitution. The second stage was the period of constitutional manifestoes, acts and laws. The third stage was the beginning of the realisation of constitutionalism, the period of the State Duma. At first the tsar was begged to grant a constitution. Later on the solemn recognition of a constitution was forcibly wrested from the tsar. Now... now, after the dissolution of the Duma, experience teaches us that a constitution bestowed by the tsar, acknowledged by the laws of the tsar, and carried out by the tsarist officials, is not worth a brass farthing.

In each of these periods we see the forefront at first occupied by the liberal bourgeoisie, noisy, bragging, full of narrow, petty-bourgeois prejudices and conceit, cocksure of its "right of inheritance", patronisingly teaching its "younger brother" the ways of peaceful struggle, of loyal opposition, of harmonising the freedom of the people with

the tsarist regime. And on every occasion this liberal bourgeoisie succeeded in confusing some Social-Democrats (of the Right wing), in securing their acceptance of its political slogans and subjecting them to its political leadership. But in reality, obscured by the hullabaloo of the liberals' political game, the revolutionary forces among the masses grew and matured. In reality, the *solution* of the political problem which history had brought to the forefront was undertaken each time by the proletarians, who attracted the advanced peasants to their side and came out into the streets, cast aside all old laws and conventions and gave the world new forms and methods of direct revolutionary struggle, and combined means of waging it.

Recall January 9. To everyone's surprise the heroic action of the workers put an end to the period of the tsar's "confidence" in the people and the people's "confidence" in the tsar! At one stroke they raised the whole movement to a new and higher plane! And yet, on the surface, January 9 was a complete defeat. Thousands of proletarians killed and wounded, an orgy of repression, the dark cloud of the Trepov regime hanging over Russia.

The liberals again came to the fore. They organised brilliant congresses, spectacular deputations to the tsar. They clutched with both hands at the sop that was thrown to them, the Bulygin Duma. They already began to growl at the revolution like dogs who have spied a choice titbit, and appealed to the students to go on with their studies and not to meddle in politics. And the faint-hearted among the adherents of the revolution began to say: Let us go into the Duma; after the *Potemkin* affair an armed uprising is hopeless; now that peace has been concluded, militant, mass action is improbable.

The real solution of the next historical problem was again supplied only by the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat. The Manifesto granting a constitution was wrung from the tsar by the all-Russian strike in October. The spirit of the peasants and the soldiers revived, and they turned towards liberty and light in the wake of the workers. Short weeks of liberty followed, succeeded by weeks of pogroms, Black-Hundred brutality, a terrible sharpening of the struggle, unprecedentedly bloody reprisals against all who had

taken up arms in defence of the liberties wrested from the tsar.

The movement was once again raised to a higher stage and yet, on the surface, the proletariat again seemed to have suffered utter defeat. Frantic repression, overcrowded prisons, endless executions, the despicable howling of the liberals dissociating themselves from the uprising and the revolution.

The loyal liberal philistines are again in the forefront. They make capital out of the last remaining prejudices of the peasants, who trust the tsar. They assert that the victory of democracy at the elections will cause the walls of Jericho to fall. They are predominant in the Duma and again begin to behave like well-fed watchdogs towards "beggars"—the proletariat and the revolutionary peasantry.

The dissolution of the Duma marks the end of the hegemony of the liberals, which was holding back and degrading the revolution. The peasants have learned more from the Duma than anyone. Their gain is that they are now losing their most baneful illusions. And the whole people is emerging from the experience of the Duma different from what it was before. As a result of the suffering caused by the failure of the representative body on which so many had placed all their hopes, the people now more definitely appreciate the task ahead. The Duma has enabled them to gauge the forces more precisely; it has concentrated at least some of the elements of the popular movement, it has shown in reality how the different parties act, it has revealed much more vividly to ever wider masses of the people the political character of the liberal bourgeoisie and of the peasantry.

The Cadets were unmasked, the Trudoviks were consolidated—such are some of the most important gains of the Duma period. The pseudo-democracy of the Cadets was branded in the Duma itself scores of times, and that by men who were prepared to trust them. The Russian muzhik has ceased to be a political sphinx. In spite of all distortions of the freedom of election, he has managed to assert himself and has created a new political type, the Trudovik. Henceforth, in addition to the signatures of organisations and parties which were built up in the course of decades, revolutionary manifestoes⁵⁶ will bear the signature of the Trudo-

vik Group, which was formed in the course of a few weeks. The ranks of revolutionary democracy have been reinforced by a new organisation, which, of course, shares a good many of the illusions that are characteristic of the small producer, but which in the present revolution undoubtedly expresses the trend toward a ruthless mass struggle against Asiatic despotism and feudal landlordism.

The revolutionary classes are emerging from the experience of the Duma more united, more closely bound to one another, more capable of undertaking a general onslaught. Another wound has been inflicted on the autocracy. It has become still more isolated. It is still more helpless in the face of the problems which it is quite incapable of solving. And starvation and unemployment are becoming more acute. Peasant revolts are breaking out more and more frequently.

Sveaborg and Kronstadt⁵⁷ have revealed the spirit of the army and navy. The uprisings have been suppressed, but the uprising lives, is spreading and gaining strength. Many Black-Hundred elements joined the strike that was called in support of the insurgents. The advanced workers stopped this strike, and they were right to do so, because the strike began to develop into a demonstration, whereas the task was to organise a great and decisive struggle.

The advanced workers were right in their estimate of the situation. They quickly rectified the false strategical move and husbanded their forces for the coming battle. They instinctively understood the inevitability of a strike as part of an uprising and the harmfulness of a strike as a demonstration.

All evidence goes to show that temper is rising. An explosion is inevitable and may be near at hand. The executions in Sveaborg and Kronstadt, the reprisals against the peasants, the persecution of the Trudovik members of the Duma — all this serves only to intensify hatred, to spread determination and concentrated readiness for battle. More audacity, comrades! More confidence in the strength of the revolutionary classes, especially the proletariat, enriched as they now are by new experience; more independent initiative! All the signs indicate that we are on the eve of a great struggle. All efforts must be directed towards making it simultaneous, concentrated, full of that heroism of the masses

which has marked all the great stages of the great Russian revolution. Let the liberals cravenly hint at this coming struggle solely for the purpose of threatening the government, let these narrow-minded philistines concentrate the whole force of their "mind and sentiments" on the expectation of a new election—the proletariat is preparing for the struggle; it is unitedly and boldly marching to meet the storm, eager to plunge into the thick of the fight. We have had enough of the hegemony of the cowardly Cadets, those "stupid penguins" who "timidly hide their fat bodies behind the rocks".

"Let the storm rage louder!"⁵⁸

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THE BOYCOTT

The Left-wing Social-Democrats must reconsider the question of boycotting the State Duma. It should be borne in mind that we have always presented this question concretely, and in connection with a definite political situation. For instance, *Proletary* (Geneva) "wrote that "it would be ridiculous to renounce utilising even the Bulygin Duma"*—if it could come into being. And in referring to the Witte Duma in the pamphlet *The State Duma and Social-Democracy* (by N. Lenin and F. Dan), N. Lenin wrote: "We must by all means carefully reconsider the question of tactics... The situation has changed" at the time of the Bulygin Duma (see p. 2 of the pamphlet cited).**

The principal difference between revolutionary Social-Democracy and opportunist Social-Democracy on the question of boycott is as follows: the opportunists in all circumstances confine themselves to applying the stereotyped method copied from a specific period in the history of German socialism. We must utilise representative institutions; the Duma is a representative institution; therefore boycott is anarchism, and we must go into the Duma. All the arguments used by our Mensheviks, and especially by Plekhanov, on this topic, could be reduced to this childishly simple syllogism. The Menshevik resolution on the importance of representative institutions in a revolutionary period (see *Partiiniye Izvestia*, " No. 2) strikingly reveals the stereotyped and anti-historical nature of their argument.

* See present edition, Vol. 9, p. 182.—*Ed.*

** Ibid., Vol. 10, pp. 104-05.—*Ed.*

The revolutionary Social-Democrats, on the contrary, lay chief emphasis on the necessity of carefully appraising the concrete political situation. It is impossible to cope with the tasks of the revolutionary epoch in Russia by copying in a biased manner one of the recent German stereotyped patterns, forgetting the lessons of 1847-48. The progress of our revolution will be altogether incomprehensible if we confine ourselves to making bare contrasts between "anarchist" boycott and Social-Democratic participation in elections. Learn from the history of the Russian revolution, gentlemen!

This history has *proved* that the tactics of boycotting the Bulygin Duma were the only correct tactics at that time, and were entirely justified by events. Whoever forgets this and argues about boycott without taking the lessons of the Bulygin Duma into account (as the Mensheviks always do) is certifying his own mental poverty, his inability to explain and take into account one of the most important and eventful periods of the Russian revolution. The tactics of boycotting the Bulygin Duma were based on a correct appraisal of the temper of the revolutionary proletariat and of the objective features of the situation, which made an immediate general outbreak inevitable.

Let us pass to the *second* lesson of history—to the Witte, Cadet Duma. Nowadays we often hear Social-Democratic intellectuals making repentant speeches about the boycott of that Duma. The fact that it did assemble and undoubtedly rendered indirect service to the revolution is considered to be sufficient reason for penitently confessing that the boycott of the Witte Duma had been a mistake.

Such a view, however, is extremely biased and short-sighted. It fails to take into consideration a number of very important facts of the period prior to the Witte Duma, the period of its existence and the period after its dissolution. Remember that the electoral law for that Duma was promulgated on December 11,⁶¹ at a time when the insurgents were waging an armed fight for a constituent assembly. Remember that *even the Menshevik "Nachalo"* wrote at the time: "The proletariat will *also* sweep away the Witte Duma, just as it swept away the Bulygin Duma." Under such circumstances the proletariat could not and should not have

surrendered to the tsar without a fight the power to convene the first representative assembly in Russia. The proletariat had to fight against the autocracy being strengthened by a loan on the security of the Witte Duma. The proletariat had to combat the constitutional illusions which, in the spring of 1906, formed the *entire* basis of the election campaign of the Cadets and the elections among the peasantry. At that time, when the importance of the Duma was being immeasurably exaggerated, the only means of combating such illusions was the boycott. The degree to which the *spread* of constitutional illusions was connected with participation in the election campaign and in the elections in the spring of 1906 is strikingly revealed by the attitude adopted by our Mensheviks. Suffice it to recall that, in spite of the warnings of the Bolsheviks, in the resolution of the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party the Duma was referred to as a "*power*"! Another instance: with complete self-assurance, Plekhanov wrote: "The government will *fall* into the abyss when it dissolves the Duma." In reply to him it was said at that time: we must prepare to *push* the enemy into the abyss and not, like the Cadets, place hopes on its "falling" into the abyss by itself. And how soon the words then uttered were proved correct!*

It was the duty of the proletariat to exert every effort to preserve the independence of its tactics in our revolution, namely: together with the politically conscious peasantry against the vacillating and treacherous liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie. But it was *impossible* to employ these tactics during the elections to the Witte Duma owing to a number of circumstances, both objective and subjective, which, in the vast majority of localities in Russia, would have made participation in the elections tantamount to the workers' party tacitly supporting the Cadets. The proletariat could not and should not have adopted half-hearted and artificially concocted tactics, prompted by "cunning" and confusion, of elections for an unknown purpose, of elections to the Duma, but not for the Dum'a. And yet it is a historical fact, which cannot be abolished by the silence, subterfuges and evasions of the Mensheviks, that *not one*

* See present edition, Vol. 10, p. 476.—Ed.

of them, not even Plekhanov, *dared* advocate in the press that we should go into the Duma. It is a fact that *not a single* call was issued in the press to go into the Duma. It is a fact that the Mensheviks themselves, in the leaflet issued by the Joint Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., officially recognised the boycott and confined the dispute *only* to the question of the stage at which the boycott was to be adopted. It is a fact that the Mensheviks laid emphasis, not on the elections *to the Duma*, but on the elections *as such*, and even on the process of electing as a means of organising *for* an uprising and *for* sweeping away the Duma. Events proved, however, that it was impossible to carry on mass agitation during the elections, and that the Duma alone provided certain opportunities for carrying on agitation among the masses.

Whoever really makes an effort to consider and weigh all these complicated facts, both objective and subjective, will see that the Caucasus was only an exception which proved the general rule. He will see that contrite speeches and explaining away the boycott as a piece of "youthful impetuosity" reveal an extremely narrow, superficial and short-sighted estimate of events.

The dissolution of the Duma has now clearly demonstrated that in the conditions prevailing in the spring of 1906 the boycott, on the whole, was the right tactics and advantageous. Under the conditions which *then* prevailed, *only* by means of the boycott could the Social-Democrats fulfil their duty of giving the people the necessary warning against the tsar's constitution and supplying the necessary criticism of the chicanery of the Cadets during the elections; and both (warning and criticism) were strikingly confirmed by the dissolution of the Duma.

Here is a small instance to illustrate the above. In the spring of 1906, Mr. Vodovozov, who is half-Cadet and half-Menshevik, was whole-heartedly in favour of participating in the elections and supporting the Cadets. Yesterday (August 11) he wrote in *Tovarishch*⁶² that the Cadets "wanted to be a parliamentary party in a country that has no parliament and a constitutional party in a country that has no constitution"; that "the whole character of the Cadet Party has been determined by the fundamental contradiction be-

tween a radical programme and quite non-radical tactics”.

The Bolsheviks could not desire a greater triumph than this admission on the part of a Left Cadet or Right-wing Plekhanovite.

However, while absolutely rejecting faint-hearted and short-sighted speeches of repentance, as well as the silly explanation of the boycott as “youthful impetuosity”, we do not by any means reject the *new* lessons of the Cadet Duma. It would be pedantic obstinacy to be afraid of frankly admitting these new lessons and taking them into account. History has shown that when the Duma assembles opportunities arise for carrying on useful agitation both from within the Duma and around it; that the tactics of joining forces with the revolutionary peasantry against the Cadets can be applied in the Duma. This may seem paradoxical, but such, undoubtedly, is the irony of history: it was the Cadet Duma that clearly demonstrated to the masses the correctness of what we might briefly describe as “anti-Cadet” tactics. History has ruthlessly confuted all constitutional illusions and all “faith in the Duma”; but history has undoubtedly proved that that institution is of some, although modest, use to the revolution as a platform for agitation, for exposing the true “inner nature” of the political parties, etc.

Hence the conclusion: it would be ridiculous to shut our eyes to realities. The time has now come when the revolutionary Social-Democrats must cease to be boycottists. We shall not refuse to go into the Second Duma when (or “if”) it is convened. We shall not refuse to utilise this arena, but we shall not exaggerate its modest importance; on the contrary, guided by the experience already provided by history, we shall entirely subordinate the struggle we wage in the Duma to another form of struggle, namely, strikes, uprisings, etc. We shall convene the Fifth Party Congress; there we shall resolve that *in the event of elections taking place*, it will be necessary to enter into an electoral agreement, for a few weeks, with the Trudoviks (unless the Fifth Party Congress is convened it will be impossible to conduct a united election campaign; and “blocs with other parties” are absolutely prohibited by the decision of the Fourth Congress). And then we shall utterly rout the Cadets.

This conclusion, however, does not by any means reveal the whole complexity of the task that confronts us. We deliberately emphasised the words: "*in the event of elections taking place*", etc. We do not know yet whether the Second Duma will be convened, when the elections will take place, what the electoral laws will be like, or what the situation will be at that time. Hence our conclusion suffers from being extremely general: we need it to enable us to sum up past experience, to take note of the lessons of the past, to put the forthcoming questions of tactics on a proper basis; but it is totally inadequate for solving the concrete problems of immediate tactics.

Only Cadets and the "Cadet-like" people of all sorts can be satisfied with such a conclusion at the present time, can create a "slogan" for themselves out of the yearnings for a new Duma and try to persuade the government of the desirability of convening it as quickly as possible, etc. Only conscious or unconscious traitors to the revolution would *at the present time* exert all efforts to divert the inevitable new rise of temper and excitement into the channel of an election and not into that of a fight waged by means of a general strike and uprising.

This brings us to the crux of the question of present-day Social-Democratic tactics. The issue now is not whether we should take part in the elections. To say "yes" or "no" in this case means saying nothing at all about the fundamental problem of the moment. Outwardly, the political situation in August 1906 is similar to that in August 1905, but enormous progress has been made during this period: the forces that are fighting on the respective sides, the forms of the struggle, and the time required for carrying out this or that strategic move—if we may so express it—have all become more exactly defined.

The government's plan is clear. It was absolutely right in its calculations when it fixed the date of the convocation of the Duma and did not fix—*contrary to the law*—the date of the elections. The government does not want to tie its hands or show its cards. Firstly, it is gaining time in which to consider an amendment of the electoral law. Secondly—and this is the most important—it is keeping the date of the elections in reserve until the character and intensity of

the new rise of temper can be fully gauged. The government wishes to fix the date of the elections at the particular time (and perhaps in the particular form, i.e., the form of elections) when it *can split and paralyse the incipient uprising*. The government's reasoning is correct: if things remain quiet, perhaps we shall not convene the Duma at all, or revert to the Bulygin laws. If, however, a strong movement arises, then we can try to split it by fixing a date for the elections for the time being and in this way entice certain cowards and simpletons away from the direct revolutionary struggle.

Liberal blockheads (see *Tovarishch* and *Rech*) so utterly fail to understand the situation that they are of their own accord crawling into the net set by the government. They are trying with might and main "to prove" the need for the Duma and the *desirability* of diverting the rising tide into the channel of an election. But even they cannot deny that the question of what form the impending struggle will assume is still an open one. Today's issue of *Rech* (August 12) admits: "What the peasants will say in the autumn ... is still unknown." ... "It will be difficult to make any general forecasts until September-October, when the temper of the peasantry is definitely revealed."

The liberal bourgeois remain true to their nature. They do not want to assist actively in choosing the form of the struggle and in moulding the temper of the peasants one way or another, nor are they capable of doing so. The interests of the bourgeoisie demand that the old regime be not overthrown, but merely weakened, and that a liberal Cabinet be formed.

The interests of the proletariat demand the complete overthrow of the old, tsarist regime and the convocation of a constituent assembly with full power. Its interests demand the most active intervention in moulding the temper of the peasants, in choosing the most resolute forms of struggle, as well as the best moment for it. On no account must we withdraw, or obscure, the slogan: convocation of a constituent assembly by revolutionary means, i.e., through the medium of a provisional revolutionary government. We must concentrate all efforts on explaining the conditions for an uprising: that it must be combined with the strike movement;

that all the revolutionary forces must be rallied and prepared for it, etc. We must resolutely take the path that was indicated in the well-known manifestoes: "To the Army and Navy" and "To All the Peasants", which were signed by the "bloc" of all revolutionary organisations, including the Trudovik Group. Lastly, we must take special care that the government does not under any circumstances succeed in splitting, stopping, or weakening the incipient uprising by ordering elections. In this respect the lessons of the Cadet Duma must be absolutely binding for us, viz., the lessons that the Duma campaign is a subordinate and secondary form of struggle, and that, owing to the objective conditions of the moment, direct revolutionary actions by the broad mass of the people still remain the principal form of struggle.

Of course, subordinating the Duma campaign to the main struggle, assigning a secondary role to this campaign for the contingency of an unfavourable outcome of the battle, or postponing the battle until experience of the Second Duma is obtained—such tactics may, if you like, be described as the old boycott tactics. On formal grounds this description might be justified, because, apart from the work of agitation and propaganda, which is always obligatory, "preparation for elections" consists of minute technical arrangements, which can very rarely be made a long time before the elections. We do not want to argue about words; in substance these tactics are the logical *development* of the old tactics, but not a *repetition* of them; they are a deduction drawn from the last boycott, but not the last boycott itself.

To sum up. We must take into account the experience of the Cadet Duma and spread its lessons among the masses. We must prove to them that the Duma is "useless", that a constituent assembly is essential, that the Cadets are wavering; we must demand that the Trudoviks throw off the yoke of the Cadets, and we must support the former against the latter. We must recognise at once the need for an electoral agreement between the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks in the event of new elections taking place. We must exert all our efforts to counteract the government's plan to split the uprising by ordering elections. Advocating their tried revolutionary slogans with greater energy than ever, Social-

Democrats must exert every effort to unite all the revolutionary elements and classes more closely, to convert the upsurge that is probable in the near future into an armed uprising of the whole people against the tsarist government.

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THE POLITICAL CRISIS AND THE BANKRUPTCY OF OPPORTUNIST TACTICS

I

The dissolution of the Duma undoubtedly marked a grave political crisis in the course of the Russian revolution. Like every crisis, it at once extremely intensified all political antagonisms, revealed the influences underlying many events and definitely set before the people tasks which hitherto had been only looming, but had not yet penetrated the minds of the broad masses. Like every crisis that comes as the climax of a whole period of preceding development, the dissolution of the Duma inevitably served as a touchstone for testing and verifying the various trends of opinion on tactics. On the one hand, this crisis brings to a close a certain cycle of development and thus enables us clearly to determine whether the general appraisal of this development is right or wrong. On the other hand, it compels us to give immediate answers to a number of problems which rapidly become urgent, and these answers are often verified on the spot, so to speak, by the rapid course of events.

The dissolution of the Duma proved to be such a "touchstone" for the "*two tactics*" which have long been noticeable in the Russian Social-Democratic movement. During the "Duma period" we argued about these two tactics more or less calmly, as the political situation did not call for immediate and important political decisions. The dissolution of the Duma called for such decisions at once. The "*two tactics*" were put *to the test* by the political crisis. The results of this test must be closely studied.

II

The Central Committee of our Party is in the hands of the Right-wing Social-Democrats. Prompt, precise and clear answers to the new tactical problems were required of them. What were their answers?

To the main question concerning the general character of the impending struggle, the Central Committee answered by proclaiming the following slogans: at the outset: "For the resumption of the Duma sessions." The Cadets took up this slogan (see *Rech* and the interview with Mr. Kedrin in the newspaper *Oko*⁶³). The Social-Democratic Party rejected it. The Bolshevik members of the Central Committee and the St. Petersburg Committee of the Party protested. The Central Committee discarded the first slogan and proclaimed another in its place: "In defence of the Duma against the camarilla, for the purpose of convening a constituent assembly." Finally, this second slogan evolved into a third and last slogan: "For the Duma as an organ of power which will convene the constituent assembly." In spite of the protests of the Left-wing Social-Democrats, the Central Committee stuck to that slogan. On the question of slogans—utter confusion.

Another question: What form of struggle should be recommended? The Central Committee was primarily in favour of demonstration strikes. It wanted to call for an immediate strike, but found no support among any of the revolutionary parties and organisations. It then signed manifestoes calling for an *uprising* (the manifestoes: "To the Army and Navy" and "To All the Russian Peasants"). But after taking a step forward from the demonstration strike to the strike for an uprising, it took a hasty step backward and called for "partial mass expressions of protest".

The third fundamental question: Who shall be our ally in the struggle? Which sections of bourgeois democracy can we depend upon, or which can we treat with preferably? With what parties or organisations should we seek an understanding? The Central Committee, as we have already seen, trimmed both its slogans and the forms of struggle recommended by it to suit the "Duma as a whole", to suit the Cadets. But "drive nature out through the door and it will

fly in through the window"! The Central Committee was *compelled* to sign manifestoes to the army, to the peasantry and "To the Whole People" in conjunction *only* with the revolutionary organisations, in conjunction *only* with the "Trudoviks" (from the wreckage of the Duma). In its *arguments* on tactics, the Central Committee, like all the Mensheviks, draws a line of demarcation between the Cadets and the Octobrists: "they"—are the Right, "we"—the Left ("we" and the Cadets). In its tactical *calls to action*, in its fighting manifestoes, the Central Committee draws a line of demarcation between the Cadets and the Trudoviks; the Cadets are placed either on the Right or among the neutrals in the struggle. It *turns out* then, that "we" means "we" and the Trudoviks, but without the Cadets. It turns out, then, that "we" are an information and co-ordination bureau for *all* the revolutionary organisations, including the "Committee of the Trudovik Group", but without the Cadets. So it is a case of "a burning desire but a bitter fate". The Social-Democrats of the Right have a burning desire to go hand in hand with the Cadets, but their fate is a bitter one, for the Cadets repudiate the fighting agreements that the course of events dictates.

Such, in its main features, is the factual history of Menshevik tactics after the dissolution of the Duma. This history is recorded in a small number of documents. Read the "Letters" (Nos. 4 and 5) of the Central Committee to the Party organisations, and the manifestoes "To the Army and Navy" (signed by the Social-Democratic Group in the Duma and by the Committee of the Trudovik Group); "To All the Russian Peasants" (signed by the Committee of the Trudovik Group, the Social-Democratic Group in the Duma, and the All-Russian Peasant Union, by the Central Committees of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party and the Social-Democratic Party, the All-Russian Railwaymen's Union, and the All-Russian Teachers' Union); "To the Whole People" (the same organisations, minus the three unions, but plus the Polish Socialist Party and the Bund); and lastly, read the protest of the three members of the Central Committee (published "for Party members only"⁶⁴) and you will have all the material on the opportunist tactics of Social-Democrats since the dissolution of the Duma.

What is the sum and substance of this factual, external history of the Menshevik tactical directives? The sum and substance is clear: vacillation between the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie and the revolutionary bourgeois democrats. Indeed, what do the vacillations of the Central Committee on the question of the slogan amount to? To vacillation between the legal constitutional method as the exclusive, sole method (the slogan: "Resumption of the Duma sessions"), and recognition, or admission, of the revolutionary method (the "constituent assembly" slogan *toned down* by invariable association with the Duma). This is vacillation between the Cadets (who fully accept, and *have accepted*, the "resumption of sessions" slogan) and the revolutionary peasantry (the Trudoviks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Peasant Union, the Railwaymen's and Teachers' unions, who in conjunction with the Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party signed the call for an uprising in favour of a constituent assembly). Our Central Committee, or our opportunist Social-Democrats, are only a little to the left of the Cadets, and much to the right of the revolutionary bourgeois democrats. Such is the sum and substance of the vacillations of the Central Committee on the question of slogans, the form of struggle and the alignment of the political parties.

Throughout the Duma period, disagreement on tactics between the Right- and the Left-wing Social-Democrats became more and more marked, and centred more and more around the main question of the line of demarcation in the ranks of the bourgeois democrats, or the question of whom we should ally ourselves with. The Right-wing Social-Democrats directed all their efforts towards forming an alliance with the Cadets (support of the Duma as a whole, support of the demand for a Duma Cabinet). The revolutionary Social-Democrats, on the contrary, directed their tactics towards winning over from the Cadets the revolutionary bourgeois democrats, towards liberating these elements from the yoke of the Cadets and uniting them with the proletariat for militant aims. The dissolution of the Duma was the upshot of the Duma period. And what happened? The Right-wing Social-Democrats were *forced* to abandon the Cadets and join the revolutionary democrats. The only things of a

Cadet nature that have remained are a few frills to their slogans. The circumstances compelled them to draw the line of demarcation exactly where the Left-wing Social-Democrats have always said it should be drawn. The inconsistency of the Central Committee's slogans, their futility, became glaringly obvious.

III

Let us now examine the arguments of the Central Committee. They are set out most fully in its fourth "letter to the Party organisations" (this letter is neither dated nor numbered, but the next letter is called the fifth). This letter is a truly remarkable specimen of opportunist thought: it deserves to be published over and over again and included in socialist readers and textbooks, as an object-lesson of how Social-Democrats should *not* discuss tactics.

The kernel of this letter is its analysis of a question which the authors themselves formulate as follows: "Into whose hands can power now pass?" And it goes on to say:

"Who at the present time is, or can be, *in the eyes* of the nation numbering 140,000,000, the natural successor to state power wrested from the tsarist government?... For when the popular movement for winning state power starts, the people must have a *clear idea in their minds* of who is to take the place of the overthrown government.... In every given period of the movement some association or organisation must, in the people's *mind*, play such a role."

We have underlined the places in the argument we have quoted which at once reveal their total fallacy. On the question of *winning* power, the Central Committee at once adopts the petty-bourgeois idealist and not the proletarian materialist point of view. It deduces "natural succession" to power from the most widespread "idea" ("in the eyes" of the people), and not from the realities of the struggle. It fails to understand that the "natural successor" will not be the one who, in somebody's "*mind*", "plays such a role", but the one who will really *overthrow* the government, who will really *win* power, who will be *victorious* in the struggle. The issue will not be decided by the "mind of the people", but

by the *strength* of the respective *classes* and elements of society.

Thus, the Central Committee immediately flies off at a tangent from the point at issue. Instead of examining the realities of the struggle, how it has been and is being waged, it starts speculating, in the worst idealist manner, about "mind" and the "idea" of who is "to take the place of the overthrown", and not about who *does the overthrowing and will achieve it*. To arrive at these opportunist conclusions it was necessary to discard the whole Marxist method, a method that demands a study of the question: which interests of which classes demand that the government be *overthrown*, and which—demand that its power be limited; which material conditions *give rise* to a revolutionary struggle ("overthrow") and which—give rise to efforts to arrange a constitutional cohabitation of the overthrown with the overthrowers. If the Central Committee had not forgotten the ABC of Marxism, it might have considered, if only on the basis of the experience of the Russian revolution, which of the classes in our country are *forced* by the very course of events, often irrespective of their "mind" (and even in spite of their monarchist minds) to *overthrow* the governmental institutions which stand in their way. The history of the *workers' and peasants'* movement in twentieth-century Russia should have provided our Central Committee with enough examples of the partial and local *overthrow* of governmental institutions to enable them to conceive of the general and complete overthrow of the central government in a Marxist manner, and not *à la* Ledru-Rollin.

Having taken the wrong path, the Central Committee goes further and further astray in its arguments on this subject. It begins to enumerate all the possible and probable combinations in the composition of the "provisional revolutionary government".

The Central Committee declares that the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, and likewise an Executive Committee composed of the Trudovik and Social-Democratic groups in the Duma, are unsuitable. The former would not receive the backing of the "hundred million peasants"; the latter would not receive the backing of "any considerable section of the urban petty bourgeoisie, the middle bourgeoisie, soldiers,

Cossacks, officers, etc. It would be a very dangerous error, however, to think that a new state power could be established against the wish of all these elements."

We suggest that the reader compare the first part of these arguments with the Bolshevik draft resolution on the provisional government (see *Partiiniye Izvestia*, No. 2, March 20, 1906, reprinted in Lenin's *Report on the Congress*, p. 92*).⁶⁵ This draft resolution precisely enumerates the organisations which *actually* played the role of organs of revolutionary power during the December uprising.⁶ In addition to the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, it mentions, of course, the soldiers', railwaymen's and *peasants'* committees, and the elected rural bodies in the Caucasus and the Baltic Provinces. Thus, history has already provided an answer to the problem which the Central Committee is now so helplessly trying to solve. History has already shown which classes and which elements of the population *take part* in an uprising and *create* the organs for it. The opportunist Social-Democrats, however, not only forget (or fail to understand) the recent past of the revolution, but do not understand in general what a provisional revolutionary government is. Only a little reflection is needed to realise that such a government is the organ of an uprising (and not only the result of an uprising, as is mistakenly assumed in the Menshevik draft resolution on the provisional government—see the same *Report*, p. 91, or *Partiiniye Izvestia*, No. 2).

Further, the second part of the above-quoted argument is even more fallacious. It is based on the usual method of the opportunists: the attempt to prove that the most moderate slogan is the most reasonable one on the grounds that it serves to unite the largest number of social elements. Bernstein said: Social revolution is supported only by a section of the proletariat, whereas social reform is supported by many social-liberal elements. Do not be misled by the idea that socialism can be established against their wishes! It is better to become a party of democratic socialist reforms! The Mensheviks say: Only the proletariat and the revolutionary section of the petty bourgeoisie (primarily the peasants) are in favour of a real victory of our revolution. But "both

* See present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 277-382.—*Ed.*

the middle bourgeoisie and the army officers, etc." are in favour of the limitation of the old monarchy as proposed by the liberals. Let us, therefore, call a deal between the liberals and the tsar a victory of the revolution, and, instead of a really revolutionary government as the organ of an uprising, let us have the Duma!

No, comrades. There are things in political arithmetic a bit more complicated than simply adding up *all* the "opposition" elements. The addition of a vacillating and treacherous opposition to the actually fighting revolutionary elements does not always produce a plus, more often it proves to be a minus. Those whose interests *compel* them to strive for the limitation of the monarchy and to fear its downfall can never create a bold and vigorous organ of an uprising. To try in advance to fashion the future organ of an uprising to fit these Cadet elements would be the same as trying to fashion the social revolution in Europe to fit a Naumann or a Clemenceau.

What a comical contradiction our opportunists have landed themselves in! They want an alliance with the middle bourgeoisie and the army officers, in short, with the elements of the Cadet Party. But in that case they must entirely discard the "constituent assembly" slogan, for the Cadets are discarding it. To proclaim the "constituent assembly" slogan, which is unpalatable to the middle bourgeoisie and the army officers, and at the same time to try to attract them by foisting an ultra-revolutionary role on a moderate and loyal Duma (to overthrow the government and become a provisional revolutionary government!)—such are the depths of absurdity to which our Central Committee has descended.

Incidentally, as regards absurdities, the Central Committee's letter contains even choicer gems. How do you like this one? "If, indeed, it is impossible, at the present moment, to put forward any other body than the Soviet of Workers' Deputies as the instrument of power, then we can say in advance that the victory over the government in a *struggle for power* (and such a victory necessarily presupposes the participation of the army in the fight) would lead to nothing short of a *military dictatorship* of the army which had passed over 'to the side of the people'." (The italics are in the original.)

Just ponder over this monstrous tirade: if the Soviets

of Workers' Deputies were to *defeat* the government with the aid of a section of the army, the army's passing over "to the side of the people"* would lead to military dictatorship!! I doubt whether such attempts to intimidate us with the prospect of a victorious outcome of the struggle could be found even in Cadet literature. I doubt whether even Mr. Struve went quite so far, in *Osvobozhdeniye*,⁶⁶ in the summer of 1905, and in *Polyarnaya Zvezda*,⁶⁷ in the spring of 1906, when he fulminated against the idea of an armed uprising as being akin to the idea of a military dictatorship. If the Central Committee had examined at least the ordinary demands of the soldiers and sailors during their innumerable "revolts" of the past year, it would have seen that these demands amount *in fact* to a demand that the caste-ridden army be converted into a people's army, i.e., a militia. The soldiers and sailors were not always able to formulate the substance of their demands; indeed, in most cases they were unable to do so. But can anyone doubt that military service in the soldier's home district and the right to hold meetings, etc., is equivalent to the establishment of a militia? Has the Central Committee lost its elementary revolutionary instinct to such an extent that it no longer sees the difference between the aristocratic revolutionary spirit of the Decembrists⁶⁸—the *raznochintsi*'s⁶⁹ revolutionary spirit of the army officers in the Narodnaya Volya⁷⁰—and the profoundly democratic, proletarian and peasant revolutionary spirit of the soldiers and sailors in twentieth-century Russia? Has it never been struck by the fundamental difference between the revolutionary spirit of the army officers in the days of the Narodnaya Volya, when almost complete apathy reigned in the ranks of the soldiers, and the reactionary spirit of the army officers today, when there is a mighty movement precisely among rank-and-file soldiers? Anyone who thinks that if the present-day Russian soldier or sailor goes over to the side of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies in the fight against the government it can serve as the transition to a military dictatorship—who thinks that this can be counteracted by winning over the army officers by means of the moderate slogan "for

* The inverted commas evidently express the irony of our Central Committee!

the Duma"—must either have lost all sense of reality, or have gone even more to the right than Struve & Co.! The Central Committee of the Social-Democratic Party wants to combat the strivings of the Russian soldiers toward a military dictatorship by winning over the officers: this is what the opportunists have brought us to!

The Central Committee tries to bolster up its hopeless case with the further argument that there is no need for us to invent a new government, as we have the Duma or, at any rate, remnants of it. These remnants "can declare themselves the State Duma", while the "popular mind, unversed in the subtleties of a written constitution, regarded and still regards the State Duma as the organ of power.... If the troops, refusing to obey the tsarist government, could enter the service of the new government, that new government would be the State Duma."

Splendid! If tomorrow the "popular mind" should regard another legal institution as "the government", we must undertake to spread this prejudice. A fine understanding of the duties of a revolutionary party, indeed! Do try to understand at last, dear comrades, that power must be taken by force, by fighting, by an uprising. Are the Cadets prepared to go so far? If so, they are welcome; we will reject no ally in this struggle. But if they are not prepared, if they are even afraid to make a *direct call* for an uprising (this, after all, is, if sincerely meant, the first step to real action, and of all the members of the Duma only the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks have taken it)—then all this talk about the Duma being an "organ of power which will convene a constituent assembly" is nothing but pernicious Manilovism⁷¹ and a deception of the people.

If the political atmosphere had been different the remnants of the Duma would have acted differently, says the Central Committee in justification of the Cadets, who were scared even by the Vyborg Manifesto. Yes, it is true, they would have acted differently. What conclusion should be drawn from this? That we must strive to create that *different* atmosphere. By what means? By rousing the elements that are capable of fighting to revolutionary consciousness, by raising their consciousness to a level higher than that of the Cadets, higher than the level of Cadet slogans. But

you *justify* the timidity of the Cadets with the plea that the atmosphere is non-revolutionary, and at the same time you make the atmosphere *less revolutionary* by substituting Cadet slogans for revolutionary ones!

IV

The Central Committee's practical conclusion in its famous fourth letter is as follows: "Local mass expressions of protest must be organised at once, everywhere." Their object is described literally as follows: "To create an atmosphere of preparation for the impending decisive struggle." ... Not to prepare for the impending decisive struggle, but to create an atmosphere of preparation!...

Our Party has already condemned and rejected this slogan of the Central Committee with rare unanimity. The Central Committee's campaign for "partial mass expressions of protest" has *already* failed. The absurdity of demonstrating, of organising protests, in a situation in which civil war has attained unprecedented intensity, is too obvious. The resolutions adopted by a large number of Party committees and conferences¹ published in this issue show clearly enough what indignation has been roused by this slogan, as well as by the Central Committee's whole policy since the dissolution of the Duma. We shall not, therefore, waste any more words on refuting a slogan that has already been refuted by facts and rejected by the Party. We need only note, firstly, the significance in principle of the Central Committee's mistake, and, secondly, its awkward attempts in letter No. 5 to extricate itself from the impossible situation in which it found itself.

From the point of view of principle, the Central Committee's mistake lies in its utter failure to understand the difference between a demonstration strike and a strike for an uprising. This is altogether unpardonable after the experience of December. It can only be explained if we take into account that in none of its letters has the Central Committee made any direct reference to an armed uprising. To evade any direct raising of the question of an uprising—such is the long-standing and constant striving of our opportunists,

a striving that inevitably follows from their whole position. This striving explains why the Central Committee talks so persistently only about demonstration strikes, and says nothing about strikes for an uprising.

Having taken up such a position, the Central Committee could not avoid lagging behind all the other revolutionary organisations and parties. It could be said that *everyone* except the opportunist Social-Democrats has realised that the question of an uprising is bound to be raised. As was to be expected, the All-Russian Railwaymen's Union has paid special attention to this question. (See its resolution and the report of the Bureau printed in this issue.⁷⁹) It is clearly evident from a number of manifestoes signed by several revolutionary organisations (including the afore-mentioned manifestoes "To the Army and Navy", "To All the Russian Peasants", etc.). Our Central Committee seems to have signed these documents against its will, contrary to its convictions!

Indeed, it is utterly impossible to sign these appeals and yet fail to see the difference between demonstration strikes and strikes for an uprising. The Central Committee's inconsistency, its likeness to a weathercock, is glaring: in its own declarations (letters No. 4 and No. 5) it does not say a word about an uprising; but when it collaborates with other revolutionary organisations it signs manifestoes calling for an uprising! When left to itself, our Central Committee inevitably lapses into a Cadet policy and expends all its energy devising slogans that would be acceptable or would seem to be acceptable to the Cadets. When marching in line with other revolutionary organisations, it "pulls itself together", becomes ashamed of its Cadet slogans and behaves properly.

This is the first time that the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party finds itself in such an undignified position. For the first time it is being publicly led by others. For the first time it is in the rear. Our duty, the duty of all members of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, is at all costs and as soon as possible to make sure that it is the first and *last* time.

The inability to understand the causes of the failure of the (last) July strike is wholly due to the above-mentioned mistake on a matter of principle. Anyone may make a mistake

in fixing the *moment* for the struggle. We do not at all blame the Central Committee *for that*. But to mistake the *character* of an action, despite the warnings of a number of organisations in conjunction with which the Central Committee signed the calls for an uprising, that is unpardonable.

In its letter No. 5, the Central Committee embarks on a petty and trivial polemic against the Socialist-Revolutionaries (merely trying to prove that the representative of the Trudoviks argued more consistently than the Socialist-Revolutionaries. What is the use of all this? Who is interested in it?), and expresses surprise that it was the advanced, class-conscious workers who failed to respond to the July strike call. The backward workers responded to that call, but the advanced workers did not! So the Central Committee is indignant, angry, almost abusive!

And yet, if the Central Committee had not taken up a fundamentally wrong position, had not disagreed *in principle* with the vanguard of the proletariat, it would have understood quite easily why this happened. The backward workers might not yet have known the difference between a demonstration strike and a strike for an uprising, but the advanced workers knew the difference very well. When there was some hope of being able to support the *uprising* in Sveaborg and Kronstadt—and there was such a moment—the declaration of a national strike was natural. But this, of course, would have been (*and was*) a strike, not with the object of protesting against the dissolution of the Duma (as the Central Committee imagined), but with the object of supporting the insurgents, of *extending* the uprising.

In a day or two, however, it became definitely clear that the uprising in Sveaborg and Kronstadt had been suppressed *on this occasion*. A strike in support of the insurgents was out of place, and the progressive workers had all the time been *opposed* to protest strikes and demonstration strikes. They had been saying all along in the clearest and most emphatic language (and only our Central Committee contrived not to know, or not to understand it) that they would go into a general decisive battle, but on no account take part in a strike for the sake of a demonstration.

The failure of the July strike thus knocked the bottom, as it were, out of the tactics of the opportunist Social-Demo-

crats. The idea of a demonstration strike fell through, utterly and entirely. The slogan of "partial mass expressions of protest" suffered the same fate.

But to anyone with the slightest knowledge of the mood of the workers in the main centres of Russia, to anyone who has watched what is now going on among the peasantry, it is quite clear that the idea of the strike for an uprising and the slogan of preparing for an uprising, far from losing their importance or clarity, are, on the contrary, everywhere maturing and gaining strength.

V

Let us now sum up our brief analysis of the Menshevik tactics during the critical days after the dissolution of the Duma.

Throughout the Duma period the Mensheviks advocated support of the Duma as a whole, support of the Cadets (under the guise of supporting the demand for the appointment of a Duma Cabinet). The Bolsheviks did their utmost to split the Trudoviks from the Cadets, and supported the idea of forming "an Executive Committee of the Left groups in the Duma".

Whose tactics have proved right now, after the dissolution of the Duma? In conjunction with the Cadets, it was found possible to issue only the timid Vyborg Manifesto. The Cadets *as a party* did not support it; they did not participate in party agitation in support of it, nor did they pursue any further activities on *those* lines. Even our Mensheviks at once admitted that this Manifesto was inadequate. The timid Vyborg Manifesto was followed by others, bolder and more definite. The amalgamation of some of the individual ex-members of the Duma was followed by the amalgamation of the "committees" of *two* Duma groups, which signed a number of manifestoes and took part in a number of revolutionary conferences, and *agreed to a war council* of the revolution.

What were these two groups which, as groups, as collective bodies, survived the débâcle of the Duma, which did not lose their heads because the "constitutional" ground had slipped from under their feet?

They were the Social-Democrats and the *Trudoviks*. The "Executive Committee of the Left groups", advocated by the Bolsheviks, who supported the *idea* of forming a committee of that kind, has *come into being*. The Trudovik Group *begot* a new *revolutionary* organisation which has *new* ties with the peasantry; as for the Cadets, they are now politically dead, just as the Bolsheviks predicted, emphasising that "maggots are found near corpses, not near living people".*

The fighting agreement between the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, etc., has now become a *fact*, documented by the above-mentioned leaflets. We lost, and lost a great deal, of course, only because we started *late* in the day, because we had not thought matters out earlier, had not prepared the ground gradually, as the Bolsheviks recommended long ago, in their draft resolution at the Unity Congress.

Volentem ducunt fata, nolentem trahunt—which may be translated approximately as follows: the wise politician keeps ahead of events, the unwise is led by them. The Bolsheviks have been insisting for months past, if not for a whole year, that fighting agreements with the revolutionary democrats *were inevitable*; they have been insisting on the importance of a fighting alliance between the proletariat and the advanced peasantry in particular. The dissolution of the Duma *compelled* us to adopt such a course; but the Mensheviks, as we have already shown in our analysis of all the episodes of the Central Committee's tactics, turned out to be unprepared, were "led" to it against their will and contrary to their convictions by the "unexpected" turn of events.

Take the question of an uprising. The Mensheviks did everything to "burke" it. At the Unity Congress they even passed a resolution *against* an armed uprising. Even now they say *nothing* about an uprising in "letters" No. 4 and No. 5, which the Central Committee wrote without the bidding of other revolutionary organisations. But when it writes anything *jointly* with them, and at their bidding, we read direct and resolute calls for an uprising. Then the slogans, too, are revolutionary. Then not a word is said about resum-

* See present edition, Vol. 10, p. 264.—Ed.

ing the sessions of the Duma, or even about convening a constituent assembly through the medium of the Duma. On the contrary, we read the following (the manifesto "To the Whole People"): "*Not an impotent Duma, but a constituent assembly with full power, on the basis of universal, etc., suffrage, this is the goal the people must strive to achieve. Not the tsar's Ministers, but a power backed by the revolutionary people must convene this assembly*" (our italics). This is the emphatic language our Central Committee uses when in the company of petty-bourgeois revolutionaries, such as the Committee of the Trudovik Group and the Polish Socialist Party!

Lastly, take the question of a provisional revolutionary government. For eighteen months our Mensheviks, headed by Plekhanov, have been arguing that Social-Democrats cannot participate in such a government jointly with bourgeois revolutionaries, and that it is Blanquism, Jacobinism, and all the other mortal sins to issue a slogan in favour of establishing a provisional revolutionary government.

And what happened? The Duma was dissolved, and the Central Committee was compelled to raise *this very* question of a provisional revolutionary government and of how it is to be constituted. Its complete unpreparedness for the question is apparent: it does not even understand that a provisional revolutionary government is *the organ of an uprising*. The Central Committee proposes that the remnants of the Duma, i.e., the Social-Democrats, the Trudoviks and some of the Cadets, be proclaimed a provisional revolutionary government. But look, comrades, see what all this amounts to: *You are in fact inviting the socialists to take part in a provisional revolutionary government jointly with bourgeois revolutionaries!* And you do this in spite of the fact that in the company of the Trudoviks and Left Cadets the Social-Democrats will form a *negligible minority!* Alas, alas! The doctrinaire talk about it being *wrong* for Social-Democrats to participate in a provisional government jointly with bourgeois revolutionaries evaporates at the first contact with reality. All the far-fetched arguments used to justify this wrong decision with the aid of false references to Marx vanish like smoke. Moreover, in addition to the bourgeois *revolutionaries* (the Trudoviks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the

Polish Socialist Party, sections of the Peasant, Railwaymen's and Teachers' unions), our "strict" pseudo-Marxists intend, by fair means or foul, to drag into the future provisional government the bourgeois *compromisers* (the Cadets)!

Well, it is hard to imagine a more complete fiasco for opportunist tactics than that suffered by our Central Committee after the dissolution of the Duma. We must pull our Party out of this mire before it is too late.

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THE EVENTS OF THE DAY

"Bloody Day" in Warsaw and other towns of Poland,⁷⁴ the attempt on the life of Stolypin and the assassination of Min⁷⁵ have all roused universal interest in the question of "guerrilla actions"—we use the term which has become current among Party members and legitimised by the resolution of the Unity Congress.

The editorial board proposes to publish in the near future an article, or series of articles, dealing as comprehensively as possible with this extremely important question.* In the meantime, so as not to leave our readers in ignorance of our views, we shall make the following brief remarks, which in subsequent articles will be developed in detail and more precisely formulated.

First remark. Going to extremes is always bad, and there can be no doubt in the mind of any socialist that the sentiments of the masses must be taken into account when organising guerrilla actions. Therefore, we think that it is absolutely necessary to take into account the opinion of the Bund (evidently in agreement with the Polish Social-Democrats), which is familiar with the conditions of work in Warsaw and the sentiments of the masses in that city, namely, the opinion that the Polish Socialist Party "went too far". Whether it did so or not is a question of fact which we are not competent to decide. It is never advisable to go too far, but it would be wrong to conclude that because there have been individual cases of "going to extremes" a certain form of struggle is no good.

* See pp. 213-23 of this volume.—*Ed.*

On the whole, we consider that the intensification of guerrilla warfare in Russia after the dissolution of the Duma is a gain. A ruthless guerrilla war of extermination against the government's perpetrators of violence appears to us to be timely and expedient.

Second remark. The Central Committee of our Party is certainly mistaken, and seriously mistaken, when it says in its footnote to the fourth "letter" (to the Party organisations): "it goes without saying that the Party, as heretofore, repudiates so-called 'guerrilla' militant actions."

This is incorrect. We abide by the decisions of the Congress, but *under no circumstances* shall we submit to decisions of the Central Committee which *violate* the decisions of the Congress. Anyone who takes the trouble to examine carefully the resolution of the Unity Congress entitled: "On Guerrilla Actions" will see without any difficulty that our Party *repudiates* one form of guerrilla action, *recognises* another, and *recommends* a third.

It entirely repudiates the expropriation of private property. It *does not repudiate* the expropriation of government funds, but hedges it round with *particularly strict* conditions ("if organs of revolutionary power are formed in the given locality", *etc.*).

Further, the resolution of the Congress *recognises* guerrilla actions *without* expropriation of property, i.e., *recognises* "terror", recognises *guerrilla* actions for the purpose of killing the enemy. This recognition is clearly and unambiguously expressed in the very first words of the resolution, following the preamble:

"The Congress resolves: (1) recognising that *parallel with* [our italics throughout] the preparation of the revolutionary forces for the coming uprising, the basis of which is the organisation of the masses of the working class, *an active struggle against government terror and the violence of the Black Hundreds will be inevitable*, it is necessary..." (then follows the prohibition of stealing, the expropriation of private funds, *etc.*).

Our excerpt from the *decision of the Congress* is perfectly clear. "Parallel with" work among the masses it recognises "active struggle" against the perpetrators of violence, which

undoubtedly means killing them by means of "guerrilla actions".

The only restrictions that the resolution places on *this* second form of guerrilla action (the killing of perpetrators of violence) are the following: "to *avoid* the violation of the personal property of *peaceful* citizens *except* [listen!] in those cases when it is an *unintentional* result of the struggle against the government *or* when, as for instance in building barricades, it is called for by the exigencies of the immediate struggle."

Thus, when the *immediate struggle* requires it, the violation of private property is permissible, e.g., the seizure of vehicles, etc., for barricades. When there is *no* immediate struggle, the Congress instructs us to *avoid* disturbing the personal safety of "peaceful" citizens; but the Congress at once points to an *exception*: it does *not* *blame* participants in guerrilla actions for "unintentional" disturbance of personal safety resulting from the struggle against the government.

Lastly, the Congress definitely *recommends* to the Party a certain form of guerrilla action, by resolving without qualifications or restrictions that: "arms and military supplies that belong to the government *must be seized whenever* an opportunity presents itself."

For instance: policemen carry arms that belong to the government. "The opportunity presents itself...."

Third remark. We advise all the numerous fighting groups of our Party to cease their inactivity and undertake a number of guerrilla actions in strict conformity with the decision of the Congress, i. e., without any expropriation of property, with the least possible "disturbance of the personal safety" of peaceful citizens, but with the *utmost* disturbance of the personal safety of spies, *active* members of the Black Hundreds, army, navy and police officers, *and so on, and so forth*. As for "arms" and "military supplies that belong to the government", they "must be seized *whenever* an opportunity presents itself".

A "LABOUR CONGRESS"

A NOTE

The newspaper *Tovarishch* publishes a note saying that Comrade Axelrod is campaigning for a "labour congress".⁷⁶ We, too, have information that the Mensheviks are in fact conducting such a campaign. We think that open discussion of such questions is a Party duty. Or is a campaign for an *open* labour congress conducted by the most prominent Mensheviks to be *concealed* from the Party? If Axelrod has no opportunity of setting out his views in print, we can offer him the columns of our newspaper.

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LESSONS OF THE MOSCOW UPRISING

The publication of the book *Moscow in December 1905* (Moscow, 1906) could not have been more timely. It is an urgent task of the workers' party to assimilate the lessons of the December uprising. Unfortunately, this book is like a barrel of honey spoilt by a spoonful of tar: most interesting material—despite its incompleteness—and incredibly slovenly, incredibly trite conclusions. We shall deal with these conclusions on another occasion*; at present we shall turn our attention to the burning political question of the day, to the lessons of the Moscow uprising.

The principal forms of the December movement in Moscow were the peaceful strike and demonstrations, and these were the only forms of struggle in which the vast majority of the workers took an active part. Yet, the December action in Moscow vividly demonstrated that the general strike, as an independent and predominant form of struggle, is out of date, that the movement is breaking out of these narrow bounds with elemental and irresistible force and giving rise to the highest form of struggle—an uprising.

In calling the strike, all the revolutionary parties, all the Moscow unions recognised and even intuitively felt that it must inevitably grow into an uprising. On December 6 the Soviet of Workers' Deputies resolved to "strive to transform the strike into an armed uprising". As a matter of fact, however, none of the organisations were prepared for this. Even the Joint Council of Volunteer Fighting Squads" spoke (on December 9!) of an uprising as of something remote, and it is quite evident that it had no hand in or control of

* See pp. 189-93 of this volume. —Ed.

the street fighting that took place. The organisations *failed to keep pace* with the growth and range of the movement.

The strike was growing into an uprising, primarily as a result of the pressure of the objective conditions created after October. A general strike could no longer take the government unawares: it had already organised the forces of counter-revolution, and they were ready for military action. The whole course of the Russian revolution after October, and the sequence of events in Moscow in the December days, strikingly confirmed one of Marx's profound propositions: revolution progresses by giving rise to a strong and united counter-revolution, i.e., it compels the enemy to resort to more and more extreme measures of defence and in this way devises ever more powerful means of attack.⁷⁸

December 7 and 8: a peaceful strike, peaceful mass demonstrations. Evening of the 8th: the siege of the Aquarium.⁷⁹ The morning of the 9th: the crowd in Strastnaya Square is attacked by the dragoons. Evening: the Fiedler building⁸⁰ is raided. Temper rises. The unorganised street crowds, quite spontaneously and hesitatingly, set up the first barricades.

The 10th: artillery fire is opened on the barricades and the crowds in the streets. Barricades are set up more deliberately, and no longer in isolated cases, but on a really mass scale. The whole population is in the streets; all the main centres of the city are covered by a network of barricades. For several days the volunteer fighting units wage a stubborn guerrilla battle against the troops, which exhausts the troops and compels Dubasov⁸¹ to beg for reinforcements. Only on December 15 did the superiority of the government forces become complete, and on December 17 the Semyonovsky Regiment⁸² crushed Presnya District, the last stronghold of the uprising.

From a strike and demonstrations to isolated barricades. From isolated barricades to the mass erection of barricades and street fighting against the troops. Over the heads of the organisations, the mass proletarian struggle developed from a strike to an uprising. This is the greatest historic gain the Russian revolution achieved in December 1905; and like all preceding gains it was purchased at the price of enormous sacrifices. The movement was raised from a

general political strike to a higher stage. It compelled the reaction to go *to the limit* in its resistance, and so brought vastly nearer the moment when the revolution will also go to the limit in applying the means of attack. The reaction *cannot* go further than the shelling of barricades, buildings and crowds. But the revolution can go very much further than the Moscow volunteer fighting units, it can go very, very much further in breadth and depth. And the revolution has advanced far since December. The base of the revolutionary crisis has become immeasurably broader—the blade must now be sharpened to a keener edge.

The proletariat sensed sooner than its leaders the change in the objective conditions of the struggle and the need for a transition from the strike to an uprising. As is always the case, practice marched ahead of theory. A peaceful strike and demonstrations immediately ceased to satisfy the workers; they asked: What is to be done next? And they demanded more resolute action. The instructions to set up barricades reached the districts exceedingly late, when barricades were already being erected in the centre of the city. The workers set to work in large numbers, but *even this did not satisfy them*; they wanted to know: what is to be done next?—they demanded active measures. In December, we, the leaders of the Social-Democratic proletariat, were like a commander-in-chief who has deployed his troops in such an absurd way that most of them took no active part in the battle. The masses of the workers demanded, but failed to receive, instructions for resolute mass action.

Thus, nothing could be more short-sighted than Plekhanov's view, seized upon by all the opportunists, that the strike was untimely and should not have been started, and that "they should not have taken to arms". On the contrary, we should have taken to arms more resolutely, energetically and aggressively; we should have explained to the masses that it was impossible to confine things to a peaceful strike and that a fearless and relentless armed fight was necessary. And now we must at last openly and publicly admit that political strikes are inadequate; we must carry on the widest agitation among the masses in favour of an armed uprising and make no attempt to obscure this question by talk about

"preliminary stages", or to befog it in any way. We would be deceiving both ourselves and the people if we concealed from the masses the necessity of a desperate, bloody war of extermination, as the immediate task of the coming revolutionary action.

Such is the first lesson of the December events. Another lesson concerns the character of the uprising, the methods by which it is conducted, and the conditions which lead to the troops coming over to the side of the people. An extremely biased view on this latter point prevails in the Right wing of our Party. It is alleged that there is no possibility of fighting modern troops; the troops must become revolutionary. Of course, unless the revolution assumes a mass character and affects the troops, there can be no question of serious struggle. That we must work among the troops goes without saying. But we must not imagine that they will come over to our side at one stroke, as a result of persuasion or their own convictions. The Moscow uprising clearly demonstrated how stereotyped and lifeless this view is. As a matter of fact, the wavering of the troops, which is inevitable in every truly popular movement, leads to a real *fight for the troops* whenever the revolutionary struggle becomes acute. The Moscow uprising was precisely an example of the desperate, frantic struggle for the troops that takes place between the reaction and the revolution. Dubasov himself declared that of the fifteen thousand men of the Moscow garrison, only five thousand were reliable. The government restrained the waverers by the most diverse and desperate measures: they appealed to them, flattered them, bribed them, presented them with watches, money, etc.; they doped them with vodka, they lied to them, threatened them, confined them to barracks and disarmed them, and those who were suspected of being least reliable were removed by treachery and violence. And we must have the courage to confess, openly and unreservedly, that in this respect we lagged behind the government. We failed to utilise the forces at our disposal for such an active, bold, resourceful and aggressive fight for the wavering troops as that which the government waged and won. We have carried on work in the army and we will redouble our efforts in the future ideologically to "win over" the troops. But we shall prove to be miserable

pedants if we forget that at a time of uprising there must also be a physical struggle for the troops.

In the December days, the Moscow proletariat taught us magnificent lessons in ideologically "winning over" the troops, as, for example, on December 8 in Strastnaya Square, when the crowd surrounded the Cossacks, mingled and fraternised with them, and persuaded them to turn back. Or on December 10, in Presnya District, when two working girls, carrying a red flag in a crowd of 10,000 people, rushed out to meet the Cossacks crying: "Kill us! We will not surrender the flag alive!" And the Cossacks were disconcerted and galloped away, amidst the shouts from the crowd: "Hurrah for the Cossacks!" These examples of courage and heroism should be impressed forever on the mind of the proletariat.

But here are examples of how we lagged behind Dubasov. On December 9, soldiers were marching down Bolshaya Serpukhovskaya Street singing the *Marseillaise*, on their way to join the insurgents. The workers sent delegates to meet them. Malakhov himself galloped at breakneck speed towards them. The workers were too late, Malakhov reached them first. He delivered a passionate speech, caused the soldiers to waver, surrounded them with dragoons, marched them off to barracks and locked them in. Malakhov reached the soldiers in time and we did not, although within two days 150,000 people had risen at our call, and these could and should have organised the patrolling of the streets. Malakhov surrounded the soldiers with dragoons, whereas we failed to surround the Malakhovs with bomb-throwers. We could and should have done this; and long ago the Social-Democratic press (the old *Iskra*!) pointed out that ruthless extermination of civil and military chiefs was our duty during an uprising. What took place in Bolshaya Serpukhovskaya Street was apparently repeated in its main features in front of the Nesvizhskiye Barracks and the Krutitskiye Barracks, and also when the workers attempted to "withdraw" the Ekaterinoslav Regiment, and when delegates were sent to the sappers in Alexandrov, and when the Rostov artillery on its way to Moscow was turned back, and when the sappers were disarmed in Kolomna, and so on. During the uprising we proved unequal to our task in the fight for the wavering troops.

The December events confirmed another of Marx's profound propositions, which the opportunists have forgotten, namely, that insurrection is an art and that the principal rule of this art is the waging of a desperately bold and irrevocably determined *offensive*.⁸⁴ We have not sufficiently assimilated this truth. We ourselves have not sufficiently learned, nor have we taught the masses, this art, this rule to attack at all costs. We must make up for this omission with all our energy. It is not enough to take sides on the question of political slogans; it is also necessary to take sides on the question of an armed uprising. Those who are opposed to it, those who do not prepare for it, must be ruthlessly dismissed from the ranks of the supporters of the revolution, sent packing to its enemies, to the traitors or cowards; for the day is approaching when the force of events and the conditions of the struggle will compel us to distinguish between enemies and friends according to this principle. It is not passivity that we should preach, not mere "waiting" until the troops "come over". No! We must proclaim from the housetops the need for a bold offensive and armed attack, the necessity at such times of exterminating the persons in command of the enemy, and of a most energetic fight for the wavering troops.

The third great lesson taught by Moscow concerns the tactics and organisation of the forces for an uprising. Military tactics depend on the level of military technique. This plain truth Engels demonstrated and brought home to all Marxists.⁸⁵ Military technique today is not what it was in the middle of the nineteenth century. It would be folly to contend against artillery in crowds and defend barricades with revolvers. Kautsky was right when he wrote that it is high time now, after Moscow, to review Engels's conclusions, and that Moscow had inaugurated "*new barricade tactics*".⁸⁶ These tactics are the tactics of guerrilla warfare. The organisation required for such tactics is that of mobile and exceedingly small units, units of ten, three or even two persons. We often meet Social-Democrats now who scoff whenever units of five or three are mentioned. But scoffing is only a cheap way of ignoring the *new* question of tactics and organisation raised by street fighting under the conditions imposed by modern military technique. Study carefully the story

of the Moscow uprising, gentlemen, and you will understand what connection exists between "units of five" and the question of "new barricade tactics".

Moscow advanced these tactics, but failed to develop them far enough, to apply them to any considerable extent, to a really mass extent. There were too few volunteer fighting squads, the slogan of bold attack was not issued to the masses of the workers and they did not apply it; the guerrilla detachments were too uniform in character, their arms and methods were inadequate, their ability to lead the crowd was almost undeveloped. We must make up for all this and we shall do so by learning from the experience of Moscow, by spreading this experience among the masses and by stimulating their creative efforts to develop it still further. And the guerrilla warfare and mass terror that have been taking place throughout Russia practically without a break since December, will undoubtedly help the masses to learn the correct tactics of an uprising. Social-Democracy must recognise this mass terror and incorporate it into its tactics, organising and controlling it of course, subordinating it to the interests and conditions of the working-class movement and the general revolutionary struggle, while eliminating and ruthlessly lopping off the "hooligan" perversion of this guerrilla warfare which was so splendidly and ruthlessly dealt with by our Moscow comrades during the uprising and by the Letts during the days of the famous Lettish republics.⁸⁷

There have been new advances in military technique in the very recent period. The Japanese War produced the hand grenade. The small-arms factories have placed automatic rifles on the market. Both these weapons are already being successfully used in the Russian revolution, but to a degree that is far from adequate. We can and must take advantage of improvements in technique, teach the workers' detachments to make bombs in large quantities, help them and our fighting squads to obtain supplies of explosives, fuses and automatic rifles. If the mass of the workers takes part in uprisings in the towns, if mass attacks are launched on the enemy, if a determined and skilful fight is waged for the troops, who after the Duma, after Sveaborg and Kronstadt are wavering more than ever—and if we ensure participation

of the rural areas in the general struggle—victory will be ours in the next all-Russian armed uprising.

Let us, then, develop our work more extensively and set our tasks more boldly, while mastering the lessons of the great days of the Russian revolution. The basis of our work is a correct estimate of class interests and of the requirements of the nation's development at the present juncture. We are rallying, and shall continue to rally, an increasing section of the proletariat, the peasantry and the army under the slogan of overthrowing the tsarist regime and convening a constituent assembly by a revolutionary government. As hitherto, the basis and chief content of our work is to develop the political understanding of the masses. But let us not forget that, in addition to this general, constant and fundamental task, times like the present in Russia impose other, particular and special tasks. Let us not become pedants and philistines, let us not evade these special tasks of the moment, these special tasks of the given forms of struggle, by meaningless references to our permanent duties, which remain unchanged at all times and in all circumstances.

Let us remember that a great mass struggle is approaching. It will be an armed uprising. It must, as far as possible, be simultaneous. The masses must know that they are entering upon an armed, bloody and desperate struggle. Contempt for death must become widespread among them and will ensure victory. The onslaught on the enemy must be pressed with the greatest vigour; attack, not defence, must be the slogan of the masses; the ruthless extermination of the enemy will be their task; the organisation of the struggle will become mobile and flexible; the wavering elements among the troops will be drawn into active participation. And in this momentous struggle, the party of the class-conscious proletariat must discharge its duty to the full.

VACILLATING TACTICS

We have received No. 6 of Plekhanov's *Dnevnik*⁸⁸—twelve small pages published in Geneva. We were agreeably surprised to find that this time, for once, the Russian liberal-bourgeois press refrained from praising Plekhanov. The dissolution of the Duma must have dispelled Comrade Plekhanov's optimism, we thought, when we found the liberal press reporting the appearance of this issue without the usual sympathetic quotations.

Indeed, in No. 6 of his *Dnevnik* Comrade Plekhanov abandons the position of extreme Right-wing Menshevism which he occupied (with Comrade Rakhmetov) at the time of the Duma. He completely dissociates himself from the attempts of the Mensheviks to *weaken* the revolutionary slogan "for a constituent assembly" by adding: "through the Duma", "for the Duma", etc. Plekhanov rightly argues that the only slogan possible is that for convening a constituent assembly, and he justly criticises the Vyborg Manifesto for its omission of this slogan. Plekhanov also completely dissociates himself from the Menshevik aim of connecting "action" with the Duma at all costs, even if it be a partial instead of a general action, even if it be an immediate and unprepared action instead of a later and more mature one. And lastly, this time Plekhanov not only refrains from adapting the slogans of Social-Democracy to those of the Cadets, or from identifying the latter with the slogans of bourgeois democracy in general, but, on the contrary, straightforwardly and openly criticises the lukewarmness of the Cadets (small wonder the Cadet newspapers are now silent about Plekhanov!) and draws a very forcible contrast between *them* and the "toiling" peasantry.

This is all very gratifying to us. Only it is a pity that Plekhanov is still evasive and vacillating on a number of tactical points.

Plekhanov justly criticises the authors of the Vyborg Manifesto for "restricting" themselves to an appeal not to pay taxes or furnish recruits for the army, and for striving to keep within the law. They should have said, says Plekhanov, "Prepare, for the time is approaching." They should have issued the slogan of a constituent assembly.

But refusal to pay taxes, etc., is a *means* of waging the struggle. The convocation of a constituent assembly is the immediate *object* of the struggle. In reproaching the Cadets for wanting to restrict themselves only to one means, he should have *pointed* to other means and analysed the conditions under which they can be applied, their significance, etc. To evade this question, as Plekhanov did, with the remark "sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof", is wrong. The Social-Democratic Party must guide the proletariat not only in presenting the right slogans, but also in choosing the most effective and expedient *means* of struggle. The Russian revolution has already given us much evidence showing that as the objects of the struggle become wider and as the numbers participating in the struggle increase, there is a corresponding change in the means and methods of struggle, which become more drastic and aggressive. Particularly at a moment like the present, it is our duty not to remain silent on this question, but to make a careful study of various means of struggle, such as: the political strike, the armed uprising, etc. These are burning issues; and the advanced workers are rightly demanding an answer to these questions from us.

Analysing the relation between the interests of the various classes and the demand for a constituent assembly, Plekhanov distinguishes *three* classes. (1) As regards the proletariat, he states that its class interests entirely coincide with the interests of the nation as a whole. (2) As regards the "toiling peasantry", he notes the possibility that, under certain circumstances, their interests might diverge from those of the nation as a whole; but he emphasises that "their class interests" demand the convocation of a constituent assembly. (3) As regards "those strata which are represented by the

Constitutional-Democratic Party", Plekhanov admits that their "class interests" will make them mistrustful of the convocation of a constituent assembly; that this will prove that they are "reconciled" to the actions of Stolypin & Co., that they are afraid of losing the big landed estates without compensation, etc. And Plekhanov states that he "does not propose to prophesy" whether among the Cadets class interests will outweigh the interests of the nation, or vice versa.

Prophecies refer to the future, but the repudiation of the constituent assembly slogan and of the revolutionary struggle for it by the Cadets is a fact of the present. To hush it up is not only futile but harmful. But if it is not hushed up, then obviously it should be admitted that: "The proletariat *together with* the politically conscious toiling peasantry *are opposed* to the unreliable and vacillating Cadets." Plekhanov has now come very close to this tactical line, which logically follows from his present formulation of the question.

He writes: "All the parties which are taking part in this movement [the struggle for a constituent assembly] should immediately come to an agreement for mutual assistance." Quite right! Which parties are these? Those to the *Left* of the Cadets, and which should be called the parties of the *revolutionary* bourgeois and petty-bourgeois democrats (for the constituent assembly slogan is a *revolutionary* slogan, in contrast to the oppositional and "*loyal*" slogan of the Cadets: "A new Duma as soon as possible"). Thus, *a fighting agreement between the party of the proletariat and the parties of the revolutionary democrats.*

That is just what we have always insisted on. It only remains for us to express the wish that Plekhanov will henceforth consistently carry out this policy. And carrying it out *consistently* means making this fighting agreement *conditional* not only on the recognition of the *revolutionary-democratic* slogan (a constituent assembly), but also on the recognition of the revolutionary means of struggle for which our movement has already matured, and which it will inevitably have to apply in fighting for a constituent assembly, in other words, the recognition of a *people's uprising*. Further, to make the constituent assembly slogan really clear and not merely to repeat it, we must raise the question of a

provisional revolutionary government. By failing to raise this question Plekhanov fails to delimit properly the interests of the "toiling" peasantry and the class interests of "those strata which are represented by the Cadet Party". By failing to raise this question Plekhanov leaves a yawning gap in our propaganda and agitation, for every agitator will be asked: Who, in the opinion of the workers' party, is to convene the constituent assembly?

As we have already stated, Plekhanov quite groundlessly evades the question of an uprising as well as the question of the means of struggle in general. He writes: "At the present time an uprising could only be an outbreak of popular indignation, only a riot, which would easily be suppressed by the authorities; but what we want is not riots or outbreaks; we want a victorious revolution."

This is just as if Nogi, in August 1905, had said: "What we want is *not* an attack on Port Arthur, *but* the capture of Port Arthur." Untimely attacks may be contrasted to timely attacks, ill-prepared to well-prepared attacks; but attacks in general cannot be contrasted to "capturing" a fortress. That would be a mistake. It would be an evasion of the question of the means of capturing the fortress. And it is precisely this mistake Comrade Plekhanov makes.

Either he is not saying all he thinks, or he himself is not clear about the question.

The difference between a demonstration strike and a strike for an uprising is clear. The difference between "partial mass expressions of protest" and a general, all-Russian action is clear. So is the difference between partial and local risings and a general, all-Russian uprising, supported by *all* the revolutionary parties and elements. If you call demonstrations, partial protests, partial risings—"outbreaks", people will understand what you mean, and your protests against "*putsches*" will be perfectly justified.

But to say: "we want *not* outbreaks, *but* a victorious revolution", means to say nothing. Even worse, it is a platitude made to sound significant. It is a resounding but meaningless phrase intended to *befuddle* the reader. It would be very difficult to find two sane revolutionaries who would *not agree* that we want "not outbreaks, but a victorious revolution". But neither would it be very easy to find two sane

revolutionaries who would *agree as to what particular* means of struggle at what particular *moment* would be, not an "out-break", but a real *step towards* a victorious revolution. Plekhanov does not make much progress by looking wise and repeating things which nobody has any doubt about and evading the really difficult part of the problem.

In conclusion, we must add that Plekhanov naturally has a passing "thrust" at the Bolsheviks: they are "Blanquists", because they boycott the Duma, and "frivolous", because, he alleges, they were unaware (until enlightened by Comrade Plekhanov in No. 6 of his *Dnevnik*) that it was necessary to increase activities among the troops. We think it sufficient just to mention these thrusts; they are not worth answering. If Comrade Plekhanov imagines that by his *present* tactics he is strengthening the Menshevik wing in our Party and weakening the Bolsheviks, we have no objection to leaving him in this state of blissful delusion.

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THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY AND THE COMING STRUGGLE

About eighteen months ago one of the humorous periodicals published by the German Social-Democrats contained a cartoon strip of Nicholas II. The tsar was depicted in military uniform and laughing. He was teasing a shaggy peasant with a crust of bread, now putting it almost into his mouth, now snatching it away. The face of the shaggy peasant now shone with a smile of satisfaction, now frowned with vexation as the bread was snatched away just as he snapped at it. The lettering on this crust of bread was "constitution". The last "scene" however, shows that the peasant, after a desperate effort to bite off a morsel of bread, had bitten off the head of Nicholas Romanov.

This was a very apt cartoon. For some years, in fact, the autocracy has been "teasing" the Russian people with a constitution, a constitution that was just on the point of being "almost completely" granted, only to be withdrawn and replaced the next moment by the same old tyranny, the same police system of abuses and iniquities in a much worse form. How long is it since we had almost the most democratic "parliament" in the world? How long is it since the whole press was discussing the question of a Cadet Cabinet as an immediate and real possibility? It is hard to believe that this was only two or three months ago. A couple of ukases, manifestoes and ordinances, and the old autocracy is again reigning supreme, the gang of universally condemned, discredited and publicly execrated embezzlers, hangmen and pogrom-mongers are hard at it again, heaping indignities upon the people, wrecking, robbing, beating, gagging, poisoning the air with the unbearable stench of serfdom.

From the standpoint of the development of the revolutionary struggle of the people, these rapid changes from short "days of freedom" to long months of rabid reaction are due to the equilibrium which has set in between the conflicting forces since last autumn. The autocracy is *no longer* strong enough to rule the people, the people are *not yet* strong enough to shake off this pogrom-mongering government. So the two conflicting forces stand facing each other like rival armies, now resting from the struggle for a time in order to recuperate, now hurling themselves anew into the battle against the hated enemy.

The publicists of the Cadet press and the *Novoye Vremya* press² are essentially alike in their *moralising* estimate of these vacillations. Both condemn and deplore the vacillation, indecision and wavering of the government, and exhort it to be "firm"—one lot demanding firmness in repression, the other demanding firmness in establishing the promised constitution. None of them has any conception of the class struggle that is changing the actual alignment of social forces.

As this struggle develops, class-consciousness and solidarity will inevitably grow in the ranks of the revolution and in the ranks of reaction, and sharper and more ruthless forms of struggle will inevitably be adopted. Nothing could be more effective than these rapid transitions from "days of freedom" to "months of shooting" in diminishing the ranks of the passive and indifferent, in drawing new strata and elements into the struggle, in developing the class-consciousness of the masses by throwing into vivid relief first one and then another aspect of the autocracy through the various experiments which have been made throughout Russia. The quicker and the sharper these transitions occur, the sooner will matters come to a head owing to the inevitable preponderance of the social forces on the side of freedom.

The class-conscious workers can therefore view quite unperturbed the astoundingly rapid "progress" of the autocracy on the path of repression. Keep it up, Messrs. Romanov, Trepov, Ignatyev and Stolypin! The more zealously you keep to that path, the sooner will you exhaust your last reserves. Do you threaten us with a military dictatorship, to put the whole of Russia under martial law? But it

is certainly the revolution that stands to gain most of all from such martial law. A military dictatorship and martial law will necessitate the mobilisation of increasing masses of troops, but the repeated mobilisations of the most "reliable" troops—the Cossacks—have already caused greatly increased discontent in the ruined Cossack villages and have increased the "unreliability" of these troops. Martial law costs money, and the autocracy's finances are already in a desperate condition. Martial law leads to increased agitation among the soldiers and teaches the population to be undaunted even by the most "frightful" forms of repression; Poland and the Baltic Provinces are eloquent proof of this.

We said that the reaction is "threatening" us with a military dictatorship. This, strictly speaking, is incorrect, for now, after the introduction of military courts⁹⁰ in nearly all the provinces, including the "border regions", i.e., in 82 out of the 87 provinces in the Empire, it is ridiculous to speak of a military dictatorship as a matter of the future. It is already present, and a change in name, the use of a more "frightful" word ("dictatorship" instead of "special emergency measures"), the appointment of a single dictator *cannot* add one jot to the system of wholesale arrests, deportations without trial, punitive expeditions, searching people in the street and shooting by order of army officers. A military and police dictatorship already reigns in Russia. These measures of repression have gone so far that revolutionaries who have been accustomed to such "treatment" ever since the days of Plehve, suffer from them relatively little; the brunt of them falls on the "peaceful" population, whom the Stolypins are "agitating" with most commendable success.

The measures of repression carried out in the winter followed a real revolutionary uprising with which the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie had no sympathy, and yet it was these measures that produced an all-opposition Duma from which the revolutionary elements benefited most. The measures of repression in the autumn follow upon a phase of legal "constitutionalism". It cannot be that they will result *only* in a more radical Duma.

The gang of pogrom-mongers feels that repression is futile and is desperately looking for support. On the one hand, the attempts to come to terms with the Octobrists

have failed; on the other, Pobedonostsev & Co. are preparing to make a clean sweep of all "constitutions". On the one hand, the universities are being re-opened and the venal press is clamouring for a strong liberal policy. On the other hand, even the congress of the Cadet Party is prohibited (how Stolypin & Co. are helping those Cadets!), and the press is being persecuted worse than under Durnovo. On the one hand—military courts; on the other—a broadly conceived attempt to come to terms with the rural bourgeoisie.⁹¹

The government feels that its only salvation lies in strengthening the rural, muzhik bourgeoisie in the village communes as a bulwark against the mass of the peasantry. But instead of approaching this objective with considered and cautious steps, as Guchkov & Co. would have done, instead of stealing up to it in a skilful and subtle way, as the Cadets are doing, the police Derzhimordas⁹² go about it so crudely, stupidly and clumsily that it is more than probable that their whole "campaign" will end in a fiasco. The peasant bourgeois element is numerically weak, but economically it is very strong in the countryside. Provision of land from landlords, as well as other land, by redemption payments in accordance with the Cadet agrarian reform would have given some slight satisfaction to the *whole* of the peasantry and would have admirably achieved the aim towards which the autocracy is "pushing forward" clumsily, namely: it would have enormously strengthened the peasant bourgeoisie and made it a bulwark of "order".

The Romanovs, Trepovs, Ignatyevs and Stolypins, however, are too dense to see this. In the Duma they brusquely refused to give land to the peasants and now they're putting up crown and state lands *for sale* through the officials. Whether this will actually induce the influential sections of the rural bourgeoisie to take the side of the *present* government is a big question, for the pack of officials will procrastinate, rob and take bribes as the Romanovs and their gang have always done. That the masses of the peasantry will get "heated up" more than ever when they hear about the sale of crown and state lands is beyond doubt. In very many cases these sales will mean that the peasants will have to pay *more*, for rent will be converted into redemption payments. And to compel the peasants to pay more for their

land is the best thing the government could think of doing to facilitate our agitation against the government. It is an excellent way to exasperate the peasants more than ever and to swing them over to *our* slogan: absolute refusal to make *any* payments for the land, the *whole* of which must go to the peasants after the victory of the revolution.

The government's ineptitude in its flirtation with the peasant bourgeoisie is due partly to the stupidity characteristic of every police government, and partly to extreme shortage of funds. The finances are in a very bad way. Bankruptcy threatens. Foreign countries are refusing to lend money. The internal loan is not being taken up. It has to be forcibly and *secretly* raised from the capital of the savings-banks, *secretly* because the savings-banks depositors would be least of all disposed to buy government bonds now. The autocracy's lackeys are beginning to sense the inevitability of the collapse of the gold currency and of unlimited issue of paper currency.

Keep it up, Stolypin & Co.! You are doing good work for us! You are rousing the population better than we ourselves could do it. You have gone to the limit with your measures of repression, thus demonstrating to all that the militant, revolutionary onslaught, too, must go to the limit.

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HANDS OFF!

The book *Moscow in December 1905* deals with events of tremendous importance in the history of the Russian revolution. As regards the positive conclusions to be drawn from the Moscow uprising, we gave them in general outline in our last issue.* Here we shall dwell on those aspects of this important, but badly executed, piece of work which have special reference to the Social-Democrats in Moscow.

The "compilers" of this book state in their preface that they used material supplied by Social-Democratic organisations, which, however, "as such have no connection with this work". It goes without saying that it is extremely irregular for Social-Democratic organisations to supply such information to persons who are not responsible to these organisations. The organisations of the workers' party have now undoubtedly been put in an awkward position by the slovenly treatment of their materials and by the choice assortment of banalities with which these have been "ornamented". All the Moscow Social-Democratic organisations, and primarily, of course, their leading body—the Moscow Committee—must, in our opinion, consider this matter and take measures to prevent a recurrence of such irregularities.

Here is one of the many instances of how the anonymous authors of the book "treat" the material supplied to them by the Social-Democratic organisations. The authors deal with the role of the revolutionary organisations in the Moscow events, and, in particular, with the Manifesto of the Combat Organisation of the Moscow Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, published on De-

* See pp. 171-78 of this volume.—Ed.

ember 11, in No. 5 of *Izvestia Sovetov Rabochikh Deputatov*.⁹³ Without giving any coherent account of the contents and character of this document, the authors give rein to their profundity by the following criticism. They quote No. 5: "The fighting is at its height. For many hours a number of sanguinary battles were fought in the streets of Moscow between the people in revolt and the tsar's troops", and they "criticise" as follows: "We know that there were only minor skirmishes between troops and a few fighting squads in the streets of Moscow." And with mock passion they cry out against this "substitution [*sic!*] of the action of handfuls of armed men for mass struggle", and exclaim: "Where did the masses come in, how could they display activity?" etc., etc.

What is this?? Can these efforts to appear profound by such methods of "criticism" be called a scientific analysis?? Just think: in a serious historical work, in a special chapter devoted to the part played by the revolutionary organisations, the authors try to find fault with the fact that on December 11, i.e., a few days *before* the crisis, when *new* methods of struggle were just beginning to be applied, the Soviet of Workers' Deputies dared to speak of "a people in revolt"! Perhaps it should have spoken of "a few fighting squads" in a profoundly condescending tone and not have called on the people and the masses to assist in the fight that was beginning? What term but cheap can we apply to these doctrinaire efforts to be "clever", these verbal quibbles, when you find these very same "compilers" in a *number* of passages in their book referring to the people as a whole, the "whole population" turning out on the streets? Do try to understand, you pitiful creatures, that to be a member of a revolutionary organisation in Moscow on December 11, and yet *not to speak* of the people in revolt could only mean that the one who kept silent was a member of the Black Hundreds or a soulless pedant like Pollack in Leonid Andreyev's *To the Stars*.⁹⁴

Let us proceed. As regards the Manifesto issued by the Combat Organisation and published in the same issue of *Izvestia* (No. 5), the compilers say with a sneer: "Squads of three or four persons, in the opinion of the authors of the manifesto, were to present [!] the people with a capital

city freed from centuries of oppression." "The Combat Organisation decided that there was no need for the masses to act."

Let us turn to the Manifesto. The compilers of this book do *not* print it *in full*; they only give excerpts from it. But even in the excerpts chosen by these "investigators" we read a *direct* call of the Combat Organisation: "*Organise as many of these squads as possible.*" Thus, the idea of "presenting" something to the people, the idea that "there was *no need* for the masses to act", is imputed to those who from the very first day of the armed struggle called upon "as many workers as possible" to join the fighting squads....

What is this? Literary slovenliness or hack literature?

The authors make no attempt whatever to analyse the connection between military organisation and military technique, the functions and interrelation of the direct armed fight and the auxiliary struggle. They shut their eyes to the past, they forget that both general strikes and demonstrations in Russia began with a very small, even insignificant number of participants, judged by present-day standards. Of a serious historical approach there is not a hint—nothing but truly nauseating attacks. The Manifesto of the Combat Organisation is quoted on page 145 in fragments, in order to distort its meaning; only further on (page 154) is it mentioned in passing that the Manifesto contains an instruction to "spare the lives of infantrymen", i.e., *directly reckons* with the psychology of the masses, making a clear distinction between Black-Hundred troops and wavering troops. But the Manifesto of the Octobrists, which had no bearing whatever on the study of the Moscow uprising, is printed *in full*!

Social-Democratic organisations have entrusted information to persons who print the Manifesto of the Octobrists in full, yet tear fragments out of the manifestoes of the Combat Organisation of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies for banal exercises in commonplace witticisms....

Let us pass on to the conclusions drawn by the compilers: "The proletariat, as a mass, did not go into action" (p. 245). "The Moscow proletariat did not go into action either on December 9-10 ... or on the following days. This does credit to its intelligence and discipline" (p. 244).

Do you hear, comrade workers: it is suggested that it is to your "credit" that the masses did not fight enough!! The fact that the masses of the workers took an inadequate part in the active, aggressive struggle is, if you please, a point in their favour. And the fact that the masses of the workers forged ahead of their leaders and proceeded to build barricades on a large scale, that they were constantly pressing their leaders to call for more drastic action, must no doubt be held against them....

"The events in Moscow," say the compilers, "prove that in the present historical period, in which militarism has been developed to an enormous degree, a necessary condition for the victory of the people in revolt is that a considerable part of the army should actively go over to the side of the insurgent population, or that the masses of the soldiers should categorically refuse to use arms against the people...."

Our wiseacres failed to understand or even to notice the struggle that went on to win over the vacillating troops. Evidently they think that an uprising is possible without having to fight the Black-Hundred section of the troops, without an active struggle on the part of the revolutionary people, which throws the ranks of the army into confusion. They have adopted the standpoint of the Cadets, who are ready to welcome the "going over" of the troops, but who declare that an armed uprising or propaganda for it is "criminal folly"....

... "But such action on the part of the troops is conceivable only towards the end [*sic!*] of a revolution, which moreover must involve the whole of the people. The December uprising of the proletariat, which enjoyed only the passive [?] sympathy of the mass of the bourgeois population, *its actions in pursuit of its own slogans* [our italics], could not [!] find support in the army, and therefore the 'attempt to convert the general strike into an armed uprising' could not be crowned with success and must be regarded as a historical blunder."

Let this be, a lesson to you, workers of Moscow! Don't fight for "your own slogans"!...

It is hard to imagine how people could sink to such depths of pedantry, to such Cadet-like poverty of thought, to drawing such banal conclusions from serious historical material.

Let the Moscow Social-Democrats express their indignation to the authors of this book and call on all Party members and revolutionaries to collect materials for a worthy account and serious criticism of the December uprising. Let all its mistakes and shortcomings be ruthlessly exposed for the instruction of the fighting proletariat. But to the Cadets and the literary hacks the party of the proletariat must say, "Hands off!"

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THE GUERRILLA ACTION OF THE POLISH SOCIALIST PARTY ⁹⁵

Our Unity Congress undoubtedly rejected all "expropriations", so that on this score the Polish Socialist Party's references to the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party are quite irrelevant. Nor is there any doubt that in organising the "action" of August 2 (15) the Polish Socialist Party failed to consider either its expediency, the temper of the masses, or the conditions of the working-class movement. Obviously, all these factors must be taken into account, and this is emphasised in a special paragraph of the Bolshevik draft resolution on guerrilla actions. In our opinion, however, it is the Polish Socialist Party's *distortion* of guerrilla tactics that deserves condemnation, not these "tactics" as such. Our Polish Social-Democratic comrades would certainly have approved of such guerrilla action as the wrecking of the Black-Hundred "Tver" inn⁹⁶ by the St. Petersburg workers last year.

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UNION OF THE BUND WITH THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY

The Seventh Congress of the Bund, the organisation of the Jewish Social-Democratic workers of Russia, has recently taken place. According to the reports of this Congress, the total number of members of the Bund amounts to 33,000 in 257 organisations. Representation at the Congress was organised on a democratic basis, with one delegate for each 300 members of the Party. About 23,000 members took part in the elections and they sent to the Congress 68 delegates with the right to speak and vote.

The chief question that the Congress had to decide was that of the union of the Bund with the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. As is known, the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. pronounced in favour of unification and laid down the conditions for it. The Seventh Congress of the Bund has now accepted these conditions. Union with the R.S.D.L.P. was adopted by 48 votes against 20. Thus, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party has at last become a truly all-Russian and united organisation. The membership of our Party is now *over 100,000*: 31,000 were represented at the Unity Congress, and then there are about 26,000 Polish Social-Democrats, about 14,000 Lettish and 33,000 Jewish Social-Democrats.

Representatives of the Central Committee of the Bund joined the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. The rather difficult work of unifying the local organisations of the Bund and those of the R.S.D.L.P. now lies ahead.

The second question discussed at the Bund Congress was that of the present political situation. In a detailed resolu-

tion, adopted by a large majority of votes, the Seventh Congress of the Bund accepted *the convocation of a constituent assembly* as a tactical slogan, and rejected all reservations tending to weaken this slogan, such as "through the Duma", etc. Boycott of the Duma was rejected conditionally, that is to say, the necessity of taking part in the elections was recognised provided that the party of the proletariat was in a position to carry out an independent election campaign.

The third question was that of "guerrilla actions", without any division of them into "expropriations" and terrorist acts. By an overwhelming majority, a resolution *against* guerrilla actions was adopted.

The last question concerned the organisation of the Bund. Organisational rules were adopted.

We limit ourselves to this short note for the time being; we hope in the near future to acquaint our readers more fully with the decisions of the Seventh Congress of the Bund.

Written in September 1906

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the manuscript

SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONARY MENSHEVIKS

As early as the beginning of 1905 the Social-Democrats pointed out that the draft programme of the S.-R. (Socialist-Revolutionary) Party marked a definite turn "from Narodism⁹⁷ to Marxism".* It was obvious that the party making this turn was bound to undergo internal disintegration.

The ideological and political disintegration of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party is now a fact. The *Minutes of the First Congress of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party*, published in book form in Paris this year, clearly indicate all the lines of this disintegration. The current political literature of the "Maximalists" and of the representatives of the nascent "Toilers' Popular Socialist Party" has conclusively revealed the full extent of this disintegration.

The two big splits which occurred in the ranks of Social-Democracy—the split between the "Economists"⁹⁸ and the old Iskristis in 1900-03, and the split between the "Mensheviks" and "Bolsheviks" in 1903-06—were the result of an acute struggle between two trends characteristic of the whole international socialist movement, viz., the opportunist trend and the revolutionary trend, in their peculiar forms corresponding to particular stages of the Russian revolution. The Socialist-Revolutionary Party, however, at the very first attempt at anything like a public statement testifying to its having a real party character, split up into *three trends*: (1) the Left—the "Maximalists"; (2) the Centre—the S.-R.'s of the old type; and (3) the Right—the opportunists (otherwise called "Legalists", "Toilers' Popular Socialists", etc.) with whom we shall deal in the present article. The

* See present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 83-89.—Ed.

contours of all three trends can be clearly seen from the *Minutes of the First Congress of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party*. We have now a vivid literary expression of the trends which have broken away (or are breaking away?) from the "Centre". The Maximalists have published *Straight to the Goal* and a detailed programmatic pamphlet by Mr. Tag—in," entitled: *Principles of Labour Theory*. The opportunist Socialist-Revolutionaries have expressed their views, carried almost to their logical conclusion, in the writings of Mr. Peshekhonov & Co. Mr. Chernov, the representative of the "Centre", was quite right in his article in *Mysl* (or maybe *Golos, Dyelo Naroda*,¹⁰⁰ etc.) in calling the Maximalists "vulgar socialists", but, if we are not mistaken, he has said nothing in the press so far about the opportunist Socialist-Revolutionaries. The concubinage of the Socialist-Revolutionary "marsh" and the Socialist-Revolutionary "extreme Right" in these newspapers was not without effect.

The division of the supporters of the "labour principle", the admirers of Lavrov and Mikhailovsky, into three trends is an important political event in the history of Russian petty-bourgeois radicalism. Marxists must pay full attention to this event, for it throws a sidelight on the trend of the maturing political thought of the awakening Russian peasantry.

The main contradiction in the programme of the Socialist-Revolutionaries is their oscillation between Narodism and Marxism. Marxism demands that a clear distinction be made between the maximum programme and the minimum programme. The maximum programme is the socialist transformation of society, which is *impossible* without the abolition of commodity production. The minimum programme proposes reforms that are possible even within the limits of commodity production. Confusion of the two inevitably leads to all sorts of petty-bourgeois and opportunist, or anarchist, perversions of proletarian socialism and inevitably *obscures* the objects of the social revolution to be achieved through the conquest of political power by the proletariat.

From the standpoint of the old Russian Narodism, of the principles of Lavrov, V. V., Mikhailovsky & Co., the distinction between the maximum programme and the minimum programme is superfluous and incomprehensible, for

the theory of Narodism denies that the laws and categories of commodity production can be applied to Russian peasant economy. The more or less consistent disciples of Lavrov and Mikhailovsky (as well as of V. V. and Nikolai—on¹⁰¹ who are undeservedly forgotten, for present-day Narodniks *have no other* source of *economic* ideas) were inevitably bound to be *hostile* to this Marxist division of the programme into a maximum and a minimum. And the very first attempt of the Socialist-Revolutionaries to transform their circles into a party revealed the strength and trend of this hostility. The supporters of the revolutionary trends in Narodism asked: Why demand only the socialisation of the land? We demand the socialisation of the mills and factories too! Down with the minimum programme! We are Maximalists! Down with the theory of commodity production!

Actually, this Maximalist trend almost coincides with anarchism, as one would expect.

The supporters of the opportunist trends in Narodism, the Narodniks of the eighties, raised another cry: What earthly use is a minimum programme, or proletarian dictatorship? Socialism is a remote prospect! Why frighten the *masses* away with a name like "Socialist-Revolutionaries"? Why demand a "republic"? What's the use of an illegal party? Down with the whole lot! Down with the maximum programme! Down with the "dangerous" clauses of the minimum programme! Instead of a programme, let us have a "platform" of an open, legal, non-republican "Toilers' Popular Socialist Party"!*

Against either of these tendencies the S.-R. Centrists, the old members of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, have *no other* defence than to invoke the laws of commodity production and *virtually* to adopt the standpoint of Marxism. The accusations levelled at the S.-R. Centre by the Right and the Left at the First Congress of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, namely that the S.-R. Centre was Marxist, that it wanted to compete with the Social-Democrats, to start out from Social-Democratic principles, were therefore

* See particularly Mr. Peshekhonov's articles in the July and August issues of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*,¹⁰² and also newspaper reports on the formation of the "Toilers' Popular Socialist Party", and on the meetings of its organising committee, or St. Petersburg Committee, etc.

quite justified. This Centre's transition to Social-Democracy is now simply a matter of time. And the sooner the revolutionary parties can exist quite openly, the sooner that time will come. No prejudices against Marxist "dogmatism" can withstand the inexorable logic of events.

The brief existence of the Cadet Duma coincided with the first appearance of representatives of the peasant masses in the general Russian political arena. It was inevitable that the Socialist-Revolutionaries should seek an understanding with these representatives and try to organise them politically on the basis of *their* Socialist-Revolutionary programme. It turned out that the Social-Democrats had, in a comparatively short time, formed a Social-Democratic *Party* Group in the Duma. The S.-R.'s, on the other hand, were never able to act except behind the backs of the Trudoviks. In political solidarity the small producer at once proved to be far inferior to the working class. Moreover, even behind the backs of the Trudoviks the Socialist-Revolutionaries were unable to carry through a *united* political campaign. On the land question, which is the basic question for the peasantry, the split between the opportunists and the Centrist S.-R.'s was soon revealed. In the arena of "parliamentary" action, the former gained the victory among the representatives of the masses: they rallied 104 Trudoviks for the opportunist Land Bill,¹⁰ whereas only 33 Trudoviks (out of the same 104) subsequently supported the Land Bill that corresponded to the programme of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party.

This split, which occurred in an open political action in the sight of the whole people, inevitably led to the systematisation of the disagreements which had caused it. Mr. Peshekhonov, one of the leaders of the S.-R. opportunists, went further than anyone else in this systematisation. Here are his views, his "outlines and scope of the platform"... of the peasant Cadets:

"The revolutionary demands must conform to and be commensurate with the revolutionary forces" (p. 194, *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 8). Therefore "the line of land and liberty" must not be "carried too far". Instead of the maximum and minimum programme of "the two socialist parties, the Social-Democrats and the Socialist-Revolutionaries", the petty

bourgeois needs a united "*platform*" to serve as "a plan of campaign, not for a long period (right until socialism), but only for the immediate future". The rest of the road to the final goal is a "*remote prospect*" (p. 196). Therefore, the *republic must be deleted* from this "platform": "We must reckon with the psychological factor.... The monarchist idea is too deeply rooted in the popular mind.... A thousand years have not passed in vain.... This psychology of the broad masses must be reckoned with.... The question of the republic calls for extreme caution" (198). The same with the national question. "Here, too, we must reckon with the psychology of the people, formed by its thousand years' history".... "Therefore, we deem it necessary to go to the masses, not with the slogan of independence for nationalities [and not their self-determination—adds the author elsewhere], but with the demand that arises in actual life, namely, the demand for their autonomy." In short, Mr. Peshekhonov bluntly puts the question: "Can we win complete freedom?" And he bluntly answers: "*No.*"

Next he puts the question: "Can we take the whole of the land?" And he also answers: "*No.*" Caution, caution, gentlemen! The peasant deputies in the Duma said to Mr. Peshekhonov: "We were sent here to get land, not to give it up." At present the peasants want neither the socialisation (equal division) nor the nationalisation of the land. They are afraid of both. They only want *additional* land. "It would therefore be more expedient not to push the 'land' line to its logical conclusion in the platform" (p. 206). "I think it is even dangerous at the present time to raise the question of general equalisation" (p. 205). "Allotment land and privately-owned land not exceeding the labour norm must be left in the possession of the present owners" in conformity with the Land Bill introduced by the 104, and the transfer of the whole land to the nation must be postponed—also, evidently, as a "*remote prospect*".

Caution, moderation and scrupulousness must be exercised in choosing the means of struggle as well as the method of organisation. An armed uprising? "I [Peshekhonov] tirelessly pray: May this bitter cup pass us by!... It would be only too deplorable if anyone were to regard an uprising not as an unfortunate possibility, but as a fatal necessity....

It is dangerous ... to make use of it carelessly ... the whole movement might come to grief" (No. 7, pp. 177-78). The main task of the moment is to organise "the forces of the people". "I scarcely believe that this task can be carried out at all satisfactorily by our two existing socialist parties. It is time to realise that a secret organisation cannot embrace the masses. The Cadet Party has also declared itself bankrupt in this matter. Evidently, this must be undertaken by someone else, and for this purpose, I believe, we need a legal socialist party." (No. 7, pp. 179-80.)

As the reader will see, it cannot be denied that Mr. Peshekhonov's views are consistent, harmonious and rounded off. This champion of the monarchy, this political trickster, who justifies the knout on the grounds that it has a thousand years of history behind it, has not left much of the official programme of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. And if the "real" S.-R.'s* could all through the Duma period cleverly conceal *such* differences of opinion, if in order to conceal them they could even collaborate on the same newspapers, it only proves how far *political hypocrisy* can go.

What is the socio-economic class basis of S.-R. opportunism? The fact that Peshekhonov & Co. *are trying to adapt themselves to the interests of the thrifty muzhik*, are adulterating socialism to suit his interests.

Take the main question, the land. Mr. Peshekhonov twice repeats with relish the words of the peasant-Trudoviks which pleased him so immensely: "We were sent here to get land, not to give it up." Indeed, those words are very significant. But they utterly refute the petty-bourgeois illusions of Narodism, and confirm all the propositions of the Marxists. These words clearly prove that the proprietary instincts of the average muzhik are *already awakening*. And only those who are absolutely ignorant of political economy and West-European history can be unaware of the fact that the more political liberty and democracy extends, the stronger these instincts grow and develop.

What conclusion should a person to whom socialism is not just an empty phrase have drawn from the words of this shrewd, thrifty muzhik, chosen by the "masses"? Obviously,

—

In spite of all their grandiloquent revolutionary phrases.

the conclusion that such a class of small proprietors *cannot* be the vehicle for socialism; that socialists can and must support the small proprietor class in its struggle against the landlords *solely* because this struggle has a bourgeois-democratic significance and can have bourgeois-democratic results; that it is the *duty* of a socialist not to obscure but to *expose* the antagonism of interests between the working masses as a whole and these small proprietors, who want to strengthen and consolidate *their own* economic position, and who will be hostile to any idea of "giving up" the land or anything else to the mass of the propertyless and destitute. "We want to get land, not give it up!" Can anything better express petty-bourgeois proprietary instincts and aspirations?

From this a Social-Democrat draws the following conclusion: we must support these small proprietors in their struggle against the landlords and the autocracy because of the revolutionary bourgeois-democratic character of this struggle. If they win, the conditions of the whole people will be improved, but this will be an improvement and development of the *capitalist* system. Therefore, we must not pander to the proprietary *or owning* instincts of this class, but, on the contrary, *at once* begin to combat these instincts and explain their significance to the proletariat, warning the proletariat and organising it in an independent party. Our agrarian programme is: to help the small proprietors to cast off the serf-owners by revolutionary means; to point out to them the conditions for achieving nationalisation of the land as the best agrarian system that is possible under capitalism, and to lay bare the great difference between the interests of the proletarian and those of the small proprietor.

The small shopkeeper's socialism involves a different conclusion: we must "reckon" with the psychology of the "masses" (the masses of small proprietors, not the propertyless masses); we must bow servilely to the proprietor's desire to "get" something from the landlord, but not to "give up" anything to the proletarian; to please the small proprietor we must relegate socialism to the dim "remote future"; we must *recognise* the desire of the petty proprietor to *consolidate* his own economic position—in short, we must

describe as "socialism" subservience to the narrow egotism of the small proprietors and truckling to their prejudices.

Monarchist sentiments are a prejudice. Perhaps you think that it is the duty of socialists to combat prejudices? You are mistaken; "toilers' socialism" must adapt itself to prejudices.

Perhaps you think that the antiquity and "stability" (??) of the monarchist prejudice call for a specially ruthless struggle against it? You are mistaken. "Toilers' socialism" deduces from the antiquity of the knout merely that it must be treated with "extreme caution".

True, Mr. Peshekhonov, in fighting—or pretending to fight—the Cadets, repeats all the Cadet arguments in favour of the monarchy. Well, what harm is there in that? Do you still not know that a bourgeois radical fights a bourgeois liberal *only* for the purpose of taking his place and not for the purpose of replacing his programme by a substantially different programme? Have you forgotten the history of the French type of Trudovik socialists, that is, the radical socialists, who "fought" the French Cadets, only to act in exactly the same way as the latter when they themselves became Cabinet Ministers? Do you not see that there is no more difference between Mr. Peshekhonov and Mr. Struve than there is between Bobchinsky and Dobchinsky? ¹⁰⁴

Mr. Peshekhonov guesses, perhaps, that there is some *material* connection between the desire "to get land, *not to give it up*", and the *monarchy*. In order "not to give it up" you must *protect* it. And the monarchy is nothing but the hired police protection of those who do not want "to give up" against those who are *capable* of taking.* The Cadets need a monarchy to protect the big bourgeoisie. The "Trudovik socialists" need a monarchy to protect the thrifty muzhiks.

It is obvious that this outlook of the "Trudovik socialists" inevitably leads to a pedantic and trite attitude to an up-rising ("an unfortunate possibility"; compare this with Mr.

* Another instrument for the police protection of proprietors is called the *standing army*. Peshekhonov writes: "The democratic republic implies ... *perhaps*, the substitution of the armed nation for the standing army" (No. 8, p. 197). Please, gentlemen, admirers of Lavrov and Mikhailovsky, will you *candidly* explain what this magnificent "*perhaps*" means?

Struve's articles in *Osvobozhdeniye*, in the summer of 1905 about the "mad and criminal advocacy of an uprising"). Hence, the lofty contempt for "secret organisations" and the yearnings, in August 1906, for a "legal socialist party". To the objective historical conditions which make an uprising *inevitable*, which compel the ignorant masses, in spite of all their prejudices, to wage a struggle precisely against the monarchy in defence of their own vital interests, and which convert all Manilov yearnings for "a legal socialist party" into grist for the mill of Ushakov¹⁶ & Co.—to these objective conditions Peshekhonov & Co. do not give a thought. The admirers of Lavrov and Mikhailovsky are obliged to reckon with the psychology of the downtrodden masses and not with the objective conditions which are *transforming* the psychology of the *militant* masses.

To sum up. We know now what it means to be a Toilers' Popular Socialist. "Toilers" means pandering to the interests of small proprietors who want "to get, but not to give up". "Popular" means pandering to the monarchist prejudices of the people, to the chauvinistic fear lest certain nationalities should secede from Russia. "Socialist" means declaring socialism to be a remote prospect and replacing what political tricksters consider a narrow, doctrinaire and irksome programme by a wide, free, flexible, mobile, light, thinly-clad and even stark-naked "platform". Long live the "Toilers' Popular Socialists"!

Mr. Peshekhonov & Co. are the first swallows of incipient social reaction among the Russian peasantry. The good god has sent the Peshekhonovs down from heaven as living proof of the Marxist proposition regarding the dual nature of every small producer. A peasant is endowed both with reason and with prejudice; he possesses the revolutionary qualities of a person who is exploited, and the reactionary aspirations of the small proprietor anxious "to get, but not to give up". Mr. Peshekhonov & Co. are the ideological expression of the reactionary aspects of the small peasant proprietor. Mr. Peshekhonov & Co. are contemplators of the "rear" aspect of the Russian muzhik. They are doing in

the realm of *ideas* what the Gurkos and Stishinskys are doing in a *coarse, material way*, bribing the peasant bourgeois with the sale of crown and state lands.

Whether such palliatives will perceptibly weaken the inevitable impact between the masses and their exploiters in a sharp struggle is still a big question. It is still a big question whether the traditional peasant prejudices, fostered by all sorts of opportunists, will be sufficient to outweigh the good sense of the poor peasantry that is being awakened in the flames of revolution. In any case, the Social-Democrats will perform their duty of developing and refining the *revolutionary* consciousness of the peasantry.

Let Mr. Pesheknov & Co. serve as a warning to the Right-wing Social-Democrats. When criticising the Toilers' Popular Socialists we might, sometimes, have said to certain Menshevik Social-Democrats: *mutato nomine de te fabula narratur* (the fable is about you, only the name is changed). We, too, have in our ranks people who yearn for a legal party, who are ready to substitute a platform for a programme, to sink to the level of the masses. We have Plekhanov, who delivered his famous verdict on the December rising: "They should not have taken to arms." We have Malishevsky, a contributor to the *Otkliki Sovremennosti*,¹⁰⁸ who attempted (although *not* in *Otkliki Sovremennosti*) to delete the republic from our programme. It would be very useful for these people to take a good look at the Peshekhnovs in all their "pristine beauty".

A NEW COUP D'ÉTAT IN PREPARATION

Guchkov's letter to Trubetskoi¹⁰⁷ long engaged, and to some extent is still engaging, the attention of our political press, if such a term may be applied to the reptile press,¹⁰⁸ and to the few surviving liberal newspapers. This letter really has a certain significance. It marks a big stride in the development of the counter-revolutionary trend among wide sections of the Russian big bourgeoisie. For these sections, the political strike in October was already a decisive turning-point. After October 17 the big bourgeois at once cried: "Enough!" Therefore, a singular and very characteristic feature of the Russian revolution is the fact that the date of the Constitutional Manifesto was used as the name of their party by the elements of the big bourgeoisie who took the side of the tsarist government, which began to adapt the new constitution to the autocratic regime. October is the date of the only partial victory the revolution in Russia has gained so far. Octobrists is the name adopted by the counter-revolutionary party of the big bourgeoisie.

This contradiction clearly reveals the class antagonisms in the Russian revolution. The explanation of it is provided by the Marxist view of the present revolution in Russia. It is a bourgeois revolution. At all events, it is clearing the ground for a wider and more rapid development of capitalism. To regard a full triumph of the revolutionary peasantry in its struggle for land as a victory for the "labour principle", as a transition to "socialisation", is a sheer petty-bourgeois illusion. But the inevitable clearing of the ground for capitalism may proceed along two main lines. Feudal Russia can be transformed into bourgeois Russia if conditions are created that provide the mass of the peasantry and prole-

tariat with the maximum welfare conceivable under capitalism. This transformation is also possible if conditions are created which mainly ensure the interests of the propertied classes, the landlords and capitalists. So far our revolution is following the second line. If it fails to gain another big victory there can be no doubt that the counter-revolutionary bourgeois Octobrists will be the legal executors of the Russian revolution, just as the Junker Bismarck became the legal executor of the half-hearted German Revolution of 1848.

Mr. Guchkov is no simpleton. He is already anticipating the pleasure of taking the reins of government in his hands after the final defeat of the revolution, and of combining business-like, *geschäftmacher*, bourgeois "liberalism" with ruthless military and police measures of repression against the discontented "lower classes". Like a practical, non-idealistic, bourgeois businessman, Mr. Guchkov has grasped the actual political situation better than many philosophers and phrase-mongers among our bourgeois intelligentsia (*l'ignorance est moins éloignée de la vérité que le préjugé!*—ignorance is less removed from truth than prejudice). Mr. Guchkov brings the bourgeois ideals of the Cadets down to earth. Especially notable in this connection is the following passage in his letter which has not been appreciated by our slavish press:

"There is no doubt now," writes Guchkov to Trubetskoi, "that the triumph of the revolution, or even a new intensification of the revolutionary crisis, will put an end to our young political liberty and the remnants of our civilisation and prosperity."

This is a remarkably correct and remarkably apt estimation of the present political situation from the point of view of the interests of the capitalist and landlord. Mr. Guchkov takes the bull by the horns. The issue in the present political situation is indeed whether we are in for a *new intensification of the revolutionary crisis*. We thank you for your candour, Mr. Guchkov! We quite realise that the bourgeois professors and diplomats on *Rech* dislike your determination, straightforwardness, quickness and aggressiveness, your—pardon the vulgar expression—capacity for "dropping bricks", but we socialists are delighted by it. It just suits us.

Thus, anyone who wishes to be serious about the present political situation must first take a clear stand on the question of a *new intensification of the revolutionary crisis*. That is exactly what Mr. Guchkov is doing. His whole letter says: "I am against it." I subordinate everything to the task of combating this intensification, to the task of suppressing everything that is conducive to it. The reason is clear. A new intensification of the revolutionary crisis contains the threat of *the triumph of the revolution*, which, in turn, will threaten the "remnants" ... of the landed estates of Messrs. Guchkov, Romanov, Stolypin and the rest of the gang of pogrom-mongers, the "remnants" of bourgeois privileges which can serve as a protection against the further struggles of the proletariat, in short, the "remnants of *our* [Guchkov's, Romanov's, Stolypin's] prosperity".

Mr. Guchkov argues correctly, far more correctly and consistently than the Cadets who are now howling against him, who, through their spokesmen, the Vinogradovs, Struves, Izgoyevs, Berdayevs and Milyukovs, have hundreds of times bewailed the impending end of "liberty and civilization" and the triumph of "spontaneous insanity".

Nor would it harm revolutionaries to take a lesson from the reactionaries in the logical presentation of the question of the present political situation, *that is to say*, of "a new intensification of the revolutionary crisis". Such an intensification will inevitably imply mass action on a still wider scale than before, enriched with the experience of the great year of the great Russian revolution. And the experience of that year, from the October strike through the December insurrection, the peaceful Duma and its dissolution, leads to an aggressive, all-Russian, armed uprising, with strikes as an auxiliary and subsidiary means of struggle.

The government has shaped its entire policy to meet this universally expected, new intensification of the revolutionary crisis. There is no doubt that it has deliberately refrained from fixing the date for the new Duma elections in order to have its hands free, in order, if the popular struggle becomes very acute, to try to split it up by suddenly appointing the elections. Nor is there any doubt that this is the angle from which it is carefully studying the question whether to summon a new Duma and whether the *old electoral*

law should remain in force. Social-Democrats have less right than anyone to treat this question lightly.

The government is in a dilemma: Should it try to summon the Duma again on the basis of the existing electoral law, while increasing repression, exercising pressure on the electors and organising Black-Hundred gangs, or should it amend the electoral law *before* the Second Duma is convened, so as to ensure a Duma "capable of working", i. e., a Black-Hundred Duma? Reaction among the landlord class, the victories of the Black-Hundred landlords in the Zemstvo, the obvious growth of discontent among the people—all these prompt the government to repeal the present electoral law at once, to limit the franchise in the sense of reverting from the Witte Duma to the Bulygin Duma, if not something worse, or simply to call together the elected representatives of the Zemstvos in the Second Duma. Our reptile press is already dropping hints about some such plans in "higher quarters", i. e., the Court set, and are preparing the ground by arguing that the autocracy has the "right" to promulgate a new electoral law without consulting the Duma.

Let us consider which of these "lines" of government policy is the more probable. Constitutional "legality", political caution and loyalty favour preservation of the electoral law of December 11. As you see, these are all "idealistic" considerations which the Romanovs and Pobedonostsevs are accustomed to despise. Besides, it is ridiculous to think that men covered from head to foot with blood and mud, fighting their last desperate battle to maintain their slaveowners' rights, would be influenced by such considerations. It is ridiculous to think that the tsar and his gang would have any qualms about "legality" when they had no qualms about promulgating the Law of December 11, the Law of February 20, ¹⁰ etc., and are not in the least disturbed by the present downright mockery of the "law". No, these arguments are too flimsy.

The opinion of Europe? The need of a loan? This need is very urgent. And European capital will lend money only on the guarantee of "order". What kind of "order", however, is immaterial to capital—it would even prefer the order that prevails in the graveyard. But a second Cadet Duma (or, which God forbid, a still more radical one!) threatens further

financial disclosures, further "disorder"! No, precisely from the point of view of obtaining a loan in Europe it would pay the government best to annul the present electoral law so as to ensure the election of a Black-Hundred Duma which will sanction any and all loans.

Of course, we must not forget that, actually, profound economic and political causes make an agreement between the autocracy and the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie *necessary*. The failure of the first attempt to come to terms through the medium of the First Duma is by no means proof, and cannot be a proof, that all such attempts will fail—and very many such attempts will still be made. But an agreement through a Cadet Duma must not now be regarded (and the autocracy cannot regard it) as being very likely.

Revolutionaries learn from the experience of revolution; but so does the autocracy, and very attentively. Everyone can see that there is practically no hope of a Duma more to the right under the present electoral law. The Second Duma is to be summoned at the end of the winter, just when it is usual for starvation, unemployment and want to become particularly acute among the masses. The parties to the left of the Cadets will now undoubtedly be far less disposed than formerly to be guided by the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie; they will be far more capable of undertaking independent, decisive and energetic political action. No! We must harbour no illusions, we must not imagine the enemy to be altogether lacking in brains, perspicacity or discretion. We need have no doubt that after the experience of the Cadet Duma the "heroes of thought and action" in this Black-Hundred government are exerting themselves to the utmost to prevent a repetition of it.

The government has seen that the dissolution of the Duma did not result in an immediate widespread uprising of the whole people. The coup d'état which had been prepared silently and secretly was very much to the liking of the "higher quarters". They have been immensely impressed by what seems to them to have been a bold and successful attack on the revolution. They cannot help contemplating now another attack of the same kind made *beforehand*, to prevent a "new intensification of the revolutionary crisis". The tsar's courtiers are military men. They fully appreciate the advan-

tage of taking the offensive, of taking the initiative in military operations. Fear an uprising? But it is inevitable, one way or another—workers' strikes, mutiny in the armed forces and peasant revolts have been *proving* this for a whole year. A second Cadet Duma would create a situation for an uprising still more favourable for the people: the final bankruptcy of the policy of "military-court liberalism", the fact that the people are sick and tired of the repressions, etc., etc. If a "new intensification of the revolutionary crisis" is inevitable, then *we* must attack first—that is what Ignatyev is thinking, what he must be thinking. And he will attack—on the eve of the elections the tsar will annul the electoral law of December 11 and promulgate a new law which will *guarantee* a Duma of Black-Hundred elements.

We do not claim to be prophets able to foresee all the possible outcomes of the present highly complicated political situation. Social-Democrats, however, must carefully weigh up the trends of all the forces that are operating in politics in order wisely to decide their own tactics. If they do that they will arrive at the following inexorable conclusion: Workers! Be prepared for the promulgation by the government of a Black-Hundred electoral law by the time of the elections! Peasants! Beware, the government is planning to change the electoral system so that peasant deputies, Trudoviks, *cannot* be elected to the Duma!

We must not let the government catch us unawares. We must conduct the most vigorous agitation among the masses to explain the danger that is threatening—we must shatter their naïve faith in the permanence of the electoral law as a "constitutional" institution—we must destroy constitutional illusions—we must recall the examples of the European revolutions with their frequent alterations of the electoral laws—we must spare no effort to spread the conviction that the crisis now maturing is not a parliamentary or constitutional crisis, but a revolutionary crisis, which force alone will decide, and which only a victorious armed uprising will resolve.

GUERRILLA WARFARE

The question of guerrilla action is one that greatly interests our Party and the mass of the workers. We have dealt with this question in passing several times, and now we propose to give the more complete statement of our views we have promised.

I

Let us begin from the beginning. What are the fundamental demands which every Marxist should make of an examination of the question of forms of struggle? In the first place, Marxism differs from all primitive forms of socialism by not binding the movement to any one particular form of struggle. It recognises the most varied forms of struggle; and it does not "concoct" them, but only generalises, organises, gives conscious expression to those forms of struggle of the revolutionary classes which arise of themselves in the course of the movement. Absolutely hostile to all abstract formulas and to all doctrinaire recipes, Marxism demands an attentive attitude to the *mass* struggle in progress, which, as the movement develops, as the class-consciousness of the masses grows, as economic and political crises become acute, continually gives rise to new and more varied methods of defence and attack. Marxism, therefore, positively does not reject any form of struggle. Under no circumstances does Marxism confine itself to the forms of struggle possible and in existence at the given moment only, recognising as it does that new forms of struggle, unknown to the participants of the given period, *inevitably* arise as the given social situation changes. In this respect Marxism *learns*, if we may

so express it, from mass practice, and makes no claim whatever to *teach* the masses forms of struggle invented by "systematisers" in the seclusion of their studies. We know—said Kautsky, for instance, when examining the forms of social revolution—that the coming crisis will introduce new forms of struggle that we are now unable to foresee.

In the second place, Marxism demands an absolutely *historical* examination of the question of the forms of struggle. To treat this question apart from the concrete historical situation betrays a failure to understand the rudiments of dialectical materialism. At different stages of economic evolution, depending on differences in political, national-cultural, living and other conditions, different forms of struggle come to the fore and become the principal forms of struggle; and in connection with this, the secondary, auxiliary forms of struggle undergo change in their turn. To attempt to answer yes or no to the question whether any particular means of struggle should be used, without making a detailed examination of the concrete situation of the given movement at the given stage of its development, means completely to abandon the Marxist position.

These are the two principal theoretical propositions by which we must be guided. The history of Marxism in Western Europe provides an infinite number of examples corroborating what has been said. European Social-Democracy at the present time regards parliamentarism and the trade union movement as the principal forms of struggle; it recognised insurrection in the past, and is quite prepared to recognise it, should conditions change, in the future—despite the opinion of bourgeois liberals like the Russian Cadets and the *Bezzaglavtsi*.¹¹⁰ Social-Democracy in the seventies rejected the general strike as a social panacea, as a means of overthrowing the bourgeoisie at one stroke by non-political means—but Social-Democracy fully recognises the mass political strike (especially after the experience of Russia in 1905) as *one* of the methods of struggle essential under *certain* conditions. Social-Democracy recognised street barricade fighting in the forties, rejected it for definite reasons at the end of the nineteenth century, and expressed complete readiness to revise the latter view and to admit the expedi-

ency of barricade fighting after the experience of Moscow, which, in the words of K. Kautsky, initiated new tactics of barricade fighting.

II

Having established the general Marxist propositions, let us turn to the Russian revolution. Let us recall the historical development of the forms of struggle it produced. First there were the economic strikes of workers (1896-1900), then the political demonstrations of workers and students (1901-02), peasant revolts (1902), the beginning of mass political strikes variously combined with demonstrations (Rostov 1902, the strikes in the summer of 1903, January 9, 1905), the all-Russian political strike accompanied by local cases of barricade fighting (October 1905), mass barricade fighting and armed uprising (1905, December), the peaceful parliamentary struggle (April-June 1906), partial military revolts (June 1905-July 1906) and partial peasant revolts (autumn 1905-autumn 1906).

Such is the state of affairs in the autumn of 1906 as concerns forms of struggle in general. The "retaliatory" form of struggle adopted by the autocracy is the Black-Hundred pogrom, from Kishinev in the spring of 1903 to Sedlets in the autumn of 1906. All through this period the organisation of Black-Hundred pogroms and the beating up of Jews, students, revolutionaries and class-conscious workers continued to progress and perfect itself, combining the violence of Black-Hundred troops with the violence of hired ruffians, going as far as the use of artillery in villages and towns and merging with punitive expeditions, punitive trains and so forth.

Such is the principal background of the picture. Against this background there stands out—unquestionably as something partial, secondary and auxiliary—the phenomenon to the study and assessment of which the present article is devoted. What is this phenomenon? What are its forms? What are its causes? When did it arise and how far has it spread? What is its significance in the general course of the revolution? What is its relation to the struggle of the working class organised and led by Social-Democracy? Such

are the questions which we must now proceed to examine after having sketched the general background of the picture.

The phenomenon in which we are interested is the *armed* struggle. It is conducted by individuals and by small groups. Some belong to revolutionary organisations, while others (the *majority* in certain parts of Russia) do not belong to any revolutionary organisation. Armed struggle pursues two *different* aims, which must be *strictly* distinguished: in the first place, this struggle aims at assassinating individuals, chiefs and subordinates in the army and police; in the second place, it aims at the confiscation of monetary funds both from the government and from private persons. The confiscated funds go partly into the treasury of the Party, partly for the special purpose of arming and preparing for an uprising, and partly for the maintenance of persons engaged in the struggle we are describing. The big expropriations (such as the Caucasian, involving over 200,000 rubles, and the Moscow, involving 875,000 rubles) went in fact first and foremost to revolutionary parties—small expropriations go mostly, and sometimes entirely, to the maintenance of the “expropriators”. This form of struggle undoubtedly became widely developed and extensive only in 1906, i.e., after the December uprising. The intensification of the political crisis to the point of an armed struggle and, in particular, the intensification of poverty, hunger and unemployment in town and country, was one of the important causes of the struggle we are describing. This form of struggle was adopted as the preferable and even *exclusive* form of social struggle by the vagabond elements of the population, the lumpen proletariat and anarchist groups. Declaration of martial law, mobilisation of fresh troops, Black-Hundred pogroms (Sedlets), and military courts must be regarded as the “retaliatory” form of struggle adopted by the autocracy.

III

The usual appraisal of the struggle we are describing is that it is anarchism, Blanquism, the old terrorism, the acts of individuals isolated from the masses, which demoralise the workers, repel wide strata of the population, dis-

organise the movement and injure the revolution. Examples in support of this appraisal can easily be found in the events reported every day in the newspapers.

But are such examples convincing? In order to test this, let us take a locality where the form of struggle we are examining is *most* developed—the Lettish Territory. This is the way *Novoye Vremya* (in its issues of September 9 and 12) complains of the activities of the Lettish Social-Democrats. The Lettish Social-Democratic Labour Party (a section of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party) regularly issues its paper in 30,000 copies. The announcement columns publish lists of spies whom it is the duty of every decent person to exterminate. People who assist the police are proclaimed “enemies of the revolution”, liable to execution and, moreover, to confiscation of property. The public is instructed to give money to the Social-Democratic Party only against signed and stamped receipt. In the Party’s latest report, showing a total income of 48,000 rubles for the year, there figures a sum of 5,600 rubles contributed by the Libau branch for arms which was obtained by expropriation. Naturally, *Novoye Vremya* rages and fumes against this “revolutionary law”, against this “terror government”.

Nobody will be so bold as to call these activities of the Lettish Social-Democrats anarchism, Blanquism or terrorism. But why? Because here we have a *clear* connection between the new form of struggle and the uprising which broke out in December and which is again brewing. This connection is not so perceptible in the case of Russia as a whole, but it exists. The fact that “guerrilla” warfare became widespread precisely after December, and its connection with the accentuation not only of the economic crisis but also of the political crisis is beyond dispute. The old Russian terrorism was an affair of the intellectual conspirator; today as a general rule guerrilla warfare is waged by the worker combatant, or simply by the unemployed worker. Blanquism and anarchism easily occur to the minds of people who have a weakness for stereotype; but under the circumstances of an uprising, which are so apparent in the Lettish Territory, the inappropriateness of such trite labels is only too obvious.

The example of the Letts clearly demonstrates how incorrect, unscientific and unhistorical is the practice so very

common among us of analysing guerrilla warfare without reference to the circumstances of an uprising. These circumstances must be borne in mind, we must reflect on the peculiar features of an intermediate period between big acts of insurrection, we must realise what forms of struggle inevitably arise under such circumstances, and not try to shirk the issue by a collection of words learned by rote, such as are used equally by the Cadets and the *Novoye Vremya*-ites: anarchism, robbery, hooliganism!

It is said that guerrilla acts disorganise our work. Let us apply this argument to the situation that has existed since December 1905, to the period of Black-Hundred pogroms and martial law. What disorganises the movement more in *such* a period: the absence of resistance or organised guerrilla warfare? Compare the centre of Russia with her western borders, with Poland and the Lettish Territory. It is unquestionable that guerrilla warfare is far more widespread and far more developed in the western border regions. And it is equally unquestionable that the revolutionary movement in general, and the Social-Democratic movement in particular, are *more disorganised* in central Russia than in the western border regions. Of course, it would not enter our heads to conclude from this that the Polish and Lettish Social-Democratic movements are less disorganised *thanks* to guerrilla warfare. No. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that guerrilla warfare is not to blame for the state of disorganisation of the Social-Democratic working-class movement in Russia in 1906.

Allusion is often made in this respect to the peculiarities of national conditions. But this allusion very clearly betrays the weakness of the current argument. If it is a matter of national conditions then it is not a matter of anarchism, Blanquism or terrorism—sins that are common to Russia as a whole and even to the Russians especially—but of something else. Analyse this something else *concretely*, gentlemen! You will then find that national oppression or antagonism explain nothing, because they have always existed in the western border regions, whereas guerrilla warfare has been engendered only by the present historical period. There are many places where there is national oppression and antagonism, but no guerrilla struggle, which sometimes develops

where there is no national oppression whatever. A concrete analysis of the question will show that it is not a matter of national oppression, but of conditions of insurrection. Guerrilla warfare is an inevitable form of struggle at a time when the mass movement has actually reached the point of an uprising and when fairly large intervals occur between the "big engagements" in the civil war.

It is not guerrilla actions which disorganise the movement, but the weakness of a party which is incapable of taking such actions *under its control*. That is why the anathemas which we Russians usually hurl against guerrilla actions go hand in hand with secret, casual, unorganised guerrilla actions which really do disorganise the Party. Being incapable of understanding what historical conditions give rise to this struggle, we are incapable of neutralising its deleterious aspects. Yet the struggle is going on. It is engendered by powerful economic and political causes. It is not in our power to eliminate these causes or to eliminate this struggle. Our complaints against guerrilla warfare are complaints against our Party weakness in the matter of an uprising.

What we have said about disorganisation also applies to demoralisation. It is not guerrilla warfare which demoralises, but *unorganised*, irregular, non-party guerrilla acts. We shall not rid ourselves one least bit of this *most unquestionable* demoralisation by condemning and cursing guerrilla actions, for condemnation and curses are absolutely incapable of putting a stop to a phenomenon which has been engendered by profound economic and political causes. It may be objected that if we are incapable of putting a stop to an abnormal and demoralising phenomenon, this is no reason why the *Party* should adopt abnormal and demoralising methods of struggle. But such an objection would be a purely bourgeois-liberal and not a Marxist objection, because a Marxist cannot regard civil war, or guerrilla warfare, which is one of its forms, as abnormal and demoralising *in general*. A Marxist bases himself on the class struggle, and not social peace. In certain periods of acute economic and political crises the class struggle ripens into a direct civil war, i. e., into an armed struggle between two sections of the people. In such periods a Marxist is *obliged* to take the stand of

civil war. Any moral condemnation of civil war would be absolutely impermissible from the standpoint of Marxism.

In a period of civil war the ideal party of the proletariat is a *fighting party*. This is absolutely incontrovertible. We are quite prepared to grant that it is possible to argue and prove the *inexpediency* from the standpoint of civil war of particular forms of civil war at any particular moment. We fully admit criticism of diverse forms of civil war from the standpoint of *military expediency* and absolutely agree that in *this* question it is the Social-Democratic practical workers in each particular locality who must have the final say. But we absolutely demand in the name of the principles of Marxism that an analysis of the conditions of civil war should not be evaded by hackneyed and stereotyped talk about anarchism, Blanquism and terrorism, and that senseless methods of guerrilla activity adopted by some organisation or other of the Polish Socialist Party at some moment or other should not be used as a bogey when discussing the question of the participation of the Social-Democratic Party as such in guerrilla warfare in general.

The argument that guerrilla warfare disorganises the movement must be regarded critically. *Every* new form of struggle, accompanied as it is by new dangers and new sacrifices, inevitably "disorganises" organisations which are unprepared for this new form of struggle. Our old propagandist circles were disorganised by recourse to methods of agitation. Our committees were subsequently disorganised by recourse to demonstrations. Every military action in any war to a certain extent disorganises the ranks of the fighters. But this does not mean that one must not fight. It means that one must *learn* to fight. That is all.

When I see Social-Democrats proudly and smugly declaring "we are not anarchists, thieves, robbers, we are superior to all this, we reject guerrilla warfare",—I ask myself: Do these people realise what they are saying? Armed clashes and conflicts between the Black-Hundred government and the population are taking place all over the country. This is an absolutely inevitable phenomenon at the present stage of development of the revolution. The population is spontane-

ously and in an unorganised way—and for that very reason often in unfortunate and *undesirable* forms—reacting to this phenomenon also by armed conflicts and attacks. I can understand us refraining from Party leadership of *this* spontaneous struggle in a particular place or at a particular time because of the weakness and unpreparedness of our organisation. I realise that this question must be settled by the local practical workers, and that the remoulding of weak and unprepared organisations is no easy matter. But when I see a Social-Democratic theoretician or publicist not displaying regret over this unpreparedness, but rather a proud smugness and a self-exalted tendency to repeat phrases learned by rote in early youth about anarchism, Blanquism and terrorism, I am hurt by this degradation of the most revolutionary doctrine in the world.

It is said that guerrilla warfare brings the class-conscious proletarians into close association with degraded, drunken riff-raff. That is true. But it only means that the party of the proletariat can never regard guerrilla warfare as the only, or even as the chief, method of struggle; it means that this method must be subordinated to other methods, that it must be commensurate with the chief methods of warfare, and must be ennobled by the enlightening and organising influence of socialism. And without this *latter* condition, *all*, positively all, methods of struggle in bourgeois society bring the proletariat into close association with the various non-proletarian strata above and below it and, if left to the spontaneous course of events, become frayed, corrupted and prostituted. Strikes, if left to the spontaneous course of events, become corrupted into “alliances”—agreements between the workers and the masters *against* the consumers. Parliament becomes corrupted into a brothel, where a gang of bourgeois politicians barter wholesale and retail “national freedom”, “liberalism”, “democracy”, republicanism, anticlericalism, socialism and all other wares in demand. A newspaper becomes corrupted into a public pimp, into a means of corrupting the masses, of pandering to the low instincts of the mob, and so on and so forth. Social-Democracy knows of no universal methods of struggle, such as would shut off the proletariat by a Chinese wall from the strata standing slightly above or slightly below it. At different

periods Social-Democracy applies different methods, *always* qualifying the choice of them by *strictly* defined ideological and organisational conditions.*

IV

The forms of struggle in the Russian revolution are distinguished by their colossal variety compared with the bourgeois revolutions in Europe. Kautsky partly foretold this in 1902 when he said that the future revolution (with the exception *perhaps* of Russia, he added) might be not so much a struggle of the people against the government as a struggle between two sections of the people. In Russia we undoubtedly see a wider development of this *latter* struggle than in the bourgeois revolutions in the West. The enemies of our revolution among the people are few in number, but as the struggle grows more acute they become more and more organised and receive the support of the reactionary strata of the bourgeoisie. It is therefore absolutely natural and inevitable that in *such* a period, a period of nation-wide political strikes, an *uprising* cannot assume the old form of individual acts restricted to a very short time and to a very small area. It is absolutely natural and inevitable that the uprising should assume the higher and more complex form of a

* The Bolshevik Social-Democrats are often accused of a frivolous passion for guerrilla actions. It would therefore not be amiss to recall that in the draft resolution on guerrilla actions (*Partiinnye Izvestia*, No. 2, and Lenin's report on the Congress), the section of the Bolsheviks who defend guerrilla actions suggested the following conditions for their recognition: "expropriations" of private property were not to be permitted under any circumstances; "expropriations" of government property were not to be recommended but only *allowed*, provided that they *were controlled by the Party* and their proceeds used *for the needs of an uprising*. Guerrilla acts in the form of terrorism were to be recommended against brutal government officials and active members of the Black Hundreds, but on condition that 1) the sentiments of the masses be taken into account; 2) the conditions of the working-class movement in the given locality be reckoned with, and 3) care be taken that the forces of the proletariat should not be frittered away. The practical difference between this draft and the resolution which was adopted at the Unity Congress lies *exclusively* in the fact that "expropriations" of government property are not allowed.

prolonged civil war embracing the whole country, i.e., an armed struggle between two sections of the people. Such a war cannot be conceived otherwise than as a series of a few big engagements at comparatively long intervals and a large number of small encounters during these intervals. That being so—and it is undoubtedly so—the Social-Democrats must absolutely make it their duty to create organisations best adapted to lead the masses in these big engagements and, as far as possible, in these small encounters as well. In a period when the class struggle has become accentuated to the point of civil war, Social-Democrats must make it their duty not only to participate but also to play the leading role in *this civil war*. The Social-Democrats must train and prepare their organisations to be really able to act as a *belligerent side* which does not miss a single opportunity of inflicting damage on the enemy's forces.

This is a difficult task, there is no denying. It cannot be accomplished at once. Just as the whole people are being re-trained and are learning to fight in the course of the civil war, so our organisations must be trained, must be reconstructed in conformity with the lessons of experience to be equal to this task.

We have not the slightest intention of foisting on practical workers any artificial form of struggle, or even of deciding from our armchair what part any particular form of guerrilla warfare should play in the general course of the civil war in Russia. We are far from the thought of regarding a concrete assessment of particular guerrilla actions as indicative of a *trend* in Social-Democracy. But we do regard it as our duty to help as far as possible to arrive at a correct *theoretical* assessment of the new forms of struggle engendered by practical life. We do regard it as our duty relentlessly to combat stereotypes and prejudices which hamper the class-conscious workers in correctly presenting a new and difficult problem and in correctly approaching its solution.

THE QUESTION OF GUERRILLA WARFARE¹¹

We consider this resolution sound in principle and note its agreement with the points we developed in our article "Guerrilla Warfare". We would suggest only a few minor amendments and additions to the text of the resolution. In Point 3 of the preamble we would say: "the revolution not being strong enough *at the present time*", etc. In the resolution proper we would add repudiation of "expropriations" in agreement with the decision of the Congress, and then a statement to the effect that guerrilla actions must conform to the temper of the broad masses and the conditions of the working-class movement. It is clear, however, that our Moscow comrades take this for granted.

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AN ATTEMPT AT A CLASSIFICATION OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES OF RUSSIA

As we know, the Unity Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party evaded the task of making a class analysis of the political parties in Russia and of defining the proletarian attitude to these parties. Its general endorsement of the Amsterdam Resolution was nothing more than a form of evasion. And yet the revolution more and more insistently demands that we apply the Marxist method and Marxist theory to throw light on the profound and highly interesting process of the formation of parties, which for obvious reasons is more rapid and intense in Russia than anywhere else.

This process, of course, has not come to an end by a long, long way, and has not yet produced fully stable results. But such a process can *never* come to an end in capitalist society, and its results can become "stable" only if the revolution, as the drastic demolition of the whole of the old political superstructure, reaches a state of stagnation. Therefore we cannot under any circumstances postpone our analysis of the bourgeois parties, the more so, because the period of the October liberties, on the one hand, and the period of the First Duma, on the other, have undoubtedly already produced *important* results which must not be ignored. The open revolutionary struggle by means of strikes, uprisings, etc., and the new election campaign will demand from our Party a clear and precise definition of its attitude to the various parties, and this is possible only on the basis of a scientific, i.e., a class analysis.

Let us start with the enumeration of the more or less important political parties (or, perhaps, *types** of parties) in their order from "Right" to "Left". 1) The Union of the Russian People, the monarchists, etc.; 2) the Party of Law and Order; 3) the Octobrists; 4) the Party of Peaceful Renovation; 5) the Party of Democratic Reforms; 6) the Cadets; 7) the free-thinkers, the radicals, the *Bezzaglav-tsi*, etc.; 8) the Toilers' Popular Socialists; 9) the Socialist-Revolutionaries; 10) the Maximalists; 11) the Social-Democrats—Mensheviks and Bolsheviks. We do not count the anarchists, for it would be too risky to call them (and, perhaps, the Maximalists) a political party.

In this motley series of parties, we can clearly distinguish *five* main *types*: 1) the Black Hundreds; 2) the Octobrists; 3) the Cadets; 4) the Trudoviks, and 5) the Social-Democrats. The soundness of this classification is proved by the analysis of the class nature of each particular party.

There can be no doubt about the need to single out the Social-Democratic Party as a distinct type. It is a type common to the whole of Europe. In Russia it is the only *workers'* party, the party of the *proletariat*, both in composition and in its strictly consistent proletarian point of view.

Further, it is equally obvious that the *Trudoviks* must also be singled out as a distinct type. They include: the Toilers' Popular Socialist Party, the Socialist-Revolutionaries proper, and, lastly, the Maximalists. They all base their theoretical standpoint on the "labour principle". They all strive to unite and merge the proletarians with the small producers in a single "toilers' group". They strive mainly for the support of the peasantry. The State Duma, where the majority of the peasant deputies formed a separate "Trudovik Group", proved in fact that the above-mentioned trends have succeeded (more or less) in actually

* We say *types* of parties, firstly, because it is impossible to keep track of all the small divisions, nor are they important (e.g., the difference between, say, the Progressive Industrial Party, or the Disc,¹¹² and the Party of Law and Order is quite negligible); secondly, it would be wrong to take into account only those parties which have formally appeared in the political arena and to ignore clearly defined political trends. A very slight change in the political atmosphere would suffice to convert these trends into regular *parties* within a few weeks.

laying the foundation of a political organisation of the peasants.

True, the political parties of this type have a far less definite and finished form than that of the Social-Democratic Party. Nominally, the Party of the Maximalists does not exist, although their split from the Socialist-Revolutionaries is an accomplished fact, certified by their independent actions, both literary and terrorist. In the State Duma, the Socialist-Revolutionaries did not form their own group, but acted behind the backs of a *section* of the Trudoviks. The Toilers' Popular Socialist Party, likewise, is still only about to be born, although its literary activity is already conducted not only in alliance with the Socialist-Revolutionaries proper, but sometimes quite independently of them. Its leaders in the Duma also acted partly in unison with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and partly independently of them. The *Minutes of the First Congress of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party* (Paris 1906) also show the Toilers' Popular Socialists as a distinct "*group*", which behaves independently of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. In short, we find in this camp: (1) a secret party (the Socialist-Revolutionaries) quite incapable of creating anything like a stable, mass organisation, and incapable of acting independently under its own flag, whether in the State Duma or in the literature of the period of liberties; (2) a *nascent* legal party (the Toilers' Popular Socialists) which acted as a group at the Congress of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party (December 1905), but which hitherto has been unable even to begin the formation of a mass organisation and which in its literature and in the State Duma acts mostly in alliance with the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

The fact that after two periods of relative freedom (the "October" and the "Duma" periods) the Trudoviks still remain a politically amorphous body cannot, of course, be attributed to chance. Undoubtedly, this to some extent is due to the fact that the petty bourgeoisie (especially in the rural districts) is less capable of organising than the proletariat. Undoubtedly, the ideological confusion of the Trudoviks also reflects the extremely precarious position of the small producer in present-day society: the extreme Right wing of the Trudoviks (the Toilers' Popular Socialist Party,

led by Peshekhonov & Co.) differs very little from the Cadets, for it deletes from its programme both republicanism and the demand for all the land; the extreme Left of the Trudoviks, the Maximalists, differs very little from the anarchists.

These two extremes indicate the amplitude, so to speak, of the political oscillations of the toiling petty bourgeoisie. That the petty bourgeoisie should display such instability is quite explicable from the economic point of view. Undoubtedly, the immediate future of the Russian revolution will increase rather than diminish this instability. But, while noting and explaining this instability, we must not lose sight of the enormous political importance of the parties of the Trudovik type. Real political liberty will strengthen *these parties most of all*, because in the absence of political liberty their ability to organise is less than that of the bourgeoisie, and also less than that of the proletariat. On the other hand, in a predominantly petty-bourgeois and peasant country like Russia, the formation of ideologically vacillating and politically unstable but exceedingly large petty-bourgeois or "Trudovik" parties is inevitable.

In a country like Russia, the outcome of the bourgeois revolution depends most of all on the political conduct of the small producers. That the big bourgeoisie will betray the revolution is beyond doubt (they have already betrayed it two-thirds). After October and December, no further proof is required that, as far as the Russian workers are concerned, the proletariat will be the most reliable fighter. The petty bourgeoisie, however, is the variable quantity which will determine the outcome. Social-Democrats must therefore watch very carefully its present political oscillations between abject Cadet loyalty and bold, ruthless, revolutionary struggle; and not only watch that process, of course, but as far as possible bring proletarian influence to bear upon it.

To proceed. Undoubtedly, the Cadets must be singled out as a separate type. The Party of Democratic Reforms to the right of them, and the free-thinkers, radicals, etc., to the left, are not more than quite insignificant offshoots. In the present political period the Cadets are an independent political type. What distinguishes them from the Trudo-

viks is clear. The typical Trudovik is a politically conscious peasant. He is not averse to a compromise with the monarchy, to settling down quietly on his *own* plot of land under the bourgeois system; but at the present time his main efforts are concentrated on the fight against the landlords for land, on the fight against the feudal State and for democracy. His ideal is to abolish exploitation; but he conceives this abolition in a petty-bourgeois fashion, and therefore, *in fact*, his strivings are converted into a struggle, not against all exploitation, but only against the exploitation practised by the landlords and the big financiers. The Cadet, however, is a typical bourgeois intellectual and sometimes even a liberal landlord. To compromise with the monarchy, to put a stop to the revolution is his main striving. Totally incapable of fighting, the Cadet is a typical stockbroker. His ideal is to perpetuate bourgeois exploitation in respectable, civilised, parliamentary forms. His political strength lies in the amalgamation of an enormous mass of bourgeois intellectuals, who are indispensable in every capitalist society, but, of course, absolutely incapable of seriously influencing a real change of the social system in this society.

The typical Octobrist is not a bourgeois intellectual, but a big bourgeois. He is not the ideologist of bourgeois society, he is its real master. Being directly interested in capitalist exploitation, he has a contempt for all theories, despises the intelligentsia, and, unlike the Cadets, repudiates all claims to "democracy". He is a bourgeois businessman. Like the Cadet, he is also striving for a deal with the monarchy, but his idea of such a deal is not some particular political system, or parliamentarism, but an agreement between a few persons, or chiefs, with the Court camarilla with a view to directly subordinating the clumsy, dull-witted and Asiatically corrupt Russian officials to the ruling bourgeoisie. An Octobrist is a Cadet who applies his bourgeois theories in business. A Cadet is an Octobrist who, when not busy robbing the workers and peasants, dreams of an ideal bourgeois society. The Octobrist has still to learn something of parliamentary etiquette and of political hypocrisy coupled with flirting with democracy. The Cadet has still to learn something of the art of bourgeois business trickery—and

then they will undoubtedly and inevitably merge, quite irrespective of whether this fusion will be brought about at the present time and by the present "Peaceful Renovators".

But let us not discuss the future. Our business is to learn to understand the present. With full power remaining in the hands of the scoundrelly Court gang, it is quite natural that the mere utterance of democratic phrases by the Cadets and their "parliamentary" opposition were *in fact* of greater service to the elements on their left. It is also natural that the Octobrist, who is directly hostile to these elements, angrily turned away from the Cadets and supported (in the elections to the First Duma) the government Black Hundreds.

The Black Hundreds are the last type of our political parties. Unlike Guchkov & Co., they do not want the "Constitution of October 17th", but the preservation and formal restoration of the autocracy. It is in their interests to perpetuate the filth, ignorance and corruption that flourish under the sceptre of the adored monarch. They are united by the frantic struggle for the privileges of the Court camarilla, for the opportunity, as of old, to rob, oppress and muzzle the whole of Russia. Their determination to defend the present tsar's government at all costs very often unites them with the Octobrists, and that is why it is so difficult to tell of some members of the Party of Law and Order where the Black Hundred begins and where the Octobrist ends.

Thus, the Russian revolution has in an extremely short period revealed the major types of political parties that correspond to all the main classes of Russian society. We have a party of the class-conscious socialist proletariat; parties of the radical, or radically inclined, petty bourgeoisie, mainly of the rural petty bourgeoisie, i.e., of the peasantry; liberal-bourgeois parties; and reactionary bourgeois parties. The political formations fail to correspond to the economic, class divisions only in that the two last-named groups correspond not to two, but to three groups of political parties: the Cadets, the Octobrists, and the Black Hundreds. This discrepancy, however, is fully explained by the transient peculiarities of the present situation, when the revolutionary struggle has become extraordinarily acute, when it is very difficult to separate defence of the autocracy

from out-and-out defence of the monarchy, when the economic classification (for progressive and for reactionary capitalism) naturally cuts across the political classification (for or against the present government). However, the kinship between the Cadets and the Octobrists is too obvious, and hardly any one can deny that the formation of a big, "business", liberal-bourgeois party is inevitable.

To sum up: the process of formation of political parties in Russia strikingly confirms the soundness of the theory of Marxism.

P. S. This article was written before the split in the Union of October Seventeenth. Shipov's resignation and the forthcoming formation of a moderate liberal party (the Left Octobrists, the Party of Peaceful Renovation, and the Right Cadets) now definitely promise to reduce all the Russian political parties to the four main types that we see in every capitalist country.

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NOTES ON *SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT*, No. 1¹¹

The article "Guerrilla Actions" in *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 1 (publication of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.), which has just reached us, is the best possible confirmation of what we said in *Proletary*, No. 5,¹¹⁴ about the stereotyped and non-historical character of the current philistine arguments on this subject.* The author fulminates against banditry, anarchism, Blanquism, Tkachevism,¹¹⁵ highway robbery ("road robbers", as the bad translation from the German reads) in exactly the same way as the liberals. The liberals are true to themselves when they repudiate as "anarchy" all armed struggle against the government. A Social-Democrat who, in words, does not reject such struggle, but who in fact does not examine the question *from this point of view*, has virtually gone over to the standpoint of liberalism. The following is a characteristic example. "Insofar as the revolutionary parties countenance anarchy, they turn the embitterment of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois classes against themselves and so play into the hands of reaction." Thus, either countenance *anarchic* armed struggle or repudiate armed struggle altogether! There is no other way, according to the writer. He *does not admit the possibility* of organised, planned, ideological, politically educative armed struggle. What a poor choice he is faced with!

"Experience has already put an end to one of the forms of revolutionary guerrilla action, viz., the expropriation of private and government property." But this is a sheer falsehood, comrade! It is impossible that you should be unaware of *Menshevik* organisations which *after* the Unity

* See pp. 213-23 of this volume.—Ed.

Congress have participated, directly or indirectly, in government expropriations, in "*utilising*" *plunder*, etc. It is a very bad thing when a Social-Democrat's words do not accord with his deeds. It leads to hypocrisy. It is due either to a bad conscience (an explanation that we reject) or to an ill-considered, illogical theory.

Comrade Axelrod makes an angry reply in *Sotsial-Demokrat* to our note in *Proletary*, No. 1.* One and a half columns of small print are devoted to expressions of bewilderment, exclamations, assurances and reproaches addressed to us because we described his agitation for a labour congress as "concealed" from the Party. Axelrod is quite unable to understand what this means. And at the same time, he says himself: "In the near future I shall *utilise* it (the opportunity that I have) to bring the question of a labour congress *into the arena of political discussion*" (our italics). Well, that should have been done long ago! You should have *begun* by "bringing the question into the arena of *political discussion*", and not into that of circle whispering. Then your agitation would have been correct from a party point of view, frank and worthy of the revolutionary class. Then the bourgeois press would not have been able to cause confusion among Social-Democrats and lower their prestige by publishing sensational reports of this circle whispering and giving rise to thousands of misconceptions. It is highly regrettable that even now, in his belated and extremely prolix "letter to the editors", Axelrod *evades* the essence of the question, saying *not a word* about what congress he is proposing, and when, on what basis, who is to convene it and what precisely is its purpose. Axelrod passes over all this with phrases like the following: the work of preparing for the congress will have an invigorating effect on Social-Democracy "to the extent that this work is imbued with really Social-Democratic content, i. e., to the extent that circle interests and factional considerations are replaced by socio-political problems and tasks that are most immediately connected with the vital interests of the working class".

* See p 170 of this volume.—*Ed.*

For pity's sake, comrade! This is indeed sheer emptiness clothed in high-sounding words. The preparation for the congress will invigorate Social-Democracy to the extent that it will be really Social-Democratic! How new and how wise! "Factional considerations" must be replaced by socio-political problems and tasks,—but it is just different conceptions of these problems and tasks that have divided the Party into factions! It is a real cock-and-bull story.

And at Axelrod's side Plekhanov utters gross and banal insinuations about the motives of the struggle for a Party congress and equally gross eulogies of Axelrod's "happy idea" of convening a labour congress "*as soon as possible*". Yes, yes... What indeed could be a happier idea than that real Social-Democratic work will invigorate Social-Democracy?

In an editorial article of *Sotsial-Demokrat* we read: "Now, as after the Second Congress, the two groups (Bolsheviks and Mensheviks) are probably of equal strength numerically", and a little lower down we read for the second time: "Now, as after the Second Congress, the two groups are equally influential in the Party." The writer's idea is clear. In an editorial of the official "publication of the Central Committee", it acquires considerable significance. The party of the working class ought to know precisely what its "groups" consist of and how strong they are. What is the basis of the opinion about their equality?

There are only two alternatives: either the writer has in mind only the Russian section of the Party (plus the Caucasus) or he adds the Poles, Letts and the Bund. On the first interpretation, the writer is admitting a vast increase in the strength of the "Majority" at the expense of the "Minority" since the Fourth (Unity) Congress, for at this Congress there were represented about 13,000 Bolsheviks and 18,000 Mensheviks. But this interpretation is improbable for it is already more than a month since all the national Social-Democratic parties were amalgamated with the R.S.D.L.P. Hence it is necessary to adopt the second interpretation. In that case it becomes obvious that the writer allocates the Poles and Letts to the Bolsheviks and the *Bund* to the *Mensheviks*. According to the data of the last congresses of the

national Social-Democratic parties, the Poles and Letts number about 40,000 and the Bund has a membership of about 33,000; thus we actually obtain approximately equal numbers for each group.

The question arises, however, whether it is correct to allocate the Bund to the Mensheviks. Of course, if the Central Committee says so, we must believe it. But it is essential to be clear about the significance of such an alignment. In the sphere of tactics, it is not confirmed by the latest resolutions of the Bund taken in their entirety. Consequently, the explanation must be sought in the *organisational* position of the Bund. It is evident that the Central Committee's publication considers as a *real* fact the circumstance that the Bund is not demanding an extraordinary congress. Whoever really wants to change the Party's policy as a whole, i.e., the policy of the Central Committee, is bound to demand a congress; anyone who does not demand this does not seriously want a change—such is the essence of this line of thought.

This reasoning is irrefutable and we regard it as our duty to assist all the organisations of our Party to obtain a clear idea of it and correctly appraise it. As a matter of fact, in a democratic organisation neutrality is almost impossible and abstention is often equivalent to action. The result of this "action" is clearly evident. The Central Committee's publication propagates the most confused ideas about a "labour congress" and definitely and consistently adopts a Menshevik position in regard to tactics. The consequences that this threatens for the whole Party in the event of an election campaign or new calls for action have been sufficiently demonstrated by the "slogans" of the Central Committee during the Duma session and after its dissolution. By its present "abstention", the Bund has actually made itself an accessory to the Menshevik tactics and policy of the Central Committee.

Written early in October 1906

* Published according to
the manuscript

THE RUSSIAN RADICAL IS WISE AFTER THE EVENT

Tovarishch of September 20 publishes an extremely instructive "conversation" between a Cadet and a certain more Left politician (a Trudovik?) who expresses the point of view of Mr. V. V. Kh—ov,¹¹⁶ a contributor to that paper. This is how the radical takes the Cadet to task:

"Is it not the other way round?" he asks the Cadet, who was declaiming that only confidence in one's rights can make one strong. "Is it not strength that makes one confident in the inviolability of right?" "The activities of your Party ... I regard as political quixotry.... You have been bolstering up fictions." "Your constitutional illusions are to blame.... All that you said, and your way of saying it, created undue confidence in the power of the Duma. And this has certainly not facilitated the accumulation of social forces.... I always wished when I heard your speeches, in and outside the Duma, that you would stop treating the Duma as a constitutional body and regard it merely as an organ of the public will that was in conflict with another will.... The situation demanded most of all the organisation of our forces.... The Duma should have exerted every effort to create for itself the apparatus that the law had not given it.... You are exposing your Achilles' heel—constitutional illusions.... I always had occasion to be convinced of one thing alone, and that is, how deeply' constitutional fictions have eaten into your Party.... I am scolding [you, the Cadets] because you had ceased to feel that you were one of the combatants, and were acting, so to speak, as liquidators of the strug-

gle. You proposed in a casual way what in other countries materialised as a result of a struggle between the rival forces."

An instructive statement, is it not? Only it is a pity that our valiant Bernsteinian "picked" a rather stupid Cadet to trounce in "conversation". There are some who are a bit smarter. There are some who closely watch Menshevik literature, particularly the writings of Plekhanov. Such a Cadet would have answered his opponent differently.

He would have said: My dear Radical! *Qui prouve trop, ne prouve rien*. He who proves too much, proves nothing. And you are undoubtedly proving *far too much* from the point of view of your own case. Did you not support us in the Duma elections and fight the boycotters? Now these elections put you under certain *obligations*. The keynote of these elections was *entirely* what you now call "constitutional illusions" (fie, fie, have you been reading Bolshevik literature?). Why, I could show you, my dear Radical, a nice passage—and more than one—in your own paper *Tovarishch* where you (not necessarily you personally, but your Party colleagues) assured the credulous Russian philistine that bad Cabinet Ministers would have to resign if the party of "people's freedom" won the elections. What's that? You don't remember, my dear Radical? But we remember it very well. You could not take part in elections, my dear Sir, unless you promised to be loyal, unless you swore to use only constitutional methods of struggle. As for us, the party of people's freedom, we make promises solely in order to carry them out, and for no other reason!

You say we had too much faith in the power of the Duma, that this did not help us to accumulate "our own" forces? But for God's sake read Plekhanov, whom you certainly regard as an authority. After all, it is you, your colleagues, and not the Cadets, who are fond of stating in private conversation that they are really quite Social-Democrats in all respects and would have declared themselves such if ... if the Social-Democrats as a whole had entirely adopted Plekhanov's standpoint. And was it not Plekhanov who said at the Unity Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party that only anarchists can shout about constitutional illusions? Did not Plekhanov move a resolution in which

the Duma was not only referred to as a *power*—and this title was confirmed by the Unity Congress of the Social-Democrats!!—but as a power “created by the tsar himself and sanctioned by law”? Did not Plekhanov himself write in the esteemed organ of the Mensheviks—and you gentlemen of *Nasha Zhizn* have always praised these tendencies of the Mensheviks!—that constructive work in the Duma has the most agitational effect? And you applauded Plekhanov; in the press you admired his “courage” (yes, that is exactly how you expressed it) in combating “Blanquism”! You have not managed, literally, to wear out your shoes since that happened, and yet you yourselves are already repeating these deplorable Blanquist fallacies!!

If the Cadet had defended himself like this, his defence would have been an attack, and the radical would have been utterly discomfited....

By his present guerrilla attack on constitutional illusions this radical reminds us of the hero of the popular epic who greeted a funeral procession with the cry: “Many happy returns of the day.” Just think: when was the struggle against constitutional illusions a vital and urgent necessity? Obviously, when they were flourishing and could, and in fact did, cause *widespread* harm by tempting the “small fry”. In other words, when the masses might have imagined, and *could not but imagine*, that there was a constitution, whereas there was none at all. This was exactly the situation during the elections to the First Duma and while the Duma was sitting, i.e., from March to June 1906. It was then that constitutional illusions caused *widespread* harm. At that time, however, only the Bolshevik Social-Democrats systematically combated them, swimming against the stream. At that time Kh—ov and other contributors to “*Nasha Zhizn*” fostered these illusions, “warring” with the Bolsheviks, and scolding them for their sharp criticism of the Cadets.

Now, the Duma is dissolved. The Cadets are defeated. No one even imagines that there is such a thing as a constitution. Now even not very noble animals may kick the Cadets (“I scold them”—see the “conversation”) and curse constitutional illusions at every fifth word. Ah, my dear Radicals! Your action comes too late!

The case of Kh—ov & Co. provides an illuminating example of how people who regard themselves as enlightened politicians, and even as free-thinkers or radicals, drift with the tide, helpless and without convictions, flabby and powerless. From March to June 1906 they fostered constitutional illusions, calling the Duma a power, trailing behind the Cadets, turning up their noses disdainfully at ruthless criticism of this, then fashionable, party. In September 1906 they "scold" the Cadets and "war" against constitutional illusions without realising that they are lagging behind again, that this is not enough now, and that what is needed is a direct call for a definite (determined by the preceding course of historical development) form of revolutionary struggle.

It would be well if the example of these gentlemen taught the Russian intelligentsia, which so prolifically produces such jelly-fish, to realise how harmful opportunism is. Very often this word is wrongly regarded as "merely a term of abuse" and no attempt is made to grasp its meaning. The opportunist does not betray his party, he does not act as a traitor, he does not desert it. He continues to serve it sincerely and zealously. But his typical and characteristic trait is that he yields to the mood of the moment, he is unable to resist what is fashionable, he is politically shortsighted and spineless. Opportunism means sacrificing the permanent and essential interests of the party to momentary, transient and minor interests. A slight revival of industry, a relative improvement in trade and a slight revival of bourgeois liberalism, and the opportunist begins to shout: Don't frighten the bourgeoisie away, don't fight shy of it, drop your "phrase-mongering" about social revolution! The Duma has assembled, a police-constitutional "spring" is in the air—and lo! the opportunist is already calling the Duma a power, hastening to curse the "fatal" boycott and hurrying forward with the slogan: support the demand for a Duma, i.e., a Cadet, Cabinet. As soon as the tide turns, the opportunist, just as sincerely, and just as inopportunistly, begins to "scold" the Cadets and demolish constitutional illusions.

If such moods characteristic of the intelligentsia prevail it will be impossible to adopt a consistent policy worthy of

a genuinely revolutionary class and to pursue it steadfastly through all minor deviations and waverings so as to prepare for a selflessly bold and determined battle with the enemy. That is why the class-conscious proletariat must be critical of the intelligentsia which is coming over to its side and must learn to wage a ruthless struggle against opportunism in politics.

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THE RESULTS OF THE CADET CONGRESS

We have already made it clear more than once that the autocracy's struggle against the proletarian and peasant revolution inevitably hits the liberal opposition too. Once the proletariat is silent, the pogrom-mongers' government will certainly not miss the opportunity to strangle the Cadets as well. It is now engaged in throttling the Peaceful Renovators. At present it is looking none too kindly even on the Octobrists. And if—thanks to the military courts—even the crack of Brownings, the bursting of bombs and the classical command: "Hands up!" cease for a while, it will be no guarantee, of course, that the Cadets and the Peaceful Renovators will, at last, reach their longed for peaceful haven of legal, constitutional struggle.

One might have thought that the tide of frantic reaction would have swept the leaders of the liberal opposition far to the left. The dissolution of the Duma has completely undermined constitutional illusions. There is not a member on the staff of *Tovarishch* or *Stolichnaya Pochta*¹¹ who could fail to see that now. The suppression of the Cadet press (the whole of the provincial and a considerable part of the metropolitan press), the banning of the congress, the refusal to legalise the party, the prosecution of all the signatories of the Vyborg Manifesto, should, one would think, have forced the Cadets to abandon the policy of organising public opinion and to adopt, at last, the policy of organising the social forces. Furthermore, one would think that if the Cadet leaders lack the heroic determination proudly to go underground, the whole following would there and then abandon such leaders.

The Cadet Congress has shown these calculations to be wrong. For the time being, at any rate. The Congress has sanctioned, though reluctantly, the policy of "marking time" or, more precisely, "don't move", proposed by the Central Committee. The Congress adopted a resolution on organising the social forces, but this was a purely platonic resolution, committing no one to anything, not even giving any indication of the purpose for which such forces could and should be organised. The Congress passed—by a relatively slight majority, it is true—the celebrated Point 4 of the resolution on tactics, which proclaims the party's passive resistance to the passive resistance that is growing spontaneously among the masses of the people and is recommended by the Vyborg Manifesto. The Congress closed as the congress of the single and indivisible "party of people's freedom".

Nor, undoubtedly, could it have been different. The hour has not yet struck for a split in the Cadet Party. While class contradictions have already irrevocably driven large sections of the big bourgeoisie into the camp of open counter-revolution, they have not yet caused sufficient disintegration in the wide sections of the middle and petty bourgeoisie who voted for the Cadets at the elections. So far, there are no objective signs that the lower middle class in the provinces has been infected with that bourgeois dread of revolution which has already possessed the "gallows humanists" of the Guchkov type.

But this disintegration is progressing rapidly. And the Cadet leaders themselves are not sure, of course, whether their motley "people's freedom" *bloc* will stand the test of the social and political struggle, which is growing more and more acute.

The Russian revolution is certainly bound to reach that fatal boundary line, beyond which the break-up of this bloc will be absolutely inevitable. That line will be reached and crossed when the vortex of proletarian and *peasant* uprising irrevocably draws into itself the broadest strata of the petty bourgeoisie and part of the *middle* urban bourgeoisie. Then, but only then, all that will actually remain of the huge Cadet bloc will be the propertied middle bourgeoisie, who were surely destined at their birth to share, in the long run, Mr. Guchkov's bourgeois fears. Then the spectre

of national revolution which is still so potent at the present time, and which is preventing many people from properly appraising the truly gigantic constructive role of the class contradictions in the Russian revolution, will vanish. When this boundary line is reached, a huge political party basing itself on the organisation of public *opinion* will be a hopeless anachronism; while all the elements of the real mass movement, both on the left and on the right, will assign to force, naked physical force, that great, not only destructive but also constructive role, without which, of course, the real consummation of revolution is inconceivable. But where physical force comes into its sovereign rights there is no place for Cadet bourgeois hegemony. The whole history of our struggle bears witness to that fact; one need not be a prophet to predict for certain that the same thing will happen if we experience a new upsurge of the revolution. The Cadet is a "legitimate" participant in the division of the spoils of the revolution—but he is no more than that.

That is why, objectively, those Cadet leaders were right who proposed that the Vyborg Manifesto be regarded simply as a mistake committed in the heat of the moment since it *directly* calls for the adoption of the tactics of passive resistance. For considering the intensity of the struggle today there cannot be any mass passive resistance that will not immediately develop into an active offensive. Mr. Struve is quite right when he says that such a civilised method of struggle (as opposed, if you please, to the purely revolutionary, aggressive method) is appropriate only against a civilised, constitutional government. Who will doubt for a moment that the Stolypin gang will send out its punitive expeditions at the very first signs of a mass refusal to pay taxes, or a mass refusal to assign recruits for the army? Who will then stop the population from defending itself, from passing to an active armed offensive?

And the Vyborg Manifesto, even at the very moment it was being signed, in its purely Cadet interpretation, was at best only a threat to the government that this would happen, and not a practical slogan. In this case, the Milyukovs and Struves are really not to blame for the political simplicity of those provincial Cadets who mistook this manifesto for a practical slogan. The fate of the manifesto in the prov-

inces bears witness to this. The intimidated press spoke very little and very obscurely about this fate, but what it did say proves, we think, that the party of "people's freedom", as a party, has worked hard to apply the principle of passive resistance proclaimed by that manifesto to the manifesto itself. That being the case, the Congress could only endorse this standpoint of the Cadets. The minority of the Congress, which at first was inclined to make some fuss over this endorsement, finally surrendered and remained in the party.

On the other hand, we get news every day from the interior of the country that the idea of passive resistance has found a response among the mass of the people. Non-payment of taxes, refusal to assign recruits, and boycott of the authorities are beginning to become really practical slogans. No one is shutting his eyes to the enormous organisational defects of this growing movement. No one will deny that a certain amount of chaos is inevitable. But out of this chaos will come order, the order of revolution, which is the highest stage of chaotic, spontaneous popular outbreaks. The hatred of the masses who are today seething under the tremendous pressure of the military-court constitution cannot but break out, and here and there is actually breaking out in explosions of open armed struggle. We do not have the data enabling us to predict for certain that when the time comes for calling up recruits and collecting taxes an uprising of the whole people will break out, even if only in the form of purely passive resistance, but that there will be manifestations of such a struggle is inevitable. And the Cadets are stepping aside in good time. "Our conscience does not allow us to endorse this dangerous opinion"—declared the Cadet Congress through Madame Tyrkova, a member of the Central Committee of the Party.

But this invocation of conscience in no way alters the case. Even if approaching events indicated with mathematical certainty the early triumph of a popular revolution, the attitude of the leading circles of the Cadets would be no different. This is proved by the whole past history of the Cadet Party, and the negotiations with the pogrom-mongers for portfolios in the Cabinet marked the culminating point of this history; objectively, they were far more characteristic of it than the Vyborg Manifesto. One of the most authorita-

tive representatives of the Party, Professor Gredeskul, testifies to this in the most definite manner (*Rech*, No. 180): "We have lived with our people," he says. "We have shared their stormy impulses." But that was the time of "boisterous, impetuous youth"; now we have reached the age of "persistent and persevering maturity". And the palladium of this maturity is the election campaign, with a platform in the shape of the Duma's reply to the address from the throne.

The Cadet Party has never shared the "stormy impulses" of the people, and never could do so; the learned professor orated like this merely by way of a rhetorical flourish. Nor has the Cadet Party, as represented by its Congress, moved to the right. It remains where it was. It intends, as hitherto, to take part in the present revolutionary crisis only insofar as it may degenerate into a *purely parliamentary* crisis.

We can only welcome the clear and explicit terms in which the Congress framed its resolutions to that effect. Of course, it will greatly disappoint those who regarded the Vyborg Manifesto as an indication that the Cadets were "beginning to turn to the left" and as a striking sign that the Russian revolution was acquiring a nation-wide character.

By declaring that it conceives the revolution only as a parliamentary struggle, the Congress has put squarely before the broad democratic masses the question of an open struggle for power. The whole course of the Russian revolution indicates that the answer of these democratic masses to that question will differ from that of the Cadets. And Social-Democrats must prepare for the moment when that answer is forthcoming so that the urban and rural poor will find in the Social-Democratic Party their natural leader in the period of revolution.

PHILISTINISM IN REVOLUTIONARY CIRCLES

Periods of counter-revolution are marked, among other things, by the spread of counter-revolutionary ideas, not only in a crude and direct form, but also in a more subtle form, namely, the growth of philistine sentiments among the revolutionary parties. Comrade Martov, in his latest pamphlet, *Political Parties in Russia*, applies the term revolutionary parties both to the Social-Democratic and Socialist-Revolutionary parties. We hope to return some other time to this interesting pamphlet of Martov's, in which he criticises the Cadets with a candour and precision unusual in Menshevik literature, but, at the same time, gives a completely false, non-Marxist classification of our political parties and repeats the fundamental error of Menshevism by classing parties of the Octobrist type with the "Centrist" parties.

But this is by the way. We are interested just now in certain other novel features of Social-Democratic and Socialist-Revolutionary publications and intend to note the most striking expressions, or rather reflections, of counter-revolutionary moods in these circles. After the defeat of the December uprising, the most conspicuous expression of counter-revolutionary sentiment among the democrats was the about-face of the Cadets, who threw overboard the constituent assembly slogan and, in the columns of *Polyarnaya Zvezda* and similar publications, abused and vilified the participants in and ideologists of the armed uprising. After the dissolution of the Duma and the failure of the popular movements in July, a novelty in counter-revolutionary sentiment among the democrats was the definite secession of the Right wing of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the formation of the semi-Cadet "Popular Socialist" Party. After the first and

major upsurge of October-December, the Cadets dropped out of the ranks of militant, fighting democrats. After the second, smaller upsurge of May-June, the Popular Socialists began to drop out.

In *Proletary*, No. 4, we outlined the main ideological and political features of these Popular Socialists.* Since then they have managed to come out quite officially; they have published the programme of their "Trudovik (Popular Socialist)" Party—changing the Socialist-Revolutionary programme from a revolutionary into an opportunist, petty-bourgeois and legal programme, and have published the names of the members of the organising committee of the new party. True, among the seventeen members of this organising committee (Messrs. Annensky, Yelpatyevsky, Myakotin, Peshekhonov and others) there is only *one* ex-member of the Duma from the "Trudovik Group", Mr. Kryukov, a high-school teacher and publicist. The founders of the new Toilers' Party do not include a single big name from the *real* "Trudoviks"! It is not surprising that some people call the Popular Socialists pretender Trudoviks. It is not surprising that news of other Trudovik parties has already appeared in the press. *Tovarishch* reported that Mr. Sedelnikov, who, of course, is a much more prominent "Trudovik" and much better known to the public for his activities in the Duma than the quite obscure Mr. Kryukov, is forming a *Popular Trudovik* Party. At a large meeting reported in *Tovarishch*, Mr. Sedelnikov frankly and openly defended his ideas, making no claim to be a socialist and raising the standard of a "democratic monarchy". According to the same report, the directness and frankness of this Trudovik from the ranks of the people roused the great ire of the Trudovik journalist, Mr. Myakotin, who, in replying, championed the views of the Popular Socialists.

The details of this family quarrel do not interest us. The only important thing for us to note is the various expressions of opportunist trends among former Socialist-Revolutionaries and certain "Trudoviks". In this respect, Mr. Peshekhonov is making more "progress" than anybody (among the S.-R.'s there are much bolder "progressive innovators" than

* See pp. 197-206 of this volume.—*Ed.*

among us). In the September issue of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* he goes further and further on his way from the revolutionaries to the Cadets. He tries to erase the difference between the revolutionary "take" and the Cadet "receive". After "proving" in August that it is impossible to take either full freedom or all the land, he now "proves" that it is impossible "to take freedom from below". *Ce n'est que le premier pas qui coûte*, or, as we say in Russia, the first glass must be forced down, the second trickles down, and all the others glide down in a merry stream. In the columns of a legally published periodical, this neo-Cadet [publicist] rails against the idea of an armed uprising, the idea of a provisional revolutionary government, without calling things by their name, of course, and without quoting in full the manifesto of the revolutionary parties which he is "refuting". He distorts and vulgarises in the free press the ideas of those who in the illegal press upheld the idea of an uprising, the idea of a provisional revolutionary government. Indeed, the Popular Socialists have not legalised their party for nothing! It can be taken for granted that they have legalised it not to defend the idea of an uprising, but to condemn it!

An important novelty as regards the reflection of counter-revolutionary moods in Social-Democratic literature has been the publication of the Moscow weekly *Nashe Dyelo*.¹¹⁸ The Cadet press has already deafened everyone with its trumpeting about this new and important "progress" of the Mensheviks: they are "progressing", as we know, from the revolutionaries to the Cadets. *Rech* published a special welcoming article; *Tovarishch* delightedly repeated the main ideas contained in *Nashe Dyelo*; *Rech* repeated the opinions of *Tovarishch*; *Tovarishch* confirmed its own views by quoting *Rech*; in short, the enlightened company of the educated betrayers of the Russian revolution are in an extraordinary state of rapturous excitement. *Rech* has even heard from some source that *Nashe Dyelo* is edited by the prominent Mensheviks, Messrs. Maslov, Cherevanin, Groman and Valentinov.

We do not know whether *Rech*'s information is correct, although it usually makes great claims to being well-informed about all Menshevik affairs. But we do know Cherevanin's leading article in *Nashe Dyelo*, No. 1. It is worthwhile quoting the passage which so delighted the Cadets,

"It would be an absurdity and folly for the proletariat to try, as some propose, to fight in league with the peasantry against the government and the bourgeoisie for a national constituent assembly with full power" (p. 4). "We must insist on the convocation of a new Duma." The Cabinet must be formed from the Duma majority. "With the peasantry completely unorganised, and terribly ignorant as they are at present, it is difficult to expect more" (p. 6). As you see, this is frank ... angelically frank. Comrade Cherevanin has gone much further to the right, while remaining in the ranks of a revolutionary party, than Mr. Peshekhonov, who has formed a new "legal party". Mr. Peshekhonov has *not yet* abandoned the constituent assembly slogan and is *still* criticising the demand for a Duma Cabinet as inadequate.

Not wishing to insult the intelligence of our readers, we will not, of course, attempt to prove the fallacy of Cherevanin's position. His name has already become a by-word among all Social-Democrats, irrespective of faction. But we do invite our readers to reflect most earnestly on the reasons for this incredibly easy conversion of a prominent and responsible Menshevik into a liberal. It is not difficult to condemn and reject a glaringly obvious "extreme", "excess", of opportunism. It is much more important to lay bare the source of these mistakes which cause Social-Democrats to blush with shame. We invite our readers to reflect on whether there is really any greater difference between Cherevanin and our Central Committee than there is between Sedelnikov and Peshekhonov.

The underlying motives of the whole of this "quartet" are the same. People of a philistine, petty-bourgeois type are weary of the revolution. A little, drab, beggarly but peaceful legality is preferable to the stormy alternations of revolutionary outbursts and counter-revolutionary frenzy. Inside the revolutionary parties this tendency is expressed in a desire to reform these parties. Let the philistine become the main nucleus of the party: "the party must be a *mass* party". Down with illegality, down with secrecy, which hinders constitutional "progress"! The old revolutionary parties must be legalised. And this necessitates a radical reform of their programmes in two main directions: political and economic. We must drop the demand for a republic and the con-

fiscation of the land, we must discard our clearly defined, uncompromisingly sharp and tangible exposition of the socialist goal and represent socialism as a "remote prospect", as Mr. Peshekhonov has expressed it with such inimitable grace.

It is these strivings that the different representatives of our "quartet" express on different grounds and in different forms. Sedelnikov's democratic monarchy; the "progress" from the Trudovik to the Cadet in the "Popular Socialist" Party; Cherevanin's rejection of the revolutionary struggle for a constituent assembly; Axelrod's and Plekhanov's labour congress; our Central Committee's slogan "for the Duma"; the arguments in No. 1 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*, published by this same Central Committee, about the conservatism of secret organisation and underground activities, and the progressiveness of going over to the "nation-wide bourgeois revolution"—all these are manifestations of a single, fundamental striving, all form a single current of the philistinism that is showing itself among the revolutionary parties.

From the point of view of legalising the Party, of "bringing it closer" to the masses, of reaching agreement with the Cadets, of association with the nation-wide bourgeois revolution, Cherevanin *quite logically* proclaimed the struggle for a constituent assembly an "absurdity and folly". We have already pointed out in *Proletary*, No. 1,* that our Central Committee glaringly contradicts itself by advocating in its famous "Letters to Party Organisations" (Nos. 4 and 5) an alliance with the middle bourgeoisie, the officers, etc., and at the same time putting forward the slogan of a constituent assembly, which is *unacceptable* to them. In this respect Cherevanin argues more consistently and more correctly, or more honestly and frankly, than the Peshekhonovs or our Central Committee. The latter's *Sotsial-Demokrat* is either trying to be cunning or it displays a striking lack of thought when, on the one hand, it fulminates against "roads which lead the proletariat away from the nation-wide movement", "dooming it to political isolation", and, on the other hand, it upholds the constituent assembly slogan and says: "it is necessary to prepare for an uprising".

* See pp. 150-66 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Take the labour congress. Recently (October 6) the Cadet newspaper *Tovarishch* at last blurted out the secret of this congress. According to the report of this newspaper, the following is what was said by "one of the veteran Social-Democratic leaders, who raised the question of a labour congress", in a lecture delivered by him a few days ago: "They [the members of the "labour congress"] can adopt the entire programme of Social-Democracy with, perhaps, a few alterations, and then the Party will emerge from its underground existence." The position is quite clear. The veteran leaders are ashamed to say openly that they want the programme of the Party changed so that it can go over to a legal position. Well, suppose we say: get rid of the republic, the constituent assembly and mention of the socialist dictatorship of the proletariat, add that the Party wages a struggle only by legal means (as was said in the programme of the German Social-Democrats prior to the Anti-Socialist Law¹¹), etc. "*Then the Party will emerge from its underground existence*"—so the "veteran leaders" imagine—then the passage will be accomplished from "conservative" illegality, revolutionism and underground existence to "progressive" constitutional legality. Such is the bashfully concealed essence of the labour congress. A labour congress is the chloroform which the veteran leaders prescribe for the "conservative" Social-Democrats, in order to be able to perform on them the painless operation carried out by the Peshekhonovs on the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. The only difference is that the Peshekhonovs are practical businessmen and know where they are going, whereas it would be unjust to say that of our veteran leaders. They do not understand that in the present political situation a labour congress is just idle talk; when this situation changes in the direction of a revolutionary upswing, a labour congress will by no means bring with it the triumph of philistinely tranquil legality, if at that time the expansion of the revolutionary Social-Democratic Party will not have made a labour congress superfluous; and if the present situation changes in the direction of a complete and lasting victory of reaction, a labour congress will then be able to *cut down* the Social-Democratic programme to an extent that will horrify even Axelrod.

That the Cadet press gives its utmost support to the idea of a labour congress is quite understandable for it has a flair for seizing on the philistine and opportunist tendencies of this scheme. It is not for nothing that Mr. Portugalov—a Cadet who considers himself a non-party socialist—is delighted by the “wise position” of Axelrod, seizes on his contemptuous words about the Party as a “circle organisation” (a “circle” with 100,000-150,000 members; i.e., on the European scale, with one to one-and-a-half million votes at elections!) and asks with an air of importance: “Is the class for the party or the party for the class?” Let us answer this wise question by another addressed to the bourgeois writers: is the head for the stomach or the stomach for the head?

Finally, let us take the arguments of the Central Committee’s *Sotsial-Demokrat*. The same Mr. Portugalov accurately seized on their essence when he quoted a passage no less worthy of renown than the statements of Cherevanin. “It [the Menshevik trend] attempted to meet halfway the inevitable conversion of the underground revolutionary struggle of the intelligentsia, who base themselves on the leading sections of the proletariat, into a national bourgeois revolution.” Mr. Portugalov comments: “Not so long ago such threats [? misprint? such ideas?] were invariably declared a heresy of ‘bourgeois-democratic’ origin. Now ‘bourgeois democrats’ have nothing to add to these remarks.”

Mr. Portugalov is right. It is not only in the recent past that the argument of the leader writer in *Sotsial-Demokrat* was declared the fruit of bourgeois-democratic ideas, it is declared to be such now and will be so declared in the future. Just reflect, indeed, on this argument. It is possible for an underground struggle to be converted into an open one, for a struggle of the intelligentsia to be converted into a people’s or mass struggle, for the struggle of the leading sections of the class to be converted into one of the entire class, but the conversion of an underground revolutionary struggle into a national bourgeois revolution is sheer gibberish. The real significance of this argument is the substitution of the standpoint of bourgeois democracy for the standpoint of the proletariat.

“Two years of civil war have brought about a national revolution in our country. That is a fact,...” says the leader

writer of *Sotsial-Demokrat*. It is not a fact, but a phrase. The civil war in Russia, if we take this term seriously, has not been going on for two years. In September 1904 there was no civil war. To stretch the concept of civil war out of all proportion will only be to the advantage of those who ignore the *special* tasks of the workers' party in a period of *real* civil war. The Russian revolution was much more national before October 17, 1905, than it is today. It is sufficient to point to the desertion of the landlords to the reactionary camp. It is sufficient to recall the formation of counter-revolutionary parties of the "Octobrist" type, and the unquestionable accentuation of counter-revolutionary characteristics among the Cadets in the summer of 1906, as compared with the *Osvobozhdeniye* League in the summer of 1905. A year ago the *Osvobozhdeniye* people did not and could not talk about stopping the revolution; Struve took the side of the revolution. Now the Cadets say openly that their aim is to stop the revolution.

What, then, does this conversion of the underground revolutionary struggle into a national bourgeois revolution amount to in practice? To ignoring, or obscuring, the class contradictions which have already been revealed by the course of the Russian revolution. To converting the proletariat from a fighting vanguard, pursuing an *independent* revolutionary policy, into an appendage of that faction of the bourgeois democrats which is most in the limelight, which lays most claim to represent "national" aspirations. Hence it is clear why the bourgeois liberal had to say: We have nothing to add to this, we quite agree, we are striving for the conversion of the proletarian struggle into a national struggle. To convert it into a nation-wide struggle (or, what is the same thing, a national revolution) means to take what is common to the Cadet and other parties more to the left and declare it to be binding, cutting out everything else as "dooming the proletariat to political isolation". In other words, subscribe to the demands of the Cadets, for any other demands will not be "national". Hence, naturally, the slogans of half-hearted Social-Democratic opportunism: "for the Duma as an organ of power which will convene the constituent assembly", or for the Duma as a "lever for winning a constituent assembly" (*Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 1). Hence the motto

of consistent Social-Democratic opportunism: it would be an absurdity and folly to fight for a constituent assembly, for the demand for a constituent assembly "dooms the proletariat to political isolation", exceeds the bounds of a "national bourgeois revolution", etc.

Revolutionary Social-Democrats must argue differently. Instead of uttering phrases about "a national bourgeois revolution", which are too general and too easily lend themselves to bourgeois distortion, we must analyse the concrete position of definite classes and parties at various moments in the revolution. In 1900 and 1901 the old *Iskra* and *Zarya*¹²⁰ quite rightly spoke of Social-Democracy as the carrier of the ideas of national emancipation, as the fighting vanguard which endeavoured to win over to its side all elements, including even liberal Marshals of the Nobility. This was true at that time, for, as yet, there was nothing, absolutely nothing in the policy of the government that could satisfy even the mildest bourgeois liberalism. The Russian general strike in October proved that this was true; for the proletarian struggle then became the centre of attraction for all sorts of bourgeois liberals, even the very mildest.

After October 17 things changed, they had to change. The liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie (Comrade Martov is wrong to call it a "liberal-democratic" bourgeoisie) had to rise in defence of the monarchy and landlordism, to do so directly (Octobrists) or indirectly (Cadets), for the further victories of the revolution were becoming a serious and immediate menace to these charming institutions. Those who forget that with the progress of revolution and the growth of its tasks a change takes place in the composition of the classes and elements of the people capable of taking part in the struggle for the achievement of these aims fall into grievous error. Through the bourgeois revolution the proletariat marches to socialism. Therefore, in the course of the bourgeois revolution it must raise and enlist for the revolutionary struggle more and more revolutionary strata of the people. In 1901' the proletariat roused the Zemstvo liberals. Now, because of the objective conditions, its main task is to rouse, educate and mobilise for the struggle the revolutionary peasantry, to deliver them from the ideological and political tutelage not only of the Cadets pure and simple,

but of the Trudoviks of the Peshekhonov type. If the revolution can triumph it will do so *only* as a result of an alliance between the proletariat and the really revolutionary, not the opportunist, peasantry. Therefore, if we seriously say that we stand for revolution (and not only for a constitution), if we are seriously speaking of a "new revolutionary upsurge", we must strenuously combat all attempts to discard the constituent assembly slogan, or to weaken it by linking it with the Duma (the Duma as an organ of power which will convene the constituent assembly, or the Duma as a lever for winning a constituent assembly, etc.), or by trimming down the tasks of the proletariat to the limits of a Cadet or alleged national bourgeois revolution. Of the mass of the peasantry, only the well-to-do and middle peasants will inevitably become opportunist and, later, even reactionary. But these constitute the minority of the peasantry. The poor peasantry together with the proletariat constitute the overwhelming majority of the people, the nation. *This majority can triumph, and will triumph completely, in the bourgeois revolution, i.e., can win complete freedom and all the land* and attain the highest level of prosperity possible for workers and peasants in capitalist society. You can, if you will, call such a revolution of the majority of the nation a national bourgeois revolution, but anyone can see that the ordinary meaning of these words is quite different, that their actual meaning at the present time is a Cadet meaning.

We are "conservative" Social-Democrats in the sense that we stand for the old revolutionary tactics. "The proletariat must carry the democratic revolution to completion, allying to itself the mass of the peasantry in order to crush the autocracy's resistance by force and paralyse the bourgeoisie's instability" (*Two Tactics*).^{*} This was written in the summer of 1905. Now the stakes are higher, the task is harder, the impending battle will be sharper. We must paralyse the instability of the whole bourgeoisie, including the intellectualist and the peasant bourgeoisie. We must rally to the proletariat the poor peasantry, which is capable of waging a determined revolutionary struggle. Not our own desires but objective conditions *will set* before the "new revolution-

^{*} See present edition, Vol. 9, p. 100.—*Ed.*

ary upsurge" *precisely these* lofty tasks. The class-conscious proletariat must do its duty to the very end.

P. S. This article had already been sent to the press when we read Comrade Martov's letter to *Tovarishch*. L. Martov dissociates himself from Cherevanin on the question of forming a bloc with the Cadets. Very good. But it is astonishing and extremely deplorable that L. Martov *does not dissociate himself* from Cherevanin's discovery: "the absurdity and folly of fighting for a constituent assembly", although he *must have known* of this discovery from *Tovarishch*, No. 73, which he quotes. Has Martov, too, already "progressed" as far as Cherevanin?

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MARTOV'S AND CHEREVANIN'S PRONOUNCEMENTS IN THE BOURGEOIS PRESS¹¹¹

TELLING HOW CERTAIN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS RESORT TO BOURGEOIS, CADET NEWSPAPERS, LIKE *TOVARISHCH*, AND, THROUGH *TOVARISHCH*, TO THE *NOVY PUT*,¹²² IN ORDER TO SPREAD FALSE REPORTS ABOUT REVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY. REFUTATION. ESTIMATION. CONCLUSIONS.

LIES SPREAD BY L. MARTOV THROUGH THE COLUMNS OF THE BOURGEOIS PRESS

The bourgeois Cadet newspaper *Tovarishch* of October 12 (No. 85) *reprints* without comment the following passage from another Cadet paper *Novy Put*: "We [*Novy Put*] cannot but admit that in insisting on a permanent bloc with the extreme Lefts (as we learn from Mr. Martov's letter) they [the Bolsheviks] are more logical than Mr. Martov."

Thus, *Novy Put* refers directly to L. Martov in confirmation of its false report about the Bolsheviks.

It is necessary to establish the facts.

In No. 1 of the "Bolshevik" *Proletary* the following was said in an article entitled "The Boycott" (p. 3). "We shall convene the Fifth Party Congress; there we shall resolve that in the event of elections taking place, it will be necessary to enter into an electoral agreement, for a few weeks, with the Trudoviks (unless the Fifth Party Congress is convened it will be impossible to conduct a united election campaign; and 'blocs with other parties' are absolutely prohibited by the decision of the Fourth Congress). And then we shall utterly rout the Cadets."*

* See p. 145 of this volume.—*Ed.*

This is *all*, to our knowledge, that has been said so far in Social-Democratic literature on the attitude of the Bolsheviks to electoral agreements. Clearly, *Novy Put* has been misled by L. Martov. Firstly, far from insisting on such a thing, the Bolsheviks have *never* even mentioned "a permanent bloc with the extreme Lefts". Secondly, as regards *all* "blocs" *whatsoever*, the Bolsheviks have demanded that the existing decision be *revised* at the next Congress. This fact is wrongfully suppressed by those who *dread* the next Congress of the Social-Democratic Labour Party. And it is also wrongfully suppressed by the bourgeois newspapers, which falsely report to their readers, or create the false impression, that the Social-Democrats do *not* formally prohibit *all* blocs.

Thirdly: L. Martov, writing for the bourgeois newspapers, deliberately, or through inadvertence or ignorance, conveys to the public, through the medium of the Cadet paper *Tovarishch*, the idea that the Bolsheviks sanction electoral agreements *at the lowest* stage of the election too, i.e., in conducting agitation *among the masses*, whereas he, L. Martov, regards as expedient only "partial agreements at the highest stages of our multi-stage electoral system".

L. Martov *has no facts* to support this assertion. L. Martov is spreading a *lie* through the columns of the bourgeois press, for the Bolsheviks proposed an agreement *only* for the highest stages, *only* with the Trudoviks, *only* for a few weeks and *only with the consent of the Fifth Congress*.

To spread this *lie*, which can easily reach the masses in view of the notorious tendency of Cadet newspapers to sympathise with the Mensheviks and sympathetically reprint any slander they choose to utter against the Bolsheviks, L. Martov used an "*abbreviated*" version of the views of *Proletary*. Although these views are fully expressed in the space of the five printed lines quoted in full above, L. Martov found it necessary, none the less, to *abbreviate* them and, moreover, *render them in his own words*. The reader will see that Martov's abridged version is tantamount to a *sheer distortion*.

In the five lines in *Proletary* the subject is mentioned in passing. No specific reference is made there to either the

highest or lowest stages of the elections. It may be objected, therefore, that I, too, have no grounds for asserting that these five lines do not refer to agreements at the first stage. But such an objection can be made only by one who desires to quibble over a word and to distort the obvious meaning of someone's argument.

Undoubtedly, a five-line statement of the question leaves many gaps; but does the general trend of the article, and its whole content, warrant a wider rather than narrower interpretation of the omissions (as regards agreements)?

In any case, even the "letter" of the quotation (unless "abbreviated" *à la* Martov) is undoubtedly opposed to a wider interpretation, because anyone with the slightest experience of elections will understand that an agreement at the *first* stage *cannot* be limited to "a few weeks" but must necessarily be for *months*. Suffice it to say that *already*, in St. Petersburg, the parties are being mentioned which are seeking an election bloc with the Cadets; and *already* the approximate distribution of Duma seats for the city of St. Petersburg between the Cadets and these parties is reported. It is said that the elections will probably take place on December 17. Two months before that date, the people who really desire first-stage agreements are already beginning to come to terms, directly or through intermediaries. Take into account also the duration of the actual elections, add the time necessary for a *party* decision on this question, the time necessary for sending *party* directives from the centre to every part of Russia—and you will see that agreements between parties for the first stage of the elections will take *months*, while a "few weeks" will only just suffice for a final-stage agreement, i.e., the distribution of seats after the contest, based on a calculation of the forces revealed by the direct vote of the electors.

Finally, since I have been compelled to make a statement in the press on this question, I think it would be improper to refrain from stating my own personal opinion. In the present political situation I would advocate the following at the Fifth Congress: no blocs or agreements whatever between the Social-Democrats and any other parties to be tolerated at the lowest stage of the elections. We must appear

before the masses at election time absolutely independently. At the highest stages agreements with the Trudoviks may be permitted exclusively for the proportional distribution of seats and on the condition that we "make" the non-party Trudoviks party men, counterposing the opportunists among them and the semi-Cadets (Popular Socialists, "Popular Socialist Party", etc.) to the revolutionary bourgeois democrats.

MARTOV AND CHEREVANIN

In *Tovarishch*, L. Martov has refuted Cherevanin, who spoke of an agreement with the Cadets. In the same *Tovarishch*, Cherevanin now explains the "misunderstanding". According to these explanations, Cherevanin did not really say definitely in No. 1 of *Nashe Dyelo* whether he advocates agreements at the lowest or the highest stages. In substance, however, he declares in favour of *permitting* agreements also *at the lowest stages in the rural districts as well as in the towns*. Cherevanin does not say with which parties agreements may be made. He (and apparently Martov, too) sees no difference between the revolutionary and the opportunist bourgeoisie, between the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Cadets, between the Trudoviks of the type of the "33" in the Duma and the Trudoviks of the "Popular-Socialist" type, etc. Moreover, Cherevanin would even allow *voting, without an agreement, for bourgeois candidates at the lowest stages of the elections!*

Thus, Cherevanin's position becomes perfectly clear. This not only prominent (as attested by the bourgeois press) but also highly responsible Menshevik, who, moreover, is the head of the weekly *Nashe Dyelo*, approves of all kinds of blocs and is even in favour of Social-Democrats voting for bourgeois candidates. Hence, the Bolsheviks were absolutely right when they said that the Mensheviks are trying to convert the working class into an appendage of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie and to degrade the role of the Social-Democrats to that of yes-men of the Cadets.

Let no one be mistaken now about the true meaning of the usual Menshevik slogan: for the *Duma*, as an organ, or lever, or instrument, etc., of the revolution. In order to support

the revolution, the Mensheviks are supporting the "Duma" as such. And in order to support the Duma as such, they are prepared to vote, even without an agreement, for the candidates of the Cadet Party, which wants to put a stop to the revolution!

Remember the French Socialists like Millerand, Viviani and Briand, who are now, under Clemenceau's leadership, serenely governing arch-bourgeois France, sending troops against strikers, etc. In order to support socialism, they called for support of the republic in general, the republic as such. In order to support the republic, they voted, with and without agreements, for commonplace bourgeois politicians, for the opportunists. Thus, slowly but surely, they themselves were converted into commonplace supporters of bourgeois oppression.

Cherevanin and his like have now come out on the main road, the beaten track!

What about Martov? He is opposed to agreements at the lowest stages. He has repudiated Cherevanin. This is very gratifying. Only ... only just see *how* he did it. Every sensible politician subordinates his electoral tactics to his general political tactics. Thanks to the kind services of the Cadet papers, Cherevanin's tactics are now manifest to all. "It would be an absurdity and folly for the proletariat to try, as some propose, to fight in league with the peasantry against the government and the bourgeoisie for a national constituent assembly with full power." This famous dictum of Cherevanin's *was cited* in the same number of *Tovarishch* which evoked L. Martov's "reply". Yet, while repudiating Cherevanin's electoral tactics, Martov said *not a word* against this underlying principle of Cherevanin's political tactics as a *whole*.

Who is the more consistent of these two? Whose is the firmer stand? For the Duma or for the revolution? For the Duma as such means: for the Cadets, which means: against the constituent assembly. For the revolution means: only for a certain part of the Duma on certain conditions, which means: against the Cadets, which means: at the present time it would be an absurdity and folly to abandon, or even to tone down, the demand for a constituent assembly.

SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS AND BOURGEOIS NEWSPAPERS

Is it permissible for a Social-Democrat to contribute to bourgeois newspapers?

Certainly not. Theoretical considerations, political etiquette and the practice of the European Social-Democrats are all against it. As is well known, this question came up for discussion at a recent congress of the German Social-Democrats.¹²² We know that our German comrades *severely condemn* the idea of Social-Democrats contributing to the bourgeois press and resolutely fight for the principle that the party of the revolutionary proletariat shall tolerate no blocs or agreements in this field either, but maintain its independence; that journalist members of the workers' party should be organised and controlled, not only in name but *in deed*; in other words, should be party men in the strict sense of the term.

Have we any right to depart from these rules here in Russia?

Some might retort: there is an exception to every rule. That is quite true. It would be wrong to condemn a person in banishment for writing to any newspaper. It is *sometimes* hard to condemn a Social-Democrat who is working in a minor department of a bourgeois newspaper to earn a living. One can justify the publication of an urgent and business-like refutation, etc., etc.

But see what will happen here. Under the pretext of refuting "misunderstandings" caused by the *Social-Democratic "Nashe Dyelo"*, L. Martov writes almost two columns in a Cadet newspaper, calmly expounding the views of some Social-Democrats, arguing against other Social-Democrats and misrepresenting the views of Social-Democrats he disagrees with, without caring in the least what pleasure his literary "bloc" with the Cadets gives to all the enemies of the proletariat. The Cadet newspapers seize on L. Martov's article in the Cadet press, give it wide publicity, add a thing or two of their own to the lie which he has put into circulation about the revolutionary Social-Democrats, pat him on the back (see *Rech*), and so on and so forth. Cherevanin is tempted. If Martov could write to *Tovarishch* to refute Cherevanin's "misunderstandings" and bring in thousands of other things

at the same time, why should not Cherevanin also write to *Tovarishch* to refute L. Martov's "misunderstandings"? And, while he is about it, why not take advantage of the opportunity to start in the Cadet press (after all, it would be improper to do so in the Social-Democratic press!) a discussion on the question whether socialists should vote for bourgeois candidates even without an agreement?*

And so a special feature has been inaugurated in Cadet newspapers: a family-literary correspondence between Social-Democratic opportunists. Since its subject is the permissibility of blocs with the Cadets, and even of voting for the Cadets, the Cadets readily give shelter to the homeless "progressive" Social-Democrats who are departing from the "conservative" rules of revolutionary Social-Democracy.

The Menshevik literary bigwigs dwell in two abodes. In the respectable quarter they talk to fine gentlemen about blocs with the Cadets and incidentally retail anecdotes about the revolutionary Social-Democrats. In the grimy quarter, in some workers' newspaper or Social-Democratic periodical, or a leaflet, they offer the workers a "non-party labour congress" and enlighten them on the absurdity and folly of fighting for a constituent assembly. Let the workers be patient and wait a little: when the Social-Democratic discussion in the Cadet *Tovarishch* on blocs between socialists and the bourgeoisie comes to an end, the workers, too, will learn something.... And so, following the homely rule of one of Turgenev's characters,¹²⁴ our advocates of a labour congress write letter after letter to *Tovarishch*, murmuring the while: our Party is a party of the intelligentsia....

Will not the Social-Democratic workers intervene to put a stop to this outrage? Is it a matter of indifference to the members of our Party?

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* F. Dan has migrated to *Tovarishch* even without the object of refuting "misunderstandings", but merely for company's sake.

ON CONVENING AN EXTRAORDINARY PARTY CONGRESS¹¹⁶

Both issues of the Central Committee's *Sotsial-Demokrat* contain articles by Plekhanov and Martov against the calling of an extraordinary congress. These articles are written in such an angry and excited tone, are so saturated with bitterness, irritation, personal insinuations and suspicion that they immediately recall the atmosphere of the worst period of émigré squabbles. By publishing these and *only* these articles on the Congress in *its own* journal, the Central Committee of our Party puts itself in a very unseemly position. Just imagine: the responsible ministry of a democratically organised working-class party is absolutely beside itself and loses all self-control because there is agitation for another congress! Why, it is simply indecent, comrades. By raging and fuming against agitation for the revision of *your* mandates and *your* tactics you are strongly condemning yourselves. If any one in favour of a congress took pleasure in being malicious he could wish for nothing better than to have the articles of Plekhanov and Martov reprinted and widely distributed!

But why is opposition to a congress expressed in the name of the Central Committee by people who can only talk in an injured, almost sobbing tone? Because the two main facts which made agitation for another congress inevitable are too clear and simple. One of these facts concerns the composition of the Party, the other concerns its tactics.

At the time of the Unity Congress our Party membership consisted of 13,000 Bolsheviks and 18,000 Mensheviks. The Central Committee, and the Central Organ even more so, express the opinion of the 18,000. Now 14,000 Letts

26,000 Poles and 33,000 Bundists have joined the Party.* The leading article in *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 1, unequivocally admits in two places that at the present time both factions in the Party are about equal in size. This opinion is evidently arrived at by classifying the Poles and Letts as Bolsheviks and the Bundists as Mensheviks. Let us assume that it is correct to classify the Bund as Menshevik. But even then it is an obvious and a crying anomaly that the Menshevik Central Committee should represent the *whole* of our Party (the Central Committee consists of seven Mensheviks, three Bolsheviks, one Lett and two Bundists; one Pole has the rights of a member of the Central Organ; moreover, on all political questions another five Mensheviks, the editors of the Central Organ, have the right to speak and vote).

As regards tactics—during the five or six months that have elapsed since the last Congress the Party has passed through two important periods in our revolution: the period of the Duma and the “Cabinet of the dissolution of the Duma”. The Duma tactics of our Central Committee amounted to supporting the (Cadet) Duma as a whole. These tactics reached their apogee in the slogan supporting the demand for the appointment of a Duma (i.e., Cadet) Cabinet. The majority of the Party rejected these tactics and this slogan; that is a fact. During the Duma period the Social-Democratic Party *combated* the tactics of *its own* Central Committee. Comment on this fact and discussion of its implications are superfluous.

Further, after the dissolution of the Duma, the Central Committee declared in favour of organising partial mass expressions of protest. The general tactical slogan became: for the Duma as an organ of power which will convene the constituent assembly. Again, it is an indisputable historical fact that the vast majority of the Party membership accepted neither this particular slogan nor the general tactics of the Central Committee. Yet anyone who carefully reads

* *Tovarishch* of October 11 gives new figures alleged to have been obtained from the Central Committee, but which, however, do not in the main alter the relative proportions. According to these figures our Party now has about 150,000 members: 33,000 of them are Bolsheviks; 43,000 Mensheviks; 13,000 Letts; 28,000 Poles, and 33,000 members of the Bund.

No. 1 and No. 2 of *Sotsial-Demokrat* cannot fail to see that these general tactics are there defended, justified and substantiated (for the Duma as a lever for convening a constituent assembly; the Cadets as the urban bourgeoisie which is progressive in comparison with the peasantry, and so forth).

Hence it is clear that if there is a new Duma campaign the Party will have to fight against the Central Committee's Duma slogans; and if revolutionary actions take place in the near future, the forces will be split and the struggle will be disorganised, because the Central Committee does not represent the will of the majority of the Party membership. Hence, any delay in convening the next Party Congress not only at present directly contravenes the whole spirit and meaning of the democratic organisation of the Party, but will also prove a most dangerous obstacle in the forthcoming Duma and general revolutionary struggle of the proletariat.

P. S. Nos. 3 to 5 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*, which have come out since this article was written, confirm all that we say even more strongly. It transpires that on the question of electoral agreements there is a complete split among the Mensheviks, and their Central Committee is oscillating between Martov and Cherevanin. Martov has publicly refuted Cherevanin. Plekhanov went off to write for a Cadet newspaper in order to support Cherevanin. The leading article in No. 4 of *Sotsial-Demokrat* proves that the Central Committee is already preparing once again, in opposition to the Party, to advance its slogans of supporting the Duma as a whole and of supporting the demand for the appointment of a Duma Cabinet.

HOW HISTORY IS WRITTEN...

This is an old story: the boycott of the State Duma. A Menshevik comrade writing in *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 3 ("Situation or Position?") tells it in the following way:

"When history presented us with the plan of the Bulygin Duma, we, acting upon our general principles, recommended the organisation of parallel unofficial elections to a People's Duma, in opposition to the Bulygin Duma, to which we had no access. But when, after the December uprising, we were faced...."

Stop, my dear historian, one moment! That you skip over the events between the Bulygin plan and the December uprising is a small matter, merely a chronological leap. But to do likewise with your tactics and "principles" is another thing; this leap is—to say the least—diplomatic. Did you recommend *only* "unofficial elections"? Did you treat the Bulygin Duma *only* as an institution to which you "had no access"? And so, for the sake of your People's Duma you intended to boycott the Bulygin Duma? Or ignore it? But did you not at that time wage war on certain boycottists? Did you not insist that an active part should be taken in the "Bulygin" election campaign which was expected at that time? Did you not demand that the Party should support the Left liberals at the elections, etc.? How is it that you have forgotten all that?

"But when, after the December uprising, we were faced...." Stop, you have omitted another small point. Russia boycotted the Bulygin Duma, but up to now there is still no People's Duma.... Well, have you admitted that your tactics in those days were mistaken? No, your answer to the boycottists was that your tactics in regard to the Bulygin Duma were correct, only the revolution prevented them from being

seen in all their glory.... Now, having recalled *all this*, continue your story.

"But when, after the December uprising, we were faced with the convocation of the new Witte Duma, we recommended participation in the primary stages of the elections, counting upon two possibilities: either the very fact of our participation would evoke a revolutionary upsurge that would sweep away the Witte Duma...."

Stop, my dear historian, stop, what has come over you? "The fact of our participation *would* evoke a revolutionary upsurge...." No, really, you must be joking! You have always accused the Bolsheviks of naively exaggerating our strength—and to think that you should speak seriously of a revolutionary upsurge—and what an upsurge: one "that would sweep away", etc.—which could be *evoked* by the "fact of our participation". No, of course, not seriously.

And so: "... either the very fact of our participation would evoke a revolutionary upsurge that would sweep away the Witte Duma and call into being a representative institution more advantageous to us; or the revolutionary upsurge would not come immediately, in which case, not only would we be able to go into the Duma, but the very state of affairs would compel us to do so, as was the case in Lefortovo District of Moscow."

Excuse me, but, if I remember rightly, you never said a word about this "or" at the time.

True, we did not—our historian replies.

"True, in the pamphlet published by the joint editorial board we said that we did not recommend participation in the elections directly to the Duma. But we did it, we tied our hands beforehand, only for the sake of a compromise, in the hope of arriving at some agreement with the boycottists for working out uniform tactics. This was 'opportunism' on our part—we deliberately adapted ourselves to the obsolete, short-sighted views of our boycottist comrades, and this we sincerely repent."

So that's it! You were saying one thing and thinking another. And you said it to the proletariat and the whole revolutionary people.... You "repent" it! But don't you know the saying: "Caught lying once, who will trust you again?" What if your "repentance" is also caused by your "adapting" yourselves to somebody's "obsolete" or "short-sighted" views? Where is the limit to such "opportunism", to

such "compromises"? What should be our attitude to any of your slogans when you yourselves admit that your slogan on one of the most important tactical questions was not put forward sincerely? Why, anyone might well believe, after this, that you call yourselves Social-Democrats only for the sake of "adapting" yourselves "to the obsolete and short-sighted views" of the revolutionary proletariat.

Well, I must say something in your defence. In the heat of controversy you have cruelly wronged yourselves. You were sincere boycottists at the third stage of the elections, just as we were sincere boycottists at all stages of the elections. But we were *boycottists* all together. *Nebst gefangen, nebst gehangen*—"caught together, hanged together". You want to "hang" us now for having been boycottists. But in that case, my dear comrades, you will have to hang yourselves as well: you have been caught at the same game. "But we have repented," you declare. Well, that mitigates your offence. But it does not acquit you, or exempt you from punishment. Well, not hanging, but how about a good flogging, for instance? Is that what you are after?

As for ourselves—we have not repented. We said and still say: boycott or non-boycott is a question not of principle, but of expediency. The boycott of the First Duma was expedient. It gave the mass of the people a vivid, concrete, proletarian appraisal of the Duma as an institution incapable of solving the fundamental problems of the revolution. The dissolution of the Duma and all that followed it have confirmed this appraisal; the mass of the people clearly perceives that here, too, the proletariat proved to be their natural leader in the revolution, warning them beforehand of the sterility of constitutional illusions! The boycott diverted the attention and the forces of the government, and thus contributed to the victory of the bourgeois opposition at the elections. The boycott united the broad proletarian masses in a single act of revolutionary protest. Its agitational and organisational effect was enormous.

The boycott performed a great service—but its work is *already* done. A proper appraisal of the Duma was given, a telling blow was struck at parliamentary illusions—there is no need to do it over again. At the present time a boycott will not divert the forces of the government—the latter has

certainly learned the lesson of the past elections. The work of agitation and organisation can be performed just as well by taking part in elections as by boycotting them—unless the electoral law is changed very much for the worse. If it is, then, perhaps, we may have to resort to the boycott again. But we may not have time to bother with Duma elections at all if big revolutionary battles begin again.

Thus, boycotting remains a question of expediency. The only point is that *for the time being* we do not see sufficient grounds for a boycott.

Whoever feels guilty, let him repent; but in doing so, let him strew ashes on his *own head* and let him rend *his own* garments, not other people's. And one should not distort history and commit libel in a fit of repentance—not even against oneself.

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**POSTSCRIPT TO THE ARTICLE:
"THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS AND THE ELECTION
CAMPAIGN"**

The above-mentioned article was already written when G. V. Plekhanov's "Open Letter to Class-Conscious Workers" appeared in the newspaper *Tovarishch*. In that letter Plekhanov, "manoeuvring" between the Left wing of the bourgeoisie and the Right wing of the Social-Democrats, finally breaks both with the principles of international revolutionary Social-Democracy and with the decisions of the Unity Congress of our Party. The Party Congress formally forbade all blocs whatsoever with bourgeois parties. The class-conscious, organised proletarian at his Party meetings calls all blocs with the bourgeoisie "betrayal of the cause of the proletariat"; in his article in *Tovarishch* and in his letter to the Party organisations, L. Martov, adopting the Bolshevik, i.e., the consistent revolutionary standpoint, emphatically expresses his opposition to all blocs at the first stage of the elections. "On the first question ["blocs" or electoral pacts]," writes Martov, "I would recommend that we insist, *in conformity with the resolution of the Congress, upon complete independence* during our participation *in the first stage* of the elections, i.e., at the stage when we come before the masses." Plekhanov regards this method of presenting the question as "misconceived hostility to compromise". "Where we cannot be sure of the victory of our candidate," writes Plekhanov, "*it is our duty to enter into an agreement with other parties who wish to fight against our old regime.*"* While thus sanctioning agreements

* Plekhanov's italics.

with bourgeois parties in spite of the decision of the Congress, Plekhanov, however, displays his "political sagacity" by foreseeing cases when we should not enter into such agreements. He writes: "Where there is no doubt that we shall succeed in *getting our candidate elected** we can and must act *independently* of the other parties." What a wonderful piece of "political sagacity"! Where we are sure of getting our candidate elected ourselves we must do it ourselves. Where we are not sure, we must apply for assistance ... to those "who wish to fight against the old regime", or else help these "wishers" to get their candidate elected. And where those "who wish to fight" are sure of getting their candidates elected themselves, what do you think, O contributor to the Cadet press, Plekhanov, will they be so anxious to conclude an agreement with us? Indeed, if we are talking about agreements, every political infant is aware that they are required only in cases where a party is not sure of getting its candidates elected by its own unaided efforts. We, however, are opposed to all agreements even under such circumstances. But G. V. Plekhanov, like a true knight of freedom, sounds the tocsin in the Cadet *Tovarishch* and calls together all those "who wish to fight".... Come, all ye "wishers"! The proletariat is fighting, you—"wish" to fight! Excellent.... If that is not enough for a proletarian, he must assuredly be an "enemy of freedom".

Thus, the leader of the Mensheviks, the darling of the Cadets, forgetting all that he said after the dissolution of the Duma, is little by little, step by step, sinking to the level of ... Cherevanin.... With his usual "swiftness, dash and unerring eye" Plekhanov is rushing to the extreme right of our Right wing. Martov is left far behind; *Sotsial-Demokrat* can hardly keep pace with its ideological leader. And the organ of the Central Committee, after a long-winded argument about the class character of our election campaign, proposes an intricate system of agreements, building a ladder by which Social-Democrats should descend to the level of the Cadets. At first, suggests *Sotsial-Demokrat*, independent, i.e., class action where we have chances of success; where there are no chances of success, we must combine with

* Plekhanov's italics.

the bourgeois parties which "are striving with us for the convocation of a constituent assembly"; if these parties do not want the constituent assembly—so much the worse (this is the third, last, anti-class and anti-democratic step)—we shall combine with them nevertheless. How the Central Committee, which was elected by the Congress to carry out the decisions of the Congress, contrives to act in violation of these decisions is a secret known only to itself. The fact remains that at the present moment we are witnessing the very disgraceful (for Social-Democracy) spectacle of "the crab crawling backwards" and the "swan straining skyward" on the editorial board of the leading, central organ, when on a question of such import to us as electoral tactics there is neither unity of thought nor unity of action, not only in the Party as a whole, but even in the "leading" faction in that Party. What country and what Socialist Party, except, perhaps, the most opportunist, would tolerate such political depravity? And the remarkable fact is that it is these crabs, pikes and swans, these two squabblers Martov and Plekhanov, who are conducting a desperate campaign against the convocation of an extraordinary congress of the Party, one which we now need more than ever.

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THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS AND ELECTORAL AGREEMENTS ¹²⁰

Written towards the end of October 1906

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The election campaign for the Second Duma is now a subject of great interest in the workers' party. Special attention is being devoted to the question of "blocs", i.e., permanent or temporary electoral agreements between the Social-Democrats and other parties. The bourgeois, Cadet press—*Rech*, *Tovarishch*, *Novy Put*, *Oko*, etc.—are doing their utmost to convince the workers of the need for a "bloc" (an electoral agreement) between the Social-Democrats and the Cadets. Some Menshevik Social-Democrats are also advocating such blocs (Cherevanin in *Nashe Dyelo* and *Tovarishch*), others are opposed to them (Martov in *Tovarishch*). The Bolshevik Social-Democrats are opposed to such blocs, and agree only to partial agreements at the higher stages of the election campaign on the distribution of seats in proportion to the polling strength of the revolutionary and opposition parties at the primary ballot.

We shall try to state briefly the case for this last standpoint.

I

Social-Democrats regard parliamentarism (participation in representative assemblies) as one of the means of enlightening and educating the proletariat and organising it in an independent class party; as one of the methods of the political struggle for the emancipation of the workers. This Marxist standpoint radically distinguishes Social-Democracy from bourgeois democracy, on the one hand, and from anarchism on the other. Bourgeois liberals and radicals regard parliamentarism as the "natural" and the only normal and legitimate method of conducting state affairs in general,

and they repudiate the class struggle and the class character of modern parliamentarism. The bourgeoisie exerts every effort, by every possible means and on every possible occasion, to put blinkers on the eyes of the workers to prevent them from seeing that parliamentarism is an instrument of bourgeois oppression, to prevent them from realising the historically limited importance of parliamentarism. The anarchists are also unable to appreciate the historically defined importance of parliamentarism and entirely renounce this method of struggle. That is why the Social-Democrats in Russia strenuously combat both anarchism and the efforts of the bourgeoisie to *stop* the revolution as soon as possible by coming to terms with the old regime on a parliamentary basis. They subordinate their parliamentary activities entirely and absolutely to the general interests of the working-class movement and to the special tasks of the proletariat in the present bourgeois-democratic revolution.

Hence it follows, firstly, that the participation of the Social-Democrats in the Duma campaign is of a quite different nature from that of other parties. Unlike them, we do not regard this campaign as an end in itself or even as being of cardinal importance. Unlike them, we subordinate this campaign to the interests of the class struggle. Unlike them, the slogan we put forward in this campaign is not parliamentarism for the sake of parliamentary reforms, but the revolutionary struggle for a constituent assembly. Moreover, we wage this struggle in its highest forms, which have arisen from the historical development of the forms of struggle during the last few years.*

* We shall not here touch on the question of boycott, as this does not come within the scope of this pamphlet. We shall only remark that this question cannot be properly appraised apart from the *concrete* historical situation. The boycott of the Bulygin Duma was *successful*. The boycott of the Witte Duma was necessary and *correct*. The revolutionary Social-Democrats must be *the first* to take the line of the most resolute, the most direct struggle, and must be *the last* to adopt more circuitous methods of struggle. The Stolypin Duma cannot be boycotted in the old way, and it would be wrong to do so after the experience of the First Duma.

II

What conclusion follows from the foregoing in regard to electoral agreements? First of all, that our basic, main task is to develop the class-consciousness and independent class organisation of the proletariat, as the only class that remains revolutionary to the end, as the only possible leader of a victorious bourgeois-democratic revolution. Therefore, class independence throughout the election and Duma campaigns is our most important general task. This does not exclude other, partial tasks, but the latter must always be subordinate to and in conformity with it. This general premise, which is confirmed by the theory of Marxism and the whole experience of the international Social-Democratic movement, must be our point of departure.

The special tasks of the proletariat in the Russian revolution may seem at once to controvert this general premise on the following grounds: the big bourgeoisie has already betrayed the revolution through the Octobrists, or has made it its aim to put a stop to the revolution by means of a constitution (the Cadets); the victory of the revolution is possible only if the proletariat is supported by the most progressive and politically conscious section of the peasantry, whose objective position impels it to fight and not to compromise, to carry through and not to curb the revolution. Hence, some may conclude, the Social-Democrats must enter into agreements with the democratic peasantry for the whole duration of the elections.

But such a conclusion cannot be drawn from the absolutely correct premise that the complete victory of our revolution is possible only in the form of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. It has yet to be proved that a bloc with the democratic peasantry for the whole duration of the elections is possible and advantageous from the point of view of present party relationships (the democratic peasantry in our country is now represented not by one, but by various parties) and from the point of view of the present electoral system. It has yet to be proved that by forming a bloc with this or that party we shall express and uphold the interests of the truly revolutionary sections of the peasantry better than by preserving

the complete independence of our Party in criticising *such-and-such* democratic peasant parties, and in *counterposing* some elements of the democratic peasantry to others. The premise that the proletariat is closest to the revolutionary peasantry in the present revolution undoubtedly leads to the general political "line" of Social-Democracy: together with the democratic peasantry against the treacherous big-bourgeois "democrats" (the Cadets). But, whether it leads to the formation *at the present time* of an election bloc with the Popular Socialists (Popular Socialist Party), or the Socialist-Revolutionaries cannot be decided without an analysis of the features which distinguish *these* parties from each other and from the Cadets, without an analysis of the *present* electoral system with its numerous stages. Only one thing follows from it, directly and *absolutely*: under no circumstances can we during our election campaign confine ourselves to baldly and abstractly counterposing the proletariat to the bourgeois democrats in general. On the contrary, we must devote our whole attention to drawing a precise distinction, based on the *historical facts* of our revolution, between the liberal-monarchist and the revolutionary-democratic bourgeoisie, or, to put it more concretely, to the distinction between the Cadets, Popular Socialists, and Socialist-Revolutionaries. Only by drawing such a distinction shall we be able to determine most correctly who our closest "allies" are. But, firstly, we shall not forget that the Social-Democrats must watch *every* ally from the bourgeois democrats as they would an enemy. Secondly, we shall examine very carefully to see which is most advantageous: to tie our hands in a *general* bloc with some Popular Socialists (for instance), or to preserve complete independence so as to be quite free at the decisive moment to split the non-party "Trudoviks" into opportunists (P. S.'s) and revolutionaries (S.-R.'s), to *counterpose* the latter to the former, etc.

Thus, the argument about the proletarian-peasant character of our revolution does not entitle us to conclude that we must enter into agreements with this or that democratic peasant party at this or that stage of the elections to the Second Duma. It is not even a sufficient argument for limiting the class independence of the proletariat during the elections, let alone for renouncing this independence.

III

In order to come nearer to the solution of our problem we must, firstly, examine the fundamental party groupings in the elections to the Second Duma and, secondly, examine the specific features of the present electoral system.

Electoral agreements are concluded between parties. What are the main types of parties that will contest the elections? The Black Hundreds will no doubt unite even more closely than during the elections to the First Duma. The Octobrists and the Party of Peaceful Renovation will join either the Black Hundreds or the Cadets, or, more probably, will oscillate between the two. In any case, to regard the Octobrists as a "party of the Centre" (as L. Martov does in his latest pamphlet, *Political Parties in Russia*) is a fundamental error: in the *actual* struggle which must finally decide the outcome of our revolution, the *Cadets* form the *Centre*. The Cadets are an organised party that is going into the elections independently and, moreover, is intoxicated with its success at the First Duma elections. But the discipline of this party is not of the strictest and its solidarity not of the strongest. The Left-wing Cadets are disgruntled about the defeat at Helsingfors¹²⁷ and are protesting. Some of them (Mr. Alexinsky in Moscow, recently) are going over to the Popular Socialists. In the First Duma there were some "exceptionally rare" Cadets who even gave their signatures to the Bill of the "33" for the abolition of all private ownership of land (Badamshin, Zubchenko and Lozhkin). Hence, to split off at least a small section from this "Centre" and bring it towards the Left is not a hopeless proposition. The Cadets are only too conscious of their weakness among the mass of the people (quite recently even the Cadet *Tovarishch* had to admit this), and they would readily agree to a bloc with the Lefts. It is not for nothing that the Cadet newspapers have with such tender joy opened their columns to the Social-Democrats Martov and Cherevanin to discuss the question of a bloc between the Social-Democrats and the Cadets. We, of course, will never forget, and will tell it to the masses during the election campaign, that the Cadets failed to keep their promises in the First Duma, that they obstructed the Trudoviks, played at making constitutions, etc., etc., going

to the extent of keeping silent about the "four points",¹²⁸ the Draconian Bills, and so forth.

Next come the "Trudoviks". The parties of this type, namely the petty-bourgeois and predominantly peasant parties, are divided into the *non-party* "Trudovik Group" (which held a congress recently), the Popular Socialists and the Socialist-Revolutionaries (the Polish Socialist Party, etc., correspond more or less to the Socialist-Revolutionaries). The only more or less consistent and determined revolutionaries and republicans among them are the S.-R.'s. The Popular Socialists are much worse opportunists than our Mensheviks; strictly speaking, they are semi-Cadets. The non-party "Trudovik Group" has, perhaps, more influence among the peasantry than the others; but the strength of its democratic convictions is difficult to determine, although it is undoubtedly far more Left than the Cadets, and evidently belongs to the camp of revolutionary democracy.

The Social-Democratic Party is the only party which, in spite of internal dissensions, will enter the elections as a thoroughly disciplined body, which has a fully definite and strictly class basis, and which has united all the Social-Democratic parties of all the nationalities in Russia.

But how are we to enter into a general bloc with the Trudoviks, considering the *composition* of this type of party, as outlined above? What sureties have we for the *non-party* Trudoviks? Is a bloc possible between party and non-party people? How do we know that Alexinsky & Co. will not, tomorrow, turn from the Popular Socialists back to the Cadets?

It is clear that a *real* party agreement with the Trudoviks is *impossible*. It is clear that we must not under any circumstances help to unite the opportunist Popular Socialists with the revolutionary S.-R.'s; on the contrary, we must split them and counterpose one to the other. It is clear that the existence of a non-party Trudovik Group makes it more to our advantage in all respects to preserve complete independence in order to exert a really revolutionary influence upon them than to tie our hands and blur the distinctions between the monarchists and the republicans, etc. It is *absolutely impermissible* for Social-Democrats to blur these distinctions; and for this reason alone it is necessary to reject blocs alto-

gether, once the *present* grouping of parties unites the non-party Trudoviks, the Popular Socialists and the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Can they really unite, and are they doing so? They certainly can unite, for they have the same petty-bourgeois class basis. They were, in fact, united in the First Duma, in the press during the October period, in the press of the Duma period, and in the ballots among the students (*si licet parva componere magnis*—if the small may be compared with the great). A minor symptom, but a characteristic one when connected with others, is the fact that in the ballots of the “autonomous” students there were often three conflicting lists: the Cadets, the bloc of the Trudoviks, Popular Socialists, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Polish Socialist Party, and, lastly, the Social-Democrats.

From the point of view of the proletariat, clarity as regards the class grouping of the parties is of supreme importance; and the advantage of independently influencing the non-party Trudoviks (or those who are oscillating between the Popular Socialists and the Socialist-Revolutionaries) is obvious compared with attempts by the Party to reach an agreement with the non-party people. The facts relating to the *parties* compel the following conclusion: no agreements whatsoever at the lower stage, when agitation is carried on among the masses; at the higher stages all efforts must be directed towards defeating the Cadets during the distribution of seats by means of a partial agreement between the Social-Democrats and Trudoviks, and towards defeating the Popular Socialists by means of a partial agreement between the Social-Democrats and the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

The objection will be raised: while you incorrigibly utopian Bolsheviks are dreaming of defeating the Cadets, you will all be defeated by the Black Hundreds, because you will *split the vote*! The Social-Democrats, the Trudoviks and the Cadets together would rout the Black Hundreds for certain; but by acting separately, you may present the common enemy with an easy victory. Let us assume that the Black Hundreds get 26 per cent of the votes, the Trudoviks and Cadets 25 per cent each, and the Social-Democrats 24 per cent. The Black Hundreds will get in unless the Social-Democrats, the Trudoviks and the Cadets form a bloc.

This objection is often taken seriously, and so we must carefully analyse it. But in order to analyse it, we must examine the *given*, i.e., the present electoral system in Russia.

IV

Our Duma elections are not direct, but multiple-stage elections. In multiple-stage elections the splitting of votes is dangerous only at the lower stage. It is only when the primary voters go to the poll that the division of the votes is an unknown quantity; it is only in our agitation among the masses that we have to work "in the dark". At the higher stages, when the elected representatives vote, the general engagement is over; all that remains is to distribute the seats by partial agreements among the parties, which *know* the exact number of their candidates and their votes.

The lowest stage in the elections is the election of electors in the cities, the election of representatives—one per ten households—in the villages, and the election of delegates to the workers' curia.

In the cities, in every electoral area (ward, etc.), we face a great mass of voters. There is, undoubtedly, a danger of splitting the vote. It cannot be denied that in the cities Black-Hundred electors may be elected in some places *exclusively* because of the absence of a "bloc of the Lefts", exclusively because, let us say, the Social-Democrats may divert part of the votes from the Cadets. It will be recalled that in Moscow Guchkov received something like 900 votes, and the Cadets about 1,400. If a Social-Democrat had taken 501 votes from the Cadet, Guchkov would have won. And there is no doubt that the general public will take this simple calculation into account; they will be afraid of splitting the vote, and because of that will be inclined to cast their votes only for the most moderate of the opposition candidates. We shall have what is called in England a "three-cornered" fight, when the urban petty bourgeoisie are afraid to vote for a socialist candidate because it would take votes from the liberal and thus allow the conservative to win.

How can this danger be averted? There is only one way: to conclude an agreement at the lower stage, that is, put up

a *joint list* of electors in which the number of candidates of each party is determined by a definite agreement of the parties *before the contest*. All the parties entering into the agreement call upon the electorate to vote for this joint list.

Let us examine the arguments for and against this method.

The arguments for are as follows: agitation can be conducted upon strictly party lines. Let the Social-Democrats criticise the Cadets before the masses as much as they like, but let them add: yet they are better than the Black Hundreds, and therefore we have agreed upon a joint list.

The arguments against are as follows: a joint list would be in crying contradiction to the whole independent class policy of the Social-Democratic Party. By recommending a joint list of Cadets and Social-Democrats to the masses we would be bound to cause hopeless confusion of class and political divisions. We would undermine the principles and the general revolutionary significance of our campaign for the sake of gaining a seat in the Duma for a liberal! We would be subordinating class policy to parliamentarism instead of subordinating parliamentarism to class policy. We would deprive ourselves of the opportunity to gain an estimate of *our* forces. We would lose what is lasting and durable in all elections—the development of the class-consciousness and solidarity of the socialist proletariat. We would gain what is transient, relative and untrue—superiority of the Cadet over the Octobrist.

Why should we jeopardise our consistent work of socialist education? Because of the danger of Black-Hundred candidates? But all the cities in Russia combined have only 35 of the 524 seats in the Duma (St. Petersburg 6; Moscow 4, Warsaw and Tashkent 2 each, the other 21 cities 1 each). This means that the cities by themselves cannot under any circumstances materially affect the composition of the Duma. Besides, we cannot confine ourselves to the merely formal consideration of the arithmetical possibility of splitting the votes. We must ascertain whether there is any great political probability of this happening. An analysis shows that the Black Hundreds obtained a very small minority even in the elections to the First Duma, that cases like the "Guchkov" case mentioned above were exceptional. According to statistics in *Vestnik Kadetskoi Partii* ¹²³ (No. 7, April 19,

1906), in 20 cities, which sent 28 deputies to the Duma—out of 1,761 electors 1,468 were Cadets, 32 Progressists, 25 non-party, 128 Octobrists, 32 of the Commercial and Industrial Party, and 76 of the Right, i.e., total Rights 236, less than 15 per cent. In ten cities *not a single* elector of the Rights was returned; in three cities not more than ten electors (out of eighty) of the Rights were returned in each of them. Is it reasonable, under such circumstances, to give up the struggle for our own class candidates because of an exaggerated fear of the Black Hundreds? Would not such a policy, even from a narrow, practical point of view, betray short-sightedness, not to speak of instability of principles?

And what about a bloc with the Trudoviks against the Cadets? we shall be asked. But we have already pointed out the special features of the party relations among the Trudoviks, which make such a bloc undesirable and *inexpedient*. In the cities, where the working-class population is mostly concentrated, we must never, *except in case of extreme necessity*, refrain from putting up absolutely independent Social-Democratic candidates. And there is no such urgent necessity. A few Cadets or Trudoviks more or less (especially of the Popular-Socialist type!) are of no serious political importance, for the Duma itself can, at best, play only a subsidiary, secondary role. It is the peasantry, the gubernia assemblies of electors, that are of decisive political importance in determining the results of the Duma elections, and not the cities.* In the gubernia assemblies of electors, however, we shall achieve our general political alliance with the Trudoviks against the Cadets far better and more cer-

* The small towns, of course, also affect the composition of the gubernia electoral assemblies, through the town conferences. Here, too, the Cadets and the Progressists have had a great majority of votes: for instance, out of 571 electors elected by town conferences, 424 were Cadets and Progressists and 147 of the Right (*Vestnik Kadetskoi Partii*, No. 5, March 28, 1906). The figures for the separate towns fluctuate very considerably, of course. Under such circumstances we could probably, in very many cases, have put up an independent fight against the Cadets without fearing any accidental splitting of the votes, and without making ourselves dependent upon any non-Social-Democratic party. As for blocs at the lowest stage of elections in the workers' curia, probably not a single Social-Democrat will speak of them seriously. Complete independence of the Social-Democrats is particularly necessary among the working-class masses.

tainly, without in the least infringing our strict principles, than at the lower stage of the elections in the countryside. We shall now discuss the elections in the countryside.

V

In the big cities, as is well known, there were cases where the state of organisation of the political parties swept away one stage of the elections. By law the elections consisted of two stages. In practice, however, the elections sometimes proved to be direct, or almost direct, as the electorate definitely knew the character of the contending parties, and in some cases they even knew the *persons* whom a given party intended to send into the Duma. In the countryside, on the contrary, there are so many stages, the electorate is so scattered, and the obstacles to open party action are so great that the elections to the First Duma were, and those to the Second Duma will be, conducted very much "under a cloak". In other words, very often, and even in the majority of cases, party propagandists will speak to the electors on parties in general, *deliberately* mentioning no names out of fear of the police. The radical and revolutionary peasants (and not only peasants) will deliberately screen themselves behind the title "non-party". At the election of one delegate per ten households it is knowledge of the person as such, personal confidence in this or that candidate, sympathy with *his* Social-Democratic speeches that will decide the issue. Here the number of Social-Democrats backed by a *local* Party organisation will be very small. But the number of Social-Democrats who win the sympathies of the local rural population may prove to be much larger than might be expected from the number of local Party units in those districts.

Petty-bourgeois romanticists like the Popular Socialists, who are dreaming of a legal Socialist Party under the existing order, do not understand how confidence in and sympathy with the underground party are growing because of its consistent, uncompromising, militant spirit and the elusiveness of its organisation, which influences the masses not through Party men alone. A real revolutionary illegal party, steeled

in battle, accustomed to the Plehves, and undismayed by the stern measures of the Stolypins, may, in the period of civil war, be capable of influencing the masses to a greater extent than any legal party which, with "callow simplicity", takes a "strictly constitutional path".

The Social-Democrats who are members of the Party, and Social-Democrats who do not belong to it, will have good chances of success at the elections of the one-per-ten-household representatives and the delegates. A bloc with the Trudoviks, or a joint list, is not at all important for success at this stage of the election in the countryside. On the one hand, the electoral units are quite small there, and on the other, real party Trudoviks, or such as at all resemble them, will be quite rare. The strict Party spirit of the Social-Democrats, their unconditional submission to the Party which has been able to exist illegally for many years and has reached a membership of 100,000 to 150,000 of all nationalities, the only Party on the extreme Left which formed a Party Group in the First Duma—this Party spirit will be a powerful recommendation and guarantee for all those who are not afraid of a resolute struggle and wish for it whole-heartedly, but do not altogether trust their own strength, are afraid of taking the initiative and are afraid to come out openly. We must utilise this advantage of being a strict, "illegal" party to the utmost, and we have nothing to gain by weakening it even slightly by any kind of permanent bloc. The only other resolute and determinedly revolutionary party likely to compete with us are the Socialist-Revolutionaries. But a bloc with them on a really party basis at the *first* stage of the rural elections would be possible only as an exception: one has only to picture to oneself clearly what the actual election conditions are like in the countryside to become convinced of this.* Insofar as the non-party revolutionary peasants will be active, while deliberately refraining from associating with any one party, it will be more to our advantage in all respects to influence them in

* It was certainly no accident that the Socialist-Revolutionaries could not come forward as a party in the First Duma; could not rather than would not. The Socialist-Revolutionaries in the Duma, as well as those in the University, thought it more advantageous to hide behind the *non-party* Trudoviks, or to enter into a bloc with them.

the sense we desire along strictly party lines. The non-party character of the association, of the agitation, need not hamper the party Social-Democrat, for the revolutionary peasants will never wish to exclude him; and his participation in a non-party revolutionary association is especially sanctioned by the resolution of the Unity Congress on supporting the peasant movement. Thus, while preserving and upholding our Party principle, utilising fully its enormous moral and political advantages, we can at the same time fully adapt ourselves to the task of working among the non-party revolutionary peasants, in the non-party revolutionary associations, circles and meetings, of working with the aid of our non-party revolutionary connections, and so forth. Instead of forming a bloc with the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who have succeeded in organising only a very small fraction of the revolutionary peasantry—a bloc that would restrict and cramp our strict Party principle—we shall make wider and freer use of our Party position and of all the advantages of working among the non-party "Trudoviks".

The conclusion to be drawn is that at the lower stages of the election campaign in the countryside, that is, at the election of the one-per-ten-household representatives and of the delegates (sometimes the election of the delegates will, in practice, probably be tantamount to a *first* stage election), there is no need for us to enter into *any* electoral agreements. The percentage of men with definite political views who are suitable as candidates for the office of one-per-ten-household representatives, or delegates, is so small that the Social-Democrats who have gained the confidence and respect of the peasants (and without this condition no serious candidature is conceivable) have every chance, almost *to a man*, of being elected as one-per-ten-household representatives and delegates, without having to enter into any agreement with other parties.

As for the assemblies of delegates, there we shall be able to base our policy upon the exact results of the primary election contests which have decided the whole matter in advance. Here we can and must enter into—not blocs, of course, not close and permanent agreements—but partial agreements on the distribution of seats. Here, and even more so in the assemblies of electors for the election of the Duma dep-

uties, we must, in conjunction with the Trudoviks, defeat the Cadets, and in conjunction with the Socialist-Revolutionaries, defeat the Popular Socialists, etc.

VI

Thus, an examination of the actual electoral system shows that blocs at the lower stages of the elections are particularly undesirable in the cities, and are not essential. In the countryside, at the lower stages (i.e., at the election of the one-per-ten-household representatives and of the delegates), blocs are both undesirable and quite unnecessary. The uyezds assemblies of delegates and the gubernia assemblies of electors are of decisive political importance. Here, i.e., at the higher stages, partial agreements are necessary and possible without undesirable infringement of party principle; for the contest before the masses has ended, and there is no need to advocate before the masses directly or indirectly (or even by assumption) a non-party policy; neither is there the least danger of obscuring the strictly independent class policy of the proletariat.*

Now let us examine, first from the formal, arithmetical point of view, so to speak, what forms these partial electoral agreements will assume at the higher stages.

We shall take approximate percentages, i.e., the distribution of electors (and delegates, who are included in what follows) according to party, per hundred electors. To succeed in an assembly of electors a candidate must obtain at least 51 votes out of every 100. This indicates that the general tactical rule of the Social-Democratic electors must be: to

* It is interesting to note that experience of the distinction between agreements at a lower stage and those at higher stages is to be found, too, in the practice of the international Social-Democratic movement. In France, the election of Senators takes place in two stages: the voters elect departmental electors, who, in their turn, elect the Senators. The revolutionary French Social-Democrats, the Guesdists, have never permitted any agreements or joint lists at the lower stage, but have permitted partial agreements at the higher stage, i.e., for the distribution of seats in the assemblies of the departmental electors. The opportunists, however, the Jaurèsists, entered into agreements even at the lower stage.

try to win over a sufficient number of bourgeois-democratic electors who sympathise with Social-Democracy, or such as most deserve support, in order jointly with them to defeat the rest and thus secure the election of in part Social-Democratic and in part the *best* bourgeois-democratic electors.*

We shall illustrate this rule by simple examples. Let us assume that out of 100 electors, 49 are Black Hundreds, 40 are Cadets and 11 are Social-Democrats. A partial agreement between the Social-Democrats and the Cadets is necessary in order to secure the election in full of a joint list of Duma candidates, on the basis, of course, of a proportional distribution of Duma seats according to the number of electors (i.e., in this case, one-fifth of the Duma seats from the whole gubernia, say, two out of ten, would go to the Social-Democrats, and four-fifths, or eight out of ten, would go to the Cadets). If there are 49 Cadets, 40 Trudoviks and 11 Social-Democrats, we must try to reach an agreement with the Trudoviks so as to defeat the Cadets and to win one-fifth of the seats for ourselves and four-fifths for the Trudoviks. In such a case we would have a splendid opportunity to test the consistency and steadfastness of the democratic convictions of the Trudoviks: would they agree to turn away from the Cadets entirely and defeat them in conjunction with the electors of the workers' party, or would they rather choose to "save" this or that Cadet or, perhaps, even prefer a bloc with the Cadets to one with the Social-Democrats? Here we can, and must, demonstrate and prove to the whole people to what extent particular petty-bourgeois elements are gravitating towards the monarchist bourgeoisie or towards the revolutionary proletariat.

In the last example the Trudoviks stand to gain an obvious advantage by forming a bloc with the Social-Democrats and not with the Cadets, for in the former case they

* For the sake of simplicity, we are assuming a purely and exclusively party distribution of electors. In practice, of course, we shall meet with many non-party electors. The task of the Social-Democratic electors will be to try as far as possible to ascertain the political character of all, especially of the bourgeois-democratic electors, and to form a "Left majority" consisting of the Social-Democrats and the bourgeois candidates most desirable for the Social-Democrats. The main criteria for distinguishing between party trends we shall discuss later.

would obtain four-fifths of the total number of seats, whereas in the latter case they would obtain only four-ninths. Still more interesting would be the reverse case: 11 Cadets, 40 Trudoviks and 49 Social-Democrats. In such a case the prospect of an obvious advantage would impel the Trudoviks to enter into a bloc with the Cadets: in that case "we" shall get more seats in the Duma, they will say. But loyalty to the principles of democracy and to the interests of the real working masses would certainly call for a bloc with the Social-Democrats, even at the cost of some seats in the Duma. The representatives of the proletariat must carefully take all such cases into account and explain to the electors and to the whole people (the results of agreements in the assemblies of delegates and electors must be publicly announced) the significance from the point of view of *principle* of this election arithmetic.

Further, in the last example we see a case where both the prospect of obvious advantage and considerations of principle are inducements to the Social-Democrats to split the Trudoviks. If among them there are, say, two fully party Socialist-Revolutionaries, we must exert every effort to win them to our side and with 51 votes defeat all the Cadets and all the rest of the *less revolutionary* Trudoviks. If among the Trudoviks there are two Socialist-Revolutionaries and 38 Popular Socialists, we shall have an opportunity to test the loyalty of the Socialist-Revolutionaries to the interests of democracy and to the interests of the working masses. We would say: vote for the republican democrats and against the Popular Socialists, who tolerate the monarchy; vote for the confiscation of the landlords' land and against the Popular Socialists, who tolerate redemption payments; vote for those who are for arming the whole people and against the Popular Socialists, who accept a standing army. And then we would see whom the Socialist-Revolutionaries would prefer—the Social-Cadets* or the Social-Democrats.

* This is what *Soznatel'naya Rossiya* ¹⁰⁰ called the Popular Socialists. Incidentally, the first and second issues of this publication have given us great satisfaction. Chernov, Vadimov and others *brilliantly* criticise both Peshekhonov and Tag—in. Particularly good is the refutation of Tag—in's arguments from the point of view of the theory of commodity production, developing through capitalism into socialism.

This brings us to the question of the significance of this election arithmetic from the point of view of political principle. Our duty here is to oppose seat-hunting and to put forward an absolutely firm and consistent defence of the standpoint of the socialist proletariat and of the interests of the complete victory of our bourgeois-democratic revolution. Under no circumstances, and in no way, should our Social-Democratic delegates and electors keep silent about our *socialist* aims, our strictly class position as a *proletarian* party. But a mere repetition of the word "class" is not sufficient to indicate the role of the proletariat as the vanguard in the *present* revolution. Expounding our socialist doctrine and the general theory of Marxism is not sufficient to prove the leading role of the proletariat. This requires, in addition, the ability to show *in practice*, in analysing the burning questions of the *present* revolution, that the members of the workers' party are more consistent, more unerring, more determined and more skilful than all others in defending the interests of *this* revolution, the cause of its *complete* victory. This is no easy task, and the fundamental and chief duty of every Social-Democrat who is entering the election campaign is to prepare for it.

To determine the differences between the parties and shades of parties at the assemblies of delegates and of electors (as well as throughout the election campaign—that goes without saying) will be a small, but useful practical task. In this matter, incidentally, the course of events will settle many controversial questions which are agitating the members of the Social-Democratic Labour Party. The Right wing of the Party, from the extreme opportunists of *Nashe Dyelo* to the moderate opportunists of *Sotsial-Demokrat*, are doing their utmost to obliterate and distort the difference between the Trudoviks and the Cadets, evidently failing to notice a new and very important phenomenon, namely, the division of the Trudoviks into Popular Socialists, Socialist-Revolutionaries, and those who are gravitating to the one or the other. Of course, the history of the First Duma and its dissolution already provided documentary evidence making the drawing of a distinction between the Cadets and the Trudoviks absolutely imperative and proving that the latter are more consistently and staunchly democratic than the

former. The election campaign to the Second Duma must prove and show this even more graphically, more exactly, more fully, and more widely. As we have tried to show by examples, the election campaign *itself will teach* the Social-Democrats to *distinguish* correctly between the various bourgeois-democratic parties and will refute, or, more correctly, sweep aside, the deeply mistaken opinion that the Cadets are the chief or, at any rate, important representatives of our bourgeois democracy in general.

Let us point out, too, that in the election campaign in general, and in concluding electoral agreements at the higher stages, the Social-Democrats must speak simply and clearly, in a language comprehensible to the masses, absolutely discarding the heavy artillery of erudite terms, foreign words and stock slogans, definitions and conclusion which are as yet unfamiliar and unintelligible to the masses. Without flamboyant phrases, without rhetoric, but with facts and figures, they must be able to *explain* the questions of socialism and of the present Russian revolution.

Two fundamental questions of this revolution, the questions of freedom and of land, will inevitably arise here. Upon these fundamental questions which are agitating the vast mass of the people we must concentrate both purely socialist propaganda—the difference between the standpoint of the small proprietor and that of the proletariat—and the distinction between the parties fighting for influence over the people. The Black Hundreds, right up to the Octobrists inclusively, are against freedom, against giving the land to the people. They want to *stop* the revolution by *force*, bribery and deceit. The liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, the Cadets, are *also* striving to *stop* the revolution, but by means of a number of concessions. They *do not want* to give the people either complete freedom, or all the land. They want to *preserve* landlordism by means of redemption payments and local land committees not elected on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot. The Trudoviks, i.e., the petty bourgeoisie, especially the rural petty bourgeoisie, are striving to secure all the land and complete freedom, but are pursuing this aim hesitatingly, not consciously, timidly, vacillating between the opportunism of the Social-Cadets (the Popular Socialists)—who justify the he-

gemony of the liberal bourgeoisie over the peasantry and elevate it to a theory—and utopian equality, alleged to be possible under commodity production. Social-Democracy must consistently uphold the standpoint of the proletariat and purge the *revolutionary* consciousness of the peasantry of Popular-Socialist opportunism and of utopianism, which obscure the really urgent tasks of the *present* revolution. Only when its *complete* victory is attained can the working class, and the whole people, *really*, quickly, boldly, freely and widely *set to work* to solve the fundamental problem of the whole of civilised mankind: the emancipation of labour from the yoke of capital.

We shall also deal carefully with the question of the *means* of struggle in the election campaign and in the conclusion of partial agreements with other parties. We shall explain what a constituent assembly is, and why the Cadets fear it. We shall ask the liberal bourgeoisie, the Cadets, what measures they intend to advocate and *put into practice independently* to make it impossible for anyone to treat the people's representatives in the way the deputies of the "first enrolment" were "treated". We shall remind the Cadets of their vile and treacherous attitude towards the October-December forms of struggle last year, and make it known to the widest possible sections of the people. We shall ask every candidate whether he intends to *subordinate* all his activities in the Duma entirely to the interests of the struggle *outside the Duma* and the interests of wide popular movement for land and freedom. We must take advantage of the election campaign to *organise the revolution*, i.e., to organise the proletariat and the *really* revolutionary elements of bourgeois democracy.

Such is the *positive* content which we must try to impart to the whole election campaign and, in particular, to the matter of entering into partial agreements with other parties.

VII

To sum up.

In their general election tactics the Social-Democrats must take as their starting-point the complete independence of the class party of the revolutionary proletariat.

This general principle may be departed from only in cases of extreme necessity and under specially limited conditions.

The specific features of the Russian electoral system and the political groupings among the overwhelming mass of the population, the peasantry, do not give rise to this extreme necessity at the lower stages of the election campaign, i.e., during the election of electors in the big cities and of the one-per-ten-household representatives and delegates in the countryside. It does not arise in the big cities because here the importance of the elections is *not at all* determined by the number of deputies to be sent into the Duma, but by the opportunities for the Social-Democrats to address the widest and most concentrated sections of the population, which are the "most Social-Democratic" in virtue of their whole position.

In the countryside, the fact that the masses are politically undeveloped and amorphous, the sparse and scattered nature of the population, and the external conditions of the elections especially provoke the development of non-party (and non-party revolutionary) organisations, associations, circles, assemblies, opinions and strivings. Under these circumstances, blocs are quite unnecessary at the lower stages. Strict adherence to Party principle in all respects is the most correct and most expedient policy for Social-Democrats.

Thus, the general proposition that an alliance between the proletariat and the revolutionary peasantry is necessary leads us to the conclusion that the only agreements that are necessary are partial agreements (such as agreements with the Trudoviks against the Cadets) at the higher stages of the electoral system, i.e., in the assemblies of delegates and electors. The special features of the political divisions among the Trudoviks also recommend this solution of the problem.

In all these partial agreements the Social-Democrats must strictly distinguish between the different bourgeois-democratic parties' and the various shades among them according to the degree of consistency and steadfastness of their democratic convictions.

The ideological and political content of the election campaign and of the partial agreements will lie in explaining

the theory of socialism and the independent slogans of the Social-Democrats in the present revolution, both in regard to the aims of this revolution and the ways and means of achieving them.

This pamphlet was written before *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 5, had appeared. Prior to the issue of this number our Party had every reason to hope that the Central Committee of our Party would absolutely disapprove of first-stage agreements with bourgeois parties, agreements which should be impermissible for socialists. We could not help thinking so, for such an influential Menshevik as Comrade L. Martov had *emphatically* expressed his opposition to *all* agreements at the first stage, writing not only in *Tovarishch*, but also in a letter sent out from the Central Committee to the organisations (written by Martov) on the question of preparing for the election campaign.

It now turns out that our Central Committee has gone over to Cherevanin or, at least, has wavered. The leading article in *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 5, *sanctions* blocs at the first stage, without even indicating precisely with which bourgeois parties! Today's (October 31) letter from Plekhanov, who for the purpose of defending a bloc with the Cadets has migrated to the Cadet newspaper *Tovarishch*, makes it clear to all whose influence it was that caused the Central Committee to waver. And Plekhanov, as usual, with the air of an oracle, delivers the most banal platitudes, entirely evading the class aims of the socialist proletariat (perhaps out of politeness to the bourgeois newspaper which has given him shelter), and does not even attempt to touch on concrete facts and arguments.

Will this "peremptory command" from Geneva be sufficient to cause the Central Committee to slip from Martov ... to Cherevanin?

Will the decision of the Unity Congress, which prohibited all agreements with bourgeois parties, be nullified by the Central Committee that was elected at that Congress?

The united election campaign of the Social-Democrats is threatened with serious danger.

The socialist workers' party is threatened with the danger of first-stage agreements with the bourgeois parties, which will demoralise the Party and prove fatal to the class independence of the proletariat.

Let all revolutionary Social-Democrats rally and declare relentless war upon opportunist confusion and vacillation!

**A DISSENTING OPINION
RECORDED AT THE ALL-RUSSIAN CONFERENCE
OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR
PARTY
BY THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC DELEGATES
FROM POLAND, THE LETTISH TERRITORY,
ST. PETERSBURG,
MOSCOW, THE CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL REGION
AND THE VOLGA AREA ¹**

The tactics of boycotting the State Duma, which helped the mass of the people to form a correct opinion of the impotence and lack of independence of that institution, found complete justification in the farcical legislative activities of the State Duma and in its dissolution.

But the counter-revolutionary behaviour of the bourgeoisie and the compromising tactics of the Russian liberals prevented the immediate success of the boycott and compelled the proletariat to take up the struggle against the landlord and bourgeois counter-revolution also on the basis of the Duma campaign.

The Social-Democrats must wage this struggle outside the Duma and in the Duma itself in order to develop the class-consciousness of the proletariat, to further expose to the whole people the harmfulness of constitutional illusions, and to develop the revolution.

In view of this state of affairs, and for the purposes mentioned above, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party must take a most energetic part in the present Duma campaign.

The principal objects of the Social-Democratic election and Duma campaigns are: firstly, to explain to the people the uselessness of the Duma as a means of satisfying the demands of the proletariat and the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie, especially the peasantry. Secondly, to explain to the people the impossibility of achieving political liberty by parliamentary methods as long as the real power remains in the hands of the tsar's government, and to explain the necessity of an armed uprising, of a provisional revolutionary government and of a constituent assembly elected by universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot. Thirdly, to criticise the First Duma and reveal the bankruptcy of Russian liberalism, and especially to show how dangerous and fatal it would be for the cause of the revolution if the liberal-monarchist Cadet Party were to play the predominant and leading role in the liberation movement.

As the class party of the proletariat, the Social-Democratic Party must remain absolutely independent throughout the election and Duma campaigns, and here, too, must under no circumstances merge its slogans or tactics with those of any other opposition or revolutionary party.

Therefore, at the first stage of the election campaign, i.e., before the masses, it must as a general rule come out absolutely independently and put forward only its own Party candidates.

Exceptions to this rule are permissible only in cases of extreme necessity and only in relation to parties that fully accept the main slogans of our immediate political struggle, i.e., those which recognise the necessity of an armed uprising and are fighting for a democratic republic. Such agreements, however, may only extend to the nomination of a joint list of candidates, without in any way restricting the independence of the political agitation carried on by the Social-Democrats.

In the workers' curia the Social-Democratic Party must come out absolutely independently and refrain from entering into agreements with any other party.

At the higher stages of the election, i.e., at the assemblies of electors in the towns and of delegates and electors in the countryside, partial agreements may be entered into exclusively for the purpose of distributing seats proportionately

to the number of votes cast for the parties entering the agreement. In this connection, the Social-Democratic Party distinguishes the following main types of bourgeois parties according to the consistency and determination of their democratic views: (a) the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Polish Socialist Party and similar republican parties,* (b) the Popular Socialists and the Trudoviks of a similar type;** (c) the Cadets.

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* Perhaps the Zionist socialists also come under this category.¹²²

** Perhaps including certain Jewish democrats. We are not competent to judge of these matters without having the opinion of the Jewish Social-Democrats.

DRAFT ELECTION ADDRESS

Comrade workers, and all citizens of Russia! The Duma elections are approaching. The Social-Democratic Party, the party of the working class, calls upon you all to take part in the elections and so help to rally the forces that are really capable of fighting for freedom.

In our revolution the mass of the people are fighting against the rule of the government officials and the police, the landlords and the capitalists, and first and foremost against the autocratic tsarist government. The masses are fighting for land and liberty, for the overthrow of the gang of pogrom-mongers and executioners, who reply to the demands of millions and scores of millions of people by bribery, deception, brutal violence, imprisonment and military courts.

By their strike in October 1905, the workers of all Russia wrung from the tsar a promise of liberty and of a Duma with legislative powers. The tsarist government broke these promises. The electoral law curtailed the rights of the peasants and workers for the benefit of the landlords and capitalists. The powers of the Duma itself were reduced almost to nil. But even that is not the main thing. The main thing is that all these liberties and rights remained a dead letter, for real authority, real power remained as before wholly in the hands of the tsarist government. No Duma can or will give the people land and liberty as long as real power remains in the hands of the pogrom-mongers and throttlers of liberty.

This is why the revolutionary workers, together with the majority of the conscious fighters for liberty in other sections of the population, boycotted the Duma. The boycott of the Duma was an attempt to take the convocation of the people's representatives out of the hands of the pogrom-mongers. The boycott of the Duma was a warning to the people not to believe in scraps of paper; it was a call to fight for

real power. The boycott failed, because the liberal bourgeoisie betrayed the cause of liberty. The Cadets—the party of “people’s” freedom, that party of liberal landlords and “enlightened” bourgeois windbags—turned their backs on the heroic struggle of the proletariat, described as folly the risings of the peasantry and of the best units of the armed forces, and took part in the elections organised by the pogrom-mongers. Thanks to the treachery of the Cadet bourgeoisie, the whole people must reckon for a time with laws and elections which the pogrom-mongers have organised, which the pogrom-mongers have falsified and which the pogrom-mongers have converted into a mockery of the people.

In taking part in the elections now, however, we can and must open the eyes of the people to the necessity of a struggle for power, to the futility of the Cadets’ playing at constitutions. Citizens of all Russia! Reflect on the lessons that the First Duma has taught us!

The fighters for liberty and for land for the peasants were killed, exiled or imprisoned. The Cadets had a majority in the Duma. These liberal bourgeois were afraid of the struggle, were afraid of the people, were content to make speeches and present petitions; they appealed to the people to wait patiently; they endeavoured to make an agreement, to strike a bargain with the pogrom-mongers’ government. And the tsar, perceiving that he was dealing with cringing bourgeois and not with men of fighting spirit, sent them packing for making objectionable speeches.

Workers, peasants and all toilers! Do not forget this great lesson! Remember that in the autumn of 1905, when the revolutionary workers were at the head of the struggling people, when the workers’ strike and the workers’ uprising were reinforced by risings of peasants and politically-conscious soldiers, the government made concessions. But when, in the spring and summer of 1906, the people were headed by the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, the Cadets, the party of vacillation between the power of the people and the power of the pogrom-mongers, then instead of obtaining concessions the deputies were booted out of the Duma by the police and the Duma was dissolved.

The dissolution of the Duma has clearly revealed to everyone how futile and fruitless are Cadet petitions, and how

necessary it is to support the struggle of the proletariat. By its strike in October the working class extorted a promise of freedom. Now it is mobilising its forces in order, by means of an uprising of the whole people, to wrest real freedom from the hands of the enemy, to overthrow the tsarist government, to establish a republic, to secure that all state authorities without exception are elected, and to convene through a provisional revolutionary government a national constituent assembly elected on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot.

The liberty for which the working class is fighting is liberty for the whole people, not merely for the nobility and the rich. The workers need liberty in order to launch a wide struggle for the complete emancipation of labour from the tyranny of capital, for the abolition of all exploitation of man by man, for a socialist system of society. As long as the rule of capital remains, no equality, not even equality of tenure for small peasant proprietors on the common land of the people, will save the people from poverty, unemployment and oppression. Only the solidarity of all the workers, supported by the mass of the working people, can overthrow the yoke of capital, which is weighing so heavily on the workers of all countries. In socialist society, liberty and equality will no longer be a sham; the working people will no longer be divided by working in small, isolated, private enterprises; the wealth accumulated by common labour will serve the mass of the people and not oppress them; the rule of the workers will abolish all oppression of one nation, religion or sex by another.

Comrade workers, and all citizens of Russia! Make use of the elections to strengthen the real champions of liberty and socialism, to open the eyes of all to the real aims and the true character of the various parties!

Besides the Social-Democrats, three main groups of parties are taking part in the elections: the Black Hundreds, the Cadets, and the Trudoviks.

The Black Hundreds are the parties supporting the government. They stand for an autocratic monarchy, police rule and the perpetuation of landlordism. They are: the Monarchist Party, the Union of the Russian People, the Party of Law and Order, the Commercial and Industrial Party, the

Union of October Seventeenth and the Party of Peaceful Renovation. These are all open enemies of the people, direct champions of the pogrom-mongers' government, the government which dissolved the Duma, the government of military courts.

The Cadets (Constitutional-Democrats, or the "party of people's freedom") are the leading party of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie. The liberal bourgeoisie are oscillating between the people and the pogrom-mongers' government. In words they oppose the government, but in fact what they fear most is the struggle of the people; they want to come to terms with the monarchy, i.e., with the pogrom-mongers, against the people. In the Duma the Cadets proposed repressive laws against the press and against public meetings. In the Duma the Cadets were opposed to referring the land question to local committees elected on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot. The Cadets are liberal landlords, who are afraid that the peasants might settle the land question in their own way. Those who do not want the police regime to be able to disperse the people's deputies, those who do not want the peasants to have to bear land redemption payments as ruinous as those of 1861, must see to it that the Second Duma will not be a Cadet Duma like the First.

The Trudoviks are parties and groups which express the interests and views of the small proprietors, mainly the small peasants. The most timid of these parties is the Toilers' Popular Socialist Party; it is little better than the Cadets. Then follows the Duma "Trudovik Group", the best members of which, such as Onipko, assisted in the popular uprising after the dissolution of the Duma. The most revolutionary of the Trudovik parties is the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. The Trudoviks are inclined resolutely—sometimes even to the point of an uprising—to uphold the interests of the peasant masses in their struggle for land and liberty, but in their activities they are by no means always able to shake off the influence of the liberal bourgeois and bourgeois views. The small proprietor stands at the parting of the ways in the great world-wide struggle between labour and capital. He has either to try to "get on in the world" in bourgeois fashion and become a master himself, or to try

to help the proletariat overthrow the rule of the bourgeoisie. We, the Social-Democrats, will use the elections to tell the peasant masses and all friends of the peasantry that the only way by which the peasants will be able to get land and liberty is not through petitions, but by fighting, not by relying on the tsar and the promises of the liberal bourgeoisie, but by relying on the power of a united struggle shoulder to shoulder with the working class.

The Social-Democratic Party is the party of the class-conscious, militant proletariat. It has no faith in any promises of the bourgeoisie; it seeks salvation from poverty and want not through the consolidation of small production, but through the united struggle of all the working people for socialism.

Comrade workers, and all of you who are employees of capital! You have all seen that when the government deprived you of the beginnings of liberty the bourgeoisie proceeded to deprive the workers of all their gains, to increase hours and cut wages again, to increase fines, to tighten the screw generally, to harass or dismiss class-conscious workers. Only by the triumph of liberty can the workers and office employees safeguard what they have won from the bourgeoisie, and secure an eight-hour day, higher wages, and tolerable conditions of life. And only by a united, concerted, supremely heroic struggle at the head of the mass of the working people can the working class win real liberty for the whole people.

Comrade workers, and all citizens of Russia! Vote for the candidates of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party! It is a party that is fighting for complete freedom, for a republic, for the election of government officials by the people. It is fighting against all national oppression. It is fighting for *all* the land to be given to the peasantry *without compensation*. It is supporting all the demands of the politically conscious sailors and soldiers by fighting to secure the abolition of the standing army and the substitution for it of the armed nation.

Comrade workers, and all citizens of Russia! Vote for the candidates of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party!

BLOCS WITH THE CADETS

At the All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. the Mensheviks, with the aid of the Bundists, secured the adoption of a resolution permitting blocs with the Cadets. The Cadet press is jubilant, and is spreading the happy tidings to all ends of the earth, gently pushing the Mensheviks one step lower, one step further to the right. Elsewhere the reader will find the decisions of the conference, the dissenting opinion of the revolutionary Social-Democrats, and their draft election address.* Here we shall attempt to outline the general and fundamental political significance of blocs with the Cadets.

Sotsial-Demokrat, No. 6, provides good material for such an outline, especially the editorial entitled "A Bloc of the Extreme Left". We shall begin with one of the most characteristic passages in the article:

"We are told," writes *Sotsial-Demokrat*, "that the Mensheviks, who had set out to push the whole Duma on to the revolutionary path, abandoned their position after the dissolution of the Duma and formed a bloc with the revolutionary parties and groups, which was expressed, firstly, in the issue of two joint manifestoes—to the army and to the peasantry—and, secondly, in the formation of a committee for co-ordinating action in view of the forthcoming strike. This reference to precedent is based on a great misunderstanding. In the instance quoted, our Party concluded with the other revolutionary parties and groups, *not a political bloc*, but a *fighting agreement*, which we have always considered expedient and necessary."

* See pp. 299-301 of this volume.—*Ed.*

The italics are those of *Sotsial-Demokrat*.

...Not a *political* bloc, but a *fighting* agreement.... For the love of God, Menshevik comrades! This is not only nonsensical, it is positively illiterate. One of two things: either you mean by a bloc only parliamentary agreements, or you mean other agreements besides parliamentary agreements. If the first is the case—then a bloc is a fighting agreement for a parliamentary fight. If the second is the case—then a fighting agreement is a political bloc, because a “fight” without a political purpose is not a fight, but merely a brawl.

Comrades of the Central Committee! Watch your editors! You really must, because they are making us feel ashamed of Social-Democracy.

But perhaps this rigmarole presented to the reader in the organ of the Central Committee is simply a slip of the pen, an awkward expression?

Not at all. The *Sotsial-Demokrat*'s mistake was not the “howler” it committed; on the contrary, the howler arose out of the fundamental mistake that lies at the bottom of its whole argument and whole position. The meaningless combination of words “*not a political bloc but a fighting agreement*”^{*} is not fortuitous; it followed necessarily and inevitably from the basic “meaninglessness” of Menshevism, namely, its failure to understand that the parliamentary fight in Russia today is entirely subordinate, and most directly so, to the conditions and character of the fight outside of parliament. In other words: this one logical blunder expresses the Mensheviks' general failure to understand the role and importance of the Duma in the present revolutionary situation.

We, of course, do not intend to copy the methods of the Mensheviks, and of their leader Plekhanov, in their polemics against us on the question of “fighting” and “politics”. We shall not reproach them, leaders of the Social-Democratic proletariat, for being capable of entering into a *non-political* fighting agreement.

* And, as luck would have it, we now have the curious situation that the Mensheviks, who have always reproached us with contrasting “fighting” to “politics”, have *themselves* based *their entire argument* on this meaningless contrast.

We call attention to the following question: *Why* did our Mensheviks, after the dissolution of the Duma, have to form a bloc *only with the revolutionary parties and groups*? Certainly not because this had been advocated for a long time (purely out of hatred for the Mensheviks) by some anarcho-Blanquist named Lenin. Objective conditions *compelled* the Mensheviks, in spite of all their theories, to form precisely such a revolutionary anti-Cadet bloc. Whether the Mensheviks wanted it or not, and *whether they realised it or not*, the objective conditions were such that the dialectical development of the peaceful parliamentary fight in the First Duma converted it, *in the course of a few days*, into one that was altogether unpeaceful and non-parliamentary. The informal *political bloc* of which the Mensheviks were not aware (because of the Cadet blinkers on their eyes)—a bloc expressed in common aspirations, common immediate political efforts and common methods of struggle for immediate political aims—this unintentional “political bloc” was *by the force of circumstances* transformed into a “fighting agreement”. And our wiseacres were so dumbfounded by this unexpected turn of events, unforeseen in Plekhanov’s letters of the period of the First Duma,¹ that they exclaimed: “This is *not* a political bloc, *but* a fighting agreement!”

The reason why your policy is no good at all, dear comrades, is that you have in mind agreements for *that* “fight” which is unreal, fictitious and of no decisive importance, and overlook the conditions of *that* “fight” which is being irresistibly brought to the fore by the whole course of the Russian revolution; the fight which arises even from conditions that at first sight seem to be the most peaceful, parliamentary and constitutional imaginable, and even from such conditions as those which the Rodichevs of the Duma exalted in their speeches about the dearly-beloved, blameless monarch.

You are committing the very error of which you groundlessly accuse the Bolsheviks. Your policy is not a fighting policy. Your fight is not a genuine political fight, but a sham constitutional fight; it is parliamentary cretinism. For the “fight” which circumstances may make necessary tomorrow you have *one* line of agreements; for “politics” you have *another* line of agreements. That is why you are no good either

for "fights" or for "politics", but only for the role of yes-men of the Cadets.

There is considerable controversy in our Party at the present time as to the meaning of the word "blocs". Some say that a bloc means a joint list of candidates; others deny this and say that it means a common platform. All these disputes are silly and scholastic. It does not make the slightest difference whether the narrower or the wider agreements are called blocs. The central issue is not whether wide or narrow agreements are permissible. Whoever thinks so is immersing himself in petty and trivial parliamentary technique and forgetting the *political substance* of that technique. The central issue is: *on what lines* should the socialist proletariat enter into agreements with the bourgeoisie, which, generally speaking, are inevitable in the course of a bourgeois revolution. The Bolsheviks may differ among themselves in regard to details, e.g., whether electoral agreements are necessary with this or that party of the revolutionary bourgeoisie, but that is not the central issue between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. The central issue remains the same: should the socialist proletariat in a bourgeois revolution follow in the wake of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, or should it march in front of the revolutionary-democratic bourgeoisie.

The article "A Bloc of the Extreme Left" gives numerous instances of how the ideas of the Mensheviks are side-tracked from the political essence of the disagreement to petty trifles. The author of the article himself describes (p. 2, col. 3) both a common platform and a joint list as bloc tactics. At the same time he asserts that we are advocating a "bloc" with the Trudoviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, while the Mensheviks advocate, not a bloc, but only "partial agreements" with the Cadets. But this is childishness, my dear comrades, and not argument!

Compare the Menshevik resolution adopted by the All-Russian Conference with the Bolshevik resolution. The latter imposes stricter conditions for agreements with the Socialist-Revolutionaries than the former does for agreements with the Cadets. This is indisputable, for, in the first place, the Bolsheviks permit agreements only with parties which are fighting for a republic and which recognise the necessity

of an armed uprising, whereas the Mensheviks permit agreements with "democratic opposition parties" generally. Thus, the Bolsheviks defined the term "revolutionary bourgeoisie" by means of clear *political* characteristics, whereas the Mensheviks, instead of a *political* definition, presented merely a *technical parliamentary* catchword. A republic and an armed uprising are definite political categories. Opposition is a purely parliamentary term. This term is so vague that it can include the Octobrists, and the Party of Peaceful Renovation, and, in fact, all who are dissatisfied with the government. True, the addition of the word "democratic" introduces a political element, but it is indefinite. It is supposed to refer to the Cadets but this is exactly where it is wrong. To apply the term "democratic" to a *monarchist* party, to a party which accepts an Upper Chamber, proposed repressive laws against public meetings and the press and deleted from the reply to the address from the throne the demand for direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot, to a party which opposed the formation of land committees elected by the whole people—means *deceiving the people*. This is a very strong expression, but it is just. The Mensheviks are deceiving the people about the democracy of the Cadets.

Secondly, the Bolsheviks permit agreements with the bourgeois republicans only as an "exception". The Mensheviks do not demand that blocs with the Cadets should be only an exception.

Thirdly, the Bolsheviks absolutely forbid agreements in the workers' curia ("*with any other party*"). The Mensheviks permit blocs in the workers' curia as well, for they only forbid agreements with groups and parties which "do not adopt the standpoint of the proletarian class struggle". This is no accident, for at the Conference there were some Mensheviks with proletarian class intuition, who opposed this stupid formula, but they were defeated by the Menshevik majority. The outcome was something very indefinite and nebulous, leaving plenty of scope for all sorts of adventurist moves. Moreover, the outcome was an idea that is altogether reprehensible for a Marxist, namely, that a party other than a Social-Democratic Party *may* be recognised as "adopting the standpoint of the proletarian class struggle".

After this, how can one describe as other than childish, to say the least, the attempts to prove that the Bolsheviks permit a *closer bloc* with the republican bourgeoisie, i.e., the Socialist-Revolutionaries, than the Mensheviks permit with the monarchist bourgeoisie, i.e., the Cadets??

The absolutely false argument about closer or less close blocs serves to obscure the political question: *with whom and for what purpose* are blocs permissible. Take the "Draft Election Platform" published in No. 6 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*. This document is one of a mass of documents defining Menshevik policy which are proof of the existence of an *ideological bloc* between the Mensheviks and the Cadets. The resolution of the conference on the "amendments" required to this draft election platform clearly demonstrates this. Just think: a conference of Social-Democrats had to remind its Central Committee that it must not omit the slogan of a republic from an illegal publication; that it must not confine itself to vague platitudes about petitions and struggle, but must accurately name and characterise the different parties from the proletarian standpoint; that it must point to the need for an uprising and emphasise the class character of Social-Democracy! Only some deep-seated abnormality, some fundamental error in the views held by the Central Committee could have made it necessary to remind the Central Committee of the Social-Democratic Party that it must emphasise the class character of the Party in its *first* election manifesto.

We do not know yet whether practical agreements with the Cadets will be concluded, or what their scope will be; but an ideological agreement, an ideological bloc, already exists: in the draft election platform the difference between the standpoint of the proletariat and that of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie is glossed over.* The Bolshevik draft

* This is not the first time the Mensheviks have made this mistake. They made the same mistake in the famous Duma declaration of the R.S.D.L.P. They accused the Bolsheviks of Socialist-Revolutionary tendencies, while they themselves obliterated the differences between the views of the Social-Democrats and those of the Trudoviks to such an extent that the Socialist-Revolutionary newspapers of the Duma period called the Duma declaration of the Social-Democrats a plagiarism of Socialist-Revolutionary ideas! In our counter-draft of the Duma dec-

election address, on the contrary, not only points out this difference, but also the difference between the standpoint of the proletariat and that of the class of small proprietors.

It is these principles and ideas that must be brought to the fore in the question of election blocs. It is useless for the Mensheviks to attempt to justify themselves by saying: we shall be independent throughout the election campaign, which we shall in no way curtail, and we shall put our candidates in the Cadets' list only at the last minute!

That is not true. We are sure, of course, that the best of the Mensheviks sincerely desire it. But it is not their desires that count, however—it is the objective conditions of the present political struggle. And these conditions are such that *every step* the Mensheviks take in their election campaign is *already tainted* by Cadetism, is already marked by obscuring the Social-Democratic point of view. We have demonstrated this by the example of the draft election platform and shall now do so by a number of other documents and arguments.

The Mensheviks' main argument is the Black-Hundred danger. The first and fundamental flaw in this argument is that the Black-Hundred danger cannot be combated by Cadet tactics and a Cadet policy. The essence of this policy lies in *reconciliation* with tsarism, *that is*, with the Black-Hundred danger. The first Duma sufficiently demonstrated that the Cadets do not combat the Black-Hundred danger, but make incredibly despicable speeches about the innocence and blamelessness of the monarch, *the known leader of the Black Hundreds*. Therefore, by helping to elect Cadets to the Duma, the Mensheviks are not only failing to combat the Black-Hundred danger, but are hoodwinking the people, are obscuring the real significance of the Black-Hundred danger. Combating the Black-Hundred danger by helping to elect the Cadets to the Duma is like combating pogroms by means of the speech delivered by the lackey Rodichev: "It is presumption to hold the monarch responsible for the pogrom."

laration,¹²⁴ on the contrary, the difference between us and the petty bourgeois was clearly shown.

The second flaw in this stock argument is that it means that the Social-Democrats tacitly surrender hegemony in the democratic struggle to the Cadets. In the event of a split vote that secures the victory of a Black Hundred, why should *we* be blamed for not having voted for the Cadet, and not the *Cadets* for not having voted for us?

"We are in a minority," answer the Mensheviks, in a spirit of Christian humility. "The Cadets are more numerous. You cannot expect the Cadets to declare themselves revolutionaries."

Yes! But that is no reason why Social-Democrats should declare themselves Cadets. The Social-Democrats have not had, and could not have had, a majority over the bourgeois democrats anywhere in the world where the outcome of the bourgeois revolution was indecisive. But *everywhere*, in all countries, the *first* independent entry of the Social-Democrats in an election campaign has been met by the howling and barking of the liberals, *accusing the socialists of wanting to let the Black Hundreds in*.

We are therefore quite undisturbed by the usual Menshevik cries that the Bolsheviks are letting the Black Hundreds in. *All* liberals have shouted this to *all* socialists. By refusing to fight the Cadets you are leaving under the ideological influence of the Cadets masses of proletarians and semiproletarians who are capable of following the lead of the Social-Democrats.* Now or later, unless you cease to be socialists, you will have to fight independently, in spite of the Black-Hundred danger. And it is easier and more necessary to take the right step now than it will be later on. In the elections to the Third Duma (if it is convoked after the Second Duma) it will be even more difficult for you to dissolve the bloc with the Cadets, you will be still more entangled in unnatural relations with the betrayers of the revolution. But the *real* Black-Hundred danger, we repeat, lies not in the Black Hundreds obtaining seats in the Duma, but in pogroms and military courts; and you are making it more dif-

* The Cadets themselves are beginning to acknowledge that in the elections they are threatened by a *danger from the Left* (the exact words used by *Rech* in a report on the St. Petersburg Gubernia). By their outcry against the Black-Hundred danger, the Cadets are leading the Mensheviks by the nose in order to avert the danger from the Left!

ficult for the people to fight this real danger by putting Cadet blinkers on their eyes.

The third flaw in this stock argument is its inaccurate appraisal of the Duma and its role. In that delightful article "A Bloc of the Extreme Left", the Mensheviks had to acknowledge, contrary to all the assertions they usually make, that the central issue lies not in technical agreements, but in the radical political difference between two tactics.

In this article we read the following:

"The tactics of a 'bloc' are consciously or unconsciously directed towards the formation in the next Duma of a compact revolutionary minority of a faded Social-Democratic hue, a minority that would wage systematic war on the Duma majority as well as on the government, and, at a certain moment, would overthrow the Duma and proclaim itself a provisional government. The tactics of partial agreements are directed towards making use, as far as possible, of the Duma as a whole, i. e., the Duma majority, for the purpose of fighting the autocratic regime while retaining all the time in the Duma the extreme position of an independent Social-Democratic Group."

As regards the "faded hue" we have already shown that it is the Mensheviks who are to blame for this—by their conduct in the elections in the workers' curia, by their wider latitude for blocs, and by their ideological substitution of Cadetism for Social-Democracy. As for "proclaiming" a provisional government, the Mensheviks' assertion is equally ridiculous, for they forget that it is not a matter of proclaiming, but of the whole course and of the success of the *uprising*. A provisional government which is not the organ of an uprising is an empty phrase, or a senseless adventure.

But on the central issue, the Mensheviks inadvertently blurted out the real truth in the above-quoted passage. Indeed, the whole thing boils down to this: *shall we or shall we not sacrifice the independence of the Social-Democratic election campaign for the sake of a "solid" liberal Duma ("the Duma as a whole")?* And indeed, the most important thing for the Bolsheviks is complete independence in the election campaign and the completely (not semi-Cadet) Social-Democratic character of our policy and of our Duma Group. But for the Mensheviks the most important thing is a solid Cadet Duma with a large number of Social-Democrats elected as semi-Cadets! Two types of Duma: 200 Black Hundreds, 280 Cadets and 20 Social-Democrats; or 400

Cadets and 100 Social-Democrats. We prefer the first type, and we think it is childish to imagine that the elimination of the Black Hundreds from the Duma means the elimination of the Black-Hundred danger.

Everywhere we have a single policy: in the election fight, in the fight in the Duma, and in the fight in the streets—the policy of the armed struggle. Everywhere our policy is: the Social-Democrats with the revolutionary bourgeoisie against the Cadet traitors. The Mensheviks, however, wage their “Duma” fight in alliance with the Cadets (support for the Duma as a whole and a Cadet Cabinet); but in the event of an uprising they will change their policy and conclude “*not* a political bloc, *but* a fighting agreement”. Therefore, the Bolshevik was quite right who remarked at the conference: “By supporting blocs with the Cadets, the Bundists have smuggled in support for a Cadet Cabinet.”

The above quotation excellently confirms the fact that blocs with the Cadets convert into empty phrases all the fine words in the Menshevik resolution on slogans in the election campaign. For example: “to organise the forces of the revolution in the Duma” (is it not rather to organise an appendage to the Cadets by disorganising the actual forces of the revolution?); “to expose the impotence of the Duma” (is it not rather to conceal from the masses the impotence of the Cadets?); “to explain to the masses that hopes of a peaceful issue of the struggle are illusory” (is it not rather to strengthen among the masses the influence of the Cadet Party, which is fostering illusions?).

And the Cadet press has perfectly understood the *political* significance of Menshevik-Cadet blocs. We said above: either in the rear of the liberals or in front of the revolutionaries. In support of this we shall cite our political press.

Can you find any serious or mass confirmation of the assertion that the Bolsheviks are following in the wake of the bourgeois revolutionaries and are dependent on them? It is ridiculous even to speak of such a thing. The whole Russian press clearly shows, and all the enemies of the revolutionaries admit, that it is the Bolsheviks who are pursuing an independent political line, and are winning over various groups and the best elements of the bourgeois revolutionaries.

But what about the bourgeois opportunists? They own a press ten times larger than that of the Social-Democrats and the Socialist-Revolutionaries put together. And they are pursuing an independent political line, converting the Mensheviks and Popular Socialists into mere yes-men.

The *whole* Cadet press quotes *only* those parts of the Menshevik resolutions which refer to blocs; it *omits* "the impotence of the Duma", "the organisation of the forces of the revolution in the Duma", and other things. The Cadets not only omit these things, they *openly rail against* them, now talking about the "phrase-mongering" or the "inconsistency" of the Mensheviks, now about the "inconsistency of the Menshevik slogans", and at another time about "the baneful influence of the Bolsheviks over the Mensheviks".

What does this mean? It means that, whether we like it or not, and in spite of the wishes of the better sort of Mensheviks, political life absorbs their *Cadet deeds* and rejects their *revolutionary phrases*.

The Cadet coolly accepts the help of the Mensheviks, slaps Plekhanov on the back for his advocacy of blocs, and at the same time shouts contemptuously and rudely, like a merchant who has grown fat on ill-gotten gains: Not enough, Menshevik gentlemen! There must also be an ideological understanding! (See the article in *Tovarishch* on Plekhanov's letter.) Not enough, Menshevik gentlemen, you must also stop your polemic, or at any rate change its tone! (See the leading article in the *Left-Cadet Vek* on the resolutions of our Conference.) Not to mention *Rech*, which simply snubbed the Mensheviks who are yearning for the Cadets by bluntly declaring: "We shall go into the Duma to *legislate*", not to make a revolution!

Poor Mensheviks, poor Plekhanov! Their love letters to the Cadets were read with pleasure, but so far they are not being admitted further than the antechamber.

Read Plekhanov's letter in the bourgeois-Cadet newspaper *Tovarishch*. How joyfully he was greeted by Mr. Prokopovich and Madame Kuskova, the very people whom Plekhanov, in 1900, drove out of the Social-Democratic Party for attempting its bourgeois corruption. Now Plekhanov has accepted the tactics of the famous *Credo*¹³ of Prokopovich and Kuskova; and these followers of Bernstein are impudently

blowing kisses to him and shouting: *We bourgeois democrats have always said this!*

And in order to be admitted to the antechamber of the Cadets, Plekhanov had publicly to *withdraw the statements he made but yesterday.*

Here are the facts.

In *Dnevnik*, No. 6, of July 1906, after the dissolution of the Duma, Plekhanov wrote that the parties that are *participating* in the movement must come to an understanding. To be able to strike together, they must *first come to an agreement*. "The parties hostile to our old regime must ... come to an agreement about what is to be the main idea in this propaganda. After the dissolution of the Duma the only idea that can serve this purpose is the idea of a constituent assembly...."

... "*Only*" the idea of a constituent assembly. Such was Plekhanov's plan for a political bloc and for a fighting agreement in July 1906.

Five months later, in November 1906, Plekhanov changes his policy on agreements. Why? Has there been any change since then in the relations between the parties which demand a constituent assembly and those which do not?

It is generally admitted that since then the Cadets have shifted still further to the right. And Plekhanov *goes* to the Cadet press but says *nothing* about the constituent assembly; for it is forbidden to speak about this in liberal antechambers.

Is it not clear that this Social-Democrat has slipped?

But this is not all. In the same No. 6 of *Dnevnik*, Plekhanov referred *directly* to the Cadets. *At that time* (that was such a long time ago!) Plekhanov explained the selfish class character of the Cadets' distrust towards the idea of a constituent assembly. Plekhanov at that time wrote about the Cadets literally as follows:

"Whoever renounces the propaganda of this idea [a constituent assembly] on whatever pretext will clearly indicate that he is not really seeking a worthy answer to the actions of Stolypin & Co., that he, though reluctantly, *is becoming reconciled to these actions*, that he is rebelling against them *only in words, only for the sake of appearances*" (italics ours).

Having now gone over to a Cadet newspaper, Plekhanov began his advocacy of an election bloc by establishing an ideological bloc. In the Cadet newspaper Plekhanov did not want to tell the people that the Cadets are *becoming reconciled* to the Stolypin gang, that they are rebelling *only for the sake of appearances*.

Why did Plekhanov not want to repeat in November 1906 what he said in July 1906?

This, then, is what "technical" blocs with the Cadets mean, and that is why we are waging a relentless struggle against Social-Democrats who sanction such blocs.

Is not your joy premature, gentlemen of the Cadet Party? Social-Democrats will vote in the elections without blocs in the Caucasus, in the Urals, in Poland, in the Lettish Territory, in the Moscow Central Region, and probably in St. Petersburg.

No blocs with the Cadets! No conciliation with those who are becoming reconciled to the Stolypin gang!

PARTY DISCIPLINE AND THE FIGHT AGAINST THE PRO-CADET SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS

The sanction of blocs with the Cadets is the finishing touch that definitely marks the Mensheviks as the opportunist wing of the workers' party. We are waging a ruthless ideological struggle against the formation of blocs with the Cadets, and this struggle must be developed to the widest possible extent. This will do more than anything to educate and unite the masses of the revolutionary proletariat, whom our *independent* (really, and not merely in name, i.e., without blocs with the Cadets) election campaign will provide with fresh material for the development of their class-consciousness.

The question is how to combine this ruthless ideological struggle with proletarian party discipline. This question must be put squarely and fully explained at once, so that there may be *no* misunderstanding and no vacillation in the practical policy of revolutionary Social-Democracy.

Let us first consider the theoretical aspect of this question, and then the practical aspect which is of immediate interest to everybody.

We have more than once already enunciated our theoretical views on the importance of discipline and on how this concept is to be understood in the party of the working class. We defined it as: *unity of action, freedom of discussion and criticism*. Only such discipline is worthy of the democratic party of the advanced class. The strength of the working class lies in organisation. Unless the masses are organised, the proletariat is nothing. Organised—it is everything. Organisation means unity of action, unity in practical operations. But every action is valuable, of course, only because

and insofar as it serves to push things forward and not backward, insofar as it serves to unite the proletariat ideologically, to elevate, and not degrade, corrupt or weaken it. Organisation not based on principle is meaningless, and in practice converts the workers into a miserable appendage of the bourgeoisie in power. Therefore, the proletariat does not recognise unity of action without freedom to discuss and criticise. Therefore, class-conscious workers must never forget that serious violations of principle occur which make the severance of all organisational relations imperative.

To prevent some literary hack from misinterpreting what I say, I shall pass at once from the general to the concrete formulation of the question. Does the sanction by Social-Democrats of blocs with the Cadets necessitate a complete severance of organisational relations, i.e., a split? We think *not*, and all Bolsheviks think the same way. In the first place, the Mensheviks are only just setting their feet, unsteadily and uncertainly, on the path of practical opportunism *en grand*. The ink is not yet dry on Martov's repudiation of Cherevanin for sanctioning blocs with the Cadets; he wrote it before the Cadet password had been given from Geneva.¹⁰⁰ Secondly—and this is far more important—the objective conditions of the proletarian struggle in Russia today irresistibly provoke *definite* and decisive steps. Whether the tide of revolution rises very high (as we expected) or completely subsides (as some Social-Democrats think it will, though they are afraid to say so), in *either* case the tactics of blocs with the Cadets will inevitably be scattered to the winds, and that in the not very distant future. Therefore, our *duty* at the present time is to avoid intellectualist hysteria and preserve Party unity, trusting to the staunchness and sound class instinct of the revolutionary proletariat. Thirdly and lastly, in the present election campaign, the decision of the Mensheviks and the Central Committee in favour of blocs is not binding in practice on the local organisations, and does not commit the Party as a whole to these shameful tactics of blocs with the Cadets.

Now for the concrete formulation of the question. To what extent are the resolutions of the All-Russian Conference of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party—and the directives

of the Central Committee—binding? And to what extent are the local organisations of the Party autonomous?

These questions would undoubtedly have caused endless disputes in our Party had the conference itself not settled them. All the delegates at the conference agreed that its decisions were *not binding* and committed nobody in any way, for a conference is an advisory, not a deciding body. Its delegates were not democratically elected, but were chosen by the Central Committee from local organisations selected by it, and in a number which it specified. *For this reason*, at the conference, the Bolsheviks, Letts and Poles did not waste time tinkering with the Menshevik resolution on blocs, nor did they work out a compromise (such as recognising the boycott as correct and *at the same time* sanctioning blocs with the monarchist bourgeoisie!), but simply *put forward in opposition* their own platform, their own slogans, their own tactics in the election campaign. In so doing the Bolsheviks took the course that was absolutely necessary at an advisory conference, which was to serve not as a substitute for a congress, but to prepare for it—not to settle the issue, but to bring it out more clearly and precisely—not to conceal, not to gloss over the struggle within the Party, but to direct it, to make it more integral and more centred around principles.

To proceed. The decisions of the conference become (with certain modifications) directives of the Central Committee. Directives of the Central Committee are binding on the whole Party. Within what limits are they binding in regard to this particular question?

Obviously, within the limits of the decisions of the Congress and within the limits of the autonomy of the local Party organisations that is recognised by the Congress. The question of these limits might also have given rise to endless and insoluble controversy (for the resolution of the Unity Congress forbids all blocs with bourgeois parties in the election campaign), had not the conference adopted, *by common consent of the Mensheviks, the Bolsheviks and the members of the Central Committee*, one of its least elastic resolutions. The absence of factional divisions in the voting on *this* resolution is an important guarantee of the unity and fighting efficiency of the workers' party.

Here is the text of this resolution:

"The conference expresses its conviction that within the framework of a single organisation all its members are obliged to carry out all decisions concerning the election campaign adopted by the competent bodies of the local organisations, within the limits of the *general directives of the Central Committee; the Central Committee may forbid local organisations to put forward lists that are not purely Social-Democratic, but it must not compel them to put forward lists that are not purely Social-Democratic.*"

The passage we have underlined obviates interminable disputes and, one may hope, will obviate undesirable and dangerous friction. The general directives of the Central Committee cannot go beyond the limits of recognising that blocs with the Cadets are *permissible*. All the Social-Democrats, irrespective of faction, declared at the time that, after all, blocs with the Cadets are not very seemly, for we all authorised the Central Committee to forbid them, but we did not authorise it to prescribe them.

The conclusion is clear. There are two platforms before the Party. One—supported by 18 conference delegates, the Mensheviks and the Bundists; the other—supported by 14 delegates, the Bolsheviks, the Poles and the Letts. The competent bodies of the local organisations are free to choose either of these platforms, to alter and supplement them, or substitute new ones. *After* the competent bodies have decided, *all* of us, as members of the Party, must *act as one man*. A Bolshevik in Odessa must cast into the ballot box a ballot paper bearing a Cadet's name even if it sickens him. And a Menshevik in Moscow must cast into the ballot box a ballot paper bearing only the names of Social-Democrats, even if his soul is yearning for the Cadets.

But the elections are not taking place tomorrow. Let all the revolutionary Social-Democrats rally still closer and launch the widest and most relentless ideological struggle against blocs with the Cadets, blocs that will hinder the revolution, weaken the proletarian class struggle, and corrupt the civic consciousness of the masses!

HOW THE ARMAVIR SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS ARE CONDUCTING THEIR ELECTION CAMPAIGN

At the elections to the First Duma the Armavir Social-Democrats formed blocs with the Cadets. *Volna*¹⁷ commented on this at the time and severely criticised them. The Central Committee of our Party also wrote to Armavir, admonishing the local comrades for acting contrary to the instructions of the Unity Congress.

Our Armavir comrades must now have gained some practical experience of what blocs with the Cadets mean. At all events, in their latest party literature, they not only refrain from advocating blocs with the Cadets, but speak *the whole plain truth* about the Cadets. We will not quarrel with the literary style of the Armavir publications—that would be mean and petty. We shall only quote the most striking passages which indicate the tactics of the Armavirians.

We have before us No. 1 of *Armavirsky Proletary*, published by the Armavir Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, dated October 1906, and issued in 5,000 copies.

In the leading article we read the following:

"Let the Cadets, merchants, government officials, landlords and liberals dance to the tune of the government, the proletariat will not take the line of submission and reconciliation."

The next article, a special appeal to get ready for the elections, states:

"Close your ranks, vote, capture the Duma! Too long have the lordly Cadets sat in the plush seats of the Taurida Palace. It is high time the toil-hardened hands of the workers drove out these chatterers and parasites!

"Make haste to secure your proletarian place in the Duma, to convert it from a Cadet talking-shop into a revolutionary field of battle against the slayer of the people, the accursed autocracy."

In a leaflet: "To the Electors", dated November 1906 and issued in 3,000 copies, the Armavir Committee writes:

"The people have realised that only by force and power can they take that which the dying autocracy will not yield voluntarily and which the impotent Cadet Duma failed to give them.... Let us make this Duma an instrument of our revolution, let us, through our deputies, install the power of the people in the Taurida Palace, let us kindle in the new Duma, by the hands of our deputies, the blazing fire of revolution and fan it with the stormy breath of the whole of proletarian and revolutionary Russia. Into the new Duma, into the new Duma!!

"...Comrades and citizens! Our future Duma will not be a Black-Hundred Duma, nor will it be a Cadet Duma—it will be a proletarian and peasant Duma—our Duma, with full power."

I repeat that it would be petty to quarrel with the style or the details of these appeals.

The important thing is their spirit. The important thing is the independent policy of the Armavir Social-Democrats, who have been through the purgatory of blocs with windbags and parasites.

So much for your hopes in the Social-Democrats, gentlemen of *Rech*, *Tovarishch*, *Vek* and *Russkiye Vedomosti*!³⁸ So much for the "danger from the Left" mentioned in *Rech* the other day!

Into the struggle then, all revolutionary Social-Democrats! Into the struggle against blocs with the Cadets! The Menshevik comrades will, like the Armavirians, go through the purgatory of blocs with the bourgeois opportunists and return to revolutionary Social-Democracy.

WHOM TO ELECT TO THE STATE DUMA'''

CITIZENS! SEE TO IT THAT THE WHOLE PEOPLE CLEARLY UNDERSTANDS WHAT THE CHIEF PARTIES ARE THAT ARE FIGHTING IN THE ELECTIONS IN ST. PETERSBURG AND WHAT EACH OF THEM STRIVES FOR!

WHAT ARE THE THREE CHIEF PARTIES?

The Black Hundreds

They are—the Union of the Russian People, the monarchists, the Party of Law and Order, the Union of October Seventeenth, the Commercial and Industrial Party, the Party of Peaceful Renovation.

The Cadets

They are—the party of “people’s” freedom or Constitutional—“Democratic” (in reality liberal-monarchist) Party, the Party of “Democratic” Reforms, the radicals, etc.

The Social-Democrats

The Russian Social - Democratic Labour Party. It is the party of the class-conscious-workers of all the nationalities of Russia, of Russians, Letts, Poles, Jews, Ukrainians, Armenians, Georgians, Tatars, etc.

WHOSE INTERESTS DO THE THREE CHIEF PARTIES DEFEND?

The Black Hundreds defend the present tsarist government, they stand for the landlords, for the government officials, for the

The Cadets defend the interests of the liberal bourgeois, the liberal landlords, merchants and capitalists. The Cadets are a

The Social-Democrats are the party of the working class, defending the interests of all the working and exploited people.

power of the police, for military courts, for pogroms.	party of bourgeois lawyers, journal- ists, professors and such like.
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WHAT DO THE THREE CHIEF PARTIES STRIVE FOR?

The Black Hundreds strive for the preservation of the old autocracy, the lack of rights of the people, the unlimited rule over it of the landlords, officials and police.

The Cadets strive for the transfer of power into the hands of the liberal bourgeoisie. The monarchy, by preserving the police and military regime, is to safeguard the capitalists' right to rob the workers and peasants.

The Social-Democrats strive for the transfer of all power into the hands of the people, i. e., a democratic republic. The Social-Democrats need complete freedom in order to fight for socialism, for the emancipation of labour from the yoke of capital.

WHAT KIND OF FREEDOM DO THE THREE CHIEF PARTIES WANT TO GIVE THE PEOPLE?

The Black Hundreds do not give the people any freedom, any power. All power is for the tsarist government. The rights of the people are: to pay taxes, to toil for the rich, to rot in gaol.

The Cadets want the kind of "people's freedom" which will be subordinated, firstly, to the Upper Chamber, i. e., to the landlords and capitalists; secondly, to the monarchy, i. e., the tsar with the irresponsible police and armed forces. One-third of the power to the people, one-third to the capitalists and one-third to the tsar.

The Social-Democrats want complete freedom and all power for the people, all officials to be elected, the soldiers to be freed from barrack servitude, and the organisation of a free, people's militia.

HOW DO THE THREE CHIEF PARTIES REGARD THE PEASANTS' DEMAND FOR LAND?

The Black Hundreds defend the interests of the feudal landlords. No land for the peasants. Only the rich to be allowed to buy land from the landlords by voluntary agreement.

The Cadets want to preserve the landlord system of agriculture by means of concessions. They propose redemption payments by the peasants which already once before in 1861 ruined the peasants. The Cadets do not agree that the land question should be settled by local committees elected by universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot.

The Social-Democrats want to abolish our landlord system of agriculture. All land must be transferred to the peasants absolutely, without redemption payments. The land question must be settled by local committees elected by universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot.

WHAT CAN THE THREE CHIEF PARTIES ACHIEVE IF THEIR WHOLE STRUGGLE IS SUCCESSFUL?

The Black Hundreds, using every possible means of struggle, can cause the people to be finally ruined and all Russia subjected to the savagery of military courts and pogroms.

The Cadets, using only "peaceful" means of struggle, can cause the pogrom-mongers' government to buy off the big bourgeoisie and the rich in the countryside at the cost of petty concessions, while it will chase out the liberal chatterboxes for insufficiently servile

The Social-Democrats, using every possible means of struggle, including an uprising, can, with the aid of the politically conscious peasantry and urban poor, win complete freedom and all the land for the peasants. And with freedom, and with the help of the class-conscious

speeches about the beloved, blame- less, inviolable, constitutional mo- narch.	workers of all Eu- rope, the Russian Social - Democrats can advance with rapid strides to so- cialism.
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**CITIZENS! VOTE AT THE ELECTIONS FOR CANDIDATES
OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY!**

SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS AND THE TRUDOVIK PARTIES

Citizens! Anyone who wants to take an intelligent part in the elections to the State Duma must first of all clearly understand the difference between the three main parties. The *Black Hundreds* stand for pogroms and the violence of the tsarist government. The *Cadets* stand for the interests of the liberal landlords and capitalists. The *Social-Democrats* stand for the interests of the working class and all the working and exploited people.

Anyone who wants to uphold intelligently the interests of the working class and all working people must know which party is really able most consistently and resolutely to defend these interests.

**WHICH PARTIES CLAIM TO DEFEND THE INTERESTS
OF THE WORKING CLASS AND ALL WORKING PEOPLE?**

The party of the working class, the Russian Social- Democratic Labour Party, based on the standpoint of the class struggle of the proletariat.	Trudovik parties, i.e., parties based on the standpoint of the small proprietor: The Socialist- Revolutionary Par- ty.	The Trudovik (Popular Socialist) Party and the non- party Trudoviks.
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WHOSE INTERESTS DO THESE PARTIES ACTUALLY DEFEND?

The interests of the proletarians, whose conditions of life deprive them of all hope of becoming proprietors and cause them to strive for completely changing the whole basis of the capitalist social system.

The interests of the petty proprietors, who struggle against capitalist oppression, but who, owing to the very conditions of their life, strive to become proprietors, to strengthen their petty economy and to enrich themselves by means of trade and hiring labour.

HOW STEADFAST ARE THESE PARTIES IN THE GREAT WORLD-WIDE STRUGGLE OF LABOUR AGAINST CAPITAL?

The Social-Democrats cannot allow of any reconciliation of labour and capital. They organise the wage-workers for a ruthless struggle against capital, for the abolition of private ownership of the means of production and for the building of socialist society.

The toilers' parties dream of abolishing the rule of capital but, owing to the conditions of life of the petty proprietor, they inevitably waver between fighting jointly with the wage-workers against capital and striving to reconcile workers and capitalists by the conversion of all the working people into petty proprietors, with equal division of land, or guaranteed credit, and so on.

WHAT CAN THESE PARTIES ACHIEVE BY COMPLETELY FULFILLING THEIR ULTIMATE AIMS?

The conquest of political power by the proletariat and the conversion of capitalist into social, large-scale, socialist production.

The equal distribution of land among petty proprietors and small peasants, in which case there will inevitably be a struggle between them again, giving rise to a division into rich and poor, workers and capitalists.

**WHAT KIND OF FREEDOM FOR THE PEOPLE
ARE THESE PARTIES
TRYING TO ACHIEVE IN THE PRESENT REVOLUTION?**

Complete freedom and full power for the people, i. e., a democratic republic, officials to be subject to election, the replacement of the standing army by universal arming of the people.

Complete freedom and full power for the people, i. e., a democratic republic, officials to be subject to election, the replacement of the standing army by universal arming of the people.

A combination of democracy, i. e., full power of the people, with the monarchy, i. e., with the power of the tsar, police and officials. This is just as senseless a desire and just as treacherous a policy as that of the liberal landlords, the Cadets.

**WHAT IS THE ATTITUDE OF THESE PARTIES
TO THE PEASANTS' DEMAND FOR LAND?**

The Social-Democrats demand the transfer of all the landlords' land to the peasants without any redemption payments.

The Socialists-Revolutionaries demand the transfer of all the landlords' land to the peasants without any redemption payments.

The Trudoviks demand the transfer of all the landlords' land to the peasants, but they allow redemption payments, which will ruin the peasants, so that this is just as treacherous a policy as that of the liberal landlords, the Cadets.

**CITIZENS! VOTE AT THE ELECTIONS FOR CANDIDATES
OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY!**

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THE NEW SENATE INTERPRETATION

When political strife assumes open forms to any extent, it is remarkable how quickly and vividly events put every tactical step to the test. Even before many of the delegates of the All-Russian Conference of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party have had time to return to their localities and report to their Party organisations, a totally new light has been thrown on the vexed question of blocs with the Cadets, which is now the central political question of the day.

At the Conference of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party it never occurred to any delegate that the Social-Democrats could even slightly weaken, or modify in any way, their independent tactical slogans in the election campaign. Formally, the corner-stone of the resolution submitted by the Central Committee and adopted by 18 votes to 14 (the Bolsheviks, Poles and Letts) was the complete independence of the platform and slogans of the R.S.D.L.P. Alliances of any permanence with other parties on the basis of any "relaxation" whatsoever of our political platform were absolutely prohibited. And the whole controversy between the Right and Left wings of the Social-Democratic Party revolved around the questions: "Are the Right-wing Social-Democrats adhering to this principle in actual practice? Are they not violating it by sanctioning blocs with the Cadets? Is not the distinction between 'technical' and ideological agreements artificial, fictitious and merely a verbal one?"

But... apparently, in our Party too, i.e., in its actual "constitution", there is an institution of the nature of a Senate; by means of Senate interpretations, there is a possibility of Party "laws", decisions of official Party bodies, being

turned into their very opposite. The new Senate interpretation of the decisions of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party came, as might have been expected, from Geneva. It was published in the Cadet newspaper *Tovarishch* in the form of "An Open Answer"¹⁴⁰ (just like Lassalle!) by G. Plekhanov to a reader of that paper "who does not consider himself either a bourgeois or a Social-Democrat". Our Party quasi-Lassalle hurries to the assistance of the reader of a newspaper which is virtually the organ of the renegades of Social-Democracy.

The reader of *Tovarishch* asked G. Plekhanov, among other things, "what, in his opinion, could serve as a joint election platform of the Left and extreme Left parties". G. Plekhanov answered: "To this question there can be no other answer than: *a Duma with full power.*"

"There can be no other answer".... These words of our quasi-Lassalle are probably fated to become "historic", at least in the Gogol sense of the term. Plekhanov condescended once to listen to a report in which it was stated that there was a certain Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, that some sort of an All-Russian Conference of that Party was being convened, and that both the Central Committee and that Conference were drawing up a reply to questions which are of interest not only to Madame Kuskova and Mr. Prokopovich, Plekhanov's present colleagues, but also to the socialist workers of Russia. Not in the least disturbed by this, G. Plekhanov proclaims: "*There can be no other answer than mine.*" And these high and mighty words are published in a Cadet newspaper at a time when the whole reading public of Russia already knows of *another* answer, given by *all* the representatives both of the regional bodies and of the central body of the whole Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

Verily, this is a "history" of the sort that Nozdrev¹⁴¹ was so often the hero of.

However, let us get to the point of this unique and inimitable answer of our inimitable G. Plekhanov.

First of all we note that he cannot even conceive of the possibility of agreements at the first stage without a joint election platform. We Bolsheviks find this opinion greatly to our liking. By this admission, Plekhanov has done the

Mensheviks a disservice. We have repeatedly pointed out, at the Conference, in controversy with the Mensheviks and Bundists, and also in No. 8 of *Proletary*,* that agreements at the first stage will inevitably affect our Party position in coming before the masses and that consequently, whatever our desires and plans may be, such agreements will inevitably acquire the colouring of a certain ideological *rapprochement*, and will in some measure obscure, diminish and blunt the political independence of the Social-Democratic Party. G. Plekhanov, with his characteristic adroitness and party tact, has confirmed our charges against the Mensheviks. In fact, he has gone even further than our accusation by advocating a *joint platform*, i.e., a definite *ideological bloc* with the Cadets.

It turns out that not only in the Russian state, but also in the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, Senate interpretations discredit those for whose benefit they are issued.

Further, let the reader ponder over the direct meaning of Plekhanov's "Cadet-Social-Democratic" slogan: "a Duma with full power"—irrespective of the attitude of the different parties towards it. The words "a Duma with full power" signify a demand for full power for the Duma. Which Duma? Evidently, the one to which Russian citizens will now elect deputies on the basis of the Law of December 11 and the Senate interpretations. For *this* Duma, G. Plekhanov proposes to demand full power. Evidently, he is convinced that this Duma will not be a Black-Hundred Duma, for he could not demand full power for a Black-Hundred Duma. To issue the slogan of "a Duma with full power" and at the same time to shout about the serious danger of a Black-Hundred Duma, is to defeat one's own case. It is tantamount to confirming the opinion of the Bolsheviks that there is really no serious danger of a Black-Hundred Duma being elected, and that the Cadets are either inventing or in some cases exaggerating this danger for their own selfish ends, namely, to shake the faith of the workers and of all revolutionary democrats in their own strength, to free the Cadet Party of the "*danger from the Left*" which is really threatening it. *Rech* itself, the official organ of the Cadets, has acknowledged *that* danger

* See p. 312 of this volume.—Ed.

in the report of the Cadets on the progress of the election campaign in St. Petersburg Gubernia.

Let us pass on to the real political meaning of Plekhanov's slogan. Its inventor is in raptures over it. "This general formula," he writes, "exactly expresses in algebraic form the political task that is most urgent today for the Lefts and the extreme Lefts", while allowing them to preserve all their other demands absolutely intact. "The Cadets' conception of a Duma with full power cannot be the same as that of the Social-Democrats. But both need a Duma with full power. Therefore, both must fight for it."

It is clear from these words that Plekhanov is fully aware that this slogan is bound to be understood differently by the Cadets and the Social-Democrats. The slogan is the same, "common" to both, but the Cadets' "conception" of this slogan *cannot* be the same as that of the Social-Democrats.

In that case, what is the purpose of a common slogan? What is the use of submitting slogans and platforms to the masses at all?

Is it only for the sake of appearances, to cover up something that should not be explained to the masses, to perform behind the backs of the people a parliamentary manoeuvre that promises all sorts of advantages? Or is it to raise the class-consciousness of the masses and really explain to them their present political tasks?

Everyone knows that bourgeois politicians always come forward with all sorts of slogans, programmes, and platforms to deceive the people. Bourgeois politicians always, especially before elections, call themselves liberals, progressives, democrats and even "radical socialists" *solely for the purpose* of catching votes and deceiving the people. This is a universal phenomenon in all capitalist countries. That is why Marx and Engels even referred to bourgeois deputies as people "*die das Volk vertreten und zertreten*", i. e., who represent and repress the people through their parliamentary powers.¹⁴²

And here we have the "veteran" Russian Social-Democrat, the founder of Social-Democracy, proposing a platform for the first general Party election campaign which it is known will be interpreted by the Cadets in one way and by the Social-Democrats in another! What does it all mean?

If the Cadets and the Social-Democrats cannot have the same conception of a Duma with full power, neither can the broad masses of the people, for the Cadets and the Social-Democrats represent the interests of certain classes, their strivings and prejudices. Evidently, Plekhanov regards the Cadets' conception of a Duma with full power as wrong, and all wrong conceptions of political aims are harmful to the people. Consequently, Plekhanov is advancing a slogan in a form that is *known* to be harmful to the people, for it leaves a wrong conception unexplained and concealed. To put it simply and bluntly, this means deceiving the workers and the whole people for the sake of an appearance of unity between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats.

What is wrong with the Cadets' conception of a Duma with full power? Plekhanov does not say. This silence proves, firstly, that Plekhanov is using the election campaign (the presentation of an election platform is a step in the election campaign) not to clarify the minds of the people but to obscure them. Secondly, it takes away all meaning from Plekhanov's conclusion that "both the Cadets and the Social-Democrats need a Duma with full power". This is sheer nonsense concealed by verbal trickery: two different parties need the same thing, which each conceives of differently! Which means that it is not the same thing: the first comer will convict Plekhanov here of a logical blunder. We might as well symbolise both an autocratic monarchy and a democratic republic with the letter "a" and say that different parties are free to substitute different arithmetical values in this general algebraic formula. That would be typical Plekhanov logic, or rather Plekhanov sophistry.

As a matter of fact, Plekhanov utters a *downright falsehood* when he says that both the Cadets and the Social-Democrats need a Duma with full power or, what is more, a popular representative assembly with full power, which he discusses all through the second part of his article. A popular representative assembly with full power is a constituent assembly; moreover it is a constituent assembly not side by side with the monarch, but *after the overthrow* of the tsarist government. If Plekhanov has forgotten this simple truth, we advise him to read the Programme of the Russian Social-

Democratic Labour Party, especially the last paragraph, which deals with this very point.

The Cadets do not need such a popular representative assembly with really full power; it would be dangerous for them and fatal to the interests they represent. It would exclude the monarchy, so dear to their hearts and valuable for their bourgeois pockets. It would deprive them of their hope of redemption payments for the landlords' lands. All this is so true that *even* Plekhanov, in No. 6 of his *Dnevnik*, speaks of the Cadet's selfish class distrust of the idea of a constituent assembly and says that, fearing a constituent assembly, the Cadets are *making peace* with the Stolypin gang.

We already quoted these passages from Plekhanov's *Dnevnik*, No. 6, in No. 8 of *Proletary*,* and pointed out that Plekhanov must now withdraw the statements he made but yesterday. His phrase "the Cadets also need a Duma with full power" is just such a *withdrawal* of his own words.

Plekhanov's main *falsehood* logically and inevitably leads to a number of others. It is *false* to say that a "popular representative assembly with full power is in itself a preliminary condition for the achievement of all the other ... demands of all the progressive parties", that "without it, not one of these demands will be achieved", that the struggle of the Lefts and extreme Lefts will begin only when "it [the popular representative assembly with full power] becomes a fact". A popular representative assembly with full power is the culmination of the revolution, its final and complete victory. But the Cadets want to halt the revolution, to put a stop to it by small concessions, and they say so openly. By trying to make the workers and the whole people believe that the Cadets are capable of fighting for the complete victory of the revolution, Plekhanov is thrice deceiving the masses of the people.

"So far we have only a Mr. Stolypin with full power," writes Plekhanov. We do not know whether this is a slip of the pen, or another example of false Cadet language ("a Duma with full power = a tsarist Duma with Ministers

* See p. 318 of this volume.—*Ed.*

appointed by the tsar from the Duma majority"), or a ruse to escape the censor. Far from having full power, Stolypin is just an insignificant lackey of the tsar and of the tsar's Black-Hundred Court gang. If the pogrom disclosures in the Duma have not convinced Plekhanov of this, let him read what the liberal newspapers say about the all-powerful influence of the Union of the Russian People.

"Now," says Plekhanov, "the Left and the extreme Left parties must join forces against those who do not want a popular representative assembly with full power, or, perhaps, any popular representative assembly at all."

Consequently, they must oppose the Cadets, who *do not want* a popular representative assembly with full power.

Plekhanov scored nicely against himself when, ostensibly combating doctrinairism, he set us an example of the worst Jesuitical doctrinairism. From the standpoint of their group, the Bolsheviks could rejoice at his performance, for a stronger blow at Menshevik tactics could hardly be imagined. As members of the united Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, however, we feel ashamed of it.

The official organ of the Cadets, *Rech*, answered Plekhanov in a way that will, perhaps, cure even the tamest Social-Democrats of their opportunist illusions. Its first reply, a leading article in issue No. 226, of November 25, consists entirely of mockery over Plekhanov's proffered hand, and it is the mockery of a liberal who has not forgotten the attacks that Plekhanov and his *Iskra* colleagues made on the opportunism of the liberals. "In this case too," says the Cadet organ, jeering at Plekhanov, "Mr. Plekhanov is making highly commendable and praiseworthy efforts to move his colleagues a little to the Right of the most Right positions they occupy." Nevertheless ... we must object.

The Cadet's objections are the type of answer that a factory owner would give to a worker who has come to beg something of him after dissociating himself from his fellow-workers who are making a joint demand backed by a strike. You come to me asking for a favour? Good. But what use are you to me if your unreasonable colleagues do not follow your example? What use are you to me if you do not go all the way? A Duma with full power? Well, well! Do you think I am going to discredit myself in the eyes of the people who

stand for law and order? You must say: a Cabinet consisting of members of the Duma majority. Then we shall agree to a joint platform with the Social-Democrats!

Such is the gist of the reply in *Rech*, which is studded with subtle ridicule both of Plekhanov's naïve "algebra" and of the fact that he, in November 1904, was a member of the leading body of the Social-Democrats (Plekhanov was then a member of the Editorial Board of the Central Organ and chairman of the Supreme "Council" of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party), the body which rejected the "famous Paris agreement"¹⁴ with the bourgeois democrats. At that time we had an "algebraic symbol", namely, "a democratic regime", says *Rech*, ironically. By that we meant a constitutional monarchy. The Socialist-Revolutionaries, who agreed to the pact, meant a democratic republic. You refused then, Mr. G. V. Plekhanov. Have you now grown wiser? We Cadets commend you for it, but if you want to *talk business*, you must go farther to the right.

And *Rech* openly admits that the Cadets were also leading the people by the nose with the slogan of a "constituent assembly". We Cadets wanted a constituent assembly "*with the preservation of the prerogatives of the monarch*", and not a republican constituent assembly. It was to our advantage to attract the sympathies of the masses by means of this deception, but now it is more important for us to win the sympathy of the tsarist gang. Therefore, away with this "dangerous", "ambiguous" and "hopeless" slogan of "a Duma with full power", which "panders to pernicious revolutionary illusions". We demand that the Social-Democrats stick to their former, Central Committee slogan: support for a Cabinet consisting of members of the Duma majority, "*with all the consequences*" that follow from it. And these consequences are, not to weaken, but to *strengthen* (*sic!*) the Cadet majority in the Duma.

In the next issue of the *Rech* the editorial specially explains to the tsar's Black-Hundred gang (ostensibly explaining the question to Plekhanov) that the Cadets *do not need* a Duma "with full power". To proclaim the Duma as having full power means a coup d'état. The Cadets will never agree to that. "We Cadets are not at all striving for a Duma with full power, nor are we obliged to do so." "Has Mr. Plekhanov,

in spite of his usual perspicacity, failed to learn" this lesson "from the course of events"?

Yes, the Cadets' jeer at Plekhanov's usual perspicacity hit the nail on the head. The whole course of events of the Russian revolution has failed to teach Plekhanov to understand the Cadets. He has received a well-merited punishment in that the Cadets have scornfully rejected the hand proffered by a Social-Democrat acting independently of his Party and contrary to its wishes.

The reply *Rech* gave to Plekhanov is also of general political importance. The Cadets are swiftly moving to the Right. They do not hesitate to say that they will come to terms with the Black-Hundred monarchy and destroy "pernicious revolutionary illusions".

The workers of the whole of Russia will, we feel sure, turn this lesson to good account. Instead of entering into blocs with the Cadets they will wage an independent election campaign, win over the revolutionary bourgeoisie and sweep aside into the slough of political treachery the whole gang of bourgeois politicians who are deceiving the people with phrase-mongering about "people's freedom".

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THE CRISIS OF MENSHEVISM

The advocacy of a non-party labour congress and blocs with the Cadets is undoubtedly a sign of something in the nature of a crisis in the tactics of the Mensheviks. Being opposed on principle to all their tactics in general, we, of course, could not ourselves decide whether this crisis had ripened sufficiently to break out on the surface, so to speak. Comrade Y. Larin has come to our assistance in his latest and most instructive pamphlet: *A Broad Labour Party and a Labour Congress* (Moscow, 1906, book depot of *Novy Mir* Publishers).

Comrade Y. Larin often speaks in the name of the majority of the Mensheviks. He styles himself—and with full right—a responsible representative of Menshevism. He has worked both in the South and in the most “Menshevik” district of St. Petersburg, Vyborg District. He was a delegate to the Unity Congress. He was a regular contributor to *Golos Truda* and *Otkliki Sovremennosti*. All these facts are extremely important in forming an opinion of the pamphlet, the value of which lies in the author’s veracity, but not in his logic; in the information he supplies, but not in his arguments.

I

A Marxist must base his arguments on tactics on an analysis of the objective course of the revolution. The Bolsheviks, as we know, made an attempt to do so in the resolution on the present situation which they submitted to the Unity Congress.¹⁴⁴ The Mensheviks withdrew their own resolution on this subject. Comrade Larin evidently feels that such

questions must not be shelved and he makes an attempt to trace the course of our bourgeois revolution.

He divides it into two periods. The first, covering the whole of 1905, is the period of the open mass movement. The second, starting with 1906, is the period of agonisingly slow preparation for the "actual triumph of the cause of liberty", "the realisation of the aspirations of the people". In this period of preparation the countryside is the decisive factor; because its aid was not forthcoming the "disunited cities were crushed". We are experiencing "an internal, outwardly passive-seeming, growth of the revolution".

"What is called the agrarian movement—the constant ferment which does not develop into widespread attempts at an active offensive, the minor struggles with the local authorities and landlords, the suspension of tax payments, punitive expeditions—all this constitutes the course most advantageous to the peasantry, not from the point of view of economising forces, perhaps, which is doubtful, but from the point of view of results. Without completely exhausting the rural population, bringing it, on the whole, more alleviation than defeats, it is seriously sapping the foundations of the old regime and creating conditions that must inevitably compel it to capitulate, or fall, at the first serious test, when the time comes." And the author points out that in two or three years' time there will be a change in the personnel of the police force and the army, which will be replenished with recruits from the discontented rural population; "our sons will be among the soldiers", as a peasant told the author.

Comrade Larin draws two conclusions. (1) In our country "unrest in the countryside cannot subside. The Austrian 1848 cannot be repeated here." (2) "The Russian revolution is not taking the course of an armed uprising of the people in the real sense of the term, like the American or Polish revolutions."

Let us consider these conclusions. The author's grounds for the first are too sketchy and his formulation of it too inexact. But in substance, he is not far from the truth. The outcome of our revolution will actually depend most of all on the steadfastness in struggle of the millions of peasants.

Our big bourgeoisie is far more afraid of revolution than of reaction. The proletariat, by itself, is not strong enough to win. The urban poor do not represent any independent interests, they are not an independent force compared with the proletariat and peasantry. The rural population has the decisive role, not in the sense of leading the struggle (this is out of the question), but in the sense of being able to ensure victory.

If Comrade Larin had properly thought out his conclusion and had linked it up with the whole course of development of Social-Democratic ideas on our bourgeois revolution, he would have found himself confronted with an old proposition of the Bolshevism that he hates so much: the victorious outcome of the bourgeois revolution in Russia is possible only in the form of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. In effect, Larin has arrived at the same point of view. The only thing that prevents him from admitting it openly is that Menshevik quality which he himself castigates, namely: hesitant and timid thinking. One need only compare Larin's arguments on this subject with those of the Central Committee's *Sotsial-Demokrat* to be convinced that Larin has come close to the Bolsheviks on this question. *Sotsial-Demokrat* went to the length of saying that the Cadets are the urban, non-Estate, progressive bourgeoisie, while the Trudoviks are the rural, Estate, non-progressive bourgeoisie! *Sotsial-Demokrat* failed to notice the landlords and counter-revolutionary bourgeois among the Cadets, failed to notice the non-Estate, urban democrats (the lower strata of the urban poor) among the Trudoviks!

To proceed. Larin says that unrest in the countryside cannot subside. Has he proved it? No. He has entirely left out of account the role of the peasant bourgeoisie, which is being systematically bribed by the government. He has given little thought also to the fact that the "alleviations" obtained by the peasantry (lower rents, "curtailment" of the rights and powers of the landlords and the police, etc.) are *intensifying* the break-up of the rural population into the counter-revolutionary rich and a mass of poor. Such sweeping generalisations must not be made with such scanty evidence. They sound trite.

But can the proposition that "unrest in the countryside cannot subside" be proved? Yes and no. Yes—in the sense that one can make a thorough analysis of probable developments. No—in the sense that one cannot be absolutely certain of these developments in the present bourgeois revolution. One cannot weigh with apothecary's scales the equilibrium between the new forces of counter-revolution and revolution which are growing and becoming interwoven in the countryside. *Experience alone* will completely reveal this. Revolution, in the narrow sense of the term, is an acute struggle, and only in the course of the struggle and in its outcome is the real strength of all the interests, aspirations and potentialities displayed and fully recognised.

The task of the advanced class in the revolution is to ascertain correctly the *trend* of the struggle, to make the most of *all* opportunities, *all* chances of victory. This class must be the *first* to take the direct revolutionary path and the *last* to abandon it for more "prosaic", more "circuitous" paths. Comrade Larin has failed to understand this truth, although he argues at great length and (as we shall see below) not at all cleverly about spontaneous outbursts and planned action.

Let us pass to his second conclusion—concerning an armed uprising. Here Larin is even more guilty of timid thinking. His thoughts slavishly follow the old models: the North American and Polish uprisings. Apart from these, he refuses to recognise any uprising "in the real sense of the term". He even says that our revolution is not proceeding on the lines of a "formal" (!) and "regular" (!!) armed uprising.

How curious: a Menshevik who won his spurs in a fight against formalism is now talking about a formal armed uprising! If your thoughts are so crushed by the formal and the regular, you have only yourself to blame, Comrade Larin. The Bolsheviks have always taken a different view of the matter. Long before the uprising, at the Third Congress, i.e., in the spring of 1905, they emphasised in a special resolution the *connection between the mass strike and an uprising*.¹⁴ The Mensheviks prefer to ignore this. It is in vain. The resolution of the Third Congress is actual proof

that we foresaw as closely as was possible the specific features of the people's struggle at the end of 1905. And we did not by any means conceive the uprising as being of "the type" of North America or Poland, where a mass strike would have been out of the question.

Then, after December, we pointed out (in our draft resolution for the Unity Congress¹⁴⁴) the change in the relation of the strike to the uprising, the role of the peasantry and the army, the inadequacy of local outbreaks in the armed forces and the necessity of reaching an agreement with the revolutionary-democratic elements among the troops.

And events proved once again, in the course of the Duma period, the inevitability of an uprising in the Russian struggle for emancipation.

Larin's arguments about a formal uprising display an ignorance of the history of the present revolution, or a disregard for this history and its specific forms of insurrection, that is most unbecoming for a Social-Democrat. Larin's thesis: "The Russian revolution is not taking the course of an uprising" shows contempt for the facts, for *both* periods of civil liberties in Russia (the October and the Duma periods) were in fact marked by a "course" of *uprisings*, not of the American or Polish type, of course, but one characteristic of twentieth-century Russia. By arguing "in general" about historical examples of uprisings in countries where rural or urban elements predominated, about America and Poland, and refusing to make the least attempt to study or even note the specific features of the uprising in Russia, Larin repeats the cardinal error of the "hesitant and timid" thinking of the Mensheviks.

Look deeper into his structure of "passive" revolution. Undoubtedly, there may be long periods of preparation for a new upsurge, a new onslaught, or new forms of struggle. But don't be doctrinaire, gentlemen; consider what this "constant ferment" in the countryside means *in addition* to the "minor struggles", the "punitive expeditions" and the *change* in the personnel of the police force and troops! Why, you do not understand what you yourselves are saying. The situation you describe is nothing more nor less than protracted *guerrilla warfare*, interspersed with a series of *outbursts of revolt in the army* of increasing magnitude and unity.

You keep on using angry and abusive language about the "guerrilla fighters", "anarchists", "anarcho-Blanquist-Bolsheviks", and so forth, yet you yourselves depict the revolution as the Bolsheviks do! Change in the personnel of the army, its remanning with "recruits from the discontented rural population". What does this mean? Can this "discontent" of the rural population clothed in sailors' jackets and soldiers' uniforms fail to come to the surface? Can it fail to manifest itself when there is "constant ferment" in the soldiers' native villages, when "minor struggles" on one side and "punitive expeditions" on the other are raging in the country? And can we, in this period of Black-Hundred pogroms, government violence and police outrages, conceive of *any other* manifestation of this discontent among the soldiers than military revolts?

While repeating Cadet phrases ("our revolution is not taking the course of an uprising"; this phrase was put into circulation by the *Cadets* at the end of 1905; see Milyukov's *Narodnaya Svoboda*¹⁴⁷), you at the same time show that a new uprising is inevitable; "the regime will collapse at the first serious test". Do you think that a serious test of the regime is possible in a broad, heterogeneous, complex, popular movement without a preliminary series of less important, partial tests; that a general strike is possible without a series of local strikes; that a general uprising is possible without a series of sporadic, minor, non-general uprisings?

If recruits from the discontented rural population are increasing in the armed forces, and if the revolution as a whole is advancing, then insurrection is inevitable in the form of *extremely bitter* struggle against the Black-Hundred troops (for the Black Hundreds are also organising and training themselves, do not forget this! Do not forget that there are social elements which foster Black-Hundred mentality!), a struggle both of the people and of a section of the armed forces. So it is necessary to get ready, to prepare the masses and to prepare ourselves, for a more systematic, united and aggressive uprising—that is the conclusion that follows from Larin's premises, from his Cadet fairy-tale about *passive* (??) revolution. Larin admits that the Mensheviks "put the blame for their own melancholy and despondency on the course of the Russian revolution" (p. 58). Exactly!

Passivity is the quality of the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia, not of the revolution. Those are passive who admit that the army is being filled with recruits from the discontented rural population, that constant ferment and minor struggles are inevitable, and yet, with the complacency of Ivan Fyodorovich Shponka,¹⁴ console the workers' party with the statement: "the Russian revolution is not taking the course of an uprising".

But what about the "minor struggles"? You, my dear Larin, think that they are the "course most advantageous to the peasantry from the point of view of results"? You maintain this opinion in spite of the punitive expeditions, and even include the latter in the most advantageous course? But have you given even the slightest thought to what distinguishes this minor struggle from guerrilla warfare? Nothing, esteemed Comrade Larin.

In your preoccupation with the ill-chosen examples of America and Poland you have overlooked the specific forms of struggle engendered by the Russian uprising, which is more protracted, more stubborn and has longer intervals between big battles than uprisings of the old type.

Comrade Larin has become completely confused, and his conclusions are all at sixes and sevens. If there are grounds for revolution in the countryside, if the revolution is expanding and drawing in new forces, if the army is being filled with discontented peasants, and if continual ferment and minor struggles persist in the countryside, then the Bolsheviks are right in their fight against shelving the question of an uprising. We do not advocate an uprising at all times and under all circumstances. But we do demand that the thoughts of a Social-Democrat should not be hesitant and timid. If you admit that the *conditions* for an uprising exist, then recognise the uprising itself and the special tasks that confront the Party in connection with it.

To call minor struggles "*the most advantageous course*", i. e., the most advantageous form of the struggle of the people in a specific period of our revolution, and at the same time to refuse to admit that the Party of the advanced class is confronted by *active* tasks which arise out of this "most advantageous course", reveals either inability to think or dishonest thinking.

II

A "theory of passivity" is the term that might be applied to Larin's arguments about a "passive" revolution that is preparing the "collapse of the old regime at the first serious test". And this "theory of passivity", a natural product of timid thinking, has left its mark on the whole pamphlet of our penitent Menshevik. He asks: Why, considering its enormous ideological influence, is our Party so weak organisationally? It is not, he replies, because our Party is a party of intellectuals. This old, "bureaucratic" (Larin's expression) explanation of the Mensheviks is quite worthless. Because, objectively, in the present period there has been no need for a different kind of party, and the objective conditions for a different kind of party have not existed. Because for a "policy of spontaneous outbursts", such as the policy of the proletariat was at the beginning of the revolution, no party was needed. All that was needed was a "technical apparatus to serve the spontaneous movement" and "spontaneous moods", to conduct propaganda and agitational work in the intervals between revolutionary outbursts. This was not a party in the European sense, but "a narrow—120,000 out of nine million—association of young working-class conspirators"; few married men; the majority of the workers who are ready for public activities are outside the Party.

Now the period of spontaneous outbursts is passing away. Calculation is taking the place of mere temperament. In place of the "policy of spontaneous outbursts", a "policy of planned action" is arising. Now we need "a party of the European type", a "party of objectively planned, political action". In place of an "apparatus-party" we need a "vanguard-party", "that would be the rallying point for all those suitable for active political life that the working class can produce from its ranks". This is the transition to a "European party based on calculated action". The "sound realism of European Social-Democracy" is taking the place of "official Menshevism with its half-hearted and hesitating measures, its despondency and failure to understand its own position". "Its voice has been making itself quite audible for some time now through Plekhanov and Axelrod—strictly speaking the only Europeans in our 'barbarian' environment...." And, of

course, the substitution of Europeanism for barbarism promises success in place of failure. "Wherever spontaneity prevails, mistakes in judgement and failures in practice are inevitable." "Where there is spontaneity, there is utopianism; where there is utopianism, there is failure."

In these arguments of Larin's we see again the glaring discrepancy between the tiny kernel of a correct, although not new, idea, and the enormous husk of sheer reactionary incomprehension. A spoonful of honey in a barrel of tar.

It is an unquestionable and indisputable fact that as capitalism develops, as experience of bourgeois revolution or revolutions, and also of abortive socialist revolutions, accumulates, the working class of all countries grows, develops, learns, becomes trained and organised. In other words: it advances from spontaneity to planned action, from being guided merely by mood to guidance by the objective position of all classes, from outbursts to sustained struggle. All this is true. It is as old as the hills, and is as applicable to Russia of the twentieth century as to England of the seventeenth century, to France of the thirties of the nineteenth century, and to Germany at the close of the nineteenth century.

But the trouble with Larin is that he is quite incapable of digesting the materials which our revolution provides the Social-Democrat. Like a child with a new toy, he is entirely taken up with contrasting the outbursts of Russian barbarism with European planned activity. Uttering a truism that applies to all periods in general, he does not understand that his naïve application of this truism to a period of direct revolutionary struggle becomes with him a *renegade* attitude towards the revolution. This would be tragicomical, if it were not that Larin's sincerity left no shadow of doubt that he is *unconsciously* echoing the renegades of the revolution.

Spontaneous outbursts of barbarians, planned activity of the Europeans.... This is a purely Cadet formula and a Cadet idea, the idea of the traitors to the Russian revolution, who go into raptures over "constitutionalism" like Muromtsev, who declared: "The Duma is part of the government", or the lackey Rodichev, who exclaimed: "It is presumption to hold the monarch responsible for the pogrom." The Cadets have created a whole literature written by renegades (the

Izgoeyevs, Struves, Prokopoviches, Portugalovs, *et tutti quanti*) who have reviled the *jolly of spontaneity*, i. e., revolution. The liberal bourgeois, like the famous animal in the fable, is simply unable to lift his eyes and understand that it is only due to the "outbursts" of the people that we still possess even a shadow of liberty.

And Larin, naïvely uncritical, trails behind the liberals. Larin does not understand that there are two sides to the question he raises: (1) the contrast between a spontaneous struggle and a planned struggle of the same dimensions and forms, (2) the contrast between a revolutionary (in the narrow sense) period and a counter-revolutionary or "only constitutional" period. Larin's logic is atrocious. He contrasts a spontaneous political strike not to a planned political strike, but to planned participation in, let us say, the Bulygin Duma. He contrasts a spontaneous uprising not to a planned uprising, but to planned trade union activity. Consequently, his Marxist analysis is converted into a flat and philistine apotheosis of counter-revolution.

European Social-Democracy is the "party of objectively planned political activity", prattles Larin ecstatically. Oh, child! He does not notice that he is going into raptures over the particularly limited field of "*activity*" to which the Europeans were compelled to confine themselves in a period when there was no directly revolutionary struggle. He does not notice that he is going into raptures over the planned nature of a struggle waged *within legal limits* and decrying the spontaneity of a struggle *for the power and authority* which determine the limits of what is "legal". He compares the spontaneous uprising of the Russians in December 1905, not with the "planned" uprisings of the Germans in 1849 and of the French in 1871, but with the planned growth of the German trade unions. He compares the spontaneous and unsuccessful general strike of the Russians in December 1905, not with the "planned" and *unsuccessful* general strike of the Belgians in 1902,¹⁴ but with the planned speeches of Bebel or Vandervelde in the Reichstag.

That is why Larin fails to understand the historic progress of the mass struggle of the proletariat signalled by the strike in October 1905 and the uprising in December 1905. Whereas the *retrogression* of the Russian revolution (*temporary*, on

his *own* admission) expressed in the necessity of preparatory activity *within the limits of the law* (trade unions, elections, etc.) he elevates into *progress* from spontaneous to planned activity, from moods to calculation, etc.

That is why, in place of the moral drawn by a revolutionary Marxist (that instead of a spontaneous political strike we must have a planned political strike, instead of a spontaneous uprising we must have a planned uprising), we find the moral drawn by a renegade-Cadet (instead of the "folly of spontaneity"—strikes and uprisings—we must have systematic submission to the Stolypin laws and a planned deal with the Black-Hundred monarchy).

No, Comrade Larin, if you had mastered the spirit of Marxism, and not merely its language, you would know the difference between revolutionary dialectical materialism and the opportunism of "objective" historians. Recall, for instance, what Marx said about Proudhon. A Marxist does not renounce the struggle within the limits of the law, peaceful parliamentarism and "planned" compliance with the limits of historical activity set by the Bismarcks and the Bennigsens, the Stolypins and the Milyukovs. But a Marxist, while utilising *every field*, even a reactionary one, for the fight for the revolution, does not stoop to glorifying reaction, does not forget to fight for *the best possible field of activity*. Therefore, the Marxist is the *first* to foresee the approach of a revolutionary period, and already begins to rouse the people and to sound the tocsin while the philistines are still wrapt in the slavish slumber of loyal subjects. The Marxist is therefore the *first* to take the path of direct revolutionary struggle, marching straight to battle and exposing the illusions of conciliation cherished by all kinds of social and political vacillators. Therefore, the Marxist is the *last* to leave the path of directly revolutionary struggle, he leaves it only when all possibilities have been exhausted, when there is not a *shadow* of hope for a shorter way, when the basis for an appeal to prepare for mass strikes, an uprising, etc., is obviously disappearing. Therefore, a Marxist treats with contempt the innumerable renegades of the revolution who shout to him: We are more "progressive" than you, we were the first to renounce the revolution! We were the first to "submit" to the monarchist constitution!

One of two things, Comrade Larin. Do you believe that there is already no basis for an uprising or for revolution in the narrow sense of the word? If you do, say so openly and prove it in the Marxist way, by an economic analysis, by an appraisal of the political strivings of the various classes, by an analysis of the significance of the different ideological trends. You have proved it? In that case, we declare that all talk about an uprising is mere phrase-mongering. In that case we shall say: what we *had* was not a great revolution, but a great bark without a bite. Workers! the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie (including the peasants) have betrayed and forsaken you. But, on the basis *they* have created in spite of *our* efforts, we shall work persistently, patiently, and consistently for a *socialist* revolution, which will not be so half-hearted and wretched, so rich in words and poor in deeds as the bourgeois revolution!

Or do you really believe what you say, Comrade Larin? Do you believe that the tide of revolution is rising, that the minor struggles and the sullen discontent will in a matter of two or three years create a new discontented army and a new "serious test"; that "unrest in the countryside cannot subside"? If so, then you must admit that the "outbursts" express the strength of the people's anger, and not the strength of backward barbarism—that it is our duty to transform a spontaneous uprising into a planned uprising, and to work persistently and stubbornly for many months, perhaps years, to bring this about, and not to renounce an uprising, as all the Judases are doing.

Your present position, however, Comrade Larin, is precisely one of "melancholy and despondency", of "hesitant and timid thinking", of putting the blame for your own passivity on our revolution.

This, and this alone, is implied by your jubilant declaration that the boycott was a mistake. It is a short-sighted and vulgar jubilation. If it is "progressive" to renounce the boycott, then the most progressive people of all are the Right-wing Cadets of *Russkiye Vedomosti*, who fought against the boycott of the Bulygin Duma and called on the students "to go on with their studies and not meddle with rebellion". We do not envy this renegade progressiveness. We think that to say that it was a "mistake" to boycott the Witte

Duma (which three or four months before its convocation nobody believed would be convened) and to *be silent* about the mistake of those who called for participation in the Bulygin Duma, means substituting for the materialism of a revolutionary fighter the "objectivism" of a professor who is cringing to reaction. We think that the position of those who were the *last* to enter the Duma, to take the roundabout way, after trying really *everything* on the direct path of struggle, is better than that of those who were the first to call for entering the Bulygin Duma on the eve of the popular uprising which swept it away.

This Cadet phrase about the boycott having been a mistake is particularly unpardonable in Larin's case since he *truthfully* relates that the Mensheviks "*invented all kinds of shrewd and cunning tricks, ranging from the elective principle and the Zemstvo campaign to uniting the Party by participating in the elections with the object of boycotting the Duma*" (57). The Mensheviks called upon the workers to elect members to the Duma, although they themselves did not believe that it was right to go into the Duma. Were not the tactics of those more correct, who, not believing this, boycotted the Duma; who declared that to call the Duma a "power" (as the Mensheviks called it in their resolution at the Unity Congress, before Muromtsev did so) meant deceiving the people; who entered the Duma only after the bourgeoisie had deserted the direct path of boycott and compelled us to take a circuitous route, though not for the same purpose, and not in the same way, as the Cadets?

III

The contrast which Larin draws between an apparatus-party and a vanguard-party, or, in other words, between a party of fighters against the police and a party of class-conscious political fighters, seems profound and permeated with the "pure proletarian" spirit. In actual fact, however, it is the very same intellectualist opportunism as the analogous contrast drawn in 1899-1901 by the supporters of *Rabochaya Mysl* and the Akimovites.¹⁰⁰

On the one hand, when there are objective conditions for a direct revolutionary onslaught by the masses, the

Party's *supreme* political task is "to serve the spontaneous movement". To contrast *such* revolutionary work with "politics" is to reduce politics to chicanery. It means exalting political action in the Duma above the political action of the masses in October and December; in other words, it means abandoning the proletarian revolutionary standpoint for that of intellectualist opportunism.

Every form of struggle requires a corresponding technique and a corresponding apparatus. When objective conditions make the parliamentary struggle the principal form of struggle, the features of the apparatus for parliamentary struggle inevitably become more marked in the Party. When, on the other hand, objective conditions give rise to a struggle of the masses in the form of mass political strikes and uprisings, the party of the proletariat *must* have an "apparatus" to "serve" *these* forms of struggle, and, of course, this must be a special "apparatus", not resembling the parliamentary one. An organised party of the proletariat which admitted that the conditions existed for popular uprisings and yet failed to set up the necessary apparatus would be a party of intellectualist chatterboxes; the workers would abandon it and go over to anarchism, bourgeois revolutionism, etc.

On the other hand, the composition of the politically guiding vanguard of every class, the proletariat included, also depends both on the position of this class and on the principal form of its struggle. Larin complains, for example, that young workers predominate in our Party, that we have few married workers, and that they leave the Party. This complaint of a Russian opportunist reminds me of a passage in one of Engels's works (I think it is in *The Housing Question, Zur Wohnungsfrage*). Retorting to some fatuous bourgeois professor, a German Cadet, Engels wrote: is it not natural that youth should predominate in our Party, the revolutionary party? We are the party of the future, and the future belongs to the youth. We are a party of innovators, and it is always the youth that most eagerly follows the innovators. We are a party that is waging a self-sacrificing struggle against the old rottenness, and youth is always the first to undertake a self-sacrificing struggle.

No, let us leave it to the Cadets to collect the "tired" old men of thirty, revolutionaries who have "grown wise", and

renegades from Social-Democracy. We shall always be a party of the youth of the advanced class!

Larin himself blurts out a frank admission why he regrets the loss of the married men who are tired of the struggle. If we were to collect a good number of these tired men into the Party, that would make it "somewhat sluggish, putting a brake on political adventures" (p. 18).

Now, that's better, good Larin! Why dissemble and deceive yourself. What you want is not a vanguard-party, but a *rearguard-party*, so that it will be rather more sluggish. You should have said so frankly.

"... Putting a brake on political adventures...." Revolutions have been defeated in Europe too; there were the June days of 1848 and the May days of 1871; but there has never been a Social-Democrat or a Communist who thought it proper to declare the action of the masses in a revolution to be an "adventure". This became possible when among revolutionary Marxists there were enrolled (not for long, we hope) spineless, craven Russian philistines, called the "intelligentsia", if you please, who have no confidence in themselves and become despondent at every turn of events towards reaction.

"...Putting a brake on adventures!" If that is so, then the first *adventurer* is Larin himself; for he calls "minor struggles" the course *most advantageous* to the revolution; he is trying to *make the masses believe* that the tide of *revolution is rising*, that in two or three years the army will be filled with discontented peasants, and that the "old regime will collapse" at "the first serious test"!

But Larin is an adventurer in another, much worse and pettier sense. He advocates a labour congress and a "non-party party" (his expression!). Instead of the Social-Democratic Party he wants an "All-Russian Labour Party"—"labour", because it must include the petty-bourgeois revolutionaries, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Polish Socialist Party, the Byelorussian Hromada,¹¹ etc.

Larin is an admirer of Axelrod. But he has done him a disservice. He has so exalted Axelrod's "youthful energy", his "true party courage" in fighting for a labour congress, he has embraced him so fervently, that ... he has smothered him in his embraces! Axelrod's nebulous "idea" of a labour

congress has been killed by a naïve and truthful, practical party worker who has gone and blurted out everything that should have been concealed for successful advocacy of a labour congress. A labour congress means "taking down the signboard" (p. 20 in Larin's pamphlet, for whom Social-Democracy is a mere signboard); it means *merging with the Socialist-Revolutionaries* and the trade unions.

Quite right, Comrade Larin! Thank you at least for speaking the truth! The labour congress really does mean all that. It would lead to that even against the wish of its conveners. And it is just for that reason that a labour congress now would be a petty opportunist adventure. Petty—for there is no broad idea underlying it, nothing but the weariness of intellectuals who are tired of the persistent struggle for Marxism. Opportunist—for the same reason, and also because thousands of petty bourgeois of far from settled opinions would be admitted into the labour party. An adventure—for under present conditions such an attempt will bring about, not peace or constructive work, or collaboration between the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Social-Democrats—to whom Larin kindly assigns the role of "propagandist societies within a broad party" (p. 40)—but only endless aggravation of strife, dissension, splits, ideological confusion, and actual disorganisation.

It is one thing to predict that the Socialist-Revolutionary "Centre" *must* come over to the Social-Democrats when the Popular Socialists and Maximalists drop out*; it is a different thing to climb after an apple which is only in process of ripening, but is not yet ripe. You will either break your neck, my dear sir, or upset your stomach with sour fruit.

Larin bases his arguments on "Belgium", as did, in 1899, R. M. (the editor of *Rabochaya Mysl*) and Mr. Prokopovich (when he was going through the "spontaneous outbursts" of a Social-Democrat and had not yet "grown wise" sufficiently to become, a "systematically acting" Cadet). Larin's booklet has a neat appendix in the shape of a neat translation of the Rules of the Belgian Labour Party! But our good La-

* See pp. 199-200 of this volume.—*Ed.*

rin forgot to "translate" to Russia the industrial conditions and history of Belgium. *After* a series of bourgeois revolutions, *after* decades of struggle against Proudhon's petty-bourgeois quasi-socialism, and *with* the enormous development of industrial capitalism, possibly the highest in the world, the labour congress and the labour party in Belgium marked a transition from non-proletarian socialism to proletarian socialism. In Russia, at the height of a bourgeois revolution, which is *inevitably* breeding petty-bourgeois ideas and petty-bourgeois ideologists, and with growing "Trudovik" trends among closely related sections of the peasantry and the proletariat, with a *Social-Democratic Labour Party* that has a history of nearly one decade, a labour congress is a badly conceived invention, and fusion with the Socialist-Revolutionaries (who knows, there may be 30,000 of them, or perhaps 60,000, says Larin artlessly) is an intellectual's whimsy.

Yes, history can be ironic! For years the Mensheviks have been trumpeting about the close connection between the Bolsheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries. And now the Bolsheviks reject a labour congress *precisely because* it would obscure the difference in the points of view of the proletarians and the small proprietors (see the resolution of the St. Petersburg Committee¹² in *Proletary*, No. 3). And the *Mensheviks* stand for *merging with the Socialist-Revolutionaries* in connection with the advocacy of a labour congress. This is unique!

"I do not want to dissolve the party in the class," pleads Larin. "I only want to unite the vanguard, 900,000 out of nine million" (pp. 17 and 49).

Let us take the official factory returns for 1903. The total number of factory workers was 1,640,406. Of these, 797,997 were in factories employing over 500 workers each, and 1,261,363 in factories employing over 100 workers each. The number of workers in the largest factories (800,000) is only a little smaller than the figure Larin gives for the workers party united with the Socialist-Revolutionaries!

Thus, although we already have from 150,000 to 170,000 members in our Social-Democratic Party, and notwithstanding the 800,000 workers employed in large factories, the workers of big mining enterprises (not included in this total)

and the multitude of purely proletarian elements employed in trade, agriculture, transport, etc., Larin has no hope that we in Russia can soon win for Social-Democracy 900,000 *proletarians* as Party members?? Monstrous, but true.

But Larin's lack of faith is only another example of the intellectual's timid thinking.

We are quite sure that this object can be attained. As a counterblast to the adventure of a "labour congress" and a "non-party party" we put forward the slogan: for a fivefold and tenfold *increase* of our *Social-Democratic Party*, only let it consist mainly and *almost exclusively* of purely proletarian elements, and let it be achieved solely under the banner of revolutionary Marxism.*

Now, after a year of the great revolution, when all sorts of parties are growing by leaps and bounds, the proletariat is becoming an independent party more rapidly than ever. The Duma elections will assist this process (if we do not enter into opportunist blocs with the Cadets, of course). The treachery of the bourgeoisie in general, and of the petty bourgeoisie in particular (the *Popular Socialists*), will strengthen the revolutionary Social-Democratic Party.

We shall reach Larin's "ideal" (900,000 Party members), and even exceed it, by hard work on the present lines, and not by adventures. It is certainly necessary now to enlarge the Party with the aid of *proletarian* elements. It is abnormal that we should have only 6,000 Party members in St. Petersburg (in St. Petersburg Gubernia there are 81,000 workers in factories employing 500 workers and over; in all, 150,000 workers); that in the Central Industrial Region we should have only 20,000 Party members (377,000 workers in factories employing 500 and over; in all, 562,000 workers).

* It would be unwise to take the trade unions into the Party, as Larin proposes. This would only restrict the working-class movement and narrow its base. We shall always be able to unite a far greater number of workers for the struggle against the employers than for support of Social-Democratic policy. Therefore (in spite of Larin's *wrong* assertion that the Bolsheviks have declared against non-party trade unions), we stand for non-party trade unions, as the author of the "*Jacobin*" (Jacobin—in the opinion of the opportunists) pamphlet *What Is To Be Done?* advocated as far back as 1902. (See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 347-529.—*Ed.*)

We must *learn* to recruit* five times and ten times as many workers for the Party in such centres. In this respect Larin is certainly quite right. But we must not fall a prey to intellectualist cowardice or intellectualist hysteria. We shall achieve our aim by following our own *Social-Democratic* path, without plunging into adventures.

IV

The only "gratifying feature" in Comrade Larin's pamphlet is his fervent protest against blocs with the Cadets. In another article in this issue the reader will find detailed quotations on this subject, with a description of all the vacillations of Menshevism on this important question.

What interests us here, however, is the general description of Menshevism given by such an "authoritative" witness as the Menshevik Larin. It is in reference to blocs with the Cadets that he protests against "*vulgarised, bureaucratic, Menshevism*". "Bureaucratic Menshevism", he writes, is capable of desiring a "suicidal alliance with the opponents of Social-Democracy in the bourgeois camp". We do not know whether Larin will be able to show more determination than Martov in defending his views against Plekhanov. However, Larin rebels against "formal" and "bureaucratic" Menshevism on other matters besides blocs with the Cadets. For example, he says of Menshevism, that "everything obsolescent acquires a bureaucratic stamp"!! (p. 65). Menshevism is becoming outlived, making way for "European realism". "Hence the eternal melancholy, half-heartedness and hesitancy of Menshevism" (p. 62). Concerning the talk about a labour congress he writes: "All this talk bears the impress of a certain reticence, timid thinking, perhaps mere hesitation to utter aloud the thoughts that have matured within" (p. 6), etc.

* We say "learn to recruit", for the number of Social-Democratic workers in such centres is undoubtedly many times the number of Party members. We suffer from routine, we must fight against it. We must learn to form, where necessary, *lose Organisationen*—looser, broader and more accessible *proletarian* organisations. Our slogan is: *for a larger Social-Democratic Labour Party*, against a non-party labour congress and a non-party party!

We already know the underlying basis of this crisis of Menshevism, why it has degenerated into bureaucratism*: it is the petty-bourgeois intellectual's lack of confidence in the possibility of further revolutionary struggle, his fear to admit that the revolution is over, that the reaction has won a decisive victory. "Menshevism was only an instinctive, semi-spontaneous yearning for a party," says Larin. We say: Menshevism is the spontaneous yearning of the intellectual for a truncated constitution and peaceful legality. Menshevism is an allegedly objective apologia for reaction, emanating from the revolutionary camp.

From the very beginning, as early as in the Geneva newspaper *Vperyod*¹⁵ (January-March 1905) and in the pamphlet *Two Tactics*¹⁶ (July 1905), the Bolsheviks presented the question in a totally different way. Being perfectly clear about the contradictory nature of the interests and tasks of the various classes in the bourgeois revolution, they stated openly at the time: It is quite possible that the Russian revolution will end in an abortive constitution. As the supporters and ideologists of the revolutionary proletariat, we shall do our duty to the last—we shall keep to our revolutionary slogans despite the treachery and baseness of the liberals, despite the vacillation, timidity and hesitancy displayed by the petty bourgeois—we shall make the utmost use of *all* revolutionary possibilities—we shall take pride in the fact that

* Another instance of the irony of history! Ever since 1903 the Mensheviks have been shouting about the "formalism" and "bureaucratism" of the Bolsheviks. Since then they have always been in possession of the "bureaucratic" and "formal" prerogatives of the Party as a whole. And now a *Menshevik* confirms that Menshevism has degenerated into *bureaucratism*. The Bolsheviks could not have wished for a better rehabilitation of themselves. Larin is not looking for the bureaucratism of Menshevism where in fact it is rooted. The source of this bureaucratism is that opportunism which under the guise of "Europeanism" is being instilled into the Mensheviks by Axelrod and Plekhanov. There is no trace of "Europeanism" in the reflected ideology and habits of the Swiss petty bourgeois. Petty-bourgeois Switzerland is the servants' hall of the real Europe, the Europe of revolutionary traditions and intense class struggle of the broad masses. Bureaucratism was fully revealed in Plekhanov's presentation of the question of a labour congress (a labour congress versus a Party congress), against which Larin is so fervently and sincerely protesting.

¹⁵ See present edition, Vol. 9, pp. 15-140. — *Ed.*

we were the *first* to take the path of an uprising and will be the *last* to abandon it, if this path in fact becomes impossible. At the present moment we are far from admitting that all the revolutionary possibilities and prospects have been exhausted. We openly and straightforwardly advocate an uprising; and stubborn, persistent and long preparation for it.

And when we realise that the revolution is over, we shall say so openly and straightforwardly. We shall then, in full view of the whole people, delete from our platform all our direct revolutionary slogans (such as the constituent assembly). We shall not deceive ourselves and others by Jesuitical sophistries (such as Plekhanov's "a Duma with full power" *for the Cadets*).^{*} We shall not justify reaction and call reactionary constitutionalism a basis for sound realism. We shall say and prove to the proletariat that the treachery of the bourgeoisie and the vacillation of the small proprietors have killed the bourgeois revolution, and that the proletariat itself will now prepare for and carry out a new, socialist revolution. And therefore, the revolution having subsided, i.e., the bourgeoisie having utterly betrayed it, we shall under no circumstances agree to any blocs—not only with the opportunist, but even with the revolutionary bourgeoisie—for the decline of the revolution would convert bourgeois revolutionism into empty phrase-mongering.

That is why we are not in the least perturbed by the angry words which Larin hurls at us in such abundance, when he shouts that Bolshevism is approaching a crisis, that it is played out, that we have always trailed behind the Mensheviks, etc. All these pinpricks only evoke a condescending smile.

Individuals have left and will leave the Bolsheviks, but there *cannot be any crisis* in our trend. The fact is that right from the very beginning we declared (see *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*^{**}): we are not creating a special "Bolshevik" trend, always and everywhere we merely uphold the point of view of *revolutionary Social-Democracy*. And right up to the social revolution there will inevitably always be an

^{*} See p. 333 of this volume.—*Ed.*

^{**} See present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 203-425.—*Ed.*

opportunist wing and a revolutionary wing of Social-Democracy.

A cursory glance at the history of "Bolshevism" is sufficient to convince anyone of that.

1903-04. The Mensheviks advocate democracy in organisation. The Bolsheviks call this intellectualist phrasemongering, as long as the Party does not come out openly. In the Geneva pamphlet (1905), the Menshevik who signed himself "A Worker"¹ admits that in fact there was no democracy among the Mensheviks. The Menshevik Larin admits that their "talk about the elective principle" was "sheer invention", an attempt to "deceive history", and that, in fact, in the Menshevik "St. Petersburg group there was no elective principle even as late as the autumn of 1905" (p. 62). And immediately after the October Revolution the Bolsheviks were the *first* to announce, in *Novaya Zhizn*,² the *actual* introduction of democracy in the Party.*

End of 1904. The Zemstvo campaign. The Mensheviks trail behind the liberals. The Bolsheviks (in spite of the frequently circulated fable to the contrary) do not reject "good demonstrations" before the Zemstvo councillors, but they reject the "poor arguments of the intellectuals,** who said that there were *two* contending forces in the arena (the tsar and the liberals), and that demonstrations before the Zemstvo councillors were a higher type of demonstration. Now the Menshevik Larin admits that the Zemstvo campaign was "sheer invention" (p. 62), that it was a "shrewd and cunning trick" (p. 57).

Beginning of 1905. The Bolsheviks openly and straightforwardly raise the question of an uprising and of preparing for it. In a resolution adopted at the Third Congress they predict *the combination of the strike with an uprising*. The Mensheviks are evasive and try to wriggle out of the tasks of an uprising; they talk about arming the masses with the fervid desire to arm themselves.

* See present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 29-39—*Ed.*

** The Geneva *Vperyod*, No. 1. (January 1905), contained a *feuilleton* which criticised the "plan of a Zemstvo campaign"; it was entitled "Good Demonstrations of Proletarians and Poor Arguments of Certain Intellectuals". (See present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 29-34.—*Ed.*)

August-September 1905. The Mensheviks (Parvus in the new *Iskra*) call for participation in the Bulygin Duma. The Bolsheviks call for an active boycott of this Duma, for direct advocacy of an uprising.

October-December 1905. The popular struggle in the form of strikes and insurrection sweeps away the Bulygin Duma. The Menshevik Larin admits in a written declaration at the Unity Congress that when the tide of the revolution was at its height the Mensheviks acted like Bolsheviks. In the rudimentary bodies of the provisional government we, the Social-Democrats, sat side by side with the revolutionary bourgeoisie.

Beginning of 1906. The Mensheviks are despondent. They have no faith in the Duma and no faith in the revolution. They appeal for participation in the Duma elections in order to boycott the Duma (*Larin*, p. 57). The Bolsheviks do their duty as revolutionaries, do their utmost to achieve the boycott of the Second Duma, in which *nobody* in revolutionary circles had any confidence.

May-June 1906. The Duma campaign. The boycott has failed owing to the treachery of the bourgeoisie. The Bolsheviks conduct their revolutionary work on new, though worse ground. During the Duma period the whole people see still more clearly the difference between our tactics, the tactics of the revolutionary Social-Democrats, and opportunism: criticism of the Cadets in the Duma, the struggle to free the Trudoviks from Cadet influence, criticism of parliamentary illusions, advocacy of a revolutionary *rapprochement* among the Left groups in the Duma.

July 1906. The dissolution of the Duma. The Mensheviks lose their heads, declare for an immediate demonstration strike and partial actions. The Bolsheviks protest. *Larin*, referring to this, says *nothing about the protest of the three members of the Central Committee which was published for Party members only*. What Larin says about this incident is not true. The Bolsheviks point out the futility of a demonstration, and advocate an uprising *at a later date*.* The Mensheviks, in conjunction with the revolutionary bourgeoisie, sign appeals for an uprising.

End of 1906. The Bolsheviks realise that the treachery of the bourgeoisie makes it necessary to take a circuitous path and go into the Duma. Down with all blocs! Above all, down with blocs with the Cadets! The Mensheviks are in favour of blocs.

No, Comrade Larin, we have no need to be ashamed of this course of the struggle between the revolutionary and the opportunist wing of Russian Social-Democracy!

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THE PROLETARIAT AND ITS ALLY IN THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

Such is the heading Karl Kautsky gave to the last chapter of his article "The Driving Forces and Prospects of the Russian Revolution", published in the latest numbers of *Neue Zeit*.¹⁴ As in the case of other works of Kautsky's, a Russian translation of this article will undoubtedly soon be published. This is an article that all Social-Democrats should certainly read, not because a *German* theoretician of Marxism can be expected to supply answers to the current problems of *our* tactics (the Russian Social-Democrats would not be worth much if they waited for such answers from afar), but because Kautsky gives us a remarkably logical analysis of the *underlying principles* of the whole tactics of the Social-Democrats in the Russian bourgeois revolution. To all members of our Party, to all class-conscious workers, overburdened with the humdrum tasks of everyday work, stunned with the hackneyed banalities of unscrupulous bourgeois-liberal scribblers, such works by thoughtful, well-informed and experienced Social-Democrats are especially valuable, for they help us to rise above everyday matters, to get an insight into the fundamental questions of the tactics of the proletariat, and to obtain a clearer idea of the theoretical tendencies and the actual mode of thought of the various trends in the Social-Democratic movement.

Kautsky's latest article is particularly important in this respect, for it enables us to compare the *character* of the questions put by Plekhanov to Kautsky (among other foreign socialists) with Kautsky's *method* of answering some of these questions.

Plekhanov, whom the Cadet Melgunov, in today's *Tovarishch* (December 10), aptly called the "former leader and theoretician of Russian Social-Democracy", asked Kautsky: (1) What is the "general character" of the Russian revolution: bourgeois or socialist? (2) What should be the attitude of the Social-Democrats towards the bourgeois democrats? and (3) What tactics should the Social-Democrats adopt in the Duma elections.

The leader of the Russian opportunists was angling for Kautsky's approval of blocs with the Cadets. The leader of the German revolutionary Social-Democrats guessed that the questioner was trying to suggest his reply on a point not directly mentioned in the questions, and preferred to answer Plekhanov with a dispassionate, circumstantial, propagandist *explanation* of how a Marxist should *formulate* questions concerning bourgeois revolution and bourgeois democracy in general. Let us examine Kautsky's explanation closely.

It would be superficial to regard the Russian revolution merely as a movement for the overthrow of absolutism. It must be regarded as the awakening of the mass of the people to independent political activity. Such is Kautsky's main premise.

This means the following. It would be a superficial analysis of the tasks of the Social-Democratic movement that merely pointed to the attainment of political liberty (the overthrow of absolutism) and to the "common" character of this task for various classes. It is necessary to examine the position of the *masses*, their objective conditions of life, the different classes among them, the *real nature* of the liberty for which they are *in fact* striving. We must not deduce from a common phraseology that there are common interests, nor must we conclude from "political liberty" *in general* that there must be a joint struggle of different classes. On the contrary, by a precise analysis of the position and interests of the various classes, we must ascertain how far, and in what respects, their fight for freedom, their aspirations for freedom, are identical, or coincide (or whether they coincide at all). We must reason, not like the Cadets, not like the liberals, not like Prokopovich & Co., but like *Marxists*.

Next. If our point of departure is the interests of the masses, then the crux of the Russian revolution is the *agrar-*

ian question. We must judge of the defeat or victory of the revolution not from government violence and the manifestations of "reaction" (which engages all the attention of many of our Cadet-like Social-Democrats), but from the position of the masses in their struggle for land.

Agriculture is the basis of the national economy of Russia. Agriculture is declining, the peasants are ruined. Even liberals (Kautsky quotes the Cadets Petrunkevich and Manuilov) realise this. Kautsky, however, is not content with pointing to the unanimity of the liberals and the socialists on *this* point. He does not let this lead him to the Cadet conclusion: "Therefore, the Social-Democrats should support the Cadets." He at once proceeds to analyse the *class interests* concerned, and shows that the liberals will *inevitably* be half-hearted in regard to the agrarian question. While admitting the decline of agriculture in general, they fail to understand the capitalist character of agriculture and the resulting problem of the special causes which retard this capitalist, and not some other, evolution.

And Kautsky minutely analyses one of these special causes, namely, the shortage of capital in Russia. Foreign capital plays a particularly important part in our country. This retards the capitalist development of agriculture. Kautsky's conclusion is: "The decline of agriculture, alongside the growing strength of the industrial proletariat, is the main cause of the present Russian revolution."

You see: Kautsky makes a careful and conscientious study of the specific character of the bourgeois revolution in Russia and does not evade it as the Cadets and the Cadet-like Social-Democrats do by doctrinaire references to the "general character" of every bourgeois revolution.

Next, Kautsky analyses the solution of the agrarian question. Here, too, he is not content with the stock liberal phrase: You see, even the Cadet Duma is in favour of land for the peasants (see the writings of Plekhanov). No. He shows that the mere increase in size of holdings is no good to the peasants unless they obtain enormous financial assistance. The autocracy is incapable of really helping the peasantry. And the liberals? They demand redemption payments. But such compensation can only ruin the peasants. "*Confiscation of the large estates*" (Kautsky's italics) is the only way by which

the peasant's landholding can be substantially increased without imposing new burdens upon him. But the liberals are most emphatically opposed to confiscation.

This argument of Kautsky's is worth considering in detail. Anyone at all familiar with the party shadings in the revolutionary circles of Russia knows that on this question of redemption payments the opportunists of *both* revolutionary parties have not only been contaminated with the liberal view, but have also distorted what Kautsky says in this connection. Our Mensheviks, at the Unity Congress and at a number of meetings in St. Petersburg (e.g., Dan in his reports on the Congress to the St. Petersburg workers in the summer), criticised as wrong that clause of the agrarian programme which was adopted with the support of the Bolsheviks, who categorically insisted on the substitution of "confiscation" for "alienation" (see Maslov's original draft). Our Mensheviks said this was wrong, that only vulgar revolutionaries could insist on confiscation, that for the social revolution it was unimportant whether there was compensation or not, and in this connection they referred to Kautsky's pamphlet *The Social Revolution*, in which, with reference to the socialist revolution in general, Kautsky explains that compensation is permissible. And the Socialist-Revolutionary Mensheviks, and the semi-Cadet Popular Socialists, have used exactly the same arguments to defend their turn towards liberalism on the question of compensation (in one of the issues of *Narodno-Sotsialisticheskoye Obozreniye*¹⁵⁷), and they, too, cited Kautsky.

Kautsky is probably unaware of the behaviour of the Mensheviks on this question, or of the significance of the policy pursued by the Popular Socialists and their group. But in his *formulation* of the question of compensation in the Russian revolution he has again given all our opportunists an excellent lesson on how one should not argue. It is wrong to draw a conclusion about compensation in *Russia in 1905-06* from *general* premises about the relation between compensation and confiscation in various revolutions, or in the socialist revolution in general. One must proceed the other way round. One must ascertain which classes in Russia gave rise to the special features of our formulation of the question of compensation and deduce the political signifi-

cance of this question in this revolution from the interests of these classes, and only then decide whether the views held by the different parties are right or wrong.

It is quite obvious that, as a result of taking this course, Kautsky did not *blur* the difference between the liberals and the revolutionaries on the question of compensation (as the Plekhanovites and Popular Socialists always do), but revealed the *depth* of this difference. Plekhanov, in putting his questions to Kautsky, concealed the difference between the "opposition" and "revolutionary" movements by avoiding concrete questions. Kautsky swept Plekhanov's concealment aside, brought the important question of compensation into the light of day, and showed Plekhanov that not only the Black Hundreds, *but the liberals as well*, are "in their own way" fighting against the revolutionary movement of the peasants.

Kautsky writes: "Without the abolition of the standing army, and of naval armament construction, without the confiscation of the entire property of the royal family and of the monasteries, without state bankruptcy, without the confiscation of the big monopolies, insofar as they are still in private hands, the railways, oilfields, mines, iron and steel works, etc., it will be impossible to obtain the enormous sums necessary to extricate Russian agriculture from its terrible plight."

Recall the customary Menshevik talk about the utopian and visionary ideas of the Bolsheviks; for instance, Plekhanov's speeches at the Congress on the subject of the demand that cardinal agrarian demands should be linked with cardinal political issues (abolition of the standing army, election of officials by the people, etc.). Plekhanov scoffed at the idea of abolishing the standing army and of the people electing government officials! Plekhanov's "*Sovremennaya Zhizn*"¹⁰ approves the line of *Nashe Dyelo*, calling political opportunism "political materialism" (??), counterposing it to "revolutionary romanticism".

It turns out that the circumspect Kautsky goes *much further* than the most extreme Bolshevik and makes far more "utopian" and "romantic" (from the opportunist standpoint) demands *in connection with the agrarian question!*

Kautsky demands not only the confiscation of the landlords' estates, not only the abolition of the standing army, but also *the confiscation of big capitalist monopolies!*

And Kautsky quite logically observes immediately after the above-quoted passage: "It is clear, however, that the liberals are frightened by such gigantic tasks, such radical changes in existing property relations. Basically, they want no more than to continue the present policy without encroaching on the basis for the exploitation of Russia by foreign capital. They are firmly in favour of a standing army, which alone, in their opinion, can maintain order and *save their property....*"

Plekhanov protests that he has not been treated fairly. He only asked Kautsky's opinion on the question of supporting the opposition parties in the Duma elections, and he was given a reply on a different subject! Duma elections and—the abolition of the standing army! What a freak of anarchist fancy, what revolutionary romanticism instead of the "political materialism" demanded by the opportunist!

But Kautsky continues his "tactless" criticism of the liberals in answer to the question about the Duma elections. He accuses them of wanting to go on extorting billions of rubles from the Russian people for armaments and interest on loans. "They [the liberals] imagine that the establishment of a Duma will suffice to conjure billions of rubles out of the ground." "Liberalism is just as incapable [of satisfying the Russian peasants] as tsarism." Kautsky devotes a special chapter to explaining the attitude of liberalism to Social-Democracy. He points out that in Russia there are no bourgeois democrats of the old type, among whom the urban petty bourgeoisie occupied a primary place. In Russia, unlike the West, the urban petty bourgeoisie "will never be a reliable support of the revolutionary parties".

"In Russia the firm backbone of a bourgeois democracy is absent." Kautsky draws this conclusion both from an analysis of the special position of the urban petty bourgeoisie and from the consideration that the class antagonism between the capitalists and the proletariat is now far more developed in Russia than it was in the period of bourgeois revolutions of the "old type". This conclusion is of enormous importance. It forms the very kernel of Kautsky's "amend-

ment" to Plekhanov's formulation of the question, an amendment which is virtually a radically different formulation.

In his questions Plekhanov employs the *old types* of bourgeois democracy, and nothing more. He uses a hackneyed term, quite forgetting to determine on the basis of *Russian* data the *degree* of democracy, and its *stability*, etc. possessed by the *different strata* that are now coming forward in Russia as bourgeois democrats. It is Kautsky's merit that he pointed to this basic omission of Plekhanov's and proceeded to explain to him in a practical manner the *method* which must be applied in order to reach a real understanding of bourgeois democracy in Russia. And through Kautsky's skilful analysis the outlines of the *vital* social forces of Russia begin to emerge from the old, hackneyed formula: the urban petty bourgeoisie; the landlord class, with its penny-worth of liberalism and pounds-worth of support of the counter-revolutionary Black Hundreds; the capitalists, with their mortal dread of the proletariat; and, finally, the peasantry.

The nebulous question of the attitude to be adopted towards "bourgeois democracy" (of the type found in France in the forties of the last century?) has disappeared. The fog has been dispelled. It was this fog that our Prokopoviches, Kuskovas, Izgoyevs, Struves and other liberals used to cloud the vision of the people, and Plekhanov is now playing into their hands. In place of the fog of old stereotyped formulas, a genuine Marxist analysis has shown us the quite special relationships of the democracy of the various strata and elements of the Russian bourgeoisie.

By means of this analysis Kautsky determines that peculiar relation between Russian liberalism and the revolutionary character of the peasants, which the Cadets deliberately conceal, and to which many Social-Democrats are blind! "The more the peasants become revolutionary, the more do the big landowners become reactionary, the more does liberalism cease to find in them the support it previously had, *the more unstable become the liberal parties*, and the more the *liberal professors and lawyers* in the towns shift to the right, so as not to lose all connection with their previous mainstay." This process "is only accelerating the bankruptcy of liberalism".

Only after laying bare the roots of this *bankruptcy of liberalism* in the present Russian revolution does Kautsky proceed to give a direct answer to Plekhanov's questions. Before answering the question whether we should support the "opposition", we must understand (Kautsky explains) the class foundations and the class nature of this "opposition" (or Russian liberalism), and in what relation the development of the revolution and of the revolutionary classes stands to the position and interests of liberalism. In elucidating *this* at the outset, Kautsky proceeds, *firstly*, to reveal the bankruptcy of liberalism, and only *then* to explain to the reader the question that interests Plekhanov: Should we support the opposition in the Duma elections? It is not surprising that Kautsky had no need to answer two-thirds of Plekhanov's questions....

Although Kautsky's answers do not satisfy Plekhanov, they will help the rank-and-file Russian Social-Democrats to think properly.

(1) Is the revolution in Russia a bourgeois or a socialist revolution?

That is not the way to put the question, says Kautsky. That is the old stereotyped way of putting it. Of course, the Russian revolution is not a socialist revolution. The socialist dictatorship of the proletariat (its "undivided sway") is out of the question. But neither is it a bourgeois revolution, for "*the bourgeoisie is not one of the driving forces of the present revolutionary movement in Russia*". "Wherever the proletariat comes out independently, the bourgeoisie ceases to be a revolutionary class."

And Kautsky declares with a vehemence even greater than the "tactlessness" the Bolsheviks usually display towards the liberals, that our bourgeoisie fears revolution more than reaction; that it hates absolutism because it engenders revolution; that it wants political freedom *in order to stop* the revolution! (And Plekhanov, in his questions, naïvely identified the struggle of the opposition against the old order, with the struggle against the government's attempts to crush the revolutionary movement!)

This first answer of Kautsky's is a brilliant vindication of the *fundamental principles* of Bolshevik tactics. Beginning with the Geneva newspapers *Vperyod* and *Proletary*, and con-

tinuing with the pamphlet *Two Tactics*, the Russian Bolsheviks have *always* regarded as the main issue in their struggle against the Mensheviks the Right-wing Social-Democrats' distortion of the concept: "bourgeois revolution". We have said hundreds of times, and have backed our statements with innumerable declarations by the Mensheviks, that to interpret the category "bourgeois revolution" in the sense of recognising the leadership and guiding role of the bourgeoisie in the Russian revolution is to vulgarise Marxism. A bourgeois revolution *in spite of* the instability of the bourgeoisie, by *paralysing* the instability of the bourgeoisie—that is how the Bolsheviks formulated the fundamental task of the Social-Democrats in the revolution.

Kautsky's analysis satisfies us completely. He has fully confirmed our contention that we are defending the position of revolutionary Social-Democracy against opportunism, and not creating any "peculiar" Bolshevik trend, and this confirmation is the more valuable for having been given by expounding *the essence of the matter*, and not by a mere staff officer's "endorsement" of this or that group.

(2) Kautsky not only considers it "*quite possible*" that "*in the course of the revolution victory will fall to the lot of the Social-Democratic Party*", but declares also that it is the duty of the Social-Democrats "*to inspire their supporters with this confidence in victory*, for it is impossible to fight successfully if one renounces victory beforehand".

This conclusion of Kautsky's is a second brilliant vindication of Bolshevik tactics. Anyone who is at all familiar with the publications of the two trends in the Social-Democratic movement must know that the Mensheviks have *most strenuously* disputed the possibility and expediency of a Social-Democratic victory in the present Russian revolution. As far back as the spring of 1905, the Mensheviks at their conference (which Plekhanov, Axelrod and others attended) adopted a resolution saying that the Social-Democratic Party must *not* strive to win power. And since then this idea that the Social-Democrats cannot strive for the *victory* of Social-Democracy in the bourgeois revolution has run like a *red* (or black?) thread through the *whole* literature and the *whole policy* of Menshevism.

This policy is opportunism. The *victory* of Social-Democracy in the present Russian revolution is *quite possible*. It is our duty to inspire all adherents of the workers' party with confidence in *this* victory; it is impossible to fight successfully if one renounces victory beforehand.

These simple and obvious truths, which have been obscured by Plekhanov's sophistry and scholasticism, must be pondered over and mastered by the whole of our Party.

(3) To imagine that "all the classes and parties which are striving for political freedom have simply to work together in order to achieve it", means "*seeing only the political surface of events*".

This is the third vindication of Bolshevism. A mere reference to the fact that the Cadets "are fighting for freedom in their own way" is not enough to justify joint action with them. This is the ABC of Marxism, which Plekhanov, Axelrod and their admirers have temporarily obscured.

(4) Which class can help the Social-Democratic proletariat to achieve victory in the present revolution, can support the proletariat and determine the limits of the immediately realisable changes? In Kautsky's opinion, this class is the *peasantry*. *Only* this class has "*stable, common economic interests with the proletariat throughout the whole period of the revolution*". "The common interests of the industrial proletariat and the peasants are the basis of the revolutionary strength of Russian Social-Democracy and of the possibility of its victory; but at the same time these common interests determine the limits within which this victory can be utilised".

This means: not the socialist dictatorship of the proletariat, but the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. In other words, Kautsky has formulated the old premise underlying the whole tactics of the revolutionary Social-Democrats, as distinguished from both the opportunists and the "enthusiasts". Marx said that every genuine and complete victory of a revolution can only be a dictatorship,¹⁰⁰ having in mind, of course, the dictatorship (i.e., unrestricted power) of the masses over the few, and not vice versa. But the important thing for us, of course, is not any particular formulation of their tactics by the Bol-

sheviks, but the *essence* of these tactics, which Kautsky has *entirely* endorsed.

Anyone who wants to think like a Marxist and not like a Cadet about the role of the proletariat in our revolution, and about its possible and necessary "ally", must come round to the views of revolutionary and not opportunist Social-Democracy on the principles of proletarian tactics.

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CONCERNING AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN THE ORGAN OF THE BUND

As our journal is illegal, we are unable to follow at all regularly the Social-Democratic newspapers that are published in Russia in languages other than Russian. And yet, unless close and constant contact is maintained between the Social-Democrats of all nationalities in Russia, our Party cannot become a real All-Russian Party.

Therefore, we earnestly request all comrades who know Lettish, Finnish, Polish, Yiddish, Armenian, Georgian or other languages, and who receive Social-Democratic newspapers in these languages, to help us to keep Russian readers informed about the state of the Social-Democratic movement and the views of the non-Russian Social-Democrats on tactics. This assistance could take the form, not only of reviews of Social-Democratic literature on a particular question (like the articles in *Proletary* on the controversy between the Polish Social-Democrats and the Polish Socialist Party, and on the Lettish view of guerrilla warfare), but also of translations of articles, or even of outstanding passages from an article.

Recently, a comrade sent us a translation of an article entitled "A Platform for the Election Campaign", signed "M" and published in *Volkszeitung*, the organ of the Bund, No. 208 (November 16). We have no means of judging to what extent that article expresses the unanimous view of the editors, but in any case it reflects certain trends among Jewish Social-Democrats. Russian Social-Democrats, too, who are familiar only with the Bolshevik and Menshevik method of treating a question, need to be aware of these trends. Here is the translation of this article:

"The energy and influence that our Party will be able to exert in the elections will depend above all on the clarity and definiteness of our position and slogans. We are faced with important political and

social questions, and it is our task to formulate them so clearly and definitely that only one answer will be possible, namely, ours. If our position is not definite enough, even the most perfect organisation will be of no avail. The importance of our platform in the election campaign depends entirely on the clarity of our position.

"The Seventh Congress of the Bund laid down the main lines of our tactics as follows: the dissolution of the Duma has clearly proved to wide sections of the population that it is impossible to obtain land and liberty by peaceful means, and that the only solution is an armed uprising. This does not mean that the elections to the new Duma imply a change from revolutionary tactics to peaceful and constitutional tactics, since in the elections it is *realised* that revolutionary tactics are *necessary*; the electors will demand that their deputies convert the Duma into a revolutionary instrument of the mass of the people. Our task in the elections is to make this principle clear to the voters, and this principle requires that the elections themselves be made an arena for mobilising the revolutionary masses of the people.

"While the Duma was in session, and still more so since the dissolution of the Duma, the country made great strides in developing its political consciousness, thanks to which the revolutionary parties count on success at the elections. At the first elections the petty-bourgeois voters voted for the Cadets, thus expressing their ardent protest against the atrocities of the government. Not having yet discarded their constitutional illusions, these voters felt sure that the Cadets would secure land and liberty for them. The Duma tactics have shattered these illusions and have convinced them that land and liberty can be gained only by fighting, not by peaceful means. The voters are now faced with the question of how to fight, and who is capable of fighting: the Cadets with their diplomatic parliamentarism, and, at best, with their weapon of 'passive resistance', or the revolutionary parties with their militant tactics? Obviously, when the voters are faced with the question of how to attain real freedom, they realise that only the revolutionary and not the constitutional parties are capable of fighting.

"The Cadets have realised this and are trying their utmost to ignore all the lessons that events have taught them; they are trying to drag the political consciousness of the country back to what it was on the eve of the first elections. 'Not a step forward,' is their cry. 'Forget all the lessons of history. The object of the new elections,' they say, 'is to recreate the political conditions under which the First Duma functioned. The people must return to the Duma the former Duma majority, and thus give rise to a political situation in the country in which the only way out will be a responsible Cabinet from the Duma majority' (*Rech*, No. 189). 'If Russia needs a real constitution and a genuine popular representative assembly,' says *Rech*, No. 196, 'then the people will return to the Duma representatives who will repeat what the First Duma stated in its reply to the address from the throne and who will set to work to do what the First Duma was prevented from doing.' The question cannot fail to arise as to what will happen if the Second Duma also is 'prevented' from doing what the First Duma intended to do. To this the Constitutional-Democrats reply that 'the government

will have to yield to the firm, peacefully and lawfully expressed will of the electorate' (*Rech*, No. 195). The Cadets know very well that their strength rests on constitutional illusions, and that is why they are doing their utmost to instil into the minds of the voters the idea that prevailed on the eve of the first elections, and to imbue them with faith in the omnipotent power of the 'firm, peacefully and lawfully expressed will of the electorate'. The strength of the revolutionary parties does not lie in the voters' belief in the 'omnipotent power of the firm, peacefully and lawfully expressed will of the electorate', but, on the contrary, in their disbelief in that power, in their clear realisation of the necessity of a revolutionary struggle.

"Our task, therefore, as far as the voters are concerned, is categorically to ask them whether they want the majority in the future Duma to be the same as the previous one, with its flexible tactics that are incapable of achieving anything. Do they want the future Duma merely to 'repeat' what the first one said, or should it go beyond idle talk and adopt more efficacious methods of struggle? Should the new Duma 'recreate the political situation' of June and July, which led to nothing, or should it take a step towards real victory for the people?

"This question must serve as our platform in the election campaign. We must surround the Cadet Party with an atmosphere of the most profound disbelief in their ability to secure land and liberty. We must energetically and ruthlessly criticise passive resistance—the method of struggle they invented in Helsingfors—and reveal to the people the impotence and inconsistency of their methods of struggle.

"Only if this necessary condition is observed will the Second Duma be a step in advance of the First Duma."

Reading this article carefully we see that it fairly accurately reflects the views of the Bund delegation at the last All-Russian Conference of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. As we know, on the one hand, this delegation voted with the Mensheviks to sanction blocs with the Cadets, but on the other hand, it voted with the Bolsheviks for drastic amendments to the Central Committee's "draft election platform" (the addition of the slogan of a republic, of a reference to an uprising, and of an exact characterisation of the parties, and an amendment giving a more precise explanation of the class nature of the Social-Democratic Party, etc.: see the resolution of the Conference on "amendments" to the platform in *Proletary*, No. 8¹⁰⁰).

The article by Comrade M. given above *seems* to be such a Bolshevik article because we see here only the left hand of the Bund; the right hand is hidden in articles advocating blocs with the Cadets.

At all events, the Bundists' idea of blocs with the Cadets

is not that of the Mensheviks. Their case is an exceptionally good illustration of the famous saying: *Si duo faciunt idem, non est idem* ("if two do the same thing, it is no longer the same thing"). There is a certain difference between the two, and this difference cannot fail to affect their ways of doing the same thing, their methods, the results of their "doing the same thing", etc. The Mensheviks' idea of blocs with the Cadets and the Bundists' idea of them are not the same. For the Mensheviks, blocs with the Cadets are fully in accord with their general tactics; in the case of the Bundists, they are not. As a result, we get articles like the one we have quoted, which clearly reveal the inconsistency, the lack of steadfastness, of the Bundists, who took part in the boycott yesterday and today justify the boycott of the Witte Duma, while at the same time sanctioning blocs with the Cadets. In the case of the Mensheviks, blocs with the Cadets naturally and spontaneously assume the character of ideological blocs. In the case of the Bundists, these blocs are intended to be only "technical" blocs.

But politics have their own objective logic, irrespective of what persons or parties plan in advance. The Bundist proposes that the bloc should be only a technical one, but the political forces of the whole country dispose that the bloc turns out to be an ideological one. After the jubilation with which the Cadets received the Menshevik decision of the Conference, after Plekhanov's famous Herostratian letter in *Tovarishch* about "a Duma with full power", there is scarcely need to prove the point.

Consider carefully the assertion of the author of the article that "the Cadets know very well that their strength rests on constitutional illusions, and that is why they are doing their utmost to instil [these illusions] into the minds of the voters".

"The strength of the Cadets rests on constitutional illusions".... Is this true; and what does it really mean? If it is not true, if the strength of the Cadets rests on the fact that they are the foremost representatives of bourgeois democracy in the Russian bourgeois revolution, then the general tactical line of Menshevism, or of the Right wing of Social-Democracy, is correct. If it is true, if the strength of the Cadets rests not on the strength of bourgeois democracy, but

on the strength of the *illusions* of the people, then the general tactical line of Bolshevism, or of the Left wing of Social-Democracy, is correct.

In a bourgeois revolution the Social-Democrats cannot but support bourgeois democracy: such is the main premise of Plekhanov and his like; and from this premise they draw the *direct and immediate* conclusion of the need to support the Cadets. But we say: The premise is right, but the conclusion is worthless, for we have still to ascertain which parties or trends at the present moment represent the *force* of bourgeois democracy that is really *capable of fighting*. The Cadets, the Trudoviks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries are all "bourgeois democrats" from the Marxist standpoint, i.e., the only scientific analysis. The "force" of the Cadets is not the fighting force of the bourgeois masses (the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie), it is not the economic and money force of the landlord class (the Black Hundreds) or the capitalist class (the Octobrists): it is the "force" of the bourgeois intelligentsia, which is not an *independent* economic class and therefore is not an *independent* political force; consequently, it is a *usurped* "force", depending on the influence of the bourgeois intelligentsia over other classes which have not yet worked out a clear, independent political ideology of their own, which submit to the ideological leadership of the bourgeois intelligentsia; it is primarily the "force" of those *erroneous opinions* concerning the nature of democracy and the methods of fighting for it which the bourgeois intelligentsia is propagating and cultivating among the bourgeois masses.

To deny this means childishly allowing oneself to be beguiled by the resounding words: "the party of people's freedom"; it means closing one's eyes to the generally known fact that the Cadets have neither the masses nor a decisive number of landlord and capitalist elements behind them.

To admit it means admitting that the *task of the day* for the workers' party is to combat the influence of the Cadets over the people—not because we have been dreaming of a bourgeois revolution without bourgeois democracy (an absurdity imputed to us by the Social-Democrats of the Right) but because the Cadets are *preventing the real force* of bourgeois democracy from developing and asserting itself.

Only a minority of the landlords of Russia (the great majority are Black Hundreds) and a minority of the capitalists (the great majority are Octobrists) belong to the Cadet Party. It has the majority, the mass, of the bourgeois intelligentsia only. Hence the spectacular politics of the Cadets, so enticing to political infants and politically impotent doctards, their din and clamour, their jubilation over cheap victories, their predominance in the liberal press, in bourgeois science, etc. Hence, too, the *sham* nature of this party, which corrupts the people with its treacherous propaganda for a compromise with the monarchy, yet in fact lacks the power to achieve any such compromise.

The Cadets are not bourgeois democracy, but the incarnation of the betrayal of democracy by the bourgeoisie—just as the French radical socialists, for instance, or the German social-liberals, are not intellectual socialists, but the incarnation of the betrayal of socialism by the intellectuals. Therefore, supporting bourgeois democracy means exposing the sham of the Cadets' quasi-democracy.

Therefore, the Plekhanovites are causing immense harm to the revolution and to the cause of the working class with their perpetual cry: we must fight reaction, not the Cadets!

Dear comrades! Your failure to grasp the point lies in your failure to understand the *significance* of our struggle against the Cadets. What is the kernel and essence of this struggle? Is it that the Cadets are "bourgeois"? Of course not. It is that the Cadets are mere chatterers about democracy, traitors to militant democracy.

To proceed: Have the Cadets any influence on the mass of the people, on the bourgeois-democratic mass of the people? Of course, they have, and very extensive influence too; with numerous newspapers, and so forth. Now judge for yourselves: Can we call upon the bourgeois-democratic mass of the people to fight reaction *if we do not unmask* their present ideological leaders, who are *damaging* the cause of bourgeois democracy? Impossible, dear comrades.

Fighting reaction means, first of all, liberating the masses from reaction ideologically. But the strong and tenacious ideological influence of "reaction" on the masses is not Black-Hundred, but *Cadet influence*. This is not a paradox. The Black Hundreds are undisguised, crude enemies, who can

burn, kill and cause havoc, but cannot convince even the ignorant muzhik, whereas the Cadets *convince* both the muzhiks and the urban petty bourgeoisie. And what do they convince them of? That the monarch is not responsible, that it is possible to win freedom by peaceful means (i.e., by leaving power in the hands of the monarchy), that a land-purchase scheme concocted by the landlords is the method of transferring land to the peasants most advantageous for them, etc., etc.

That is why you cannot convince either the simple-minded peasant or the simple-minded petty bourgeois that it is necessary to wage a serious struggle unless you undermine the influence on them of Cadet phrases and Cadet ideology. And anyone who says: "we must fight reaction, *not* the Cadets" fails to understand the *ideological* tasks of the struggle, sees the essence of struggle, not in convincing the masses, but in physical action, understanding the word struggle in the vulgar sense: "strike" at the reactionaries, but don't "strike" at the Cadets.

Of course, for the time being we shall strike by force of arms, not at the Cadets, or even at the Octobrists, but *only* at the government and its direct servants—and after we have beaten them, the Cadet will, for a fee, stick up for republican democracy just as today (for a professorial salary, or a lawyer's fee) he is sticking up for monarchist democracy. But, in order to gain a real victory over reaction we must free the masses from the ideological influence of the Cadets, who are giving them false notions of the aims and nature of the fight against reaction.

Let us return to the Bundists. Can they really fail to see now that the "technical" blocs with the Cadets which *they* sanction have in fact *already become* a mighty instrument for strengthening belief in the Cadets (and not for creating an atmosphere of disbelief) among the mass of the people? Only the blind can fail to see this. The ideological bloc of all the Menshevik Social-Democrats, including the Bundists, with the Cadets is an accomplished fact, and articles like that written by Comrade M. are well-meaning, but simple-minded, platonic dreams.

THE GOVERNMENT'S FALSIFICATION OF THE DUMA AND THE TASKS OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS

The tsarist government steadily continues its "work" to falsify the Duma. Warning the credulous Russian public not to be carried away by constitutionalism, we wrote, even before these falsifications began (see *Proletary*, No. 5, September 30, 1906), that a new coup d'état was in preparation, namely, that the electoral law of December 11, 1905, was to be amended *before* the elections to the Second Duma. At that time we wrote: "Nor is there any doubt that the government is carefully studying" the question "whether the old electoral law should remain in force".*

Yes, the tsar's government has been studying this question and, perhaps, has already even completed its study. It has preferred to amend the electoral law by means of Senate interpretations.¹¹ Now it is taking further steps in the direction of restricting freedom of agitation (if freedom in Russia can be *further* restricted) and faking the elections. The other day an *order* was promulgated prohibiting the issue of election forms to unregistered parties.¹² Newspapers are being more and more summarily suppressed. Arrests are becoming more and more frequent. Premises are being raided and searched with the most transparent object of obtaining the names of electors and influential voters, in order to "remove" them. In short, the election campaign is in full swing, as the witticism of Russian citizens puts it.

How far the government will go with its military-court methods of falsifying the Duma, no one can tell. Why not arrest the electors both on election day and *after the elec-*

* See pp. 209-10 of this volume.—*Ed.*

tions? The law—that stupid word still has currency in Russia—speaks of the immunity of members of the Duma, but there is not a word in it about the immunity of electors. Our press pointed this out even during the elections to the First Duma. The Black-Hundred tsarist gang thought that “Witte missed his chance” on that occasion; but in fact the government was still too weak after the December uprising to go on and capture the revolution’s next line of defence. Now the counter-revolution has gathered strength, and is doing the right thing, from its point of view, in breaking the constitution (which only naïve Cadets could believe in). The reactionaries are not liberal Balalaikins.¹⁶ They are men of action. They see, and know from experience, that the tiniest bit of freedom in Russia inevitably leads to an upsurge of the revolution. They are therefore *compelled* to go farther and farther, to do more and more violence to the October Constitution, to tighten still further the political safety valve that once was half open.

It takes the infinite obtuseness of a Russian Cadet, or of a non-party progressive intellectual, to cry out, on that account, about the government’s folly and urge it to return to the path of constitutionalism. The government *cannot act otherwise* in protecting the tsarist regime and landlordism from the concealed, subdued, but unquelled pressure from below. And we say to the government: All right, put your dampers on, tighten the half-opened valves. While they were somewhat open the fresh draught increased the heat in the boiler. When you close the valves there may be an explosion of the very kind we most desire. Our business is to make the utmost use among the masses of Stolypin’s splendid propaganda, of his splendid explanations of the “nature of the constitution”.

But here we see the deep gulf that separates the tactics of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie from the tactics of the socialist proletariat. The Social-Democrats advocate a struggle, and explain to the people with the aid of a thousand and one lessons from history that a struggle is inevitable; they are preparing for it and retaliate to the intensification of reaction with intensified revolutionary agitation. The liberals cannot advocate a struggle, because they are afraid of it. They respond to the intensification of reaction

by whining about a constitution, thus corrupting people's minds, and by intensified opportunism. The methods of the liberals were aptly and graphically hit off by the Trudovik Sedelnikov at a meeting on May 9 in the Panina Palace. When a liberal is abused, he says: Thank God they didn't beat me. When he is beaten, he thanks God they didn't kill him. When he is killed, he will thank God that his immortal soul has been delivered from its mortal clay.

When Stolypin's Black-Hundred gang cried out against the Cadets and launched a campaign against their revolutionary tendencies, the Cadets began to howl: "It is not true, we are not revolutionaries, we are respectable people! Down with the Vyborg Manifesto, down with blocs with the Lefts, down with the slogan of 'a Duma with full power' advocated by the most Right-wing of the Right Social-Democrats, Plekhanov; down with pernicious revolutionary illusions! We are going into the Duma to legislate." When the Black-Hundred gang announced that the Cadets, as an unregistered party, would not be issued election forms, the Cadets cried out: "That puts a different complexion on the question of agreements!" (See the leading article in *Rech*, December 13). That "increases the importance of the only registered party of the opposition, the Party of Peaceful Renovation". "When entering into agreements this must be taken into consideration!" And when the Cadet elector who has managed to creep into the Peaceful Renovation list is hauled off to the police station—the Cadets will thank God that we have not been completely deprived of the constitution. Our knights of the law will then say: The only absolutely safe party is that of the Octobrists; and have we not always said that we take our stand on the Manifesto of October 17?

What do the Menshevik comrades think about this? Should we not hasten to call a new Party conference and sanction agreements with the Peaceful Renovators and, perhaps, even with the Octobrists? After all, they, too, want "semi-liberty", as the extremely embarrassed Plekhanov argues today (December 14) in the newspaper of the ex-Social-Democrats!

It is not by accident that the question of the Peaceful Renovators has cropped up among the Cadets. It had been raised before, prior to the order concerning the issue of

election forms. Even the Left Cadets on *Tovarishch* (the "almost socialists", as some jesters call them) in their issue of December 5 included the Peaceful Renovators among the progressive parties, counting six progressive parties in all (the Cadets, the Social-Democrats, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Popular Socialists, the Party of Democratic Reforms and the Party of Peaceful Renovation). In the same issue of *Tovarishch* the ex-Social-Democrats poured their wrath on the poster about the three *main* parties published as a supplement to *Proletary*, No. 8.* It is "political dishonesty", cried Plekhanov's friends—to relegate Heyden to the Black Hundreds!

We are very glad that we have compelled the renegade Social-Democrats to defend this former Octobrist, who after the dissolution of the Duma, protested against the Vyborg Manifesto and negotiated with Stolypin about the Cabinet.

But you gentlemen, collaborators of Plekhanov, should have been more adroit in your defence of him! It is common knowledge that in the first elections the Octobrists (including Heyden and Shipov) formed a bloc with the Black Hundreds. You are prepared to forget this because the party has changed its name? And yet on that very page (4) of *Tovarishch*, December 5, we read that there is a trend in the Union of October Seventeenth which is in favour of an agreement with the Party of Peaceful Renovation, and that this trend even predominates in the St. Petersburg branch of the Union. And a little lower down we read that "the Central Board of the United Russian People" sanctions blocs with the Octobrists, and for that reason *Tovarishch* refuses to recognise the Octobrists as constitutionalists.

Isn't that fine? We refuse to call the Octobrists constitutionalists because the Black Hundreds sanction blocs with them. But we call the Peaceful Renovators progressives, despite the fact that the Octobrists sanction blocs with them.

Oh, those sapient gudgeons of our notorious progressive "intelligentsia"!

The intellectualist radicals' defence of the Peaceful Renovators, the turn taken by the central organ of the Cadet Party towards peaceful renovation immediately after the

* See pp. 328-31 of this volume.—Ed.

order on election forms was issued, are typical examples of liberal tactics. If the government takes one step to the right, we take two steps to the right! Lo and behold!—again we are legal and peaceful, tactful and loyal; we shall manage without election forms, we are always ready to adapt ourselves in conformity with infamy!¹⁶⁴

The liberal bourgeoisie think that this is realist politics. They are proud of this grovelling realism (to use the admirable expression of a certain Social-Democrat), they consider it the height of political tact and wise diplomatic tactics. In actual fact, these are not only the most stupid and treacherous, but the most sterile tactics imaginable; it was by pursuing these tactics that the German Cadets—from the Frankfort windbags to Bismarck's bootlicking national liberals¹⁶⁵—for more than half a century after the bourgeois revolution consolidated the state power in the hands of the Junkers (the Black-Hundred landlords, the Dorrers, Bulatsels and Purishkeviches—to name their Russian counterparts) and in the hands of "military despotism embellished with parliamentary forms".¹⁶⁶

It is time our Mensheviks, who are so enamoured of this policy of the Cadets and are imitating it, understood that the only realist politics, realist in the good and not vulgar sense of the word, are the politics of revolutionary Marxism. We must retaliate to the tricks and manoeuvres of the reactionaries not by adapting ourselves to the Right, but by intensifying and spreading our revolutionary propaganda among the proletarian masses, by developing the spirit of revolutionary class struggle and revolutionary class organisations. In this way, and only in this way, will you strengthen the power of the only fighters against reaction, in spite of all the latter's tricks and manoeuvres. Retaliating to the Black-Hundred tricks of the government by adapting your tactics to the Right you break up and weaken the only force that is capable of fighting, the force of the revolutionary classes, you obscure their revolutionary consciousness with the tinsel of tricky political "manœuvres".

At first the Mensheviks were opposed to agreements with the Cadets. Martov condemned agreements. Y. Larin indignantly rejected them. Even Nich. I—sky disapproved of them. Influenced by the Senate interpretations (by our re-

actionary senates in Geneva and in St. Pétersburg) Martov & Co. adapted themselves to the Right. They are in favour of blocs with the Cadets, but not with any one further to the Right than the Cadets—heaven forbid! With the “opposition democratic parties” (the resolution of the All-Russian Conference, proposed by the Central Committee and adopted by 18 votes to 14), but no further to the Right!

But now the Cadets are turning to the Peaceful Renovators. And are you, Menshevik comrades, going to do the same? In answer to the Senate interpretations—blocs with the Cadets; in answer to the withdrawal of election forms—blocs with the Peaceful Renovators? What will your answer be when they start arresting the electors??

You have already abandoned real revolutionary propaganda among the masses. You are no longer combating illusions about peaceful evolution and those who are spreading these illusions—the Cadets. All you are concerned about is the Black-Hundred danger. But your “subtle manoeuvres” of joint election lists with the Cadets are built on sand. You are impoverishing the real content of revolutionary Social-Democratic work among the masses, but the gains from this political trickery will not accrue to you, perhaps not even to the Cadets—perhaps not even to the Peaceful Renovators, but to the Octobrists! You reply to the falsification of the Duma by falsifying revolutionary Social-Democratic tactics—but in this way you will neither improve the Duma, nor strengthen socialism, nor advance the cause of revolution.

Unprincipled practical politics are the most unpractical politics.

The working class must reply to the falsification of the Duma not by relaxing but by intensifying its revolutionary agitation, by dissociating itself in its election campaign from these wretched traitors, the Cadets.

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THE POLITICAL SITUATION AND THE TASKS OF THE WORKING CLASS

After the dissolution of the Duma the government was able to hold the indignation of the country in check only by means of military terror. The special and emergency security regulations, endless arrests, military courts, punitive expeditions—all these taken together cannot be called anything but military terror.

The government used this military suppression of the movement for freedom as a test of its own strength. If we are strong enough—we shall not convene the Duma at all, and at once satisfy the desires of the Union of the Russian People and similar “truly Russian” Black-Hundred parties. If we are not strong enough—we shall convene it once more, we shall try to modify the electoral law, try to ensure a Black-Hundred Duma, or to tame a Cadet Duma. That is how the government reasoned.

The military strength of ruthless repression has only sufficed, so far at least, to enable the government, by means of Senate interpretations and in violation of the law, to deprive thousands and tens of thousands of workers, poor peasants and railwaymen of the right to vote. The government's financial difficulties have increased enormously. It has failed, so far, to obtain a loan. Inevitable bankruptcy is staring it in the face. There is not a single party in the country it can rely on, and it is oscillating between the hooligan gangs (the true Russians) and the Octobrists. It has been unable to reach full agreement even with the Octobrists.

Such are the conditions in which the election campaign for the Second Duma is being inaugurated. The ordinary man in the street is cowed. He has been intimidated by the military

courts. He is under the spell of the government's boast that the Duma will be docile. He yields to this mood and is ready to forgive the Cadets all their mistakes, to throw overboard all that the First Duma taught him and vote for the Cadets if only the Black Hundreds are kept out.

That the ordinary man in the street should behave in this way is natural. He is never guided by a definite world-outlook, by principles of integral party tactics. He always swims with the stream, blindly obeying the mood of the moment. He cannot reason in any other way than by contrasting the most moderate of all the opposition parties to the Black Hundreds. He is incapable of thinking for himself over the experience of the First Duma.

But what is natural for the ordinary man in the street is unpardonable for a party man, and altogether reprehensible for a Social-Democrat. Listen to the arguments of those Social-Democrats who are calling on the socialist workers *to vote for the Cadets* (it makes no difference whether it is only for Cadets in constituencies where the Social-Democrats have refrained from putting up their own candidates, or for Cadets and Social-Democrats where there is a joint list). Instead of arguments you will hear only one refrain, a cry of terror and despair: Don't let the Black Hundreds in! Vote for the Cadets! Draw up joint lists with the Cadets!

A Social-Democrat, a member of the worker's party, cannot stoop to such philistine behaviour. He must clearly understand what actual social forces are engaged in the struggle, the real significance of the Duma in general, and of the Cadet Party, which predominated in the First Duma, in particular. Whoever argues about the present policy of the proletariat without thinking over all these questions will never arrive at anything like correct conclusions.

What is the issue in the present struggle in Russia? It is a fight for freedom, i.e., a fight for state power to be in the hands of the representatives of the people and not in the hands of the old government. It is a fight for land for the peasants. The government is opposing these strivings with all its might, fighting to retain its power, its land (for the richest landlords are among the most aristocratic and most highly placed persons in the state). Opposed to the government are the workers and the mass of the poor peasantry,

ТЕРНИИ ТРУДА

24 декабря 1906 года.

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Политическое положение и задачи рабочего класса.

Послѣ разгона Думы правительство сдерживало возмущеніе страны только посредствомъ военнаго террора. Усиленными и чрезвычайными охраня, аресты безъ конца, военно-полевые суды, карательныя экспедиціи, все это, вмѣстѣ взятое, нельзя назвать иначе, какъ военными террорами.

Правительство испытывало свою силу на этомъ военномъ подавленіи освободительнаго движенія. Хватить силы, — вовсе не созовемъ Думы, сразу удовлетворимъ желанія союза русскаго народа и тому подобныя «истинно-русскія» партіи черносотенцевъ. Не хватить силы, — созовемъ еще разъ, попытаемся передать избирательный законъ, попытаемся обезпечить черносотенную Думу или укротить кадетскую Думу. Така разсуждало правительство.

Военной силы безпощаднаго подавленія хватило до сихъ поръ по крайней мѣрѣ, только на то, чтобы посредствомъ сенатскихъ разъясненій отнять, вопреки закону, избирательное право у тысячъ и десятковъ тысячъ рабочихъ, немущихъ крестьянъ, железнодорожниковъ. Финансовыя затрудненія правительства чрезвычайно усилились. Займа пока не удастся добыть. Грозитъ неминуемое банкротство. Внутри страны правительство не можетъ опереться ни на одну партію, колеблется между шайками хулигановъ (истинно-русскіе люди) и октябристами. Вполнѣ спиться оно не могло даже и съ октябристами.

При такихъ условіяхъ начинается избирательная кампанія во вторую Думу. Обыватели запуганы. На него ударяющее повалило военно-полевые суды. Онъ находится подъ впечатлѣніемъ правительственнаго хвастовства, что Дума будетъ послушной. Онъ поддается настроенію и готовъ простить всѣ ошибки кадетамъ, готовъ выбросить за бортъ все то, чему научила его первая Дума и голосовать за кадета, лишь бы не прошелъ черносотенецъ.

Со стороны обывателя такое поведение понятно. Обыватель никогда не руководится твердыми мироощущеніемъ, принципами цѣльной партійной тактики. Онъ всегда плыветъ по теченію, сабѣ отда-

ваясь настроенію. Онъ не можетъ разсуждать иначе, какъ противопоставляя черной сотнѣ самую скромную изъ оппозиціонныхъ партій. Онъ не въ состояніи самостоятельно обдумать опытъ первой Думы.

Но то, что естественно для обывателя, неестественно для партійнаго человѣка и совсѣмъ уже неприлично для социалдемократа. Прислушайтесь, въ самомъ дѣлѣ, къ доводамъ тѣхъ социалдемократовъ, которые зовутъ социалистовъ рабочихъ голосовать за кадетовъ (все равно, за однихъ ли только кадетовъ тамъ, гдѣ социалдемократы отказались вовсе выставить своего кандидата, или за кадета вмѣстѣ съ социалдемократомъ, гдѣ есть общій списокъ). Вмѣсто доводовъ вы услышите одинъ только призывъ, одинъ крикъ страха и отчаянія какъ бы не прошелъ черносотенецъ! Голосуйте за кадетовъ! Составляйте общие списки съ кадетами!

Социалдемократъ, членъ рабочей партіи, не можетъ опускаться до такой обывательщины. Онъ долженъ дать себѣ ясный отчетъ въ томъ, какия дѣйствительныя общественныя силы ведутъ борьбу, какое дѣйствительное значеніе имѣетъ Дума вообще и господствовавшая въ первой Думѣ партія кадетовъ въ особенности. Кто разсуждаетъ о современной политикѣ пролетаріата, не обдумавъ всѣхъ этихъ вопросовъ, тотъ никогда не можетъ прийти къ сколько-нибудь вѣрнымъ выводамъ.

За что идетъ теперь борьба въ Россіи? За свободу т. е. за власть народныхъ представителей въ государствѣ, а не стараго правительства. За землю для крестьянъ. Правительство всими силами борется противъ этихъ стремленій, отстаиваетъ свою власть, свою землю (ибо самые богатые помѣщики принадлежатъ къ числу самыхъ знатныхъ и наиболѣе высокопоставленныхъ лицъ въ государствѣ). Правительство имѣетъ противъ себя рабочихъ и массу крестьянской бѣдноты, а также, разумеется, и городской бѣдноты, о которой не къ чему говорить отдѣльно, ибо у нея нѣтъ особыхъ интересовъ въ отягченіе отъ основныхъ интересовъ пролетаріата и крестьянства.

Какъ относится къ борьбѣ высшіе классы, помѣщики и буржуазія? Сначала, до 17-го октября, большая часть ихъ были либеральны, т. е. сочувствовали свободѣ, даже помогали такъ или иначе борьбѣ рабочихъ. Буржуазія была недовольна самодержавнымъ порядкомъ управленія и требовала себѣ тоже

Front page of the weekly *Ternii Truda*, № 1, December 24, 1906, which carried Lenin's leading article "The Political Situation and the Tasks of the Working Class"

Reduced

and also, of course, the urban poor, about whom there is no need to speak separately since they have no special interests that differ from the fundamental interests of the proletariat and the peasantry.

What is the attitude of the upper classes, the landlords and the bourgeoisie, to this struggle? At first—until October 17, a great number of them were liberals, i.e., they sympathised with the cause of liberty, and in one way or another even helped the workers in their struggle. The bourgeoisie was dissatisfied with the autocratic system of government and demanded a voice in state affairs. The bourgeoisie called itself democratic, i.e., claimed to stand for the people's freedom, in order to obtain the people's backing for its aspirations. But after October 17 the bourgeoisie was satisfied with what it had received, i.e., participation of the landlords and capitalists in state affairs and the promises of freedom made by the old regime, which remained intact. The bourgeoisie was frightened by the independent struggle of the proletariat and the peasantry, and proclaimed: "We have had enough of revolution!"

Before October 17 there was one all-inclusive liberal-bourgeois party of the Zemstvo people, who assembled at their famous semi-legal congresses and published abroad the journal *Osvobozhdeniye*. After October 17 the participants in these Zemstvo congresses split: the capitalist businessmen and the bigger landlords, or landlords who conducted their estates on feudal lines, joined the Octobrist Party, i.e., openly went over to the government. The other section, mainly lawyers, professors and other bourgeois intellectuals, formed the Cadet Party (the Constitutional-Democrats). This party also turned against the revolution; it, too, was frightened by the workers' struggle; it, too, proclaimed: "Enough!" But it wanted, as it wants now, to stop the struggle by more subtle means, by small concessions to the people, land for the peasants with compensation, etc. The Cadet Party promised that if its members were elected to the Duma it would give the people liberty and the peasants land. The Social-Democrats realised that the Cadets were deceiving the people and therefore boycotted the Duma. But the ignorant peasants and the cowed ordinary citizens nevertheless elected the Cadets to the Duma. Instead of fighting for lib-

erty when they got into the Duma, the Cadets began to appeal to the people to keep calm, while they themselves strove to obtain appointments as the tsar's Ministers. The Duma was dissolved because speeches were delivered there that displeased the powers that be, because the Social-Democrats and the bolder deputies addressed the people from the Duma tribune, calling on them to fight.

Even the blindest or the most ignorant people must now realise what the Cadet Party really is. It is not a party of the champions of the people; it is a party of bourgeois petitioners, middlemen and hucksters. The workers and intelligent peasants will be able to achieve their aims only when the masses cease to believe in the Cadet Party, when the masses realise the necessity of an independent struggle. Therefore, to vote for the Cadets, or advocate voting for the Cadets, means misleading the masses, undermining their solidarity and hindering them in preparing for the struggle.

The class-conscious workers are now confronted by quite a different task. They must combat philistine confusion and lack of principles with consistent, steadfast, co-ordinated socialist propaganda during the election campaign.

The immediate task of the class-conscious workers is to explain to the proletarian masses and to all the progressive peasants the real nature of the struggle, the actual position of the various classes in this struggle.

The workers have progressed more than any other class in the course of our revolution. They are now coming over *en masse* to the Social-Democrats. More intense and more extensive work must, of course, be carried on among them; but here the road has been well explored. Work among the peasants is much more important and much more difficult. The peasants are a class of small proprietors. That class is far less favourably situated in regard to the struggle for liberty and the struggle for socialism than the workers. The peasants are not united by working in big enterprises; on the contrary, they are disunited by their small individual farming. Unlike the workers, the peasants do not see before them an open, obvious, single enemy in the person of the capitalist. The peasants themselves are to a certain extent masters and proprietors. That is why they always trail behind the bourgeoisie and try to imitate it. Their ambition is

to develop and consolidate their small property, and not to fight in a common struggle with the working class against the capitalist class.

That is why the mass of the poor peasants have always and in every country proved to be less persistent in their struggle for liberty and for socialism than the workers. That is why, in this country, the peasant deputies in the Duma, the Trudoviks, have so far not succeeded, in spite of all the lessons of Cadet treachery, in casting off the influence of the liberal bourgeoisie, its views, its prejudices and its political methods—methods which are supposed to be cunning and subtle, to consist of fine “manoeuvres”, whereas in fact they are stupid, futile and disgraceful for every genuine fighter.

Class-conscious workers! Take advantage of the election campaign to open the eyes of the people! Do not yield to the persuasions of these well-meaning but feeble and irresolute people who are urging you to put up joint lists with the Cadets, and to obscure the minds of the masses by means of joint slogans with the Cadets. Do not believe the stock cries and warnings about the Black-Hundred danger. The real and fundamental danger that confronts the Russian revolution is the immaturity of the peasant masses, their lack of staunchness in the struggle, their failure to understand the shallowness and treachery of bourgeois liberalism. Fight against that danger, tell the whole truth openly to the mass of the people. In that way you will draw them away from the Cadet windbags and gain their support for the Social-Democrats. Only in this way will you be able to combat the real Black-Hundred danger. No Senate interpretations, no executions, no arrests can prevent the people from carrying on *such* work, the work of raising the civic and class consciousness of the masses to a higher level, of organising them to fight for their own and not liberal-bourgeois aims in the struggle.

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THE WORKING-CLASS PARTY'S TASKS AND THE PEASANTRY ¹¹⁷

The Volga Region is one of the big centres of the peasant movement. The particularly urgent task confronting the workers' party there is: to carry out the independent class policy of the proletariat, while constantly explaining to the peasant masses that they can win land and liberty only by breaking with their customary leaders from among the liberal landlord-Cadets, only by joining with the revolutionary proletariat.

It is to this task, too, that the election campaign of the workers' party should be wholly subordinated. For this very reason, blocs with the Cadets—which in general are impermissible because of the whole position in principle of the Social-Democratic Party as the party leading the class struggle of the proletariat—are particularly harmful in the Volga Region. To show this more clearly, let us take the example of a peasant deputy to the First Duma from the Volga Region. This deputy is Mr. I. Zhilkin, a Trudovik elected from Saratov Gubernia.

Trudovik Zhilkin is now writing in the St. Petersburg Cadet newspaper *Tovarishch* and defending blocs with the Cadets. But see *how* he defends such blocs. In *Tovarishch* of December 17 he describes the elections to the First Duma in Saratov Gubernia. The peasants elected their own people, instinctively—with the true instinct of the working and exploited people—distrusting the liberal landlord and bourgeois lawyer. In the gubernia, when all the electors had gathered for the election of the Duma deputies, the peasants comprised about two-fifths of the total.

(Let us recall that the total number of electors in Saratov Gubernia was 150. Of these, 64 were from the peasants, 51 from the landowners and 35 from the townfolk. Mr. Zhilkin gives the number as 152 electors, perhaps adding the workers' curia.)

The peasant electors in the gubernia came up against "prominent" Cadets like Mr. N. N. Lvov, "attached to the Central Committee of the Cadet Party". Among the electors from the uyezd towns some people proved to be more to the left than the Cadets. And very rapidly, almost of itself, a Left bloc was formed, an "Alliance of the Working People", the germ of the future Trudovik Group in the Duma.

Haggling with the Cadets for seats in the Duma began. The Cadets demanded two-thirds of the seats for the Constitutional-Democrats, the "working people" demanded the same for themselves. No agreement was reached. The Cadets did not believe in the strength and solidarity of the alliance of the working people. At the last election meeting, however, it turned out that the candidates of the alliance obtained *from 78 to 89 votes* out of the total of 152. "The chief candidates of the Cadets obtained from 50 to 67."

Then the Cadets surrendered. They agreed to their party being in the minority in the Duma. "The committee of the alliance of the working people agreed to secure the election of two candidates under the Cadet flag: N. N. Lvov and S. A. Kotlyarevsky. "And it was typical," writes Mr. Zhilkin, "that these candidates who had only obtained 59 and 67 votes at the election meeting, received 111 votes at the poll."

Yes, this is very, very typical. Only unfortunately Trudovik Zhilkin does not understand the *significance* of the facts he reports.

Just think: the Left Alliance of the Working People, disposing of 78-89 votes out of 152, i.e., *the majority*, secured the election of N. N. Lvov to the Duma. And so Mr. Zhilkin, the Trudovik, defends blocs with the Cadets.

Do you know, workers and peasants, what sort of a man N. N. Lvov is? He is a landlord, one of the founders of the "*Osvobozhdeniye* League", i.e., one of the founders of the Cadet Party. For seven years he served as a Marshal of the Nobility. In the Duma he belonged to the most Right-wing Cadets. In other words, he not only opposed the Social-

Democratic worker deputies and the Trudoviks, but even found that the whole Cadet Party was too far to the left! He found that the Cadet Draconian laws on assembly and the press were too liberal and the ruinous compensation payment which the Cadet landlords proposed for the peasants was a reform too generous to the peasants. The Cadets wanted to sell land to the peasants at a just valuation, this just valuation to be arrived at by a body with an equal number of representatives of the peasants and the landlords and with the addition of representatives of the government. One peasant, one landlord, one police official—was this not a truly beautiful example of Cadet justice! But to the landlord Mr. Lvov it seemed altogether too liberal. Apparently he would have liked more police officials on the local land committees.

Consequently Mr. Lvov delivered speeches in the Duma *against* the peasants' demand for land. During the period of the Duma Mr. Lvov hastened to make his way by the backstairs to the powers that be in order to haggle over ministerial seats for the liberal landlords in return for "curbing" the Trudoviks and Social-Democrats in the Duma. That's the sort of man he is, this liberal landlord Lvov, elected to the Duma by the Trudoviks. And after the dissolution of the Duma landlord Lvov had talks with Stolypin about entering the Stolypin Cabinet!!

In order to talk more freely with Stolypin, Lvov left the Cadets and formed the Party of Peaceful Plunder. *The Cadets are now entering into a bloc with this party.* The newspaper *Tovarishch*, for which Mr. Zhilkin writes, calls it a progressive and not a Black-Hundred party!

What is important for us is that Lvov was a Cadet when he entered the Duma. What is important is that the Cadet landlord betrayed the peasants in the most vile fashion, fighting against their demands in the Duma and even after the dissolution of the Duma haggling for a ministerial seat with people who were responsible for shooting and flogging masses of peasants.

That is the sort of Cadet landlords the Trudoviks elected to the Duma!

Let us suppose that *at that time* Mr. Zhilkin and the other Trudoviks did not know what kind of an animal this Lvov

was. Let us suppose that Mr. Zhilkin & Co. *made a mistake*. One cannot be condemned for making a mistake.

Very well. But is it possible that at the present time Mr. Zhilkin does not know how the Cadet landlords like Lvov have gone over from "people's freedom" to the Stolypin military-court Cabinet? Mr. Zhilkin does know this; *nevertheless* he advises the Trudoviks and Social-Democratic workers to enter into a bloc with the party of the liberal landlords and bourgeois lawyers, with the Party of the Cadets.

Lvov is an example of the Cadet traitor, an example of the liberal landlord party.

Zhilkin is an example of the unintelligent and vacillating Trudovik who trails in the wake of the "liberal" landlords, incapable of opening the eyes of the peasants, incapable of gaining a victory even when in the majority, incapable of rallying the peasants to independent struggle.

Let all the class-conscious workers, all the Social-Democrats of the Volga Region, use the example of Lvov and Zhilkin to teach the people.

Workers! Do you want to help elect to the Duma Cadets like the landlord Lvov, who one day delivers orations on people's freedom and the next day goes over to the side of Stolypin?

If you do not want this, reject all blocs with the Cadets, with this party of "liberal" landlords. Call upon the peasants to support the Social-Democratic Labour Party and not the Party of the Constitutional-Democrats.

Peasants! Do you want once more to elect to the Duma "liberal" landlords like the Cadet Lvov, who prior to the Duma promised you a land flowing with milk and honey, but when in the Duma proposed a just valuation of the landlords' land by officials appointed by the landlords' government? Do you want to entrust defence of peasant demands to the liberal landlords and bourgeois lawyers?

If you do not want this, vote for the Social-Democrats, i. e., for the workers' party. Nowhere in the world has the Social-Democratic Labour Party betrayed the interests of the ruined, impoverished, toiling and exploited peasantry. Throughout the world the liberal bourgeoisie has deceived

the peasants fighting for land and liberty just as the Cadets like Lvov are deceiving them in this country.

There is not and cannot be any other remedy against the wobbling of the Trudoviks than a strong, class-conscious workers' party that never departs from the class standpoint. The peasants can win land and liberty only by marching hand-in-hand with the class-conscious workers.

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**PREFACE TO THE RUSSIAN TRANSLATION
OF W. LIEBKNECHT'S PAMPHLET:
*NO COMPROMISES,
NO ELECTORAL AGREEMENTS***

Liebknecht's pamphlet, the translation of which is now offered to the Russian reader, is of special interest at the present time, on the eve of the elections to the Second Duma, when the question of electoral agreements has aroused keen interest in the workers' party and among the liberal bourgeoisie.

We shall not dwell here on the general importance of Liebknecht's pamphlet. The reader will have to consult Franz Mehring's history of the German Social-Democratic movement and a number of other works by our German comrades to obtain a clear idea of its importance and to understand correctly certain passages in it which are liable to misinterpretation if divorced from the situation at the time they were written.

The important thing for us here is to note Liebknecht's *method* of reasoning, to show how he *approached* the question of agreements, so as to help the Russian reader to make his own approach to the solution of the question that interests us, viz., that of blocs with the Cadets.

Liebknecht does not in the least deny that agreements with the bourgeois opposition parties are "useful" both from the standpoint of obtaining "seats in parliament" and from the standpoint of enlisting an "ally" (a supposed ally) against the common enemy—reaction. But the true political acumen and the staunch Social-Democratism of this veteran German socialist are revealed by the fact that he *does not limit*

himself to these considerations. He examines the question whether the "ally" is not an enemy in disguise whom it would be particularly dangerous to admit to our ranks; whether and in what way he actually fights against the common enemy; whether agreements, while being useful as a means of obtaining a larger number of seats in parliament, are not detrimental to the more permanent and more profound aims of the proletarian party.

Let us take at least the three questions I have indicated, and see whether an advocate of agreements between the Russian Social-Democrats and the Cadets like Plekhanov, for instance, *understands* their implications. We shall see that Plekhanov's presentation of the question of agreements is extremely narrow. The Cadets want to fight reaction, therefore ... agreements with the Cadets! Beyond this Plekhanov does not go; he thinks it would be doctrinaire to go any further into the question. Small wonder that a Social-Democrat so forgetful of the requirements of Social-Democratic policy should find himself in the company of and in collaboration with renegade Social-Democrats like Prokopovich and the other publicists of *Tovarishch*. Small wonder that even the Mensheviks, who share the principles of this Social-Democrat, either maintain an embarrassed silence, not daring to say aloud what they think of Plekhanov, and repudiating him at workers' meetings, or simply laugh at him, like the Bundists in *Volkszeitung* and *Nasha Tribuna*.¹⁰

Liebknicht teaches us that a Social-Democrat must be able to expose the dangerous aspects of every ally in the bourgeois camp and not conceal them. Our Mensheviks, however, cry out that we must fight not the Cadets but the Black-Hundred danger! It would be useful for these people to ponder over the following words of Liebknicht: "The stupid and cruel outrages perpetrated by the police politicians, the encroachments of the Anti-Socialist Law, the Draconian law, the law against parties that advocate revolution, may evoke feelings of contempt and pity; but the enemy who proffers us his hand for an electoral agreement and worms his way into our ranks as a friend and brother is the enemy, *the only enemy we have to fear*."

You see, Liebknicht, too, takes police outrages and Black-Hundred laws into account. Nevertheless, he tells the work-

ers boldly: it is not this enemy that we must fear, but an electoral agreement with a false friend. Why did Liebknecht think so? Because he always regarded the strength of fighters as real strength only when it is the strength of *class-conscious* masses of workers. The class-consciousness of the masses is not corrupted by violence and Draconian laws; it is corrupted by the *false friends* of the workers, the liberal bourgeois, who *divert* the masses from the real struggle with empty phrases about a struggle. Our Mensheviks and Plekhanov fail to understand that the fight against the Cadets is a fight to free the minds of the working masses from false Cadet ideas and prejudices about combining popular freedom with the old regime.

Liebknecht laid so much emphasis on the point that false friends are more dangerous than open enemies that he said: "The introduction of a new Anti-Socialist Law would be a lesser evil than the obscuring of class antagonisms and party boundary lines by electoral agreements."

Translate this sentence of Liebknecht's into terms of Russian politics at the end of 1906: "A Black-Hundred Duma would be a lesser evil than the obscuring of class antagonisms and party boundary lines by electoral agreements with the Cadets." If Liebknecht had said this, what a howl would have been raised against him by those who have deserted socialism for the liberals and are now writing for *Tovarishch* and similar newspapers! How often have we heard the Bolsheviks "condemned" at workers' meetings and in the columns of the Menshevik press for expressing ideas similar to those for which Liebknecht was attacked (see p. 54 of the pamphlet). But the Bolsheviks will be as little intimidated by these howls and condemnations as Liebknecht was. Only bad Social-Democrats can make light of the harm done to the working masses by the liberal betrayers of the cause of the people's liberty who ingratiate themselves with them by means of electoral agreements.

Apropos of this treachery of the liberals. Our opportunists, Plekhanov among them, cry: It is tactless in our country, and at the present time, to say that liberalism is treacherous. Plekhanov has even written a whole pamphlet to teach the tactless socialist workers to be polite to the Cadets. But Liebknecht's pamphlet clearly shows that

Plekhanov's ideas are second-hand and that his phrases have already been worn threadbare by the German bourgeois liberals. It transpires that the "trump card" that Plekhanov has been playing against the revolutionary Social-Democrats is *the very same* childish fable about the shepherd and the wolf that the German opportunists used to frighten Liebknecht with. The argument runs: people will get so accustomed to hearing you shout "wolf, wolf!" that when the wolf does come no one will believe you. Liebknecht had an apt answer for the present Plekhanov's numerous kindred spirits in Germany: "In any case, the interests of the Party are not worse protected by cautious men than by scoffers."

Let us take the second question: Are our bourgeois liberals, i. e., the Cadets, really fighting against the Black-Hundred danger and if so, how? Plekhanov is unable either to formulate that question or to answer it by a careful analysis of Cadet policy in revolutionary Russia. Plekhanov, in violation of the elementary principles of Marxism, deduces the concrete relations between the Russian Social-Democrats and the Cadets from the "general concept" bourgeois revolution, instead of studying the actual specific features of the Russian bourgeois revolution in order to obtain a general conception of the mutual relations between the bourgeoisie, the proletariat and the peasantry in contemporary Russia.

Liebknecht teaches us to reason differently. When he was told that the bourgeois liberals were fighting reaction, he replied by carefully analysing *the manner* in which they were fighting. And he showed—in the present pamphlet and in many other writings—that the German liberals (just like our Cadets) were "betraying liberty", that they were coming to an understanding with the "Junkers [the landlords] and the clergy"; that they had proved incapable of being revolutionary in a revolutionary epoch.

Liebknecht says: "As soon as the proletariat begins to come forward as a class distinct from the bourgeoisie and in its interests hostile to the bourgeoisie, *the latter ceases to be democratic.*"

But our opportunists, as if in mockery of the truth, call the Cadets democrats (even in the resolutions of Social-Democratic Party conferences) in spite of the fact that the Cadets repudiate democracy in their programme, recognise

the principle of an Upper Chamber, etc., and in spite of the fact that in the State Duma they proposed Draconian laws against the holding of meetings and opposed the formation, without permission from above, of local land committees on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot!

Liebknecht quite rightly condemned the practice of using the word "revolution" as a shibboleth. When he spoke of revolution, he really meant it; he analysed all questions and all steps in tactics, not only from the point of view of the interests of the moment, but also from the point of view of the vital interests of the revolution as a whole. Liebknecht, like the Russian revolutionary Social-Democrats, had had to experience the painful transitions from direct revolutionary struggle to a miserable, abominable and vile Black-Hundred constitution. Liebknecht knew how to adapt himself to these painful transitions, he knew how to work for the proletariat even in the most adverse circumstances. But he did not rejoice at passing from the fight against an infamous constitution to work under this constitution, he did not jeer at those who had done *everything* to prevent the *emergence* of such a "constitution". By "caution" Liebknecht did not mean kicking the revolution as soon as it begins to decline (even though temporarily) and adjusting oneself as soon as possible to a truncated constitution. No. By "caution" this veteran of the revolutionary movement meant that a proletarian leader must be the last to "adjust" himself to the conditions created by the temporary defeats of the revolution; that he must not do so until long after the bourgeois poltroons and cowards have done so. Liebknecht says: "Practical politics forced us to adjust ourselves to the institutions of the society in which we live; but every step we took in the direction of adjusting ourselves to the present social order was hard for us, and we took it *only with great hesitation*. This called forth no little ridicule from various quarters. *But he who fears to tread on this inclined plane is in any case a more reliable comrade than he who jeers at our hesitation.*"

Remember these golden words, worker comrades who boycotted the Witte Duma. Remember them especially when miserable pedants jeer at you for having boycotted the Duma, forgetting that it was under the flag of the boycott of the

Bulygin Duma that the first (and so far the only, but we are sure not the last) popular movement against institutions of *that type* flared up. Let the Cadet traitors be proud of having been the first voluntarily to crawl on their bellies under the laws of the counter-revolution. Class-conscious proletarians will be proud that they kept their colours flying and the open battle going longer than all the rest, that they fell only under heavy blows in the midst of the fray, and that they, longer than all the rest, continued their efforts and called upon the people to rise again and rush forward to a man, and crush the enemy.

* * *

Finally, let us take the third and last question. Will not electoral agreements be prejudicial to what we hold most dear: "the purity of the principles" of Social-Democracy? Alas! This question has already been answered by the realities of Russian political life in facts which make class-conscious workers blush with shame.

The Mensheviks assured us in their resolutions, vowed and swore at meetings that they would go no further than technical agreements, that they would continue the ideological struggle against the Cadets, that not for the world would they swerve a hairbreadth from their Social-Democratic principles, from their purely proletarian slogans.

And what was the outcome? No less a person than Plekhanov went knocking at the door of the Cadet press so as to offer the people a "middle" slogan, neither Cadet nor Social-Democratic, but agreeable to all and offensive to none: "a Duma with full power". What does it matter if this slogan is a downright deception of the people, that it throws dust in their eyes—so long as there is an agreement with the liberal landlords! But the Cadets have dismissed Plekhanov with contempt; and the Social-Democrats have turned away from him, some with embarrassment, others with indignation. Now he is alone, venting his spleen by railing against the Bolsheviks for their "Blanquism", against the writers on *Tovarishch* for their "lack of modesty", against the Mensheviks for their lack of diplomacy, against everybody but himself! Poor Plekhanov! How cruelly the candid,

plain, proud and outspoken words of Liebknecht's on the harmfulness in principle of agreements have proved justified in his case!

And "Comrade" Vasilyev (who has also peeped at the revolution from the Swiss kitchen window) proposes in *Tovarishch* (December 17), with a direct reference to Plekhanov, that we should simply dissolve the Social-Democratic Party and temporarily—only temporarily!—merge with the liberals. Yes, well might Liebknecht say that in the German Party, too, there was hardly any one who wanted to deviate "from Party principles". But it is not a matter of what one wants, but of what the *force of circumstances* drives the Party to for committing a false step. Plekhanov, too, had the best of intentions: peace and good will with the Cadets against the Black-Hundred danger; but the outcome was an infamy and disgrace for the Social-Democrats.

Worker comrades, read Wilhelm Liebknecht's pamphlet very carefully and be more critical of those who advise you to enter into agreements with the Cadets, which would be fatal to the proletariat and to the cause of liberty.

N. Lenin

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**PREFACE TO THE RUSSIAN TRANSLATION
OF K. KAUTSKY'S PAMPHLET:
*THE DRIVING FORCES AND PROSPECTS
OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION***

The progressive workers of Russia have long known K. Kautsky as *their* writer, who is not only able to substantiate and expound the theoretical teaching of revolutionary Marxism, but also to apply it intelligently, with a thorough analysis of the facts, to the complex and knotty problems of the Russian revolution. And now, when the attention of the Social-Democrats is sometimes almost entirely taken up with the pointless prattle of the liberal Petrushkas¹⁰⁰ and of their conscious and unconscious echoers, when for many people petty "parliamentary" technicalities overshadow the fundamental questions of the proletarian class struggle, and when despondency often gets the better even of decent people and impairs their intellectual and political faculties—now it is trebly important for all Social-Democrats in Russia to pay close attention to Kautsky's opinion on the fundamental problems of the Russian revolution. And not so much to heed Kautsky's opinion as to reflect on the way he presents the question—for Kautsky is not so light-minded as to hold forth on specific questions of Russian tactics with which he is but slightly familiar; and not so ignorant of Russian affairs as to dismiss them with commonplace remarks or uncritical repetition of the latest fashionable pronouncements.

Kautsky answers the questions which Plekhanov addressed to a number of foreign socialists. And in answering these questions—or rather, in selecting from these badly formulated questions the points that *can* be usefully discussed among socialists in all countries—Kautsky begins with a modest reservation. "In regard to the *Russian* comrades, on matters that concern Russia, I feel that I am in the position of a *pupil*." This is not the mock modesty of a Social-

Democratic "general" who begins with the mincing manners of a petty bourgeois and ends with the haughtiness of a Bourbon. Not at all. Kautsky, *in fact*, confined himself to answering *only* those questions by analysing which he could *help* thinking Social-Democrats in Russia to work out for themselves the problems connected with the concrete tasks and slogans of the day. Kautsky refused to be a general who issues commands: "Right turn!" or "Left turn!" He preferred to adopt the position of a comrade standing at a distance, but a thoughtful comrade, indicating where we ourselves should seek for a solution of our problems.

Plekhanov asked Kautsky: 1) What is the "general character" of the Russian revolution: bourgeois or socialist? 2) What should be the attitude of the Social-Democrats towards the bourgeois democrats? 3) Whether the Social-Democratic Party should support the opposition parties in the Duma elections.

At first sight these questions would seem to have been chosen with great "finesse", but as the saying goes: "If a thing is too fine, it breaks." In fact, any more or less competent and observant person will at once see the fine ... *subterfuge* in these questions. A subterfuge, firstly, because they are fine specimens of the metaphysics against which Plekhanov is fond of declaiming so pompously, although he is unable to keep it out of his own arguments on concrete historical questions. Secondly, because the person questioned is artfully driven into a small and exceedingly narrow enclosure. Only those who are entirely, one may even say virginally, innocent in questions of politics can fail to notice that Plekhanov deliberately starts out remote from the subject and gently but firmly pushes the person he is questioning into the position of justifying ... blocs with the Cadets!

To drive a simple-minded interlocutor into justifying blocs with a certain party, without naming that party; to talk of a revolutionary movement and not distinguish the revolutionary from the oppositional bourgeois democracy; to hint that the bourgeoisie is "fighting" *in its own way*, i.e., different from the proletariat's way, and not say plainly and clearly what the difference really is; to try to catch the interlocutor like a young jackdaw with the bait of the Amsterdam Resolution so as to *conceal* from the foreigner

the real points at issue among the Russian Social-Democrats; to deduce concrete rules concerning definite tactics in a definite case, in regard to the attitude to be adopted towards the various parties of the bourgeois democrats, from a general *phrase* about the "general character" of the revolution, instead of deducing this "general character of the Russian revolution" from a precise analysis of the concrete data on the interests and position of the different classes in the Russian revolution—is not all this a subterfuge? Is it not open mockery of Marx's dialectical materialism?

Either "yea, yea—nay, nay, and whatsoever is more than these comes from the evil one." Either a bourgeois revolution or a socialist revolution; the rest can be "deduced" from the main "solution" by means of simple syllogisms.

It is Kautsky's great merit that in answering such questions he at once grasps the point and goes to the root of the mistake contained in the very way they were formulated. Kautsky *virtually* answers Plekhanov's questions *by rejecting* Plekhanov's formulation of them! Kautsky answers Plekhanov by *correcting* Plekhanov's formulation of the question. And the more gently and carefully he corrects the initiator of the questionnaire the more deadly is his criticism of his formulation of the question. Kautsky writes: "We should do well to realise that we are moving towards totally new situations and problems, for which none of the old patterns are suitable."

This exactly hits the mark in relation to Plekhanov's question: Is our revolution bourgeois or socialist in its general character? This is the old pattern, says Kautsky. The question cannot be put in that way, it is not the Marxist way. The revolution in Russia is not a bourgeois revolution, for the bourgeoisie is not one of the driving forces of the present revolutionary movement in Russia. And the revolution in Russia is not a socialist revolution, for it *cannot possibly* result in the *sole* rule or dictatorship of the proletariat. The Social-Democrats can achieve victory in the Russian revolution and *must* strive to do so. But victory in the present revolution cannot be the victory of the proletariat alone, without the aid of other classes. Which class then, *owing* to the objective conditions of the present revolution, *is* the ally of the proletariat? *The peasantry*: "stable, common

interests during the whole period of the revolutionary struggle exists only between the proletariat and the peasantry."

These propositions of Kautsky's are a brilliant confirmation of the tactics of the revolutionary wing of the Russian Social-Democratic Party, i.e., the tactics of the Bolsheviks. And this confirmation is the more valuable because Kautsky, putting aside the concrete and practical questions, concentrated all his attention on a systematic exposition of the *general principles* of socialist tactics in our revolution. He shows that Plekhanov's threadbare method of argument: "the revolution is a bourgeois revolution, therefore we must support the bourgeoisie", has nothing in common with Marxism. He thus recognises the main error of our Social-Democratic opportunism, i.e., Menshevism, which the Bolsheviks have been combating ever since the beginning of 1905.

Further, Kautsky's analysis, which proceeds not from general phrases but from an analysis of the position and interests of definite classes, confirms the conclusion which the yes-men of the Cadets in our ranks considered "tactless", namely: that the bourgeoisie in Russia fears revolution more than reaction; that it hates absolutism because it engenders revolution; that it wants political freedom in order to stop the revolution. Compare this with the naïve faith in the Cadets professed by our Plekhanov, who, in his questions, has imperceptibly identified the struggle of the opposition against the old order with the struggle against the government's attempts to crush the revolutionary movement! Unlike the Mensheviks with their stereotyped views, Kautsky reveals the revolutionary and non-revolutionary elements of "bourgeois democracy", reveals the bankruptcy of liberalism, and shows that as the peasants become more independent and more politically conscious, the liberals will inevitably and rapidly turn to the right. A bourgeois revolution, brought about by the proletariat and the peasantry in spite of the instability of the bourgeoisie—this fundamental principle of Bolshevik tactics is wholly confirmed by Kautsky.

Kautsky shows that in the course of the revolution it is quite possible that victory will fall to the lot of the Social-Democratic Party, and that that Party *must* inspire its adherents with confidence in victory. Kautsky's conclusions completely confound the Menshevik fear of a Social-

Democratic victory in the present revolution. Plekhanov's ridiculous efforts to "fit" the tasks of our revolution "into the Amsterdam Resolution" seem particularly comical when compared with Kautsky's clear and lucid proposition: "It is impossible to fight successfully if one renounces victory beforehand."

The fundamental difference between Kautsky's *methods* and those of Plekhanov, the leader of our present opportunists, is even more striking when the former states: to imagine that "all the classes and parties which are striving for political freedom have simply to work together in order to achieve it," means "*seeing only the political surface of events*". This sounds as though Kautsky were directly referring to that small band of Social-Democrats who have deserted to the liberals: Portugalov, Prokopovich, Kuskova, Boguchar-sky, Izgoyev, Struve and others, who are committing the very error Kautsky points to (and are dragging Plekhanov with them in the process). The fact that Kautsky is unacquainted with the writings of these gentry only enhances the significance of his *theoretical* conclusion.

Needless to say, Kautsky *fully* agrees with the fundamental thesis of *all* Russian Social-Democrats, that the peasant movement is *non-socialist*; that socialism cannot arise from small peasant production, etc. It would be very edifying for the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who are fond of asserting that they "also agree with Marx", to ponder over these words of Kautsky's.

In conclusion just a few words about "authorities". Marxists cannot adopt the usual standpoint of the intellectual radical, with his pseudo-revolutionary abstraction: "no authorities".

No. The working class, which all over the world is waging a hard and persistent struggle for complete emancipation, needs authorities, but, of course, only in the way that young workers need the experience of veteran *fighters* against oppression and exploitation, of those who have organised many strikes, have taken part in a number of revolutions, who are wise in revolutionary traditions, and have a broad political outlook. The proletarians of every country need the authority of the world-wide struggle of the proletariat. We need the authority of the theoreticians of international Social-

Democracy to enable us properly to understand the programme and tactics of our Party. But, of course, this authority has nothing in common with the official authorities in bourgeois science and police politics. It is the authority of the experience gained in the more diversified struggle waged in the ranks of the same world socialist army. And important though this authority is in widening the horizon of the fighters, it would be impermissible in the workers' party to claim that the practical and concrete questions of its immediate policy can be solved by those standing a long way off. The collective spirit of the progressive class-conscious workers immediately engaged in the struggle in each country will always remain the highest authority on all such questions.

Such is our view on the authoritativeness of the opinions held by Kautsky and by Plekhanov. The theoretical works of the latter—mainly his criticism of the Narodniks and the opportunists—remain a lasting asset for Social-Democracy all over Russia, and no "factionalism" will blind any man who possesses the least bit of "physical brain power" to such an extent as to make him forget or deny the importance of this asset. But as a political leader of the Russian Social-Democrats in the Russian bourgeois revolution, as a tactician, Plekhanov has proved to be beneath criticism. In this sphere he has displayed an opportunism a hundred times more harmful to the Russian Social-Democratic workers than Bernstein's opportunism is to the German workers. And this Cadet-like policy advocated by Plekhanov, who has returned to the fold of Prokopovich & Co. whom he, in 1899-1900, expelled from the Social-Democratic Party, we must most ruthlessly combat.

That this tactical opportunism of Plekhanov's is an utter negation of the fundamentals of the Marxist method is best shown by Kautsky's *line of argument* traced in the essay here presented to the reader.

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THE ATTITUDE OF THE BOURGEOIS PARTIES AND OF THE WORKERS' PARTY TO THE DUMA ELECTIONS

The papers are full of news about the preparations for the elections. Almost every day we are informed either of a new government "interpretation" striking out of the voters' list one more category of unreliable citizens, or of new persecutions, prohibitions of meetings, suppression of newspapers and the arrest of suspected electors or candidates. The Black Hundreds have raised their heads, whooping and hooting more insolently than ever.

The parties that are objectionable to the government are also preparing for the elections. These parties are confident, and justly confident, that the *mass* of the voters will have their say, will take advantage of the elections to express their true convictions in spite of all the tricks, pin-pricks and restrictions, great and small, that are directed against the voters. This confidence is based on the fact that the most ferocious persecutions, the most intolerable pin-pricks will at most eliminate hundreds, thousands, let us say, tens of thousands of voters throughout Russia. But this will not alter the sentiments and the attitude of the *masses* towards the government. Ten or twenty thousand voters can be struck off the list in St. Petersburg, say, but this will only cause the 150,000 voters in the capital to withdraw into their shells, as it were, to lie low for a time. They will not disappear, however, and their mass sentiment will not change; if it does change, it will not, of course, be in favour of the government. Therefore, unless the electoral law is radically amended, unless all remnants of electoral legality are finally trampled upon (and they can still be further trampled upon by means of systematic arrests of electors: one may

expect the very worst from Stolypin!)—there is still no doubt that the mood of the masses will decide the elections, and the decision will certainly not be in favour of the government and its Black Hundreds.

And all non-supporters of the government are placing their hopes in the masses of the voters. But if you examine carefully what this hope in the masses really amounts to, what *the attitude* of the various parties is towards the masses—you will observe a vast difference between the bourgeois parties and the party of the proletariat.

The Cadets are at the head of the liberal-bourgeois parties. During the elections to the First Duma they shamefully betrayed the struggle, they refused to take part in the boycott; they themselves went tamely to the elections and drew the raw masses after them. Now they are placing their hopes on the inertness of these masses, and on the restrictions which have been imposed on agitation and on the Left parties in the conduct of their election campaign. The Cadet's hope in the masses is hope in the immaturity and servitude of the masses. He argues as follows: the masses will not understand our programme and tactics, they will not go beyond a peaceful and legal, the most peaceful and timid protest—not because they do not wish to, but because they will not be allowed to. They will vote for us, for the Lefts have no newspapers, no meetings, no leaflets, no security against arbitrary arrest and persecution. So thinks the Cadet. And he proudly raises his eyes to heaven and says: I thank thee Lord that I am not as one of those "extremists"! I am not a revolutionary; I shall be able to adjust myself most obediently and abjectly to any measures; I shall even get my election forms* from the Peaceful Renovators.

Hence, the whole of the Cadets' election campaign is directed to frightening the masses with the Black-Hundred danger and the danger from the extreme Left parties, to adapting themselves to the philistinism, cowardice and flabbiness of the petty bourgeois and to persuading him that the Cadets are the safest, the most modest, the most moderate and the most well-behaved of people. Every day the Cadet papers ask their readers: Are you afraid, philistine? Rely

* See p. 385 of this volume.—Ed.

on us! We are not going to frighten you, we are opposed to violence, we are obedient to the government; rely on us, and we shall do everything for you "as far as possible"! And behind the backs of the frightened philistines the Cadets resort to every trick to assure the government of their loyalty, to assure the Lefts of their love of liberty, to assure the Peaceful Renovators of their affinity with their party and their election forms.

No enlightenment of the masses, no agitation to rouse the masses, no exposition of consistent democratic slogans—only a haggling for seats behind the backs of the frightened philistines—such is the election campaign of all the parties of the liberal bourgeoisie, from the non-party people (of *Tovarishch*) to the Party of Democratic Reforms.

The attitude of the workers' party towards the masses is exactly the reverse. The important thing for us is not to get seats in the Duma by means of compromises; on the contrary, those seats are important only because and insofar as they can serve to develop the *political consciousness* of the masses, to *raise* them to a higher political level, to *organise* them, not for the sake of philistine happiness, not for the sake of "tranquillity", "order" and "peaceful [bourgeois] bliss", but for the *struggle*, the struggle for the complete emancipation of labour from all exploitation and all oppression. Only for this purpose, and only to the extent that they help us to achieve it, are seats in the Duma and the *whole* election campaign important for us. The workers' party places all its hopes on the masses; on the masses who are not frightened, not passively submissive and who do not humbly bear the yoke, but who are politically conscious, demanding and militant. The workers' party must treat with contempt the usual liberal method of frightening the philistine with the bogey of the Black-Hundred danger. The whole task of the Social-Democrats is to make the masses *conscious* of the real danger, of the actual aims in the struggle of these forces whose strength lies not in the Duma, which find full expression not in Duma debates, and which will settle the question of Russia's future outside the Duma.

The workers' party therefore warns the masses against the clandestine election tricks of the Cadet bourgeoisie, against its stultifying cry: Entrust to us, lawyers, professors

and enlightened landlords, the task of combating the Black-Hundred danger!

The workers' party tells the masses: trust only your socialist consciousness and your socialist organisation. To surrender priority in the struggle and the right to lead it to the liberal bourgeoisie is tantamount to selling the cause of liberty for grandiloquent phrases, for the tawdry brilliance of fashionable and gaudy signboards. No Black-Hundred danger in the Duma can be as harmful as the corruption of the minds of the masses who are blindly following the liberal bourgeoisie, its slogans, its candidates and its policy.

Among the masses to whom the workers' party is appealing, the strongest numerically are the peasants and various sections of the petty bourgeoisie. They are more determined than the Cadets, more honest and a thousand times more capable of fighting, but in politics they are too often led by the Cadet windbags. Even now they are wavering between the militant proletariat and the compromising bourgeoisie.

The advocates of blocs with the Cadets are not only doing harm to the proletariat and to the whole cause of liberty. They are prejudicing the development of political consciousness among the urban and rural poor. They are not performing their immediate duty, which is to free these people from the influence of the liberal bourgeoisie. Look at the Trudoviks, the "Popular Socialists" and the Socialist-Revolutionaries. They, too, are wavering, and are also mainly occupied with plans for deals with the Cadets. The leaders of the Trudoviks, having failed to form a party of their own, are multiplying their Duma mistakes tenfold by appealing to the masses to vote for the Cadets (Anikin—through newspaper reporters, Zhilkin—in *Tovarishch*, etc.). This is downright treachery to the cause of the peasants' struggle, downright betrayal of the peasants to the liberal landlords, who would rob the peasants by means of a "fair" compensation as thoroughly as their forefathers did in 1861. And as for the "Popular Socialists", even the Cadets are laughing at them and calling them "second reserve Cadets" (Milyukov in *Rech*). Their leaders (Annensky and others) also appeal for blocs with the Cadets. Their tiny party (which according to *Tovarishch*, a paper which is favourably disposed to them, is weaker even than the party of peaceful plunder, and which

has only about 2,000 members throughout Russia!) is a mere appendage of the Cadets. The position of the Socialist-Revolutionaries is also ambiguous: both in the October period and in the period of the First Duma they concealed the fact that they had split with the Popular Socialists; they continued to collaborate with them and jointly published the same newspapers. Today, they are not conducting any open and independent struggle, are not sufficiently broadly, openly and sharply attacking the "second reserve Cadets", are not supplying the masses with adequate data for criticising that party, and are not making any appraisal in principle of the whole election campaign and all electoral agreements in general.

It is the great historical duty of the workers' party to help to create an *independent* political party of the working class. Those who advocate blocs with the Cadets hinder the fulfilment of this duty.

Another great duty that confronts the workers' party is to free the masses of the ruined, poverty-stricken and doomed urban petty bourgeoisie and peasantry from the influence of the ideas and prejudices of the liberal bourgeoisie. The fulfilment of this duty is also being hindered by those who advocate blocs with the Cadets. They are not divorcing the peasants from the liberals, but are strengthening this unnatural alliance, which is fatal to the cause of liberty and to the cause of the proletariat. They are not warning the peasant masses against the liberals' backstairs politics (or rather, political intrigue for the distribution of seats in the Duma), but are sanctioning this intrigue by taking part in it.

Down with all blocs! The workers' party must conduct its election campaign independently, not only in words, but in deeds. It must provide the whole people, and the masses of the proletariat in particular, with a model of courageous and consistent criticism based on principle. Only in that way shall we succeed in rallying the masses for effective participation in the struggle for freedom and not in the sham liberalism of the Cadet betrayers of freedom.

PLEKHANOV AND VASILYEV

The attitude of the Menshevik Social-Democratic press towards Plekhanov's well-known Herostratian articles in *Tovarishch* deserves the attention of the whole party of the working class. The most prominent representative of the Menshevik trend, the leader of the Mensheviks, as all the liberal newspapers openly and constantly call him, is publicly proposing a *joint platform* for the Social-Democrats and Cadets.

And the Mensheviks are silent!

One would think that they had no newspapers, magazines, leaflets, institutions, collegiums, not a single Party organisation. One would think that they were not in the least concerned by what *their* leader says about *their* policy in the hearing of all Russia....

But we are all perfectly aware that the Mensheviks possess both organisations—even such influential ones as the Central Committee—and organs of every type. Their silence, therefore, is only another proof of the utter falsity of their position. The Bundists alone stand out among the mass of the Mensheviks. They have protested against the slogan of “a Duma with full power” in their *Volkszeitung*, which unfortunately is almost unknown among the Russians. They have poured ridicule on Plekhanov in their *Nasha Tribuna*, published in the Russian language. They have thus proved, at any rate, that they have the courage of their convictions, the courage to recognise in deed and not only in words their *own* Party organisation, whose *obligation* it is openly and straightforwardly to express its opinion on all political questions, and to place its political duty to the proletariat above

all considerations of personal sympathy, friendship and respect of persons....*

What a disgraceful thing to happen in a workers' party! The trend which predominates in the Party and controls the Central Committee does not dare to mention the mistakes of *one* of its members. At all meetings, at all debates at which workers are present, at all discussions with the Bolsheviks, the Mensheviks solemnly avow that they disagree with Plekhanov. But they are silent about it in their press: not a single *official* declaration from any Party unit. What is this? Repudiation in secret and confirmation by official silence? Abuse the master ... behind his back and be silent in his presence. Such things are done only by ... well, gentlemen, we'll leave you to guess who does such things.

But to the workers and the whole Party membership we say: You cannot trust political leaders who disappear, bag and baggage, at the first surprise attack from whatever quarter. They are not to be trusted. Whenever any final decision is to be taken, all these "leaders" will act *not* as they say but as some third person *says for them*.

By the way, the behaviour of Plekhanov and the Mensheviks in the present incident is a good illustration of the current talk about the "intellectualist" character of our Party. Yes, it is true that the non-proletarian intelligentsia has far too much influence on the proletariat in our Party. If that were not the case, would the proletarian party tolerate

* We have just received an extract from the Georgian Social-Democratic organ of the Tiflis *Mensheviks*, "*Tsin*" ("*Forward*"), of December 8. The Tiflis Mensheviks emphatically challenge Plekhanov's views and declare that his arguments in favour of the slogan: "a Duma with full power" are erroneous, that the Social-Democrats *cannot* take this slogan to mean a constituent assembly. The slogan of "a Duma with full power", they write, "would mean the curtailing of our programme". Further on they argue that this slogan is also unacceptable to the Cadets, and that in general a joint platform for the Social-Democrats and Cadets is quite out of the question. A joint platform means "clipping the wings of our Party's independence, blurring the differences between the views of the Social-Democrats and those of the bourgeois parties".

You are right, Tiflis Menshevik comrades! We note with satisfaction that in spite of the Central Committee and the majority of Russian Mensheviks, the Bundists and the Caucasians have not swerved from their duty to state plainly that Plekhanov's view and his whole statement are wrong.

Plekhanov's antics and the Mensheviks' attitude towards them even for a week? How clearly this reveals the true nature of the talk about a *non-party* labour congress. If only our Party were superseded by a legal labour (simply labour, not Social-Democratic) party, as Larin and the publicists of *Nashe Dyelo* and *Sovremennaya Zhizn* desire, there would be a wide field for actions like Plekhanov's. Write for any newspapers you please, enter into any literary or political blocs with anyone you please, propose your *own* slogans in your own name, completely ignoring any Party organisation! Complete freedom for intellectualist individualism, while the mass of non-party workers remains an amorphous mass. Is this not the ideal of the old Prokopovich *Credo* (for which Plekhanov and I, in 1899-1900, attacked Prokopovich and drove him and all his fraternity out of the Social-Democratic Party)? The *Credo*—that quintessence of Social-Democratic opportunism—advocated non-political, non-party labour unions for the economic struggle, and political struggle through liberal channels. Blocs with the Cadets and a non-party labour congress are nothing but a 1906-07 edition of the *Credo* of 1899.

Plekhanov's articles in *Tovarishch* are simply Larin's proposal put into practice: free propagandist societies for all and sundry "socialists"—if they can be called socialists—against a background of non-party labour organisations. *In actual fact*, Plekhanov wrote in *Tovarishch* not as a member of the Party, not as a member of one of the Party organisations. This is a fact which cannot be explained away by any sophistry; and no "hushing up" of this fact by the Menshevik Central Committee can save a certain faction in our Party. In fact, Plekhanov wrote exactly as Larin wrote, as a *non-party* socialist in a non-party "socialist" organ; and he put forward a non-party, *non-socialist* and even *anti-socialist* proposal.

Vasilyev has followed in Plekhanov's footsteps. Switzerland, owing to its freedom from the traditions of the Russian revolutionary proletariat, is supplying us with more and more "advanced" opportunists.

Vasilyev is a prominent Menshevik. He has worked with Mensheviks; not with Mensheviks casually met in some remote provincial town, but with the most prominent and most

responsible Mensheviks. Hence, the Mensheviks *have no right* to treat Vasilyev with disdain.

And Vasilyev directly refers to Plekhanov. More than that, he refers to him *in support* of his own case. He calls Plekhanov's disgraceful (for the Social-Democratic Party) article in the Cadet press proposing a joint platform with the Cadets "a courageous call". He "regrets" that "there are no Plekhanovs in the other parties".

Vasilyev displays much zeal but little intelligence. He wanted to praise Plekhanov, and in praise of him he blurted out: "Unfortunately there are no Plekhanovs in the other parties." This is matchless! Good Vasilyev was the first to use the word "Plekhanovs" as a *generic* term for politicians who act on their own account, and independently of their party. From now on people will probably begin to speak of: "*the Plekhanovs* in the *Vasilyev* sense of the word...."

Slapping "the Plekhanovs" on the back, the Vasilyevs dot the i's and cross the t's. In 1899, the authors of the *Credo*, Prokopovich & Co., spoke of a pure labour movement free from the germs of revolution. The Vasilyevs talk of a revolution which must give birth to a "constitution" and nothing more, and give birth to it *without* the aid of midwives, without revolutionaries. *No* midwives, no revolutionaries, no revolutionary people—such is Vasilyev's slogan.

Shchedrin once poured classic ridicule on the France that was shooting the Communards, the France of the bankers who were cringing before the Russian tyrants. He called her a republic without republicans.¹⁷⁰ It is time a new Shchedrin was born to ridicule Vasilyev and the Mensheviks, who are advocating revolution with the slogan of "no" revolutionaries, "no" revolution.

Are we right in interpreting Vasilyev's "pronouncement" *in this way*? Are we right in putting him on a par with the Mensheviks?

Of course, we are! Vasilyev's whole article, all his ideas, all his proposals are imbued with the "plan" to facilitate the birth of a constitution by killing the revolution. To "temporarily relinquish" all programmes, to merge all Social-Democrats, Socialist-Revolutionaries, and suchlike with the Cadets in one liberal party, to unite them all for the struggle for a "political constitution" "without the simulta-

neous solution of economic programmes" (this is exactly what the letter says—"without solution of programmes". The Swiss advisers of the Russian proletariat are not always able to express themselves in good Russian)—does not all this evince a desire to save the constitution by renouncing the revolution?

A revolution in the real, serious sense is *inconceivable* without "solution of economic programmes". A revolution can only be made by the masses, actuated by profound *economic* needs. The fall of absolutism in Russia, its *real* fall, would *inevitably* mean an *economic* revolution. Only those who are virginally innocent of socialism can fail to understand this. To abandon economic programme means abandoning the fundamental economic causes of revolution, abandoning the economic interests which impel the masses of downtrodden, cowed, ignorant people to wage a great and unprecedentedly selfless struggle. It means abandoning the masses, leaving only a gang of intellectual spouters, and substituting liberal spouting for socialist policy.

"What benefit was it to the peasants that their cause was espoused by the Duma that was dissolved mainly on account of the agrarian question?" Does not this argument entitle Vasilyev to have a monument erected to him in his lifetime for socialist opportunism unsurpassed in the world?

And is this not (we now pass to the second of the two questions raised above) a Menshevik argument?

Ride in the same compartment with the Cadets as far as Tver without disturbing each other, says Plekhanov. Ride with the Cadets to the Duma, allying ourselves with a non-revolutionary party (for a time! "for a short time!" says Vasilyev, supplementing the Menshevik formula) for revolutionary objects—say the Mensheviks. Ride together as far as a Cadet Cabinet, said our Central Committee recently.

Yes, let's ride, agrees Vasilyev, "*without jostling or frightening each other*". "Now, at this moment, it [the struggle of classes and groups] is fatal and criminal."

To wage the class struggle is criminal; to jeopardise the constitution by revolutionary demands (such as: a Duma with full power, a constituent assembly, etc.) is criminal. However much the Mensheviks may repudiate Vasilyev (they have not done so yet, by the by) they will never be able to

obliterate the fact that it is *this idea* that underlies blocs with the Cadets, support for the demand for a Duma Cabinet, and all these joint trips as far as Tver, etc., etc.

Vasilyev, of course, is unique. But even unique phenomena of nature occur only in a definite environment and spring only from definite conditions. Vasilyev, of course, is the Mont Blanc of opportunism. But one does not find Mont Blancs in the steppes. They exist only among Alpine peaks. Vasilyevs can only appear in company with the "Plekhanovs", Cherevanins, and *tutti quanti* down to Prokopovich.

And thanks to "the Plekhanovs in the Vasilyev sense" Mr. Struve is able to say, as he did at a meeting in Solyanoi Gorodok on December 27 (*Tovarishch* of December 28) that "all the present opponents of the Cadets will in the near future become Cadets themselves. *Tovarishch* is already being called a Cadet paper. The Popular Socialists are being called Social-Cadets, the Mensheviks—semi-Cadets. Many people regard G. V. Plekhanov as a Cadet, and indeed, many of his present utterances can be welcomed by the Cadets. It is a pity only that he did not say these things when the Cadets stood alone. The Bolsheviks alone may prove incorrigible, hence their fate will be to end up in a museum of history."

Thank you for the compliment, clumsy Mr. Struve! Yes, we shall end up in the museum of history that is called "the history of the revolution in Russia". Our Bolshevik slogans, the Bolshevik boycott of the Bulygin Duma, the Bolshevik calls for a mass strike and uprising (as early as the Third Congress) will be *inseparably and forever* associated with the October Revolution in Russia. And we shall use our place in this *museum* even during long years or (if it comes to the worst) decades of reaction to teach the proletariat to hate the treacherous Octobrist-Cadet bourgeoisie, to despise intellectualist phrases and petty-bourgeois sentimentality. We shall use our place in this *museum* under all political conditions, even the worst, to preach relentless class struggle to the workers, to teach them how to prepare for a *new* revolution—one that will be more independent of the half-hearted and flabby bourgeoisie, and closer to the socialist revolution of the proletariat.

And your place in the museum, worthy Mr. Struve, will be the place assigned to those who rejoice and make fine speeches when counter-revolution triumphs. You will always be able to rejoice at such times over the fact that the revolutionaries have fallen in battle and the stage is occupied by the liberals, who lay down voluntarily, lay down at the enemy's feet, so as to "crawl into infamy".

If, contrary to our expectations, the revolution is not destined to rise again and wrest power from the tsar and his gang, you will long remain the hero of the counter-revolution. We will have a "place in the museum", but a good place—that of the *October struggle of the people*. If, however, the revolution rises again, as we believe it will, every trace of the miserable Cadets will disappear within a week, and the struggle of the masses of the proletariat and the ruined peasantry will once again go forward under Bolshevik slogans. Under the hegemony of the Cadets, the revolution can only lie in the dust. It can be victorious only under the hegemony of the Bolshevik Social-Democrats.

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THE WORKERS' PARTY ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN ST. PETERSBURG

The St. Petersburg organisation of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party has held its third (in the past year) general conference.¹⁷¹ The first conference, February 1906, decided the question whether or not to participate in the elections to the Witte Duma. The second, June 1906, decided the question whether the demand for a Duma Cabinet should be supported. The third, January 1907, decided the question of the Second Duma election campaign.

The bourgeois parties settle big political questions from case to case by a simple ruling of one or other party "authority", which secretly concocts various political nostrums for the people. Only the workers' Social-Democratic Party actually practises democracy in organisation, in spite of the enormous difficulties—and even heavy sacrifices—which this entails for an illegal party. Only the workers' Social-Democratic Party weighs the importance in *principle* of every major political step before it decides to take it. It does not strive for ephemeral success, but subordinates its practical policy to the ultimate goal—the complete emancipation of labour from all exploitation. Only the workers' party, when marching to battle, demands from all its members a well-considered, straight and clear answer to the question whether a certain step should be taken and how it should be taken.

The last conference of the St. Petersburg organisation, too, was based on the democratic representation of all the members of the Party. Moreover, the delegates had to be elected on the basis of a canvass of opinion of all the electors

on the question of agreements with the Cadets. Without an intelligent answer to this topical question of tactics, the democratic procedure of electing delegates to the conference would have been idle play, unworthy of the proletariat.

Here is the resolution adopted by the Conference:

In view of the fact: (1) that it is absolutely obligatory for the Social-Democratic Party, as the class party of the proletariat, to conduct its election campaign independently in all cases where no special and exceptional circumstances are present; (2) that hitherto the St. Petersburg Social-Democrats, headed by the St. Petersburg Committee, have been conducting an entirely independent election campaign, influencing all sections of the working population, both those who adopt a consistent proletarian standpoint and those who have not fully mastered it; (3) that at the present time, two weeks before the elections, it is already evident that in St. Petersburg the chances of the parties on the right are very slight, while those of the Cadets are considered (mainly owing to tradition) to be strong, so that it is particularly imperative for the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party to exert every effort to break the hegemony of the Cadets in the metropolis, on which the attention of the whole of Russia is concentrated; (4) that large sections of the poorer working people in the city who do not yet adhere to the proletarian standpoint, and whose vote can influence the result of the elections in the city curia, are vacillating between the desire to vote to the Left of the Cadets, i.e., to free themselves from the leadership of the treacherous liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, and the desire to secure at least a few Trudovik deputies in the Duma by entering into a bloc with the Cadets; (5) that the wavering Trudovik parties reveal a desire to sanction a bloc with the Cadets on condition of obtaining one, or at any rate not more than two out of the six seats in the metropolis, on the grounds that the Social-Democrats refuse under any circumstances to enter into an agreement with the non-Social-Democratic sections of the urban poor against the liberal bourgeoisie—the Conference resolves: (1) immediately to inform the St. Petersburg Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party and the Committee of the Trudovik Group that the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. is prepared to enter into an agreement with them on condition that they enter into no agreements whatsoever with the Cadets; (2) the terms of the agreement to be complete independence of the contracting parties as regards slogans, programmes and tactics generally. The six seats in the Duma to be distributed as follows: two seats for the workers' curia, two for the Social-Democrats, one for the Socialist-Revolutionaries and one for the Trudoviks; (3) the Conference authorises its executive body to conduct the negotiations; (4) that in St. Petersburg Gubernia local agreements with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Trudoviks are permitted on the same principles.

Note: In regard to the P. S. Party (the Trudovik or Popular Socialist Party) it is resolved: in view of that party's evasive position on the fundamental questions of the struggle outside the Duma, the Conference sanctions agreements with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Trudoviks provided that they have no agreement with the P. S. Party.

Three main points stand out in examining this resolution: firstly, categorical renunciation of all agreements with the Cadets; secondly, inflexible determination of the Social-Democrats to put forward its independent lists under all circumstances; and, thirdly, sanction of agreements with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Trudoviks.

To reject agreements with the Cadets was the plain duty of the workers' party. As soon as the election meetings began in St. Petersburg it at once became clear to all that the revolutionary Social-Democrats were right when they said: our liberals have been humbugging ignorant people who have no definite principles with their cries about the Black-Hundred danger in order to avert the real danger threatening them from the left. The petty police tricks of the government, cheating the poor voters out of their votes with the aid of Senate interpretations have failed to change the mood of the mass of the voters (whether there will be 100, 120 or 150 thousand voters, makes no difference). And this mood of the masses is being clearly manifested at meetings as a mood that is to the left of the Cadets.

Of course, the Black-Hundred danger may not lie in the mass of the electorate voting Black Hundred, but in the arrest of Left voters and electors by the Black-Hundred police. There are persistent rumours that the present relative "freedom" (in Russia if a person is allowed to breathe it is called freedom!) of election meetings is a trap laid by the government, which intends to arrest prominent speakers and electors. But it is quite easy to understand that to combat *this* Black-Hundred danger we need, not blocs with the Cadets, but the preparedness of the masses to engage in a struggle that will go beyond the bounds of so-called parliamentarism.

Secondly, the Conference decided, as was to be expected, that in the metropolis the Social-Democrats will conduct

their campaign independently under any circumstances. They may offer to enter into an agreement with another party in one form or another; but we were prepared for complete independence before, and are ready for it now. Taking the election campaign as a whole, an agreement under such circumstances will in fact be an exception; the independence of the Social-Democrats will be the rule.

Thirdly, the Conference offered to enter into an agreement with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Trudoviks on condition that they kept aloof from the Cadets and the pro-Cadet Popular Socialists, and on the further condition that the workers' curia is given two seats and that the four remaining seats are divided equally.

This proposal is based on the principle of discriminating between parties according to their attitude towards the struggle outside the Duma, which tomorrow may become an immediate question. By making their pacts with other parties conditional upon the observance of certain principles the Social-Democrats provide ammunition for mass agitation and propaganda on the true character of the various parties. The Social-Democrats take into account the peculiarities of the situation in St. Petersburg, where the mass of the "Trudovik-inclined" urban petty bourgeoisie are led in tow by the Cadets. Under such conditions we cannot neglect the task of breaking this hegemony of the Cadets, of helping the working people to take a *step forward*—a small step, it is true, but one of unquestionable political importance—a step towards a more determined struggle, towards clearer political ideas, towards more definite class-consciousness.

And *this* result we shall achieve by our agitation, by our whole procedure in conducting the election campaign; and we shall achieve it whatever the answer of the Trudoviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries to our offer may be. There is no need for us to go into all sorts of calculations to ascertain the probability of an affirmative or a negative answer. Our attention must not be concentrated on this. The important thing for us is the fundamental policy of the proletariat, which remains unchanged in the face of various specific possibilities: to the deceptive illusions of peaceful struggle and constitutional toys we counterpose a clear analysis of the

tasks of the struggle outside the Duma, a struggle that the course of events is bringing ever nearer. We say to the petty-bourgeois sections of the urban and rural working people: there is only one thing that can prevent the instability and vacillation of the small proprietors, and that is an independent class party of the revolutionary proletariat.

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THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS AND THE ELECTIONS IN ST. PETERSBURG

The conference of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation adopted a resolution not to enter into a bloc with the Cadets, but to propose an agreement with the Trudoviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries. The Mensheviks made a number of protests on formal grounds and, being in a minority, walked out of the conference.

The liberal newspapers have already made a lot of noise about this event. They predict a split in the Social-Democratic Party, and hasten to draw a number of political conclusions. In view of this it is extremely important for every class-conscious worker to understand what is really taking place in the Social-Democratic organisation in St. Petersburg and what attitude to adopt towards this.

We propose, therefore, to examine the main questions that arise in connection with this event, namely: (1) the composition of the conference; (2) the immediate reason why the Mensheviks walked out of the conference—the attempt of the Central Committee to divide the conference into two parts, one for the city and one for the gubernia; and (3) *the significance of the whole event*, especially in view of the election campaign now proceeding in St. Petersburg.

I

THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE WAS CONVENED, AND ITS COMPOSITION

The object of the conference of the St. Petersburg organisation was to adopt a final decision on the most important political question of the day, namely: whether or not to

enter into agreements with the Cadets at the first stage of the Duma elections.

The Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party is organised on democratic lines. This means that all the affairs of the Party are conducted, either directly, or through representatives, by all the members of the Party, all of whom without exception have equal rights; moreover, all officials, all leading bodies, and all institutions of the Party are subject to election, are responsible to their constituents, and are subject to recall. The affairs of the St. Petersburg organisation are managed by an elected body, the St. Petersburg Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. The supreme body of the St. Petersburg organisation, in view of the impossibility of bringing together all the members of the Party (about 6,000), is the *conference of representatives* of the organisation. To this conference *all* members of the organisation have a right to send representatives: one delegate for a definite number of Party members; one delegate for every 50 members, for instance, the ratio that was adopted for the last conference. These representatives must be *elected* by all the members of the Party, and a decision adopted by the representatives is supreme and final for the whole of the local organisation.

But this is not all. In order that the settlement of a question may be really democratic, it is not enough to call together the elected representatives of the organisation. It is necessary that *all* the members of the organisation, in electing their representatives, should at the same time *independently, and each for himself*, express their opinion on the point at issue before the whole organisation. Democratically organised parties and unions cannot, on principle, dispense with such a canvass of the opinion of every member without exception, in the most important cases at any rate, and especially when it is a question of a political action in which the *masses* act independently, e. g., a strike, elections, the boycott of some important local institution, etc.

Why is it considered insufficient to send representatives in such cases? Why must there be a canvass of the opinion of *all* members of the Party or what is called a "referendum"? Because the success of mass actions requires the conscious and voluntary participation of every individual worker.

A strike cannot be conducted with the necessary solidarity, voting at elections will not be conducted intelligently, unless *every worker* consciously and voluntarily decides for himself the question: to strike or not to strike? to vote or not to vote for the Cadets? It is impossible to decide all political questions by canvassing the opinion of all members of the Party: this would involve endless, tiresome and fruitless voting. But the most important questions, and especially those which are directly connected with some definite action by the *masses themselves*, must, for the sake of democracy, be settled, not only by sending representatives, but also by canvassing the opinion of all members of the Party.

That is why the St. Petersburg Committee resolved that the election of delegates to the conference should take place only *after* the members of the Party had discussed the question of whether to enter into agreements with the Cadets, only *after* all members of the Party had voted on that question. An election is an affair in which the masses take a direct part. Socialists consider that the political consciousness of the masses is the main force. Consequently, *every* member of the Party must express his considered opinion on the question whether or not to vote for the Cadets at the elections. Only after this question has been openly discussed by all the Party members assembled is it possible for each one to adopt an intelligent and firm decision one way or the other. Only on the basis of such a decision can the election of representatives to the conference be, not the result of clannishness, friendship or force of habit ("We will elect *our* Nikolai Nikolayevich or Ivan Ivanovich!"), but the result of the considered decision of the "rank and file" *themselves* (i.e., of *all* the members of the Party) as to their own political conduct.*

* Some say that the election of a representative can take place on the basis of knowing the representative's *views*, even without a vote being taken on the question at issue. But this is true, only as regards the *totality* of the views held by that representative. It cannot apply when a special question affecting the action of the masses themselves is involved. The refusal to vote on a platform (for blocs with the Cadets or against them) would, under such circumstances, imply that the voter's views were vague, that he was irresolute, that he was not quite in agreement with his representative.

The elections to the Duma, i. e., the primary and main voting for delegates or electors, will be carried out, not through representatives, but by every voter individually. Consequently, if we want to be socialists in deeds and not only in words, socialists organised in a really *democratic workers'* party, then we must see to it that *every worker* is clear on the question of whether to vote for the Cadets or not. To entrust representation to Ivan Ivanovich, who is an acquaintance of ours, or to Sidor Sidorovich who is a decent fellow, is not enough; the *essence* of the question at issue must be *intelligently* examined by the "rank and file". Only when that is done will the democratic decision be the considered democratic decision of the *masses* and not only the decision of representatives elected because "we know them".

The St. Petersburg Committee is the elected leader of the *whole* Social-Democratic organisation in St. Petersburg and St. Petersburg Gubernia. To lead the *membership* in a matter like the Duma elections, it was obliged (if it recognised democracy not in words only) to seek the conscious participation of the *whole membership* in the elections. And in order that the participation of the whole membership in the elections might be conscious and united, it was necessary that not only representatives of the Party, but that every member of the Party should give a definite answer to his St. Petersburg Committee on the question: Does he or does he not stand for agreements with the Cadets?

Such is the significance of the "debate", that is, of the *discussion* that took place on the controversial question itself before the election of representatives. At every meeting of Party members, before proceeding to elect representatives to the conference, there had first to be a *discussion* of the controversial political question. The opinion had to be heard of a representative of the St. Petersburg Committee, i.e., of the leading local body, and also of those who represented other views. After the discussion *all* the Party members voted whether or not they were in favour of agreements with the Cadets. The votes were counted by a committee of scrutineers, consisting of representatives of both sides (if there were two sides on this question in the Party unit). Only by *this* procedure could the St. Petersburg Committee ascertain

the *considered* opinion of the *whole* Party membership, and consequently, be in a position to lead the masses, not blindly, but on the basis of their full understanding of the question.

This explanation was necessary because at the conference disputes arose regarding the "discussion" and the canvass of opinion of all the members of the Party.

That these disputes were uncalled for is the more obvious to Party members for the reason that the Central Committee's own letter of November 10 regarding the settlement of the question (whether to enter into agreements) by the local organisations definitely recommends "*preliminary discussion*" of the question by all members of the Party.

Let us now consider the composition of the conference itself. At first, all the representatives elected by the respective organisations were admitted without a verification of the elections (i.e., without verification of "credentials"). There were in all 71 representatives, or delegates, of whom 40 were Bolsheviks and 31 Mensheviks, distributed as follows (by districts).

	<i>* Bolshevik</i>	<i>Menshevik</i>	<i>Total</i>
Vasilyevsky Ostrov	7	6	13
Vyborg	2	5	7
City	5	7	12
Railway	1	2	3
Lettish	2	—	2
Moscow	4	5	9
Narva	—	—	—
Neva	2	1	3
Okružnoi	9	2	11
Artisans (shop assistants) . . .	4	1	5
Petersburg	3	2	5
Estonian	—	—	—
Military organisation	1	—	1
<i>Total</i>	40	31	71

Two Estonian delegates (both Bolsheviks) and one Lettish delegate (Menshevik) were absent. Had they been present, there would have been 42 Bolsheviks and 32 Mensheviks.

Hence it is clear that the Bolsheviks were in the majority *from the outset*, before the credentials were verified. Consequently, all talk about the Bolsheviks having an "artificial" majority falls to the ground. Complaints that the Bolsheviks did not endorse all the credentials have now been inserted by the Mensheviks even in the bourgeois press. They forgot to inform that press, however, that the Bolsheviks had a majority *even before* the verification of credentials!

To make the question of who had the majority at the conference even clearer and to settle it once and for all, let us take, not the number of credentials, but the *total number of votes cast by members of the Party*.

We shall then get the following figures:

	<i>For the Bolsheviks</i>	<i>For the Mensheviks</i>
Unchallenged votes . . .	1,848 *	787
Challenged votes . . .	300	946
<hr/>		
<i>Total votes</i> . .	2,148	1,733

Thus, in all, about 4,000 (3,881) Party members voted. The Bolshevik majority *is over 400*.

Thus, it is beyond doubt that even if *all* the challenged votes were regarded as being in order, the Bolsheviks would still have had a large majority. Consequently, the disputes over the validity or invalidity of certain votes had nothing to do with the question of the Bolshevik majority; the dispute was over the question of how to carry out to the full the principle of democratic representation.

Why did the Bolsheviks cancel some of the credentials? Because the *challenged* credentials could not be recognised as being in order. And irregular credentials cannot be placed on the same footing with regular and unchallenged credentials.

* This figure includes 185 votes which the conference decided were quite in order. If these are not counted, the number of unchallenged votes will be 1,663.

Which credentials were challenged? Those that were not regularly issued; for example, those that were not certified by a committee of scrutineers, those issued without discussion before the voting, or without voting on "platforms" (i.e., where they failed to ask *all* the voters whether or not they were in favour of agreements with the Cadets). Irregular credentials cannot be regarded as having been democratically issued.

Now the question arises, what was to be done with the challenged credentials? It was impossible to examine each case separately. This would have entailed sitting an extra day, and the conference was *pressed for time*. It was scarcely able to get through the business by the date on which the workers *had* to go to elect the delegates (January 7).

There was only one way out: to raise the "basis of representation" for *all the challenged* credentials, i.e., to count them at the rate of one representative for every 75 votes instead of one for every 50. This method was adopted for three reasons: (1) it did away with arbitrariness and mutual irritation in estimating individual challenged credentials; (2) it put the challenged credentials on both sides on the same footing; (3) it was based on a decision taken by the St. Petersburg Committee long before the conference—namely: the St. Petersburg Committee had decided, in cases where it was quite impossible to conduct democratic elections to a conference (e.g., where it was impossible to call meetings owing to police restrictions), to admit representatives who were elected not quite democratically, but in such cases to *raise* the basis of representation, i.e., to allow, not one delegate per 50 members, but one per 75, per 100, and so on.

Now take the number of challenged and unchallenged votes. If we take the unchallenged votes, counting one delegate per 50 votes, we get 37 Bolsheviks and 16 Mensheviks. If we take the challenged votes, counting one delegate per 75 votes, we get 4 Bolsheviks and 12 Mensheviks. The total is 41 Bolsheviks (plus one from the military organisation, where democratic elections were impossible) and 28 Mensheviks.

The 70 credentials finally endorsed were distributed by districts as follows:

	<i>Bolshevik</i>	<i>Menshevik</i>	<i>Total</i>
Vasilyevsky Ostrov	7	6	13
Vyborg	2	4	6
City	5	7	12
Railway	1	2	3
Lettish	2	1	3
Moscow	4	4	8
Narva	—	—	—
Neva	2	1	3
Okružnoi	9	1	10
Artisans (shop assistants) . . .	4	—	4
Petersburg	3	2	5
Estonian	2	—	2
Military organisation	1	—	1
<i>Total</i>	42	28	70

Hence it is plain that complaints about the composition of the conference are quite groundless. Of course, if you shout to an uninformed public about the rejection of the credentials of this person and about the disqualification of that person, you may for a moment create an impression, if the public does not consider the matter carefully. But this is mere wrangling, not controversy.

One need only examine all the facts relating to the composition of the conference to see clearly that there was *nothing* arbitrary in raising the basis of representation for *all* the challenged votes. After all, it was not by mere chance that 2,635 votes were entirely unchallenged and only 1,246 were challenged! And it cannot be seriously maintained that the *bulk* of the challenged votes were challenged at random without any grounds whatever!

Only think, for instance, what it means to vote "without a platform", as the Mensheviks have done so often (which is the very reason why nearly 1,000 of their votes were challenged). It means that not *all* the members of the Party are asked whether they are in favour of agreements with the Cadets or against them. The election of delegates takes place without such a canvass of opinion, or without a platform. It means that the conference has no means of knowing *exactly* the opinion of the Party members! It means that the *membership itself* is not consulted on a controversial question (involving the action of the rank and file). Can irregularities be avoided under such circumstances?

Can a *sincere* advocate of democracy in organisation defend such a method of voting? Democracy does not mean that the masses must trust their individual representatives because they know them; it means that the masses themselves must vote intelligently on the substance of the very important questions at issue.

Finally, complaints about the composition of the conference must be regarded as groundless for the additional reason that *a number* of similar conferences have been held in St. Petersburg recently. A year ago there was a conference on the question of the boycott. The Bolsheviks obtained a majority. In the period of the First Duma there was a conference on the question of supporting the demand for a Duma (i.e., Cadet) Cabinet. The Bolsheviks obtained a majority.

Is it not ridiculous to say now that the Bolshevik majority on the question of electoral agreements with the Cadets could be an accidental one?

II

THE QUESTION OF DIVIDING THE CONFERENCE

The Central Committee of the Party, in which the Mensheviks predominate, demanded that the St. Petersburg Conference should divide into two: a City Conference and a Gubernia Conference. The Mensheviks try to justify their walking out of the conference on the grounds that this demand was not complied with.

Let us see whether this demand was in keeping with the Party Rules, whether it was binding on the conference, and whether it was practicable.

The Rules of our Party very definitely establish the democratic organisation of the Party. The whole organisation is built from below upwards, on an elective basis. The Party Rules declare that the local organisations are independent (autonomous) in their local activities. According to the Rules, the Central Committee co-ordinates and directs all the work of the Party. Hence it is clear that it has no right to interfere in determining the *composition* of local organisations. Since the organisation is built from below upwards, interference in its composition from above would

be a flagrant breach of democracy and of the Party Rules. Let us assume that an organisation, for one reason or another, combines heterogeneous sections, for instance, a city and a gubernia. Under a democratic system, this combination cannot be maintained (or prescribed) by orders from above. Consequently, it can be broken up only if this is desired from below: the city can separate from the gubernia, and no one can forbid it to do so. The gubernia can separate from the city, and no one can forbid it to do so. If no at all large, or at all distinct, part of an organisation has expressed a desire to separate, it means that the Central Committee has been unable to *convince* a *single* influential part of the organisation that separation is necessary! That being the case, to force a division from above is a mockery of democracy, a mockery of the Party Rules. It signifies nothing more nor less than an attempt on the part of the Central Committee to abuse its powers, i.e., to use them, not in the interests of Party unity, but in the interests of one section of the Party (the Mensheviks)—to use its powers to distort the will and the decisions of the local workers.

The Central Committee was so conscious of the fact that its demand was unwarranted that in its *written general* order it expressed itself very guardedly. In it the Central Committee *recommends* all Party organisations "*as far as possible*" (this is the literal expression!) to adapt their boundaries to accord with the boundaries of the electoral districts. There can be no question of such advice being binding; *and nobody claimed that it was*. That the Central Committee had some special object in view in regard to St. Petersburg is evident from the fact that it made no such demand for a division of the conference *in any other city in Russia*. For instance, in *Wilno*, the city conference embraces Social-Democrats representing enterprises situated *outside the city boundaries*, i. e., in *another* electoral district. The Central Committee did not even think of raising the question of dividing the Wilno Conference!

In Odessa, also there was a joint conference, although there, too, some of the factories that were represented are situated outside the city police area. In fact, can one mention a single large city where the organisation corresponds to the police division into city and part of the gubernia?

Can anyone seriously claim that in the big cities, in the centres of the Social-Democratic workers' movement, the *suburbs* where the biggest factories are sometimes situated, the *most proletarian "suburbs"* should be separated? This is such a gross mockery of common sense that only those who are most unscrupulously seeking a pretext for a split could seize upon it.

We have only to look at the districts of St. Petersburg to see that the demand to divide the conference was impracticable. To divide an organisation in general, or a conference in particular, into two parts, one for the city and one for the gubernia, it is necessary either to know the address of every member of the Party, or have ready-made Party units, branches and districts organised on a *territorial* basis, i.e., districts formed according to the place of residence of Party members, or the situation of factories in the various *police* districts.

But we see that in St. Petersburg (as probably in most cities in Russia) the districts, sub-districts and lower Party units are organised, not only on a territorial (local) basis but *also on an occupational* basis (according to the trade and occupation of the workers, and of the population in general) and on a *national* basis (different nationalities, different languages).

For instance, in St. Petersburg there is a *railway* district. This district is organised on an occupational basis. How could it be divided into a city section and a gubernia section? According to the place of residence of every individual railwayman: St. Petersburg, Kolpino, and other stations? Or according to the location of the railway trains, which, unfortunately for our Central Committee, have a habit of moving from place to place, from the "city" of St. Petersburg into the "gubernia", and even into other gubernias?

Try to divide the *Lettish* district! And then there is the Estonian district and the military organisation.

Even the territorial districts cannot be divided. The workers at the conference said so themselves. A worker from Moscow District got up and said: I know factories in our district which are not far from the city boundaries. At the end of the day's work you can see at a glance that part of the workers make for the "city" and others for the "guber-

nia". How are we going to divide them? And the workers simply laughed at the Central Committee's proposal.

Only very naïve people can fail to see the underlying purpose of the whole business. Only very naïve people can say: still, we ought to have tried to divide, "*approximately*", "*as far as possible*".

If it were done approximately, it would, to some extent, have been an *arbitrary* division, for it would have been *impossible* to divide the Lettish, railway and other districts exactly. But every arbitrary decision would have evoked new, interminable protests and complaints; it would have called forth new orders from the Central Committee, and would have provided any number of new pretexts for splits. Look at the list of districts (given above) and you will see that some people might have declared that only four districts are purely and indubitably city districts: the Vasilyevsky Ostrov, City, Vyborg and Petersburg districts. Why only these? Because *there the Mensheviks would have had a majority*. On what grounds could such an arbitrary decision be justified?

And how could the Central Committee justify its arbitrary conduct in not even thinking of dividing Wilno, yet demanding that St. Petersburg should be divided? If you protest against arbitrary action, who will finally settle your dispute? Why, this very same Central Committee....

Even the most naïve people will now understand that the complaints about the composition of the conference and about its refusal to divide are simply a blind. The sum and substance of the matter is that the Mensheviks decided not to submit to the majority of the St. Petersburg organisation, and to bring about a split on the eve of the elections in order to desert the socialist workers for the Cadets.

III

WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MENSHEVIK WALK-OUT AT THE CONFERENCE?

Some readers may think that the conclusion we have drawn is too drastic. We, however, think that it is unworthy of a socialist to conceal or blur the truth concerning a serious

political matter. We must call a spade a spade. We must expose all subterfuges and pretences, so that the mass of the workers may clearly understand what is going on. Only bourgeois parties regard elections as a game played behind the scenes and a division of the spoils. A workers' party, however, must first of all help the people clearly to understand the relations between the parties, to understand their own interests and the objects of the struggle, to understand what is going on behind the scenes.

We have seen that the complaints about the composition of the conference of the St. Petersburg organisation of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, about its refusal to divide, were mere evasions. We know that the real issue is a simple one. The Mensheviks wanted an agreement with the Cadets at all costs. The Mensheviks knew that the majority of the members of the St. Petersburg organisation did not share that view. At the All-Russian Conference the Mensheviks decided to abide by the decision of the local organisation in each locality. Now they have *broken their promise* and are trying to achieve their objects by means of a *split*.

Today (January 13) the 31st Mensheviks who walked out of the conference have already declared in the St. Petersburg newspapers that they have made proposals for a bloc to the Cadets and to all the Trudovik parties; not only to the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Trudoviks (with whom the conference offered to make an agreement), but also to the "Popular Socialists".

So the matter is perfectly clear. The class-conscious proletariat has decided to conduct an independent election campaign. The petty bourgeoisie (including the Trudoviks) is vacillating, rushing from one side to another; it is quite capable of preferring a deal with the Cadets to a struggle based on principles. The Mensheviks are the petty-bourgeois section of the workers' party. At the very last moment, on the flimsiest pretexts, they are abandoning the revolutionary proletariat and going over to the Cadets.

That this conclusion is right is best confirmed by the Cadet newspapers. No one will suspect the Cadets of being in sympathy with the views of the St. Petersburg, i.e., the Bolshevik Social-Democrats!

Look at *Rech*, the central organ of the Cadet Party. Everybody knows perfectly well that *Rech*, in unison with *Tovarishch*, has been constantly egging the Mensheviks on to a split, and seeking every opportunity to praise them, carefully distinguishing them from the Bolsheviks. As soon as it became known that the Mensheviks had walked out of the Social-Democratic conference, *Rech* (January 11) published an editorial entitled: "The Social-Democratic Conference and Agreements". This article openly *applauds* the "determination" of the Mensheviks and *welcomes the split* which they have initiated. This article openly declares that "*outside the bloc of the revolutionary parties in the narrow sense of the word*" (i.e., the St. Petersburg Social-Democrats and those to whom they have made proposals for an agreement, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Committee of the Trudovik Group) there remain *the Mensheviks and the Popular Socialists* (the most moderate and semi-Cadet of all the petty-bourgeois Trudovik parties).

And the Cadets say outright that they are prepared to "resume" negotiations with "both these moderate socialist parties". They say outright that "the differentiation [division] which has taken place among the socialist parties promises to bring the ideas of the moderate socialists on Duma tactics somewhat closer to our own [i.e., Cadet] ideas on this subject".

Coming from the leading Cadet newspaper, this statement is extremely important. The Cadets not only appreciate the practical results of the Menshevik change of front. They see clearly that the split engineered by the Mensheviks is of fundamental significance, i.e., that this split in fact will change the attitude of the Mensheviks towards the fundamental concepts of the political struggle and the tasks of the working class. The Cadets understand perfectly well that the Mensheviks have veered, not only towards accepting agreements in practice, but also towards the fundamental views of the bourgeoisie; that they have departed from the proletarian policy, and have approached the bourgeois policy. *Rech* plainly states that the *moderate socialists* (that is to say, the Mensheviks) are approaching the Cadet tactics, are actually recognising Cadet priority and leadership. Although they do not yet know whether the Socialist-Revolu-

tionaries and the Trudoviks will accept the proposal of the Social-Democratic conference, the Cadets are *already* reckoning with a very definite alignment of political forces: the liberal bourgeoisie will lead the moderate petty bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeois section of the proletariat; the revolutionary proletariat will act independently, and draw with it, at best (best for us, worst for the Cadets) only a part of the petty bourgeoisie.

This is how the Cadets depict the situation. And it cannot be denied that in this respect the Cadets are quite right. As the sun is reflected in a drop of water, so the small episode in St. Petersburg reflects the constant relationship between the policies of the liberal bourgeoisie, the working class and the petty bourgeoisie that inevitably characterises all capitalist countries. Everywhere and at all times the liberal bourgeoisie tries to bribe the uneducated masses with sops in order to divert them from revolutionary Social-Democracy. The Cadets are beginning to apply in Russia the "English" bourgeois method of fighting the proletariat, i. e., not by violence, but by bribing, flattering, dividing and cajoling the "moderates", by making them Cabinet Ministers, Members of Parliament, electors, etc.

The meaning of the phrase in the Cadet *Rech* about "resumption" of negotiations is also clear enough. When the Social-Democrats were united and the revolutionary Social-Democrats were predominant among them, the negotiations were broken off. Now that "both the moderate socialist parties" have broken away from the revolution, the Cadets declare: "negotiations may be resumed".

If the reader is not quite clear as to what these words mean in practice, we will explain them to him. The Cadets offered two seats (out of six) to the Lefts, namely: one seat to the workers' curia and one to the socialists generally. The negotiations were broken off. Now the Cadets are inviting the "moderate socialists" again: "Come back, Mr. Customer, perhaps we can come to terms. We will give one seat to the Mensheviks and another to the 'Popular Socialists', or, in a fit of generosity, we will even give you three seats."

That is what the Cadets mean by "resumption" of negotiations: we made no concessions to the *Lefts*; but we are willing to make concessions to the *moderate Lefts*!

Persons who are naïve or politically inexperienced may shake their heads, express doubt, sympathise, etc., as much as they like; it will not alter matters. After all, it is not *how* a certain result was obtained that is important, it is the result itself that is important (i.e., for the Cadets it is not important, but for the masses of the workers who wish to adopt an *intelligent* attitude towards politics, it is very important).

We do not know exactly how the negotiations between the Mensheviks and the Cadets were conducted—whether in writing, or by word of mouth, or by mere hints. It is possible that prominent moderate Mensheviks simply *hinted* to the Cadet leaders that a split was likely among the Social-Democrats, hinted that they would agree to agreements *on a district basis*. And the Cadets, of course, were quick to take the hint: “they” will split the St. Petersburg Social-Democrats, and we will include “them” in the district election list! “They” will help us, and we will help “them”. Is this deal less effective, business-like and definite than if “they” had gone straight to Kutler, Milyukov or Nabokov and said in plain words: We will split the St. Petersburg Conference of the Social-Democratic Party for you, and you will help us to get elected on some district list?

It is a fact that *this is precisely* the policy that is pursued by the bourgeois liberals and the opportunist Social-Democrats in *all* constitutional countries. The Russian workers must *learn to understand* this policy if they do not want to be led by the nose. Chernyshevsky said in his day: “Those who are afraid of soiling their hands had better keep away from politics.”¹⁷ Those who take part in the elections and are afraid of soiling their hands in turning up the muck of bourgeois politics had better get out. Kid-gloved simpletons only do harm in politics by their fear of facing facts.

Another statement in the bourgeois press that fully confirms *our* estimate of the split is that made by Madame Kusko-va in *Tovarishch* (January 10). She, too, welcomes the Mensheviks, incites them to bring about an irrevocable split, advises them not to “compromise” with the Bolsheviks, and promises them the assistance of the *Rabocheye Dyelo* group.

To understand Madame Kuskova's article, one must know who she is. We will say who she is, as the majority of the workers do not know her.

The Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party was founded in 1898. In 1899 Madame Kuskova and M. Prokopovich were members of the Party, to be exact, members of the section abroad; which was led by Plekhanov, *at that time* a revolutionary Social-Democrat. Madame Kuskova, however, was then, as now, an opportunist; she advocated petty-bourgeois views in the Social-Democratic movement and championed Bernsteinism, which, in the final analysis, means subordinating the working class to the policy of the liberals. Madame Kuskova expressed her views most clearly in the celebrated *Credo* (which means a symbol of faith, a programme, an exposition of world-outlook). This *Credo* said the following: "The workers must conduct the economic struggle, and the liberals the political struggle." The *Rabocheye Dyelo* people (as the opportunists in the Social-Democratic movement were then called) were substantially inclined to take the same view. Plekhanov declared a war to the knife against these views (in which he was assisted by the Russian revolutionary Social-Democrats), and on this issue *split* the section of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party abroad. He wrote a pamphlet entitled *Vademecum* (a *Guide* for the *Rabocheye Dyelo* people), in opposition to the opportunists, especially Madame Kuskova.

Madame Kuskova was expelled from the Social-Democratic Party. With Prokopovich, she went over to the liberals, the Cadets. Later on she left the Cadets as well, and became a "non-party" writer for the "non-party" Cadet newspaper *Tovarishch*.

Madame Kuskova is not an isolated case. She is a *typical* specimen of the petty-bourgeois intellectual, who imports opportunism into the workers' party and wanders from the Social-Democrats to the Cadets, from the Cadets to the Mensheviks, and so forth.

These are the people who are beating the drum and cheering in honour of the split that the Mensheviks are causing among the Social-Democrats in St. Petersburg.

These are the people to whom the workers who follow the Mensheviks are handing over the cause of the proletariat.

IV

THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE FORTHCOMING
ELECTIONS IN ST. PETERSBURG

How do matters stand now with the elections in St. Petersburg?

It is clear now that there will be three main lists at the elections: the Black-Hundred list, the Cadet list, and the Social-Democratic list.

The first will be supported by the Octobrists; the second, probably, by the Mensheviks and the Popular Socialists; the third, perhaps, by the Trudoviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, although it is quite possible that these vacillating parties, which have not given a definite answer, so far, will also follow the Cadets (partly owing to the split among the Social-Democrats).

Is there a Black-Hundred danger in St. Petersburg, i.e., a danger of the Black Hundreds winning the elections? The Mensheviks, who are now going over from the socialists to the Cadets, say that there is.

They are telling a downright lie.

Even in the Cadet *Rech*, that cautious, diplomatic newspaper, which protects the interests of the liberals in every detail, even in *Rech* we read in an article by Mr. Vergezhsy that at the election meetings the Octobrists are entirely in the background and that the voters are wavering between the Cadets and the socialists.

All the information we get about the election meetings and about the impression created by the Lidval case,¹⁷⁴ the trial of the murderers of Herzenstein,¹⁷⁵ the exposures of Black-Hundred outrages, etc., clearly shows that the Right parties enjoy no respect among the voters.

Those who still talk about a Black-Hundred danger in the elections are deceiving themselves and deceiving the masses of the workers. It is now obvious that the cry about the Black-Hundred danger is a Cadet attempt to gain the support of the ignorant masses.

The Black-Hundred danger does not lie in a Black-Hundred vote, but in the possibility that the government will resort to violence, in the possible arrest of electors, etc. The remedy for *this* danger is not agreements with the Ca-

dets, but the development of the revolutionary consciousness and the revolutionary determination of the masses. And it is the Cadets who more than anyone else are hindering the development of this consciousness and this determination.

The really important fight in St. Petersburg is that between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats. The Trudovik parties have proved their weakness by following the most moderate and semi-Cadet "Popular Socialist Party", and also by the fact that they are not displaying any independence or firmness at all.

If the Mensheviks had not betrayed the socialists on the eve of the elections, there is no doubt that the Trudoviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries would have *accepted our* terms. There is no doubt that the *bulk* of the voters, who in St. Petersburg, as everywhere, are poor people, would have followed the socialists and the Trudoviks, not the Cadets. The elections in St. Petersburg would then have had the significance of a major battle, which would clearly and definitely have put before the whole of Russia the *fundamental* questions of the future of the Russian revolution.*

The treachery of the Mensheviks makes our election campaign more difficult, but this *increases the importance* in principle of *an independent Social-Democratic campaign*. The proletariat does not have, and cannot have, any other means of combating the vacillation of the petty bourgeoisie than that of developing the class-consciousness and solidarity of the masses, of training them through *experience* of political development.

While the Trudoviks are wavering and the Mensheviks are haggling, we must throw all our energies into independ-

* An interesting event in this connection was the meeting of voters held in Kolomna the other day. The "Trudovik" Vodovozov (who, apparently, became a Trudovik only for the purpose of harnessing the Trudoviks to the Cadets) proposed and secured the adoption of a resolution in favour of giving the Cadets two seats out of six in a general bloc of Left parties. What simplicity! Before one can offer the smaller share of seats, one must *win* first, Mr. Vodovozov, and not trail behind the Cadets! But even *such* a meeting, with *such* a "chorus leader", showed by the way it voted that the masses are inclined more to the Left than the Cadets. We are obliged to put before these masses the alternative: either for the liberal bourgeoisie, or for the revolutionary proletariat.

ent agitation. Let everyone know that the Social-Democrats are putting forward their own list without fail, under all circumstances. And let all the poor sections of voters know that the choice before them is between the Cadets and the socialists.

The voters must ponder over this choice. At all events, this reflection will help very much to develop the political *consciousness* of the masses, which is of far greater importance than obtaining a seat for X or Y from the Cadets. If the masses of the urban poor are taken in once more by the promises of the Cadets, if they are carried away once more by the clamour of liberal phrase-mongering and liberal promises of "peaceful" progress and "peaceful" legislation by Gurko, and Kutler and Milyukov—events will soon shatter their last illusions.

The revolutionary Social-Democrats must tell the masses the whole truth and unswervingly pursue their own path. All those who cherish the real gains achieved in the Russian revolution by proletarian struggle, all who possess the instinct of those who work and are exploited, will follow the party of the proletariat. And the correctness of this party's views will become clearer and clearer to the masses with every new stage in the development of the Russian revolution.

POSTSCRIPT

The leading article in *Rech* of January 14 further confirms what we have said above concerning the significance of the Menshevik desertion from the socialists to the side of the bourgeoisie. *Rech* is jubilant at the fulfilment of its prediction, at the fact that the Mensheviks are breaking away in St. Petersburg and setting up their own organisation. "That is exactly what happened," says the newspaper, referring to what it had said in previous issues. "A section of the Social-Democratic Party, not the most influential, but the one that is most inclined to parliamentary activity, has fallen in with our proposals."

Yes, it is true. The Mensheviks *have fallen in with* the desire of the liberal bourgeoisie to split off the opportunist section of the workers' party and to subordinate it to the leadership of the Cadets. We have seen above that *Rech* has already separated the Mensheviks and the Popular Socialists from the revolutionary parties, calling them "moderate socialists". Now *Rech* has gone a step further. It says that the Popular Socialists, too, will probably prefer a bloc with the Cadets. It states: "The Mensheviks have definitely fallen in with the proposal to form a *general opposition bloc*." "It must be admitted that the possibility of an opposition bloc of the Cadets, Mensheviks and Popular Socialists has become considerably greater since the Bolsheviks rejected the proposal."

Thus, the Cadets themselves have now admitted that there are three blocs, or at any rate three main political forces, in the elections: the government bloc, the opposition bloc and the revolutionary bloc. This division is quite correct. We note that force of circumstances is compelling the

Cadets to recognise what we have long and persistently pointed out. We also note that *so far* the only ones in the revolutionary "bloc" who are resolute and determined are the revolutionary Social-Democrats. The other elements, and in particular the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie (the "Socialist-Revolutionaries"), are still wavering.

The significance in principle of the Menshevik desertion to the Cadets is becoming more and more apparent. The fine words of the Menshevik election platforms and of the statements of principle in their resolutions (for instance, at the All-Russian Social-Democratic Conference), the declarations that they would shatter the illusions about the peaceful method, that they were advising the voters to send fighters to the Duma and not petitioners, and so on and so forth—all these words have turned out to be *mere words*. Actually, the Mensheviks have allowed themselves to be dragged along by the Cadets, by *Cadet* policy. Actually, the Mensheviks *have found themselves* in the "opposition bloc", in other words, they have become a mere appendage of the Cadets.

More than that, the leading article in *Rech* of January 14 reveals also *the price* the Cadets intend to pay the Mensheviks for supporting them and joining the opposition bloc. This price is one seat in the Duma, *to be taken from the workers' curia*. Listen:

"Since this [i.e., the formation of an opposition bloc of the Cadets, Mensheviks and Popular Socialists] has reduced the number of claimants for the Duma seats, it may be possible, by a new arrangement, to accept the proposal of the party of people's freedom and content ourselves with two seats out of the six. Now, of course, it will in all probability be necessary to amend this proposal somewhat. *After the decision of the conference, the seat that was intended for the person elected by the workers' curia can obviously no longer be given to a Bolshevik worker.* In view of the new composition of the bloc *the Mensheviks might legitimately regard that seat as theirs.* The other seat out of the two ceded by the party of people's freedom would in that case go to the Popular-Socialist bloc."

A fine stroke of business! We can congratulate the Cadets on their bargain! For the same two "ceded" seats they acquire all the petty-bourgeois parties, as well as the petty-

bourgeois section of the workers' party—and that *at the expense of the workers!*

The workers are to lose their right to a representative from the workers' curia *because* the Mensheviks have deserted the Social-Democrats and have become a moderate socialist party (in the estimation of *Rech*), have joined the opposition bloc. The workers of St. Petersburg are to lose the right allowed them by the Cadets of disposing of their seat as they please *because* the Mensheviks instead of following the revolutionary Social-Democrats, have followed the Cadets. For their "little deal" with the Cadets the Mensheviks receive a "small concession", not at the expense of the Cadets, but at the expense of the workers.... What a magnificent specimen of bourgeois concessions to "the people"! The bourgeoisie is prepared to give seats to the champions of "the people", providing these champions go over to the bourgeoisie....

The delegates and electors in the workers' curia will undoubtedly see now what *advantages*, in practice as well as in principle, they will derive from an agreement with the Cadets. It is clear, is it not, that the Cadets have offered (not given, but offered) one seat to the workers' curia out of sincere sympathy with real freedom really for the people, and not because they want to entice the ignorant, needy masses to the side of the bourgeoisie?

"WHEN YOU HEAR THE JUDGEMENT OF A FOOL..."¹⁷⁶

FROM THE NOTES OF A SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PUBLICIST

St. Petersburg, January 15, 1907

The bourgeois press is now gossiping and cackling over the resolutions of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic Conference. The liberals, from the pompous official organ *Rech* to the gutter rag *Segodnya*, are united in a general chorus of jubilation over the split caused by the Mensheviks, of triumph at the return of these prodigal sons of "society" to the fold of the "opposition bloc", at their emancipation from "revolutionary illusions".

Social-Democrats who are really on the side of the revolutionary proletariat would do well to ask: "But who are the judges?"

Let us take what is perhaps the best of these judges, *Rodnaya Zemlya*, of January 15. The trend of this newspaper is undoubtedly more Left than that of the Cadets. Judging from all the facts, it may be called a Trudovik trend. As documentary confirmation of this political estimate we may point out that Mr. Tan¹⁷⁷ is a contributor to that newspaper. Mr. Tan's name is in the published list of members of the organising committee of the "Trudovik (Popular Socialist) Party".

And so, the judges are the Trudoviks.

They condemn the Bolsheviki, and, like the Cadets, approve the plan of the Mensheviks. They disagree with the Cadets only in that they object to the latter getting more than two or three seats in the general bloc of all the Left parties.

Such is the verdict. Let us examine the grounds.

“The controversy undoubtedly centres on the question whether there is or is not a Black-Hundred danger in St. Petersburg.”

That is not true. If you take it upon yourselves to judge the Bolshevik Social-Democrats in a leading article of a political newspaper, it is your *duty* to know what you are judging. In that leading article you yourselves say: “The controversy that has now flared up over the resolutions of the [Social-Democratic] conference is undoubtedly one of public interest.” People who express the wish publicly to participate in a controversy of general interest and at once betray their ignorance of the “centre” of the controversy run the risk of having a none too flattering appellation hurled at them....

The revolutionary Social-Democrats have repeatedly explained and insisted in all their numerous political declarations that the so-called Black-Hundred danger *cannot* be regarded as the “centre” of the controversy over election tactics.

Why not? Because the tactics of the workers’ party during the elections must be only the *application* to a particular case of the *general principles* of the socialist tactics of the proletariat. Elections are only one of the fields, and by no means the most important, most essential one (particularly in a revolutionary period), in which the socialist proletariat wages the struggle for liberty and for the abolition of all exploitation. In addition to the one waged with the aid of ballot papers, there is another type of struggle, which *inevitably* flares up in times of revolution. This other struggle is apt to be forgotten by intellectuals who imagine that they are men of education, whose sympathies for liberty lie no deeper than the tips of their tongues. And it is apt to be forgotten by the small proprietors, who stand aloof from the bitter, everyday struggle against capital and its henchmen. But the proletarian does not forget about it.

Therefore, for the class-conscious proletarian, election tactics can only be an adaptation of his general tactics to a particular struggle, namely, the election struggle; under no circumstances does this imply a change in the principles of his tactics, or the shifting of the “centre” of these tactics.

The basis of socialist tactics in time of revolution consists in the progressive class, the proletariat, marching at the head of the people's revolution (the revolution that is now taking place in Russia is a bourgeois revolution in the sense that the attainment of complete freedom and all the land for the people will not rid us in the least of the rule of the bourgeoisie; obviously, the fact that the revolution has this socio-economic character does not prevent it from being a people's revolution). The progressive class must therefore consistently expose to the masses the falsity of all hopes of negotiations and agreements with the old regime in general, and of agreements between landlords and peasants over the land question in particular. The progressive class must pursue its independent line of undeviating struggle, supporting only those who are really fighting, and only to the extent that they fight.

Such are the basic principles of socialist tactics, which dictate to the workers' party class independence as the rule, and collaboration and agreements only with the revolutionary bourgeoisie, and only as an exception.

The liberals do not understand these principles of Social-Democratic tactics. The idea of class struggle is foreign to them; the idea of contrasting a people's revolution to deals and negotiations is repugnant to them. But in principle *all* Social-Democrats, Bolsheviks and even Mensheviks, accept these tactics. The Trudoviks, who undertake to edit a political organ without knowing the ABC of the contemporary tactical problems of socialism, can read about this even in the election platform of the Social-Democratic Party—the platform of the Mensheviks, who predominate in the Central Committee.

"Citizens," states this platform, "you should elect to the Duma people who not only want liberty for Russia, but are anxious to help the people's revolution to achieve it.... The majority in the First Duma, led by the party of 'people's freedom', hoped to obtain liberty and land by means of peaceful negotiations with the government.... Citizens! Elect fighters for the revolution, who, shoulder to shoulder with you, will continue the great cause that was initiated in January, October and December last year (1905)."

The "centre of the controversy", which our Trudoviks have totally failed to grasp, is whether agreements with the Cadets can be sanctioned *in principle from this point of view*. The St. Petersburg Social-Democratic Conference answered this question in the negative, as the 14 delegates of the All-Russian Conference (of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party) had done before them. No agreements can be tolerated with a party which is bargaining and parleying with the old regime. The Cadets cannot be our allies in the "people's revolution". Their admission to the ranks of the "fighters for the revolution" would not strengthen but weaken these fighters, whose work is being hindered by the Cadets, who are now openly opposing the struggle and *all* revolutionary slogans.

In failing to see the *principle* underlying the attitude of the Bolshevik Social-Democrats towards the Cadets, our judges have failed to notice the "elephant".

These Trudoviks are entirely under the ideological influence of the bourgeois liberals. The elections have overshadowed everything for them; election results have overshadowed the task of enlightening the *masses* in the course of the election campaign. They have no idea how important it is for a Social-Democrat to carry on perfectly clear, definite and unambiguous election agitation if he is to remain true to his principles, loyal to his revolutionary standpoint in spite of all efforts to tempt him with the prospect of a seat in the Duma, or to frighten him with the prospect of not winning a single seat in the capital. Absorbed in the liberals' scrapping, the Trudoviks have forgotten all principles, they have forgotten all the fundamental objects of the revolution. They see nothing, understand nothing, care for nothing, and only keep on muttering: "one seat, two seats, three seats"!

... "The controversy ... centres on ... whether there is a Black-Hundred danger in St. Petersburg."...

So you reduce the Black-Hundred danger to the danger of a Black-Hundred victory in elections faked by the government! Cannot you understand, gentlemen, that by putting the question *in this way*, you are admitting that the government is already victorious, and that the cause of liberty,

which you prate about so much, is already lost? You yourselves do not see, and you are preventing the masses of the people from seeing, *the real* Black-Hundred danger, which is manifested not in the voting, but in the definition of the conditions of voting (the Senate interpretations and the impending repeal of the electoral law of December 11), in the nullification of the results of voting (the dissolution of the Duma). You are entirely adopting the vulgar liberal point of view and are concentrating your minds—and the minds of the mass of the people whom you are misleading—on a struggle within the limits of a fake law which is being still further faked. You fail to see the Black-Hundred danger in the form of the possible arrest of all the electors. You throw away that which depends on you, and wholly on you, which is at any rate a lasting and substantial asset to the revolution, namely: the development of the revolutionary spirit of the masses by consistent agitation. On the other hand, what you are chasing after depends not on you, but on the artifices of Stolypin, on a new Senate interpretation, on further violations of the electoral law by the police. Consequently, you are fighting the “Black-Hundred danger” in exactly the same way as the French bourgeois republicans are fighting the monarchist danger; namely, by strengthening monarchist institutions and the monarchist constitution within the republic. For, by instilling into the minds of the people the idea that the Black-Hundred danger is the danger of an increased Black-Hundred vote, you are perpetuating the ignorance of the most backward masses as to the real source and real nature of the Black-Hundred danger.

But let us proceed. Let us assume that there will be no further Senate interpretations concerning the elections and the electors. Let us take the question of the parties that may win the elections in St. Petersburg under the existing electoral system.

The Trudoviks cannot deny that the parties of the Right have been seriously compromised; that the Union of October Seventeenth is suffering defeat after defeat, each more ignominious than the last; that “of late the Octobrists have completely subsided, stunned by heavy blows from the Left”; that “the public has swung to the Left”.

But ... Shchedrin long ago translated this "but" of the Russian liberals into intelligible language: "ears will never grow higher than foreheads, never!"—*but* "technical difficulties", "literature is not being delivered", "they won't give us ballot papers", "police restrictions"....

There you have the psychology of the Russian intellectual: in words he is a bold radical, in deeds he is a contemptible little government official.

The remedy for police restrictions is supposed to lie in blocs with the Cadets! Why not blocs with the Octobrists, who "*want*" a constitution, and are sure of not being subjected to "restrictions"? Truly Russian political logic: electoral agreements to combat the failure of the post-office to deliver literature, to combat the refusal to issue ballot papers.... What are you combating, gentlemen?

The "laws" which sanction the outrageous conduct of the police, which declare certain parties to be "illegal" and deprive them of ballot papers. How are you combating them?

Why, of course, by means of an agreement with a party which will either obtain ballot papers from the Peaceful Renovators, or come to terms with Stolypin before the Duma opens, or else will also be left without ballot papers!

The Russian government official (a radical at twenty, a liberal at thirty, and simply an official at forty) is accustomed to play the liberal when at home and make threatening gestures where nobody can see him. He thinks the election campaign should be fought along these same lines. Influence the masses? Nonsense, the post-office refuses to deliver our literature.

Publish and distribute literature without the "post-office" and similar institutions?

Nonsense! These are obsolete, revolutionary illusions, which are not in accord with "broad" constitutional activity. Broad constitutional activity consists in acting so as to fool the authorities; "they" will look for me among the Social-Democrats, or among the Socialist-Revolutionaries, but I shall hide in the Cadet list so well that they will not find me. The government will look for me as a revolutionary, but I shall fool both the government and the revolutionaries; I shall go over to the "opposition bloc". You see what a clever fellow I am!

But will it not turn out, Oh worthy politician, that you will be fooling also the masses, who will no longer be able to distinguish you from the "opposition" of the obsequious liberals?

Nonsense! What do the masses matter?... Well, we'll give the workers' curia a seat.... And then, from a certain point of view, we are all in favour of freedom ... the revolution has become a national cause ... the Cadets, too, are ready to fight in their own way....

The question arises, have our Trudoviks any political ideas, besides ideas relating to the *police*? They have. Their idea is that we must adapt ourselves not to the energetic and active voter, but to the stay-at-home, the cowed or sleepy voter. Listen to the arguments of a "Left" newspaper:

"The temper that prevails at meetings is no criterion of the temper of the whole mass of voters.... Not more than one-tenth of the voters go to meetings; of course, these are the most energetic, lively and active people."

Truly a sufficient reason for trailing in the wake of the least energetic, the most lifeless and inactive Cadet voters! The tragedy of the Russian radical is that for decades he has been yearning for meetings, for liberty, burning with passion (in words) for liberty; and when he goes to a meeting and finds that its temper is more radical than his own, he begins to sigh: "it is hard to judge", "not more than one-tenth", "one must be a bit more cautious, gentlemen!" He is just like Turgenev's ardent hero who ran away from Asya, and about whom Chernyshevsky wrote "A Russian at a Rendez-vous".¹⁷⁸

Oh, you, who call yourselves supporters of the toiling masses! It's not for you to go to a rendezvous with the revolution. Stay at home; really, it will be quieter there; and you need have no dealings with these dangerous "most energetic, lively and active people". Stay-at-home philistines are more your type!

Perhaps this simple example will help you to grasp the "centre of the controversy" over agreements with the Cadets?

It is, my dear sir, that we want to shake up the philistine and make a citizen of him. And to do that we must

compel him to choose between the philistine policy of the Cadets who are prostrating themselves before the (pshaw! pshaw!) "constitution", and the revolutionary policy of the socialist proletariat.

A "bloc of all the Left parties" means *submerging* the "one-tenth, the most energetic, lively and active people", in the mass of the apathetic, stolid and somnolent. It means *subordinating* those who are willing to fight (and are capable of carrying the masses with them at the decisive moment) to those who prefer to play the same despicable game of loyalty that the Cadets played in the First Duma, and, like the Cadet Lvov, prefer to haggle with Stolypin and basely go over to the latter.

The reaction is attacking us, it has already withdrawn a good third of what was gained in October, and is threatening to withdraw the other two-thirds. But you pose as men of law and order and defend yourselves by appealing to philistine mentality: no attacks; no revolution; we are going into the Duma to legislate; we confine ourselves to *defence*; we abide by the law!

When will you understand that to keep on the defensive is in itself an admission of moral defeat? In fact, you are people who have suffered moral defeat. All you are fit for is to vote for the Cadets.

"*Compel* the philistine to choose", we said. Yes, *compel*. No socialist party in the world could wrest the masses from the influence of the liberal or radical bourgeois parties, which base themselves on the mentality of the philistine, without giving them a jolt, without meeting with some resistance, without taking the risk involved in the *first* experiment to decide who is *really* defending liberty, we or the Cadets?

If there is an agreement with the Cadets, the philistine has *no need* to worry about this. The radical windbag politicians and Social-Democratic opportunists have already thought the matter out for him at their rendezvous with the Cadets. The philistine has shifted to the Left (not as a result of our efforts, not as a result of our *Party* propaganda, but as a result of Stolypin's zeal)—that's enough for us. And since he has shifted to the Left, he will be for a "bloc of all the Lefts"! And it will be the *whole* mass of philistines, not

merely the restive—pardon—active one-tenth of the people. We should adapt our meetings and our whole policy to suit the cowardly philistine—*that is what a bloc with the Cadets means in practice.*

But we said: We need not only leaflets and platforms, resolutions and speeches, but we must carry out our whole policy, and election campaign in such a way as to *draw a sharp contrast* between the cowardly philistine and the staunch fighter. And this can be done *only* by contrasting *two different* lists: the Cadet list and the Social-Democratic list. In the metropolis, whose newspapers circulate all over Russia, where the headquarters of all the political parties are located, which leads the country ideologically and politically, it is a thousand times more important to give an example, not of a policy of philistine equanimity, but of a policy worthy of the October fighters who wrested a little freedom from the authorities, a policy worthy of the proletariat.

Our talk about the necessity of recognising the mistakes of the “peace-loving” Cadet Duma, and of taking a step forward, will remain idle talk unless we *ourselves* take a *step forward* in combating the philistine Oblomov¹⁷⁹ idea of “a bloc of all the Left parties”. Our calls to go *forward* will ring false and will fail to fire the hearts of the fighters among the people if we ourselves, the “guides”, the “leaders”, *mark time* in the capital in full view of all the peoples of Russia, arm in arm with these same Cadets, on the basis of an “*amicable*” distribution of seats, in friendly fashion, all together, all for the same cause, all for liberty.... What is the use of reviving old quarrels? What harm if the Menshevik Ivan Ivanovich did call the Cadet Ivan Nikiforovich a goose?¹⁸⁰

“Not more than one-tenth of the voters go to meetings.” ... Very well, Mr. Radical. We will take your word for it for once; we will concede this point to you, because—because your argument is so clumsy.

One-tenth of the voters makes 13,000 out of 130,000 for the whole of St. Petersburg. These 13,000, the most energetic, lively and active voters, are more to the Left than the Cadets. Let us ask ourselves: Can anyone of sound mind and judgement assert that the energetic people who attend meetings *do not lead* a certain number of the less energetic, stay-at-home voters? Everyone will realise that such an assertion

would be *wrong*; that in a city with a population of a million and a half there are thousands of agencies and channels, apart from newspapers and meetings, through which the mood of the advanced elements is communicated to the masses. Everyone will understand—and all elections in all countries confirm it—that every energetic voter who attends meetings is backed by not one but several stay-at-home voters.

At the last elections, of the total of 150,000 voters in St. Petersburg, 60,000 went to the poll. Of these, about 40,000 voted for the Cadets, and about 20,000 in the whole of St. Petersburg voted for the Rights. We have heard from our Mr. Radical himself, who does not wish to be an “optimist” (Heaven forbid! our radicals want to be “steady respectable people”... like the German radicals of the eighteen forties).... We have heard from him that the Octobrists have become quiescent, and we know *from facts* of their utter defeat. Now we hear of 13,000 energetic voters who are more to the Left than the Cadets. Remember that this proportion varies considerably in the different districts. Remember the number of votes that are usually behind every voter who goes to meetings.

It will be clear to you then that the danger of a Black-Hundred vote in St. Petersburg, meaning the danger of the Rights being elected to the Duma as a result of a split in the Cadet and socialist vote, is a *preposterous fable*. For the Rights to be elected to the Duma in St. Petersburg, the votes in the *majority* of the districts would not merely have to be split, but split in such a way that *both* the Cadets *and* the socialists would each have fewer votes than the Black-Hundred list. That is an obvious absurdity.

Therefore, we say plainly: if the Black-Hundred danger does not manifest itself in *violations* of the “constitution” (and it is the estimate of *this* prospect that is the crux of the difference between the tactics of the Cadets and that of the socialists), then a split in the Cadet and socialist vote *cannot possibly* result in a victory for the Rights in St. Petersburg.

The cry about the danger of a Black-Hundred *victory* in the elections in St. Petersburg is a *deception of the people* spread by the Cadets, the “radicals” and the opportunists

of every brand, and serves the interests of *philistinism* in politics. *In practice*, the fable about *this* Black-Hundred danger is in the interests of the Cadets, whom it helps to protect against *the danger from the Left*. It serves to *dull* the senses of the masses, for it does not require them, when they cast their vote, to distinguish between the "legislating" bourgeois Cadet and the socialist who is leading the people into battle.

Therefore, when the general chorus of liberals, Trudoviks and opportunist Social-Democrats howl at us: You are isolated!—we answer calmly: We are very glad to have isolated ourselves from a fraud. We are very glad to have isolated ourselves from a dirty business. For to come before a mass of 130,000 voters in St. Petersburg, after January 9, 1905, and after October 1905, in order to help to elect Kutler, Nabokov, Struve & Co. to the Duma is certainly a dirty business.

We predict to the Trudoviks and to the opportunist Social-Democrats who are rejoicing in anticipation that the Cadets will get them and not the Bolsheviks into the Duma—we predict that if the Second Duma is a Cadet Duma, the Trudoviks and opportunist Social-Democrats will be *ashamed* of having helped to elect the Cadets. They will now be *directly* responsible for it. And the Cadets in the Second Duma will move so far to the right (this is evident from their general behaviour and from all the political literature they have issued during the past year) that even the extreme opportunists will be obliged to expose them. In the First Duma, the Cadet Lvov went over to the Peaceful Renovators and justified the Black-Hundred dissolution of the Duma. In the Second Duma (unless history brings us a radical change that will wipe out all petty deals with the Cadets, and all the Cadets themselves), in the Second Duma the Cadets of the Lvov type will show their true colours not at the end, but at the beginning.

Well then, gentlemen, take the seats in the Duma that the Cadets are offering you! We do not envy you. We shall undertake to warn the mass of the workers and of the petty bourgeoisie in the capital. We shall undertake to make them realise—not only by speeches, but also by means of the elections themselves—the *gulf* that divides the Cadets from the socialists.

Every man to his trade—though “there are hosts of people who would like to mix these two trades, we are not of their number.”¹¹¹

“And they,” says the leading article in *Rodnaya Zemlya*, speaking of the Bolsheviks, “will now be even more isolated than ever; for those former boycottists, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, are now not only taking part in the elections, but are even in favour of a bloc with the Cadets.”

This is new and interesting. We have already observed, on a former occasion, that on this question of electoral agreements the Socialist-Revolutionaries are not behaving like a political party, but like an intellectualist clique, for we heard of no open political action of their *organisations* on this question. And now, assuming that the newspaper for which Mr. Tan writes is not telling a down-right lie and is not repeating an unverified rumour, we shall draw this further conclusion—namely: in the matter of electoral agreements the Socialist-Revolutionaries are guilty of *political dishonesty*, or, at any rate, are displaying vacillation that amounts to a political danger.

Everyone knows that the Conference of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation rejected a bloc with the Cadets and offered to enter into an electoral agreement with the Trudoviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries *against the Cadets*. Our resolution was published in all the newspapers.

Negotiations between the St. Petersburg Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and the appropriate bodies of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Committee of the Trudovik Group *have already taken place*. Differences arose over our exclusion of the Popular Socialists and over the distribution of seats. If, *nevertheless*, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who *began* negotiations with us *after* we had declared that we had definitely decided to give battle to the Cadets in St. Petersburg, have *begun*, or are *continuing*, negotiations with the Cadets for a bloc, then obviously, the Socialist-Revolutionaries are guilty of *political dishonesty*.

We openly declare: We are going to fight the Cadets. Who is on our side?

But the Socialist-Revolutionaries are negotiating *both* with us *and* with the Cadets!

We repeat: We do not know whether the leading article in *Rodnaya Zemlya* told the truth or not. We cannot altogether ignore a direct statement made by an organ to which Mr. Tan, a member of the Organising Committee of the Popular Socialist Party, is a contributor. We have learned about the bloc between the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Popular Socialists from the press and from the communications made by the Socialist-Revolutionaries in their negotiations with us (although we are ignorant of the terms of this bloc and of its real nature; in this connection also something is going on behind the scenes).

Our duty, therefore, is to raise this question publicly and openly, so that *all* may know of the behaviour of a certain political party. Hitherto, in this country, the alignment of parties has been determined only by their programmes and literature—but these, after all, are only words. The First Duma provided an opportunity of judging *some* parties by their *actions*. Now we must make use of the *elections*, too, and we shall use them for fully enlightening the masses as to the *real* nature of the parties.

That the Socialist-Revolutionaries are *hiding* something in their relations with the Popular Socialists is now a political fact. That the Socialist-Revolutionaries are now actually trailing in the wake of the opportunist party that has split off from them is also a fact. Hence, in regard to revolutionary independence and determination the Socialist-Revolutionaries are really much worse than they seem to be. And if they agree to enter into a bloc with the Cadets—and to gain a seat not for themselves, but for the Popular Socialists—we shall have excellent agitational material with which to explain to the workers of St. Petersburg the Marxist thesis of the utter instability and deceptive exterior of the petty-bourgeois (even if revolutionary) parties.

We not only think that it is a matter of honour for a Social-Democrat to “isolate” himself from *such* parties, but we think it is the only well-calculated policy to pursue. But our calculation is made not from the point of view of seats in the Duma, but from the point of view of the working-class movement *as a whole*, from the point of view of the fundamental interests of socialism.

But let us return to *Rodnaya Zemlya*. The following passage shows how frivolous that newspaper can be.

"Generally speaking, the decisions of the Bolshevik Conference appear to have been adopted hastily and rashly. After all, in what respect are the Trudoviks better than the Popular Socialists?"

This "after all" is a real gem. The author is such an ignoramus in politics that he does not even realise that he is walking about naked, like an Australian savage. And these are the educated politicians of the petty bourgeoisie!

Well, there is nothing for it but to perform the "thankless task" of the publicist: to go over old ground and teach the ABC.

The Trudoviks, i. e., the *Committee* of the Trudovik Group, which was approached by the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic Conference, and the Popular Socialists, originated from the Trudovik Group in the First Duma. This Trudovik Group had two wings: one opportunist, the other revolutionary. The difference between them was most clearly revealed in the two Land Bills introduced by the Trudovik Group: the Bill of the 104, and the Bill of the 33.

Common to both Bills is that (1) they are in favour of transferring the land from the landlords to the peasants; (2) they are thoroughly permeated with the spirit of petty-bourgeois utopianism, the utopia of "equalising" small proprietors (in some respects, at least) in a society based on commodity production.

The difference between these Bills is that the first is permeated with the small proprietor's *fear* of being too radical, of drawing too large a mass of poor people into the movement. This "spirit" of the Bill of the 104 was admirably expressed by one of its authors, one of the leaders of the Popular Socialists, Mr. Peshekhonov, in referring to the declaration of the "thrifty muzhiks" in the Duma: "We were sent here to get land, not to give it up." This means that in addition to the utopia of petty-bourgeois equalitarianism *this* wing of the Trudoviks clearly expresses the *selfish* interests of the *more well-to-do* section of the peasantry, who are afraid lest they might have to "give up" something (on the assumption that there will be general "equalisation", as socialism is conceived by the petty bourgeois). Take from the

landlord, but give nothing to the proletarian, such is the motto of the party of the thrifty muzhiks.

On the other hand, the Bill of the 33 proposes the immediate and complete abolition of private property in land. It also contains the "equalitarian" utopia, and to the same degree, but it does not express the fear of having to "give up". This is the utopia, not of the opportunist but of the revolutionary petty bourgeois; not of the thrifty muzhik, but of the ruined muzhik. It is not a dream of profiting from the landlord to the detriment of the proletarian, it is a dream of making everybody, including the proletarians, happy by equalisation. It expresses, not the fear of drawing the broadest and poorest masses into the movement, but the desire to draw them into the struggle (the desire is there, but the ability or understanding how to do so is lacking).*

After the Duma this difference in the two trends among the Trudoviks led to the formation of two distinct political organisations: the Committee of the Trudovik Group, and the Popular Socialist Party. The former has earned an honourable place in the history of the Russian revolution by its July manifestoes. So far as public knowledge goes, it has not yet forfeited its good reputation, has never renounced its manifestoes or joined the chorus of moaners, grouchers and renegades.

The second organisation took advantage of the period of the dissolution of the Duma to legalise itself under the Stolypin regime, to "berate" the above-mentioned manifestoes in the legal press, where it was shielded from criticism from the Left, to advise the people "for the time being" not to come into conflict with certain institutions of the old regime, and so forth. The Conference of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation was, if anything, rather mild in its criticism of this party when it spoke of its "evasive position on the fundamental questions of the struggle outside the Duma".

Thus, the political *facts* so far are that the petty-bourgeois or Trudovik parties have clearly split into the parties of

* Of these and many other petty-bourgeois revolutionaries we might say what an anarchist poet said about us: "Together we'll destroy, but not construct."¹²²

the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie (the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Committee of the Trudovik Group) and a party of the opportunist petty bourgeoisie (the Popular Socialists). Since for Social-Democrats the election campaign is a means for politically educating the masses, here too, by distinguishing two Trudovik parties from a third, we have *compelled* the ordinary man in the street to *ponder* over the reasons for this distinction. And after thinking it out and realising what it is all about he will make an *intelligent* choice.

In conclusion we must note that the naïve and ignorant leader-writer of *Rodnaya Zemlya* indulges also in amusing sophistries to support his case. It would not be amiss to analyse one of these sophistries, which is of a kind that just suits philistines:

“The Bolsheviks are wrong even if there is no Black-Hundred danger. For, in that case, there is no need for a bloc with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Trudoviks, and the Socialist-Democratic Party could with great benefit to the purity of its class content come out in the elections quite independently.”

See what clever fellows we are, thinks this radical—we can even judge of the purity of class content!

Yes, the modern newspaper hack “can” make judgements about anything, but he lacks knowledge and understanding. It is not true to say that the need to preserve the purity of a class position precludes all agreements. To think so is to reduce the ideas of Marxism to absurdity, to make a caricature of them. And it is equally untrue to say that there is no need for a bloc with the Socialist-Revolutionaries if there is no Black-Hundred danger.

Complete independence of the Social-Democratic Labour Party in the election campaign is the general rule. But every live, mass party must allow certain exceptions, but only within reasonable and strictly defined limits. In the epoch of the bourgeois revolution *all* Social-Democrats sanctioned political agreements with the *revolutionary* bourgeoisie, when they worked together in the Soviets of Workers', Peasants', Soldiers', Railwaymen's, etc., Deputies, and when they signed the famous manifesto of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies (December 1905) or the July manifestoes (July

1906). The leader-writer of *Rodnaya Zemlya* is evidently ignorant of the most generally known facts about the parts played by the various parties in the Russian revolution. The revolutionary Social-Democrats reject unprincipled agreements, they reject harmful and unnecessary agreements, but they would never think of tying their hands altogether and under all circumstances. That would be childish. The platform of the 14 delegates at the All-Russian Social-Democratic Conference is documentary proof of that.

To proceed. The "necessity" of an agreement with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Trudoviks in St. Petersburg arises from the *Cadet* danger. Had the author of the leading article in *Rodnaya Zemlya* been familiar with the subject which he undertook to discuss, he would have known that even among the Social-Democrats who support agreements with the Cadets there are highly influential bodies (the Bund, for example) which recognise the need for a bloc with the revolutionary bourgeoisie in case of a Cadet danger, when there is no Black-Hundred danger. In St. Petersburg, it would be possible not only to conduct an election campaign in the spirit of revolutionary and socialist education of the masses (we Social-Democrats will achieve this in any case), but to *defeat* the Cadets, if the Menshevik Social-Democrats did not betray us, and if *all* the revolutionary Trudoviks followed *all* the socialists. And since we are conducting an election campaign, we have no right to miss any opportunity of achieving victory, as long as there is no violation of the principles of socialist tactics.

That the *only* important fight being waged in St. Petersburg is that between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats is *proved* by the election meetings (the same holds good for Moscow, and we may add that the results of *all* straw votes, such as that instituted by the newspaper *Vek*, or by the Shop Assistants' Union "Unity and Strength", have also confirmed this thesis).¹¹¹

That an agreement with the Cadets means the ideological and political hegemony of the Cadets over their allies is borne out by the whole political press and by the whole character of the negotiations. The Cadets dictate the terms. The Cadets publicly lay down the *significance* of the agreements (recall their comments on the Mensheviks and the Pop-

ular Socialists: "the moderate socialist parties", "the opposition bloc"). The Cadets are asked to agree to an equal distribution of seats as a maximum concession.

It is equally beyond doubt that an agreement between the Social-Democrats and the revolutionary-democratic parties means the hegemony of the Social-Democrats over the petty bourgeoisie. The Social-Democratic press has given an open, clear and all-round exposition of *all* its views, whereas the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Committee of the Trudovik Group have made no independent statement whatever on the question of agreements. The keynote is set by the Social-Democrats. The modification of their socialist views, of their class standpoint, is quite out of the question. When it comes to distributing the seats no one will think of offering them the smaller share. Their campaign in the workers' curia is proceeding quite independently, and is proving their preponderance.

Under such circumstances it would be simply absurd to be afraid to lead our revolutionary petty-bourgeois allies into battle against the Cadets. Under such circumstances we could even draw the Popular Socialists with us if the occasion required it. The principles of our Party would not suffer from this in the least: the political line would remain the same and the struggle against the leading party of the liberal-bourgeois conciliators would be waged with no less vigour. No sensible person would say that we were following the Popular Socialists (in conceding to them, together with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Committee of the Trudovik Group, two seats out of six). On the contrary, it would be proof that the Social-Democrats were conducting a *really* independent campaign, and that we had *deprived* the Cadets of one of their appendages. Is it not obvious that if the semi-Cadets came on our list, their mobilisation against the Cadets would not merely not prejudice, but would, on the contrary, facilitate the task of fighting the latter?

The Conference of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation acted rightly in declaring *openly* and publicly its hostility towards the Popular Socialists. It was our duty to warn the revolutionary Trudoviks against *such* a pseudo-Trudovik party. If the revolutionary Trudoviks are

dependent on the Popular Socialist Party, which is formally an entirely independent party, let them say so publicly. It is most important for us to drag this fact into the light of day, to make them admit it, and to draw *all* the conclusions that follow from it in our agitation among the mass of the workers, among the whole people.

Whether we get Trudoviks of a better or worse quality as our allies in the fight against the Cadets in St. Petersburg, is a question that we shall decide in a purely practical way. We have formulated our principles. *In any case* we shall go into the fight independently. We have openly disclaimed responsibility for the least reliable Trudoviks and placed this responsibility on others.

* * *

The Left Cadets on *Tovarishch* tried to ridicule the Bolsheviks when the latter declared, as early as November, that three main parties were contending against each other in St. Petersburg: the Black Hundreds, the Cadets, and the Social-Democrats.

Rira bien qui rira le dernier (he who laughs last laughs best).

Our forecast has been proved correct.

There will be *three* lists for the Duma elections in St. Petersburg: the Black-Hundred, the Cadet and the Social-Democratic.

Citizens, make your choice!

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